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Insp Repts 50-369/97-19 & 50-370/97-19 on 971205-06. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Response to 971202 Event Involving Seal Damage Event at Four Air Lock Doors of Unit 2 Containment Bldg
	ML20199B164
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	01/05/1998
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20199B133	List: ML20199B131; ML20199B157; ML20199B164;
References
	50-369-97-19, 50-370-97-19, NUDOCS 9801280193
	Download: ML20199B164 (14)
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION 11 ,

Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50 370

License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17

Report Nos.: 50-369/97-19, 50-370/97-19

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Licensee: Duke Energy Company (DEC)

Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.

Huntersville, NC 28078

Dates: December 5-6, 1997

Inspector: W. W. Stansberry. Safeguards Specialist

Approved by: G. Belisle, Chief

Special Inspection Branch

, Division of Reactor Safety

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9001280193 900105

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. i

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McGuire Nuclear-Station.- Units 1 and 2-

1NRC InspectiorLReport_Nos.--50-369/97-19 and 50 370/97-19

.A Chronological Sequence of Events was established for the December 2. 1997.

seal damage event at the four air lock doors of Unit 2 Containment Building. 3'

The chronology of events is documented in Attachment A-.to this report.

A list-of documents reviewed during this inspections is documented in

Attachment B to this report.

Overall. the licensee's response to the Dece.nber 2.1997, seal damage event

was' adequate. The licensee *s reportability of the event to the NRC was not in. ,

accordance with regulatory requirements. The licensee's initial evaluation .

has concluded that the seal-damage was perpetrated by an individual (s) who had

" authorized unescorted access to the-site.

The inspector concurred with the investigation team's conclusion that the act

of damaging the seals at the Unit-2. upper and lower containment access doors

did not compromise-the current safe operation of plant systems. (Section-

02.1.1)

Based on-independent-reviews of the documentation by the NRC and the ,

licensee's inspections and walk-down of the plant.. it was concluded at the

time of the inspection that there may not be any other examples specifically

- related to the seal puncturing events. -(Section 02.1.2)

Site management drafted an adequate plan to pursue identification of the

-individual (s) who vandalized the seals and identification of any additional

potential tampering with plant equipment. As of the end of the inspection. -it

.was concluded that vandalizing the seals ~had occurred and that the most likely

. individual (s) involved had authorized access to.the protected area and vital

, -areas. However. .to date.- a suspect has not been identified. (Section 02.1.3)

Management started actions to enhance detection of additional vandalism with

patrols and extra posting of security officers at the airlock doors. The

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licensee intends to maintain the posted security officers to detect or deter

, future tampering during the outage. (Section 02.1.4)

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The licensee-3rovided appropriate and adequate support for the Investigation

' Team'establisled to investigate-the facts and circumstances surrounding'this

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' event.. The~ Investigation Team was-reviewing the event and other previous

events to ensure that any potential tampering events hao been fully evaluated,

. ..TheLinvestigation is continuing. : The Region II Physical Security staff is

Econtinuing to; monitor the investigation. ~(Section S1.3)

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<The licensee was:in compliance with the Physical: Security. Plan. Safeguards

Contingency Plan.. and: implementing-procedures and directives with respect to

responding.to'a tampering or vandalism event. (Section S1.4)

The licensee failed to make the required one hour Event Notification to the

NRC' Operations Center resulting in a violation. -(Section S3.4)

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REPORT DETAILS

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

02.1 Tamoerina Event (71707. 81700)

On December 2.1997, at approximately 1:00 a.m. , with Unit 2 in Mode 6

at the end of a refueling outage. the lower containment reactor side

airlock door failed a leak test. A visual ins)ection by engineers of

the airlock door identified one small cut on tie smaller of the two

seals on this door. No cuts were discovered on the larger seal. The

cut was assumed to have been caused by accidental contact with materials

being transported into the Unit 2 containment building. On December 3.

1997, at approximately 2:00 a.m.. Operations test group 3ersonnel

performed a leak test of Unit 2 upper containment airlocq doors and

identified failures of the smaller seals on both the auxiliary building

side and reactor side doors. At approximately 3:05 p.m. . engineers

inspected the Unit 2 upper containment airlock door seals and discovered

one small cut on the smaller seal of the auxiliary building side airlock

door. No other cuts were identified on the seals of the u)per

containment doors. Engineering personnel suspected that tie cuts were

the possible results of a deliberate act. Engineers then ordered

Operation's test group to test the Unit 2 lower auxiliary building door

seals. The smaller seal on this door also failed the leak test. On

December 4. 1997, at approximately 8:10 a.m.. the Security Manager was

notified. At approximately 8:15 a.m. , the NRC Resident Inspectors were

notified of the event. At approximately 1:00 p.m. . security Josted an

, officer at the lower and u)per containment access points. Su) sequent

tests and inspections by NRC Resident Inspectors and engineering

personnel determined that all of the eight seals had been punctured or

slashed by a sharp instrument the airlock seals. These punctures or

slashes were approximately one to two inches long and were on the hinge

side of the door seals.

02.1.1 Evaluation and Correction of Damaaed Comoonents (71707)

a. Insoection Scoce

The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the damaged airlock

seals to determine if the as-found conditions represented tampering or

vandalism.

b. Observation and Findings

The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions because of the airlock

door seals' tampering or vandalism event.

The inspector noted that the licensee's investigation team at the time

of this inspection concluded that there were no apparent safety

-implications from the act of tampering or vandalism. Five factors were

considered in determining the probability of a malevolent act:

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- The_ seals were exposed and damage could be observed upon close

. inspection.- Also, the seals would and did fail the airlock seal

integrity test which was required to be performed before the restart

of Unit 2. This suggested that the individual (s) who damaged the

seals were not trying to hide the act. A thorough search of-the area

did not reveal evidence of deliberate manipulation of any other-

equipment.

- There was no communicated threat received toward the plant or plant

equipment.

- There were no other events of this specific nature.

- The event involved a low level of sophistication. The seals could

have been punctured or slashed as a person traversed through the-

doors. The instruments capable of being used to damage the seals

were readily available to personnel working in and around

containment.

- The target selection suggested that the individual (s) may possess:

1. a poor knowledge of the plant parameters, since the damaged seals

in Mode 6 condition did not affected safety-related ecuipment: or

2. a good knowledge of restart parameters, since the camaged seals

would be discovered during airlock seal integrity testing before

start-up.

c. Conclusion

The inspector concurred with the investigation team's conclusion that

the act of damaging the seals at the Unit 2 upper and lower containment

access doors did not compromise the current safe operation of the plant.

02.1.2 Evaluation of Plant Systems for Additional Tamoerina (71707)

a. Insnection Scop _q

The inspector verified that plant safety systems had been sufficiently

evaluated for potential tampering or vandalism to assure they can

perform their intended functions,

b. Observation and Findinas

In response to the seals being damaged at Unit 2 airlock doors the

licensee did an insaection of both safety-related and nonsafety-related

systems that could lave an impact'on-the safe operation of the plant, to

assure _that the systems were intact with no signs of potential tampering

or vandalism. This walk-down also included Unit 1 vital areas-outside

containment. The licensee's investigation team will continue

independent inspections of the systems. Acceatance criteria for these

system inspections and the investigation of t11s event will be conducted

using the NRC Information Notice (IN) 83-27. " Operational Response to

Events Concerning Deliberate Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment." IN

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96-71. " Licensee Response to Indications of Tampering. Vandalism, or

Malicious Mischief." and Nuclear Security Manual Directive. " Guideline

for Security Response to Indications of Tampering. Vandalism, or

Malicious Mischief."

As of this inspection a search of the industry data base had not been

conducted using the key words " vandalism." * tampering." and " sabotage"

to reveal other instances of apparent deliberate acts. The licensee

stated that they would be conducting such searches. The purpose of a

previous similar event search would determine if previous corrective

actions were iriaffective or if previous opportunities to take corrective

actions were missed. Although actions to absolutely arevent tampering

or vandalism are generally not feasible, actions can )e taken to reduce

their probability.

Review of Previous Problem Investiaation Process (PIP) for Evidence of

Tamoerina

The licensee stated tney would be reviewing the PIPS to determine if any

other suspected issues existed that had the potential to have been

caused by tampering or vandalism. At the time of the inspection, the

PIP search had not begun,

c. Conclusion

Based on independent reviews of the documentation by the NRC and

licensee's ins)ections and walk-down of the plant, the inspector

concluded at t1e tine of this inspection that there may not be any other

examples specifically related to the seal puncturing events.

02.1.3 Site Manaaement's Resoonse to the Event

a. Insoection Scope

The inspector reviewed the actions taken by site management in

responding to the tampering or vandalism of the seals to determine if

management's response was appropriate.

b. Observation and Findinas

The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions from the failure of the

first- airlock seal leak test (December. 2.1997, approximately 1:00 a.m.)

to the end of this inspection. From the first time the engineers

suspected possible tampering or vandalism (December 3.1997,

approximately 3:05 p.m.) to the time security was notified (December 4,

1997, approximately 8:10 a.m.) 17 hours1.967593e-4 days 0.00472 hours 2.810847e-5 weeks 6.4685e-6 months had passed. Once security was

notified.- promat action was taken to draft an Airlock Doors' Seal Leak

Investigation )lan and form an investigation team. The investigation

-plan included the following:

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Notify the NRC

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- Assemble an Investigation Team

- Heighten the awareness of site security and site personnel

- Post security officers at the event areas

- . Increase security patrols

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Initiate plant inspections for similar damage

- Preserve the actual on-scene damage with digital pictures

- Preserve the damaged seals once removed from the doors for

potential analysis by Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEA)

- Notify the LLEA and Federal Bureau of Investigation

- Perform a root cause analysis or investigation by the Safety

Review Committee

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Review records of access transaction at the vital area access

points for the upper and lower containment doors

- Review human resources for any known behavioral situations that

could have instigated the event

- Review seal reliability history

Management initiated the following immediate measures:

1. Heightened presence of site management was initiated to observe key

work during the outage, protect Unit 2 from further outage tampering

or vandalism activities, and support worker morale as they perform

their outage tasks, This extra presence was to contribute to the

overall security environment provided at McGuire as a deterrent to

future random acts of vandalism.

2. Plant management conducted briefings on the event with site

personnel. The briefing requested an increased presence and

attentiveness in the field to personnel in the " wrong" area and to

'other than normal" behaviors.

3. Site security began additional patrols inside the plant and near

outage areas.

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c. Conclusions

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Site management drafted an adequate plan to pursue identification of the

individual (s) who vandalized the seals and to identify _ ar.y additional

potential problems with plant equipment. As of the end of the

inspection, plant management concluded that vandalizing the seals had

occuired and that the most likely individual (s) involved had authorized

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access to the protected and vital areas. Huwever, to date. a suspect

has not been identified.

02.1.4 Imolementation of Interim Action To Detect Other Vandalism (8)f2(!1

a. Insoection Scooe

Determine if adequate interim actions were started to detect any new

events of vandalism,

b. Observation and Findinas

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After the seal damage event was discovered, the licensee took the

following actions to detect new vandalism:

- Posteu the access points to Unit 2 containment to preserve the scene

- Established additional prott.cted and vital area patrols to preserve

the integrity of essential plant systems

- Continud to have Safety Review. Operations. Engineering, and Security

conduct inspections of all Unit 1 and 2 vital areas and safety-

related equipment

- Limited access to the vital areas, especially Unit 2 containment

during the outage

- Continued to conduct plant walk-downs / inspections by Operations.

Engineering, and NRC Resident Inspectors using the NRC's ins and

licensee's Nuclear Security Manual's " Guidance for Security Response

to' Indications of Tampering. Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief" as

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guidance

c. Conclusion

Management started actions to enhance detection of additional vandalism

with pattois and extra posting of security officers at the airlock

doors. The licensee intends to maintain the posted security officers to

detect or deter future tampering during the outage.

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities

S1.3 Security Investication of the Event

a. InsoectjDn Scone (81020_1

The insnector evaluated the-degree of the licrosce 3 management support

-and implementation of tne Investigation Teaa. This evaluation was to

determine if the licensee appropriately assigned, analyzed and set

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ariorities for the team's investigative action to reach a cr'iclusion

7 pased on tacts and make' recommendations at the conclusion of the

investigation.

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b. Observation and Findinas

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By the end of this inspection, the licensee had drafted an Investigation l

Plan and organ 17.ed an Investigation Team. The Security Manager was

designated as the team leader. There were four other members on the

team. The Safety Review i. ember will be responsible for the root cause l

investigation. The Security member will be responsible for conducting !

the security investigation. The Engineering member will be responsible

for coordinating the engineering investigations. lhe Operations member

will be responsiblo for corroleting the Operations Checklist. The team's

objective was to investigat the facts and circumstances surrounding the

airlock doors' seal tarpering or vandalism event, reach a conclusion-

based on the facts as t7ey were discovered, and make appro)riate

recommendations at the conclusion of the investigation. T7e team was

authorized to interview any person associated with the McGuire site

during this investigation and review any records or physical evidence

that may lead to the root cause of the event. Licensee's management

exhibited an awareness and favorable attitude toward this investigation

and the team. As of the end of this inspection, the Investigation Team

had no information that could lead to the identification of the

individual (s) responsible for the damaged seals.

c. Can_clgli_qn

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The inspector found that the licensee rovided ap3ropriate and adequate

support for the Investigation Team which was esta)lished to investigate

the facts and circumstances surrounding this event. The Investigation

Team was reviewing the event and other previous events to ensure that

any potential tampering events had been fully evaluated. The

investigation is ccntinuing. The Region 11 Physical Security staff is

continuing to monitor the investigation.

S1,4 S_afgauards

a Con _.tinoency Plan Imolenentation Review

a. Insoection Scone (816_QR

The irspector reviewed the licensee's program for responding to security

contingencies, as outlined in the licensee's approved Safeguards

Contingency Plan (SCP) and its implementing procedures. The inspector

also reviewed the responses of the licensee's security organization to

contingencies to ascertain consistency with responses detailed in the

approved SCP and its implementing procedures.

b, Observations and Findinas

The licensee's Physical Security Plan and the SCP were previously

evaluated in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-369 and 370/97-13 and found

satisfactory. Since that review there was no change that affected

security % response ~to this event. The safe 3 ard capabilities specified

in the licensee's SCP were available and functional to meet the

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requirements of this event. The detailed procedures and directives were

available at the licensee's site addressed this potential contingency,

end were found adequate to meet the requirements of this event.

c. Conclusion

The licensee was in com)liance with the Physical Security Plan,

Safeguards Contingency )lan, and implementing procedures and directives

with respect to responding to a tampering or vandalism event.

S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation

53.4 Evaluation of Records and Reports Related to the Event

a. lamection Scoce (81038)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's records and reports related to the

seal damage event. This review was to determine if the records ano

reports were adequate and appropriate for the intended function.

b. Observations and Findinas

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The inspector verified that proper report 1ng of this event to meet the

requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(b) was not made. 10 CFR 73.71(b) requires

that each licensee subject to the provisions of paragraph 73.55 shall

notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour of discovery of the

safeguards events described in paragraph 1(a)(2).of appendix G to Part

73. Events to be reported within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of discovery, followed by a

written re) ort within 30 days includes any event in which there is

reason to )elieve that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to

commit or cause significant physical damage to a power reactor or its

equipment. On December 3.1997, at approximately 3:05 p.m. . Enaineering

personnel suspected seal cuts to be aossible results of a deliberate

act. At 4:00 p.m., Engineering furtier discus.ed evidence of cuts as

possible deliberate act. At 4:30 p.m. , the Engineering Section Menager

was informed of the suspicion of cuts caused by delibe' ate mets. The

Nuclear Support Lection Manager was informed of the suspected deliberate

acts sometime after 4:30 p.m. A short time later, the Steam Generator

Repla'.ement Group Supervisors were also informed. At approximately

8:10 a.m., on December 4, 1997, 17 hours1.967593e-4 days 0.00472 hours 2.810847e-5 weeks 6.4685e-6 months after the first suspicion of

dri1 berate acts to cut the airlock seals, the event was reported to

Socurity. Approximately 28 hours3.240741e-4 days 0.00778 hours 4.62963e-5 weeks 1.0654e-5 months after the first suspicion of

deTiberate acts, the licensee informed the NRC 0)erations Center. The

call was made at 6:48 p.m.. December 4. 1997. T11s delay was contrary

to 10 CfR 73.71(b) and paragraph 1(a)(2) of appendix G to Part 73 and

'<as identified as a violation (50 369. 370/97-19-01),

c. Conclusion

The licensee failed to make the required one hour Event Notification to

the NRC Operations Center resulting in a violation.

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V. Mananement MeetiD91

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X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspection scope and findings were summarized to licensee management

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at the conclusion of the inspection on December 6.1997 and by a re exit

conference call on December 30. 1997, with M. Cash of your staff. The

inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection

results. Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. l

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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Licensee

B. Barron. Vice President. McGuire Nuclear Station

M. Cash. Nuclear SU) port Section Manger

W. Evans. Security Manager

S. Sellers. Security Technical Specialist

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S. Sheaffer. Senior Resident Inspector

Other licensee employees contacted included Operations. Ergineering.

Licensing, and Maintenance personnel.

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1NSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 81020: Management Effectiveness

IP 81038: Records and Reports

IP 81601: Safeguards Contingency Plan Implemc.1 ting Review

ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED

OPENED

50 369, 370/97-19 01 N9V Failure to make the required one hour Event

Notification to_the NRC Operations Center

(Section 53.4)

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CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

DATE TIME * EVENT

12/02/97 1:00 a.m. Unit 2 lower containment reactor side airlock door

failed a leak test conducted by Operations test group

personnel.

12:30 p.m. Engineering personnel discovered one small cut on the

smaller seal of the two seals on the lower containment

reactor side door. No cuts were found on the larger

seal. The cut discovered was assumed to have been

caused by accidental contact with materials

transported into the Undt 2 containment building.

12/03/97 2:00 a.m. Unit 2 upper containment reactor and auxiliary side

airlock doors' smaller seals failed a leak test

conducted by Operations test group personnel.

10:00 a.m. Operations informed Engineering of the second leak

test failure.

3:05 p.m. Engineering personnel discovered one small cut on the

smaller seal of the upper containment auxiliary side

airlock door. No other cuts were discovered then on

this door. The engineers discussed the evidence found

and suspected cuts to be possible results of

deliberate acts. Engineering ordered a test of the

Unit 2 lower auxiliary side door seals by Operations.

4:00 p.m. Engineering personnel found a cut in the smalke seal

of the upper reactor side airlock door. Again, the

engineers discussed evidence of cuts as possible

deliberate acts.

4:30 p.m. An engineer contacted Engineering Section Manager to

report the current findings of inspections of Unit 2

upper and lower airlock door seals and discussed the

suspected cause to be deliberate acts. The

c Engineering Section Manager informed the engineer that

he would contact Security and the Nuclear Support

Section Manager regarding the failures and suspicion

of deliberate tampering.

Sometime after 4:30 p.m.

Nuclear Support Section Manager was contacted by the

Engineering Section Manager to discuss the findings.

This discussior included the need to notify Security

and brief the Steam Generator Replacement Group (SGRG)

Supervisors of the event. Notification of Security

did not take place at tiits time. Engineering assumed

that the SGRG would post monitors at the airlock doors

Dalf TIME * ENNI

- Approximate time

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ATTACHMENT A-

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to prevent further incidents to the seals. No

monitors were established. However, SGRG 3ersonnel ,

were advised to heighten their awareness w1en moving

material through the airlock passage way and to take '

extra caution to prevent furtier damage to the airlock ;

, door seals.

10:00 p.m. The smaller seal on the Unit 2 lower auxiliary side

airlock door failed a leak test conducted by

Operations test group. -

12/04/97 7:45 a.m. Engineering notified of the failed leak test of the

lower auxiliary side airlock door.

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8:10 a.m. Security Manager was notified by Work Control and the

Security Support Technician was notified by the

Engineering Section Manager of a possible tampering

event on the Unit 2 containment airlock.

8:15 a.m. Security Manager. Engineering Section Manager. Work

Control and the Station Manager met to discuss and

determine if the event was an intentional act of

tampering.

8:15 a.m. McGuire Site Vice President informed the NRC Senior

Resident inspector of the event,

8:30 a.m. Engineering group personnel went back to inspect Unit

2 lower containment auxiliary side airlock door and '

the upper reactor side airlock door seals. One cut

was found on the smaller seal of the lower auxiliary

side door and one cut was found on the larger seal of

the upper reactor side door.

8:30 a.m. Security Manager. Engineering Section Manager. Work

Control and the Station Manager determine that the

event was an intentional act of tampering.

8:45 a.m. Security Support Technician notified the Operations

Shift Manager that the cuts found on the airlock seals

had been determined to be a deliberate act of

tampering.

9:05 a.m. Security Support Technician requested the Operations

Shift Manager to make a reportability determination to-

NRC regarding the event.

9:15 a.m. Security Manager. Engineering Section Manager.

Engineering Section Manager, and the Human Resources

Manager discussed the event-via telephone conference

call and determined that the event did not meet the

DAIE IltiE* flENI

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requirements for one hour reportability to the NRC.

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10:00 a.m. NRC Resident Inspector was informed by the Security i

Manager that the event was determined not to be a one i

hour reportable event. !

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12:12 p.m. Engineering. Security Compliance, and three NRC .

Resident Inspectors observed the cuts on airlock seals ,

in Unit 2 upper containment. Additional cuts were 1

found on the larger seal.

1:00 p.m. Security Group established compensatory measures at

both Unit 2's upper and lower containment access- ,

points. Security officers posted were instructed to ,

monitor all personnel and material entering

containment and report anything suspicious immediately

to the Security Shift Supervisor. A communication to

all Security Force members was issued to heighten

awareness and to be sensitive to any activities that

appear to be suspicious. Protected and vital area

oatrols were increased. Vital area patrols were

conducted twice per shift and protected area patrols

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increased to once each two hours.

1:02 p.m. Engineering. Security Compliance, and three NRC '

Resident inspectors observed the cuts on airlock seals .

in Unit 2 lower containment. Engineering discovered

an additional cut to the larger airlock seal on the~

reactor side door. -

6:48 p.m. NRC Operations Center was notified of the tampering of

the airlock seals to Unit 2 upper and lower. auxiliary

and reactor side doors.

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LIST OF LICENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Ouke Power Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan

Nuclear Security Manual Directive. " Guideline for Security Response to

Indications of Tampering. Vandalism, or Malicious Mischief."

Safeguards Event Logs

NRC Event Notification Worksheet for the 6:48 p.m., December 4.1997 call to

the NRC Operations Center

Problem Investigation Process 2 M97-4569 and Licensee Event Report 370/97-4s

Airlock Doors Seal Leak Investigation Plan

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ATTACHMENT B

ML20199B164

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