IR 05000369/1990015
| ML20059K676 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059K672 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-90-15, 50-370-90-15, NUDOCS 9009240160 | |
| Download: ML20059K676 (13) | |
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UNITE 3 STATES p RtIg'o -
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NUCLEAR nEGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
- t ATL ANT A, GEORCl A 30323
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Report'Nos.: 50-369/90-15 and 50-370/90-15
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Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street Charlotte.-AC 28201-1007 l
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' Docket Nos.: '50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: HPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 a
l'nspection Conducted: August 13-17, 1990 Inspector:
Nr 8
/7 8 ND E. D. Testa.-
Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:
G. Arthur A. Herdt S. Ninh-b 9!7!9
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Approved by: M a I t L M 10 ~
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W. H. Rankin, Chief ~
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Emergency Preparedness Section.
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Emergency Preparedness and Radiological l
Protection Branch
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Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY-Scope:
This-routine, announced inspection was to observe ' and evaluate. the - annual emergency exercise.
State and local-government participation was limited to communication of emergency notification messages.
The licensee's Crises.
Management Center -did not participate.
A separate medical drill was held involving transportation. of a-contaminated, injured (simulated) patient to the hospital.
Results:
' Within~ the areas evaluated,. one non-cited violation involving a procedure inadequacy for sampling reactor coolant.for Radio-Iodine determination will-be j
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discussed in the resident's monthly report (50-369/90-17 and 50-370/90.17) and; no-deviations were identified.
One exercise weakness was identified involving the Operational Support Center's lack of-control' and direction: to emergency teams (Paragraph 8).
9009240160 900910 PDR ADOCK 05000369 G
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During the inspection Unit 2 declared a real Notification of Unusual Event due
to ' unidentified leakage exceeding the Technical Specification Limit of-1.0 -gallons - per minute.
The classification. and initial and followup
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notifications were correct and timely and performed as specified in the
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procedure.
identified in the licensee's emergency following (strengths were1) use of the simulator allowed full play in a control room
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organization:
atmosphere with a plant experiencing a casualty, (2) effective exercise critique and self identification of items needing improvement, and (3) the
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Emergency Coordinator and Technical Support Center staff were very knowledgeable and operated as a smoothly functioning team.
Within the scope of the observed exercise, the licensee fully demonstrated the
capability of implementing its Emergency Plan and procedures to provide for the i
health and safety of the public in a radiological emergency.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- S. Adams, Director, Energy Explorium
- G. Addis, Superintendent, Station Services
- S. Bean IAE Superintendent
- J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
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- W. Davis, Manager, Computer Services
- E.~Estep. Station Services
- G. Gilbert, Superintendent, Technical Services
'*B. Hasty, Production Specialist II.
- R. Harris, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Planning
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- J. Jenkins, Operations-Coordinator
- C, Jennings, Station Emergency Planner, Oconee
- J. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner
- T. McConnell.. Station Manager
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- L. McKenzie, Nuclear Station Instructor
-*W. McRee, Nuclear Emergency Planner g~
M. Sample.-Superintendent of Maintenance
- H. Sloan, Radiation Protection-
- D Simpson, Nuclear Emergency Planner
- B. Travi.s', Superintendent of Operations Other' licensee employees contacted during this' inspection included craftsmen,- engineers, operators, - mechanics, security force members,
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technicians, and administrative personnel.
. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission
- T.' Cooper, Resident Inspection
- D. Hood, Project-Manager, Licensing
- Attended exit interview
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ExerciseScenario-(82302)
- The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that f provisions had been made to test an integrated emergency response:
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capability as well as the basic elements existing -within the licensee.
-State and local Emergency Plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E Paragraph IV.F and~ specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed 'in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed with members of the licensee's staff.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate-to exercise the onsite emergency i
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. organizations of the licensee.
The final exercise data and necessary packag6s were distrib'ut*d during a pre-exercise licensee briefing held
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LAugust 14, 1990. - No prongting or undue interaction between controllers t
and. players was observed dudng the exercise.
On August 14, 1990 a separate ' medical, drill was belo involving simulated injuries to three personnel.. The Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) consisting of security personnel assisted by Health Physics personnel responded and i
provided first aid, stabilized and packaged the injured individuals and-
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turned the patients over to Mecklenburg County Emergency Medical Service and North Mecklenburg Rescue Squad.
During a pre-drill discussion, the inspector determined that the Safety Department understood that contaminated patients would not be accepted for transport by the Carolina Medical Center Emergency Flight Services and had so. trained the MERT teams.
The Emergency Planning group in procedure RP/0/A/5700/05, Enclosure 4.1. Item 4.3.8, list Carolina Medical Center Emergency Flight Services. as a contact point for transporting patients.
This inconsistency in knowledge between the Safety Department and Emergency Planning Group about the use of the Emergency Flight. Service for injured contaminated patients was identified as an Inspector. Followup Item (IFI).
IFI 50-369, 370/90-15-01:
Failure to define and understand the use of.
Carolina Medical Center Emergency Flight Services for transporting contaminated injured patients.
No violations or deviation.e were identified.
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AssignmentofResponsibility(82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities: for
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emergency response by the -licensee had been specifically established and t
that adequate staff was-available to respond-to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.A and' specific
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criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency. assignments had been made-for the licensee's. emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated erergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives.-
The scenario did not require long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response ' organization to be demonstrated.
The licensee
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demonstrated. a strong: commitment to training shown'. by the number. of
alternates participating in key positions during the exercise.
The inspector cbserved the activecion, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the C'sntrol Room, ' Technical Support Center (TSC), and the Operational Suppr rt Center (OSC). Staffing and activation s
were both timely and effective in the TSC and OSC.
The assignment of responsibility at each of the facilities were consistent with the
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licensee's Emergency Plan ant. implementing procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
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The-licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that
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the following requirements were implemented pursuant.to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance' promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident
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response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite.and offsite support organization interactions.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization.was.
adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional
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positions within the organization.
Augmentation of the initia. emergency i
response organizations was accomplished through mobilizations of additional day-shift personnel.
The Shift Supervisor (at the Simulator)
assigned to the exercise assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator
.promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the-
- response until formally relieved by the Plant Manager.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Classification. System (82301)
This area was observed'to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section 11.0 of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.
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Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure No. RP/0/A/5700/00 titled
" Classification of Emergency" was used to promptly identify and properly-classify the scenario' simulated events.
The Alert, and Site Area Emergency classifications were timely and correct by procedure. The Alert-was declared at about 11:40 a.m. due to primary coolant leakage greater than 50 gpm.
The Site Area Emergency declat 'ition was made at about 1:00 p.m. due to a Steam Generator tube leak with an unisolable steam line
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break outside containment and indication of fuel damage, i
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel,. and that the content of initial and followup
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messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure.
pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50,
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Appendix E.
Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedure had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated
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emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations
and~ to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
Notification of -the State and designated local offsite organizations were completed within 15 minutes following(ANS) for alerting the declaration of the emergency
event. The Alert Notification System
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the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ was not actuated
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during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Communications (82301)
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This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for_ prompt i
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comrunications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communication existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities.
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No violations or deviations were. identified.
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Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
-This area was observed to determine that adequat'e emergency facilities and equipment to support an emerg)ency response are provided and maintained as -
i required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.E, and lL, specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
L The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the'
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emergency response facilities.
No major equipment deficiencies were i
observed.
Facilities observed by the NRC evaluation team included:
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Control Room (Simulator) - The exercise control room'was established l
outside the main Control Room in the simulator at the training
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center. The inspector observed that following review and analysis of-l _~
the sequence of accident events, control room operation's personnel acted promptly to initiate required response to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were available and followed. -.The designated Exercise Shift Supervisor evaluated the significance of each degradation in plant conditions and quickly and continuously prioritized repair activities.
The Shift Supervisor and Senior -
Reactor Operator in the Control Room for the medical drill held on August 14, 1990 performed exceptionally well.
Both the simulator
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g shift personnel and-the control room personnel followed procedures.
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Command and control was demonstrated in a quiet competent manner, b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC manager demonstrated
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effective command and control providing periodic informative
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briefings on plant status to the TSC staff.
The facility staff -
F appeared to be cognizant of their duties, authorities and-responsibilities.
The TSC manager conducted an.in-depth detailed discussion concerning the-possibilities. of upgrading the
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classification of the event to General Emergency; however, after
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obtaining all the options and evaluating them decided that-the upgrade was not warranted.
This was a correct decision based on the exercise scenario, c.
Operational Support Center (0SC) - The inspector observed that j
following the request for activation, personnel responded promptly to l
staff the facility.
The-inspector observed that, although simulated
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plant conditions warranted health physics actions, there were no step off pads or frisking stations established to preclude the spread of
contamination when the teams returned from their work jobs to the
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OSC.
The inspector also observed that checks for contamination in the OSC, TSC or connecting hallways were not performed. Teams being dispatched were not controlled by Radiation Work Permits or D
Maintenance Work Orders. Team briefings were done orally (no written j
records were produced).
The briefings did not include a discussion
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of what to expect, use of anti-C's, communication requirements to and from teams-if conditions should unexpectedly change.
Team nembers were not instructed on dose exposure limits or other hold points.
The use of respiratory protection was-not discussed in the briefings.
Although the licensee identified a number of these items, the overall poor control and team management practices exhibited in the OSC were identified as an exercise weakness.
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1 Exercise Weakness (50-369, 370/90-15-02:
Iailure of the OSC to
adequately manage and control teams.
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Crisis Management Center (CMC) - This facility was not activated i
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during this small scale exercise.
L No violations or deviations were identified.
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AccidentAssessment(82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual -or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required-by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B. and specific criteria:in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
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The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of
plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and-l
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offsite personnel. resulting from the accident.
Both programs appeared
effective during this exercise in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations >to the Emergency Coordinator concerning mitigating actions j
to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials, and to terminate the emergency condition. -
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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10. ProtectiveResponses(82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions
'during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, -including
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evacuating of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as i
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
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Section.II.J.
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An inspec. tor verified that the licensee had developed and implemented emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations -
(PARS) for offsite population.within the 10 mile EPZ. The licensee's PARS
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.were consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other
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Although the exercise events did not progress to a' General Emergency Classification, an extensive discussion concerning the: options-of evacuating people and the time required to implement that decision occurred-in the TSC.
The inspector observed that site accountability was completed within the 30 minute' goal..The alarm and Public. Address announcements were audible
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in the TSC 0SC, and the' hallway connecting the two facilities.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exercise Critique (82301)
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The' licensee's_ critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
' determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the ~ licensee's emergency response organization were
formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR'50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N The -licensee conducted a series of post-exercise critiques' on August 15
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and August 16, 1990.
Critiques were held with players, controllers, and'
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management.. The management critique was attended by exercise controllers, observers, and NRC representatives.
Findings identified dur4 g the exercise and plans for corrective action were discussed.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive deficiencies 'and planned improvement items.
The conduct of the critique
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Action on Previous Inspector Finding (92701).
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(Closed) Violation 50-369, 370/89-38-01:
Failure to conduct a periodic test in accordance with procedure PT/0/A/4600/79.
The inspector reviewed.
records showing that the functional check of the emergency boat was added
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to the test program on January 1, 1990.
The latest equipment functional l
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check was completed on July 11, 1990.
(Closed) Violation 50-369,370/89-38-03:- Failure to provide notifications I
to State / local agencies in accordance with RP/0/A/5700/01. The inspector.
reviewed the training records of Control Room Senior Reactor Operators,
Reactor Operator and Shif t Support personnel.
Training classes were
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conducted on January 10, 1990, January 13,1990,. January 16, 1990 and-
January 18,1990.
A total of thirty four persons were trained.in the completion and transmission of ' the Emergency Notification Form.
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inspector observed the exercise and a real declaration of Notification of.
Unusual-Event during the inspection and found no difficulties.
s (Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-369, 370/89-39-01:. Shift Supervisor failed
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to demonstrated the responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator.
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. inspector observed the medical drill conducted on August 14, 1990, and the
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Exercise on August 15, 1990 and the Shift Log for the real Notification-of
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Unusual Event on August 16, 1990.
The Shift Supervisor satisfactorily:
i demonstrated the responsibilities of Emergency Coordinator.
(Paragraph 8(a)).
(Closed) IFI 50-369, i*0/89-38-02:
Complete the. update to the tone-alert L
radio distribution lists.
The ' inspector reviewed the tone. alert radio -
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inventory list generated on August 14, 1990. _The data base included the l tone alert radio serial number, name of the individual, address, contact '
name and. telephone number, type of activity at that location,. the year, L
town and and county. There were a total of 74 records in the data file.
H (Closed) IFI 50-369, 370/89-39-03:
Revise Section 2.2.1.2 of procedures l
RP/0/A/5700/04 for consistency with enclosure 4.5 to procedure.
The inspector reviewed the procedure and found that the inconsistency no.
longer existed in the new revision to theLprocedure.
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13. Exit Interview n
The-inspection scope and results were summarized on August 16, 1990, with
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those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
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Licensee management was informed that two violations, one exercise
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weakness and two IFIs (listed in Paragraph 12) were considered closed.
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= Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number-Description and Referenced
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50-369,370/90-15-01 IFI - Failure to-define and understand; the use of Carolina Medical Center-Emergency Flight Service for transporting contaminated. injured patients (Paragraph 2).
50-369,370/90-15-02-Exercise Weakness - Failure of the OSC-l
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to adequately manage and control teams l
(Paragraph 8).
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