IR 05000369/1990017
| ML20059L565 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1990 |
| From: | Cooper T, Son Ninh, Shymlock M, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059L563 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-90-17, 50-370-90-17, A-370-90-17, NUDOCS 9009270125 | |
| Download: ML20059L565 (10) | |
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NUCLEAR REGUL.ATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET N.W.
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Report Nos. 50-369/90-17 and 50-370/90-17 Licensee: Duke Power Company
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'P.O. Box 1007 Charlotte, NC 28201-1007 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2-Docket Nos.:-50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.:
NPF-9 and NPF-17 Inspection Conducte : Ju y 26 990 August 28, 1990 Inspectors:
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Date Signed Approved by:
fMy 8.-//- 90 M. B. Shymlpg4, Section Chief Date Signed Division of4 eactor Projects 5UMMARY Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted on site inspecting in the areas of plant operations safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, facility modifications, follow-up-on previous inspection findings, and follow-up of event reports.
- Results
In the areas inspected, one weakness, a second exanspie of a previous violation and two non-cited violations were identified.
The first
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non-cited violation involved an inadequate reactor coolant sampling
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procedure during emergencies (paragraph 4).
The second non-cited violation involvod failure to red mark a drawing regarding a temporary modification (pa agraph 5.b.).
The weakness involved unclear guidance'
and inconsistent documentation for temporary modification evaluations (paragraph 5.c.).
A'second example of a previous violation involved closure of inlet valves rendering control room ventilation inoperable-(paragraph 2.e.).
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I REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted 1.icensee Employees G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager
- A. Beaver, Operations Coordinator
- J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager J. Foster, Station Health Physicist D. Franks. QA Yerification Manager
- G. Gilbert Superintendent of Technical Services
- C. Hendrix, Maintenance Engineering Services Manager
- L. Kunka, Compliance Engineer
- T. Mathews, Site Design Engineering Manager
- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
- R. Michael, Station Chemist
- D. Murdock, McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager
- T. Pederson, Compliance Engineer R. Pierce, IAE Engineer W. Reeside Operations Engineer R. Rider Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
- M. Sample, Superintendent of. Maintena ice
- R. Sharpe, Compliance Manager
- J. Snyder Performance En-ineer J. Silver, Unit 2 Operations Manager A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman
- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations 0ther licensee employees contacted included craf tsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
PlantOperations(71707,71710)
a '.
The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.
Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment. removal and restoration records were routinely reviewed.
Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at' shift changes.
Actions and/or activities observed were condJcted as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives.
The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded.the minimum required by Technical Specifications (TS).
The inspectors also reviewed Problem Inve:,tigation Reports to determine whether the l
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licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
b.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not
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limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekaeping, fire protection, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
On August 5, 1990, while touring the Auxiliary Building 767 elevation, the inspector noted several discrepancies on the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary isolation valve test panel.
These discrepancies included no lighted indications for Valve Nos. 2N1-11, 2NI-13, ?41-72, 1NI-69, IN1-79, 1NI-153, IN1-92, 1NI-163, and 1NI-130-and the safety injection test line flow on Unit 2 indicated 7 gallons
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per minute (gpm) instead of 0 gpm. These discrepancies were brought to the control room shift supervisor's attention.
As a result, the
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burned out light bulbs for 9 valves were replaced and WR# 192712 was
issued to investigate the test line flow gauge indication.
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c.
Unit 1 Operations The unit began the inspection at 100 percent power.
On August 7, 1990, the unit oegan load reduction to 15 percent power to allow
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containment entry to investigate a high containment temperature problem.
The result of the entry revealed that there was some
leakage of dry boron from D reactor coolant pump (NCP) #3 seal.
On August 8,1990, the unit reduced load to 12 percent power for i
additional containment entry to evaluate D NCP #3 seal and clean Lower Containment Cooling (VL) A & B Air Handling Units.
As the result of the evaluation, the unit began shutdown to Mode 3 for
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l repair of D NCP #3 seal.
On August 11, 1990, the unit returned to 100 percent power. At 11:22 a.m.,
on August 26,1990 a - Unit 1 l
Containment Vantilation isolation occurred due to a containment l
radiation monitor, IEMF-30, trip 2 actuation.- Radiation Protection personnel performed sampliq in containmer,t and detected an increase in containment particulate activity.
At 5:30 p.m.,
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personnel made the determination that-the event was an increase in particulate activity and not Reactor Coolant leakage.
The
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notification r,f the NRC of the Engineered Safety Features (EST)
actuation was made at 5:44 p.m.
Primary Coolant sampling revealed no increase in fuel damage.
Earlier reports of increased Iodine activity were incorrect.
No increase in lodine activity was noted.
Licensee procedure PT/1/A/4150/01B, Reactor Coolant Leakage Calculation, was completed at 10:40 p.m.
Calculated leakage was 2.615 gpm, with a Technical Specification limit of 1.0 gpm.
A confirmatory leakage calculation was completed at 00:24 a.m.,
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August 27, 1990, with a calculated unidentified ledkage at 1.954 gpm.
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Inspections performed in the accessible areas of containment did not reveal any obvious leaks.
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the unit coarnenced shutdown per TS 3.4.6.1, and entered a Notification of Unusual Event based on that shutdown.
The unit shutdown at a rate of approximately 25% thermal power per hour.
At 09:53 a.m., the unit was taken off-line and Mode 3 was entered at
10:13 a.m.
Inspections following shutdown revealed two valves on ' top of the
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pressurizer with packing leaks, INC-33, Pressurizer PORY lsolation Valve and 1NC-252 Pressurizer Shutdown Instrumentation Reference Leg Isolation Valve.
Work Requests were. issued to repair these leaks.
INC-33 was backseated, since the valve could not be disassembled
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while the unit was pressurized. The backseating of the valve reduced
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unidentified leakage to within Technical Specification limits and the
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Unusual. Event was terminated at 00:30 a.m.
The associated PORV was isolated with power removed.
Additional review of the event i
disclosed that the isolation was not an ESF.
Had the event been an ESF the NRC report would have been late.
The licensee also noted
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that they had failed to provide one of the 4-hour update reports (10:00 a.m.) to the states.
The licensee was cautioned regarding
late reporting and was also cautioned regarding the inaccurate. report of an lodine increase.
The unit commenced start-up following the completion of the repairs.
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d.
Unit 2 Operations The unit began the inspection at 100 percent power.
On August 3, 1990, the unit commenced load reduction to 10 percent power to allow containment entry to add oil for 2 A NCP. On August 5, 1990, the unit returned to 100 percent power. On August 16,.1990, the unit' declared an unusual event for approximately 91/2 hours due to Reactor Coolant ('4C) system unidentified leakage greater than.1.0 gpm and a load reduction was initiated.
Subsequently, the unit was taken off line to comply with the TS action statement for NC system leakage.
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fe feral, state, and counties were properly notified in a timely manner.
The procedures were properly implemented during the event.
The unit rebarned to 100 percent power on August 17, 1990 and remained on line at the end of the inspection period.
e.
Control Room Venti'ation System On August 19, 1989 the licensee issued an Operability Evaluation (JC0-8915) for the Control Room Ventilation (VC) system.
This evaluation required all outside air intakes (eight valves, two valves per intake) to be. maintained open to meet Technical Specification L
pressurization requirements for both trains of VC due to a design l
deficiency.
A special order was also issued to operators describing
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the requirement for all valves to be open.
On August 2, 1990, the
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inspector conducted a visual walkdown of control room panels of Unit 1 and Unit 2.
During the walkdown of the VC system, the inspector discovered that Unit 2 outside Air intake valves (1VC-9A, 10A,11B, and 12 B) were in the closed position at 6:50 a.m.
The discrepancy was brought to the control room shift supervisor's attention and these valves were immediately reopened at 6:55 a.m.
An investigation revealed that radiation monitor EMF 43B had a loss of sample flow at 6:39 a.m.
The operator had successfully restored the
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sample flow and received no indication of high radiation on EMF 43B.
However, the EMF data computer printout indicated a false high radiation on EMF 43B immediately upon restoring of the sample flow.
A WR was written to investigate the loss of sample flow on EMF 43B and closing of the outside air valves.
As a result. the licensee could not determine the root cause of the false high radiation signal
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which closed the valves.
10CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (iii) (d) requires that this event be reported to NRC within four hours of the occurrence of the situation which, in this instance, was considered to be the time the valves were found closed. The-valves were found closed at 6:50 a.m. on August 2, 1990, but the situation was not reported until 5:14 p.m. on August 2,1990.
This is considered another example of Violation 369,370/90-11-07 which the licensee had not yet responded to when this situation was discovered.
One violation was identified.
3.
SurveillanceTesting(61726)
Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the-inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance
with applicable Technical Specifications.
p Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved l
procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were me;, that system restoration was
I completed and acceptance criteria were me'..
m Detailed below are selected tests whi.n were either reviewed or witnessed:
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PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT / TEST
PT/0/A/4350/28B 125 V Vital Battery Quarterly Performance Test (EVCD)
PT/1/A/4252/02B CA Valve Stroke Timing - IB Motor Driven
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Pump Flow Path PT/1/A/4252/18A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 A Discharge Pressure Verification i
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PT/1/A/4403/02A RN Train 1A Valve Stroke Timing Quarterly PT/2/A/4403/02A RN Train 2A Valve Stroke Timing Quarterly PT/2/A/4457/002A YX Train A Valve Stroke Timing Quarterly PT/2/A/4457/002B VX Train B Valve Stroke Timing Quarterly PT/1/A/4150/001B Reactor Coolant Leakage Calculation PT/1/A/4253/02B CF Train B Valve Stroke Timing Quarterly 4.
Emergency Exercise (82301)
On August 14, 1990, the NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's emergency exercise scenario and quettioned the plant staff as to how they would.
obtain or calculatt the percentage of fuel damage in order to evaluate entering a General Emergency classification.
The inspectors noted that McGuire procedure OP/0/A/6550/17 Estimate of = Failed Fuel based on 1-131 Concentration, requires that a chemistry sample of the Reactor Coolant (NC) System be obtained to determine the 1-131 concentration. The results of the 1-131 conc.ntration level in the NC system estimates the amount of the failed fuel.
During the emergency drill, the licensee discovered that NC loop sampling values (NM-22A, C; NM-25 A.C; NM 26B) were closed upon a Phase A isolation initiation and these valves could not be opened until the operators reset the initiation.
A licensee drill controller noted that an NC sample actually could be obtained during Phase A isolation by placing these valves in byaass using a Control Room switch.
However, McGuire proceriures OP/1 ant 2/A/6200/063, Nuclear Sampling system, were inadequate-in that they did not provide guidance to bypass isolated NC sampling valves. during.the Phase A isolation in order to obtain an NC sample.
These issues were identified at the licensee drill critique.. It could be argued that the controller would not have discovered the problem if the NRC question had not been asked.
However, drill players did independently recognize the sampling problem without knowle' je of the NRC's question and therefore the licensee is given credit for identifying this problem.
The inability to obtain an NC sample prevents the timely estimate of the core damage in a postulated event and entering the General Emergency classification in a timely manner.
This item is considered a Non-Cited Violation 369,370/90-17-01:
Inadequate Reactor Coolant Sampling Procedure During Emergencies.
This Licensee identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
5.
Maintenance Observation, (62703)
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Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
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6 The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and maintenance results were adequate.
Activity Work Request Perform PM/PT Channel 09409B PT Calibration on Condenser Air Ejector Radiation Monitor 2 EMF 33 Investigate Light Indication 89262 PRF Problem on 2KCIA Perform PM on Component 01252C PM Cooling Pump and Motor 2A1 Perform PM on Component 01253C PM Cooling Pump and Motor 2A2 Perfonn PM/PT Channel 06642B PT Calibration on Spent Fuel Building vent Radiation Monitor 1 EMF-42 Investigate / Repair 89296 PRF Detector F Moveable incore Detector System Perform PM/PT on S/G A 08434B PT Feedwater Flow Channel 1 Perform PM/PT Functional 01538C PT Test and Calibration of Containment Hydrogen Analyzer 1A Train Perform PM on Motor Driven 01543C PM Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A Disconnect and Reconnect 953772 SSD SV-2320 and Rework Associated
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Circuitry Per NSM 502270/00 Train B l
Disconnect and Reconnect 953774 SSD
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SV-2460 and Rework Associated l
Circuitry Per NSM 5-2270/06 Train B 1-
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Perform PM/PT on Rotork 08536A PT Actuator b.
Control Room Drawings During a review of Temporary Modification (TM) No. 6078, 2 A D/G Room Damper #DSF-20, the inspector noted the control room drawing for this TM was not red marked or referenced in Section 4.0 of the TM Work Request Addendum as required.
The discrepancy was brought to the attention of the TM coordinator and control room shift supervisor.
As a result the licensee took immediately action to red-mark the affected control room drawing and reference the tirawing number in Section 4.0 of the TM Work Request Addendum.
Section 5.1.1.2 of procedure Station Directive 4.4.2, Control of Temporary Modifications, states that drawings that are affected by the change shall be red marked clearly and included in the TM documentation package.
Failure of the licensee to follow the plant approved procedure is identified as non-cited violation 370/90-17-02:
Failure to Follow Procedure for Red Marking Drawings.
This NRC identified (
violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.A. of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
c.
Technical Evaluation of Temporary Modifications The inspector also noted that directions in Station Directive 4.4.2, Section 2.0, Technical Evaluation, of the TM Work Request Addendum were confusing to the qualified designer and qualified design verifier for the completion of evaluations.
A question was asked in Section 2.0 whether the following items (i.e. T.S. requirements, seismic requirements, appendix A requirements, structural require-ments) had been considered and incorporated, if applicable.
The answer was either yes or N/A. These directions were not clear. The answer can be either yes or N/A and is still correct, depending on the interpretation.
For example, TM-WR# 14154, Remove 1 CFF 5030 Foxboro Transmitter and Associated Power Supply Capu.itor and Installed New Rosemount Transmitter, was checke5 all yes and other a
Some.adividuals interpreted
TMs were checked some yes and some N/A.
a yes answer to indicate that they had performed the evaluation while the intent is to check yes if the requirements have been
incorporated.
Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that appropriate evaluations had been accomplished.
The licensee was informed of the weakness in the procedure.
The procedure is being revised to clarify the directions.
This item is considered an IFl 369,370/90-17-03:
Weakness in Procedural Guidance for Completing Technical Evaluation of Temporary Modifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-up (90712,92700)
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The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine
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if the infonnation provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements
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satisfied, and-the relative safety significance of each event. Additional
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inplant reviews and dis:Ussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
369/90-04, Rev. 1 Holes left in Auxiliary Shutdown Panel in Violation of TS 369/90-14, Rev. 1 Both Trains of the Control Room Ventilation System Were Inoperable Because of a Procedure Deficiency (Violation Issued in Report 369,370/90-11)
369,90-15 TS 3.0.3 Entered for Inoperable Power Range.
Nuclear Instrumentation During Power Escalation 369/90-18 A Dummy Control Rod Assembly was Moved With the Fuel Pool Ventilation System Inoperable (Violation issaed in Report 369,370/90-13)
- 370/90-02 Seven Day TS furveillance of the Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Missed 7.
Fitness For Duty During an inspection of the licensee's Fitness For Duty Program (see Catawba Station Report No. 50-413, 414/90-20) a review of an incident l
relating to the McGuire Station was conducted.
The incident involved a licensed operator having been indicted by the Federal Grand Jury on drug l.
trafficking charges.
The licensee eventually terminated the operator for f ailing to inform management of the indictment s - required by the
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licensee's Fitness For Duty procedures. The operator had been informed on
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July 6 that a drug test would be administered on July 9; the test proved L
negative, one of the " lessons learned" from this event was not to notify individuals well in advance of a for-cause test.
On July 25 during the Catawba / General Office inspection, the NRC verified the operator's access at all three facilities had been voided.
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Followup on Previous Insection Findings (Closed) IFI 370/87 40-02, PORV Correction Closure force for the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) is provided by spring force end air pressure.
Since the air pressure was supplied by a non-qualified sy:tm the licensee has prepared a design modification, number NSM-MG-22102, to provids a seismically and thermally
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qualified air (nitrogen) supply to these valves. This procedure provides instructions for installing new instrument air tubing between the PORVs
and a qualified air supply, the cold leg safety injection accumulator.
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The procedure specifies installation prerequisites, limits and precautions, and the installation steps. The licensee will implement this modification during;the upcoming Fall 1990 refueling outage.
9.
ExitInterview(30703)
The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on August 28, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The following items were discussed in detail:
A second example of a previous violation (paragraph 2.e.)
Non-Cited Violation 369,370/90-17-01:
Inadequate Reactor Coolant Sampling Procedure During Emergencies (paragraph 4)
Non-Cited Violation 370/90-17-02:
Failure to follow Procedure for Red MarkingDrawings(paragraph 5)
Inspector Followup Item (369,370/90-17-03: Weakness in Procedure Guidance for Completing Technical Evaluation of Temporary Modifications (paragraph 5.c.)
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of their inspection.
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