ML20151E608
| ML20151E608 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1988 |
| From: | Croteau R, David Nelson, William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151E581 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-88-14, 50-370-88-14, NUDOCS 8807260140 | |
| Download: ML20151E608 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1988014
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UNITED STATES
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-WUCLEAR REGULATOHY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
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Report Nos. 50-369/88-14 and 50-370/88-14
Licensee: Duke' Power Company-
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Facility Name: McGuire Nuc' ear Station 1 and 2
Docket Nos: 50-369 and 50-370
License Nos: .NPF-9 and NPF-17
Inspection Conducted:
May 21, - June 24, 1988
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Inspectors;/
"W.
0rder' , Senior Res ent Inspector
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D.'NeTson, Resident /spector
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/ R. 'Crdteau,' Residen
nspector
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Approved by:
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T. A./Peebles,'Section Chief
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations
safety verifica fon, surveillance testing, maintenance activities,
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re. fueling outage activities, and follow-up on~ previous inspection-
findings.
Results:
In the areas inspected, two violations were identified. One of these
violations was classified as a licensee identified violation (LIV).
The inspection findings indicate a continued weakness in' the
procedural compliance area. A strength was noted in the establish-
ment and use of an on site design angineering staff (see paragraph
11). One unresolved item was identified involving the failure of the
McGuire Safety Review Group (MSRG) to perform the activities intended
by Technical
.ecifications 6.2.3.3 and 6.2.3.4 (see paragraph 8).
Within the ar'eas inspected, the following violations were identified:
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Inadequate procedure / failure to follow procedure with respect
to safety injection check valve testing (see paragraph 4). This
violation is classified as an LIV.
9807260140 s0070s
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ADOCK 05000369
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Failure to follow procedure and failure to use a procedure to
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perform safety related work when adjusting diesel generator
power output without a work request or a procedure (see para-
graph 5).
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees-
- N. Atherton, Compliance
D. Baxter, Operations
J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
- R. Futrell, Nuclear Safety Assurance
B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services
- S. LeRoy, Licensing, General Office
- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
W. Reeside,' Operations Engineer
M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance
- A. Sipe, McGuire_ Safety Review Group
R. Sharp, Compliance Engineer
- J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
R. White, IAE Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included construction
craftsmer., technie'ans, operators, mechanics, security force
members, and offi , personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Unresolved Items
An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is
required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation
or deviation. One unresolved item was identified in this report . involving
activities of the McGuire Safety Review Group as identified in the AE0D
inspection (see paragraph 8).
3.
Plant Operations (71707, 71710)
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The inspection staff revie.ied plant operations during the report period:tu
verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room
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logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records- and equipment ,
removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were
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cond"cted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,
and p~erformance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shif ts and at
shift chcnges. Actions and/or_ activities observed were conducted as
prescribed in applicable station administrative directives._The-complement
of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required
by Technical Specifications.
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Plant tours _ taken during. the reporting period included, but were not
limited to,' the turbine ouildings, the auxiliary building, Units l'and 2
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electrical equipment rooms,' Units 1.and 2 cable spreading rooms', Unit 2 '
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reactor building,;and the station yard zone inside the protected l area.;
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During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,-
equipment status and radiation ~ control practices were observed,
a.
Unit 1 Operations
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Unit 1 operated at 100 percent power until June 20 at 12:05 a.m..when
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the unit tripped on high negative flux rate. The Figh negative flux
rate .was caused when several rods dropped into the core due to a
problem with a rod control cabinet power supply. . The motor generator
minus 24 volt de power supply to one of the rod control ' cabinets -
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malfunctioned and the other' power supply.to the cabinet from station;
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auxiliaries was deenergized for a-transfer of power supply from-one
unit to the other.
The problem was corrected and the unit returned
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to power operation on June 21.
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b.
Unit 2 Operations
The unit operated at full power until May 25 wl.en load was gradually
reduced as requested by the load dispatcher and in anticipation of
the scheduled refueling outage.
The unit.was taken off line on
May 27 for a 60 day refueling outage and ended the period with the
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core off-loaded.
Or: June 24 Unit 2 experienced a short loss of offsite power when
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real' ming power supplies.
The Unit was in."no mode" at the time
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with no fuel in the vessel and the the loss of-power had'no effect on
Unit I which was operating at the time. The ?B diesel picked up load
on the bus, however, the 2A di'sel tripped on
a,. v.~rspeed condition
after starting.
This event o: curred on the laet day of the report
period and was still being ir vestigated :by the licensee arid the
inspectors.
No violations or deviations were identified
4.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the
inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance
with applicable Technical Specif; cations.
Selected tests were witnessed to aster *,ain that-current written approved
procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was
calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was
completed and test results were adequate.
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' Detailed-below are selected tests which were either' reviewed or. witnessed:
PROCEDURE-
EQUIPMENT / TEST
PT/0/A/4200/18-
Ice Condenser Basket Weight Check'
PT/2/A/4206/09A
NI Check Valv'e Movement Test
PT/2/A/4200/09A
ESF Test
a.
ESF-Testing - Unit 2
During performance of ESF testing during the week of May 29,.1988, in
accordance 'with PT/2/A/4200/09A several problems were encountered.
Each time the load shed and. sequencer functioned during the testing.
the feeder breaker 2ECXA ~ opened deenergizing 'several. A train VC/YC-
(control room ventilation and chiller) components.
When manually
closed the breaker operated p'roperly.
Subsequent investigation
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reveled that the breaker was operating properly and the- sequencer
came out of the accelerated sequence and went into the committed
sequer.ce which is much longer.
Operators were unaware of this-and
closed the-breaker manually prior to it sequencing back on.
Also, train A of Nuclear' Service Water (RN) did not align to .the
low level intake as expected.
The licensee initially suspected
incomplete make up of the actuation switch. IAE later determined that
lifted leads from the switch that had been taped together wepe not
making good contact.
Connecting the lifted leads is ' intentional
to allow the RN portion of the circuitry to align du',g~ the test
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without adversely affecting other components. The inadq uate contact
prevented RN from realigning. The licensee stated .that .the leads
would be bolted together in the future to provide better contact.
A swing of approximately six- hertz -was noted on- the l 2A diesel
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generator output frequency and the test was secured to trouble shoot
the problem.
The governor was replaced and the test was resumed.
The governor was sent to the manuf acturer (Woodward) to detennine the
cause of the failure.
On June 1 the 2A diesel generator did not start on a blackout signal
initiated as part of the test and the test was 'again - secured.
A
relay in the start circuitry was found to be sticking and was
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replaced. Following testing of the' governor the 2A diesel could not
be ' stopped from the control room and had to be shut down locelly.
The licensee discovered that a blackout signal . was initiated and
locked in during the testino of the new governor preventing ~ the
operators from securing the diesel from the control room.
The
procedure for testing the governor is being modified to alert
operators to this. condition.
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The A diesel-tripped on overspeed in the next run of the ESF. test due
to a loss of control oil to the new governor. The licensee stated
that the new governor was supplied by Woodward with bolts 1/8"~ longer
than previously installed. This' resulted in.an' insufficient seal . fit
causing a slow loss of. oil.
The licensee' has notified Woodward and
is ' evaluating reportability under: 10CFR21. The governor was again
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replaced and the A. train of the ESC test .was then completed satis-
factorily.
When testing the B train, B train of .RN failed to align. to the
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standby Nuclear Service. Water Pond as designed:but did . realign 10
minutes af ter actuation of. the test;
Following 'the test"it was
determined that the taping of ' leads as described above also caused
the problem with B train of RN. During the testing of the B train, a
flange leak developed in the 28 diesel generator lube oil fline which
sprayed oil throughout the 28 diesel ronm.
The diesel was imme-
diately shutdown and clean up and repairs begun.
The licensee
decided to postpone the B train ESF testing to later in the outage in
order to move onto other outage work.'
b.
Safety Injection System (NI) Check Valve Movemant Test
On June 3. 1987, during performance of PT/2/A/4206/09, NI Check Valve
Movement Test, the operating Residual Heat Removal (ND) pump was:left
in service and suction pressure fell 1to zero psi due te.a decrease in
loop water level when. the other ND pump was started for the test.
One N0 oump was secured and suction pressure returned to normal. The
test was completed successfully.
The licensee investigated the
occurrence and found the procedure to oe inadequate in many respects
including the fact that the test procedure did not directly monitor
reactor coolant level or ND suction pressure. Also, a note contained
in the procedure stated that valves may be aligned by;the- operating
procedure (0P). This was meant to allow the valvessto be signed off
as being in the position required by the PT af ter verifyina that they
were in that position by reviewing the OP.
Instead, operators
interpreted tne statement to niean ' that valves ceuld be in the
position required by the PT or the OP. .Two valves were in positiots
not in compliance with the PT due to this erroneous interpretation
The licensee is changing the performance +.est to correct these :and
other deficiencies. These deficiencies are identified as a -licensee
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identified violation (LIV 370/88-14-01) for an inadequate procedure
(PT/2/A/4206/09) and failure to follow the procedure with regard to
misinterpretation of the valve alignment requirements.
S.
Maiatenance Observations (62703)
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Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by--tl e
resident inspection staff-to ascertain procedural and performance adeqiccy
and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
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The selected activities witnessed were examined to-ascertain that, where
applicable, current written: approved procedures were available and in use,
that prerequisites were. met, that equipment restoration was; completed and
maintenance results were adequate.
On May 23, 1988, during performance of PT/2/A/4200/36A,.DG.2A-24 Hour Rm
Lthe diesel could only :be loaded to 4375 KW. The procedure required _.4,,
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0perations requested ' maintenance ' adjust the diesel . engine to provide
the required. output but no -work request was initiated as required by-
Maintenance Management Procedure 1.0.
Maintenance personnelLadjusted the
-fuel racks to obtain an output of 4400.KW without a work request and-
without a procedure. TS 6.8.1.in conjunction with Regulatory 1 Guide 1.33 .
require that maintenance which can af fect performance of- safety-related
equipment be performed -in accordance with written procedures. 'This is
identified as an apparent violation (370/88-14-02) for a failure to follow
procedure and a failure to have a procedure.
The inspector also noted
that the diesel ' vendor manual states tnat' the fuel pump rack? settings
should be equal at all pumps. This condition is mt satisfied if adjust-
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ments similar to those made on May 23 are' performed.
6.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712, 92700)
The following LERs were reviewed to determine whether reporting require--
ments have been met, the cause appears accurate, the-corrective actions
appear appropriate, generic applicability has been considered,'and whether
the event is related to previous events.
Selected LERs were chosen for
more detailed followup in verifying the nature, impact, and.cause of the
event as well as corrective actions taken.
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(CLOSED) LER 369/87-30;
"A"
Diesel Generator Fuel . Oil Supply . Valve
Mis-Labeling / Mis-Alignment.
This. LER is associated with: Licensee
Identified Violation 369/87-36-01 and . Unresolved ' Item 369/87-36-02
discussed in paragraph 7 of this report.
This item.is closed.
7.
Follow-up or. Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
The following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain .that
the licensee's' responses, where applicable, and. licensee actions were in
compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions 'have been
completed.
Selective verification. included record review, ' observations,-
and discussions with licensee personnel.
(CLOSED) Violation 369,370/87-05-02, T.S.6.8.1 -. Inadequate Slave Relay
Test caused VC Chiller Trip on loss of RN flow. Procedures PT/1-2/4200/28
A and B have been changed to ensure that the opposite train of VC/YC be in
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operation and the train under test is secured.- This item is closed,
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(CLOSED) . Unresolved Item 369,370/87-05-03, Resolve . concerns ' regarding '
Operability of Tripped Rotating Equipment.' Station Directive: 2.8.2 was
issued . covering . 0perability. Determinations.
Revision:1 dated June 1, .
1987, was reviewed with regard to. tripped equipment. Section 5.2.1 states
that:
"When a system, subsystem,' train, component, or device trips, it is'
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Following an immediate assessment for cause which requires
no maintenance, if -it can txf restarted:within. one hour, .it is considered
-operable and should not ~ be- loggedLin' the Technical Specification Action
Item Log (TSAIL).
If it fails to restart within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, ,the time . frame
for Technical' Specification considerations begins at the. time. of the
initial trip and the item should be . logged accordingly' ino the TSAIL."
This item is closed.
(CLOSED) Violat,an 369/87-08-01, Inadequate Control of' Temporary Modifica-
tion.
Corrective action included stressing that the test log be checked
to ensure that identified' testing is in. progress prior .to performing work.
Also, shift operating personnel were' instructed that clearance.will not be
given to perform work on TS related items unless the work is identified on
the Operating Schedule.
This. item is closed'.
(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 369, .370/87-08-02 and Unresolved Item 369,
370/87-14-08; Post Maintenance Valve - Testing.
These items constituted
a potential violation but were lef t . unresolved pending ' the licensee's
response to an Institute of Nuclear Power Operations-(INPO) audit finding
on this subject of the same time frame.
The licensee has. taken appro-
priate actions in response to the INP0 finding to ensure that maintenance
retesting'is properly identified and documented.
These items are closed.
(CLOSED)
Licensee
Identified
Violation
369/87-14-07;
Inadequate
Procedure. Changes have been made to correct the procedure-deficiencies.
This item is closed
(CLOSED)
Licensee ' Identified Violation 369/87-36-01; Diesel Generator
Fuel-Oil Supply Valve Mis-Labeling / Mis-Alignment.
The. licensee corrected
the valve labeling and changed the Operations procedure that contributed:
to the problem. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the licensee's label
Plate Program for component identification adequacy. No deficiencies were
noted nor have further mis-labelings been identified.
This item is'
closed.
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item 369/87-36-02; Reportability of Diesel Generator
Fuc1 Oil Supply Valve Mis-Labeling / Mis-Alignment.
The licensee reported
this event via LER 360/87-30.
This item is closed.
8.
McGuire Safety Review Group Operation
a.
Background
During an NRC senior management .oaeting in - June .1987, it was
concluded that additional i n forma'.i on was needed regarding the
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overall performance of Duke Power Company and its nuclear stations.
.The McGuire Nuclear Station was chosen for the '"diagnostic evalua-
tion" of Duke's nuclear program.
On November 20, 1987, a Diagnostic Evaluation Team' (DET) began an
initial two-week evalntion at the station and corporate' offices.
Selected team members returned.:to the Duke Corporate. offices on
January 4,1988, for an additional ' week . to complete the evaluation.
An exit' meeting with corporate officers and managers was held on
January 22, 1988 at the Duke corporate of fices in Charlotte, North
Carolina.
The Diagnostic Evaluation Team report was transmitted to the licensee
on April 8,
1988.
One of the findings. documented in the : report -
concerned the McGuire Safety Review' Group (MSRG).
Specifically, it
was determined that:
(1) the MSRG had not been . performing all
functions identified as part of .the McGuire licensing basis and
resultantly did not appear to have.-been.meetir.;: the intent.of McGuire
TS 6.2. 3. 3 a'nd 6.2. 3.4 (2) the scope and focus of current- MSRG
activities had evolved to the point:that the majority of the group's.
time was spent on investigation- of. plant ~ events, with little or
no time spent on surveillance of plant operations and maintenance
activities, and (3) a proposed TS change increasing MSRG responsi-
bility for review of' written safety evaluations could further-
adversely effect MSRG review functions.
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With respect to licensing basis commitments, it was found that
certain of the functions. described in the ' Safety Evaluation Report
(SER) for McGuire were not being performed by- the MSRG
The MSRG was
not reviewing: (1) all design changes involving structures, systems,
or components, nor (2) all station. procedures and changes to
procedures. Discussions with the Nuclear. Safety Review: Board (NSRB)
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Director confirmed the team's observation,
Supplement No. 4 to tht SER for McGuire documents NRC staff review
of the MSRG.
The review discusses the acceptability of the MSRG
as described by Duke in Station Directive 3.1.32, ."Station Safety
Engineering Group." The SER stat'ed that the MFRG will function as '
an independent technical review group in the performance of the '
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following activities:
(1) Review of LERs for applicability to McGuire.
(2) Review and evaluate the effectiveness of plant programs.
(3) Review of all design changes involving structures, systems, or
components with quality assurance conditions to insure all
safety concerns are properly addressed.
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(4)' Review all station procedures and changes to' procedures to
determine their adequacy.
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(5)
Investigate all incident reports. involving reportable items'and
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conduct other. investigations as deemed . appropriate bye the MSRG
Chairman.
The SER assumed that the LStation' Directive 3.'1.32 would be approve'd'
and implemented prior to fuel load'of.McGuire Unit 1.
This was never
approved or implemented.
On January 6,1981, however, the licensee provided a response -to TMI
Actions Items I.B.1.2 and I . C .' 5 .
As part ~ of this ' response, the'
licensee provided the charter of the MSRG. This charter is'signifi-
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cantly different from Station Directiv_e 3.1.32.
As an example,
neither functior. (3) nor (4) described above was contained 'in the
charter.
The MSRG Chairman indicated in an interview that recent activities of
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the review group result in 85-90 percent of their time being devoted
to incident investigations. A review of the SRG Work Assignment Log-
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covering the year 1987 indicated that no routine station activity
areas had been assigned to any MSRG member during 1987.
b.
Resident Inspector Staff Review
The resident inspection staff review of the MSRG and requirements
pertaining thereto included a review of:
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(1) Station Directive 3.1.32
(2) Supplement 4 to the McGuire SER
(3) Charter of the Station Safety Review Group-(SSRG)l
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(4) Section 6.2.3 of the McGuire Station: Technical Specifications
(5) The DET Team P.eport
(6) The results of an Of fice of Nuclear -Reactor Regulation .(ONRR)_
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review of commitments relative to the MSRG
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Basically, the resident review confirmed .the inconsistencies between
the above mentioned commitments and actual practice. An apparent
explanation for the contradictions was detailed in the'0NRR review
mentioned above and described'below.
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c.
.0NRR Review
A review of the above menti aed findings of th'e!DET was performed.by
0NRR staff. Tne thrust of that review dealt with the-history:of the
commitments made by the licensee ' relative' to the MSRG. , The L ONRR
review confirmed th inconsistencies described above and
revealed
that these inconsistencies are-the probable result of.the time frame
of .the McGuire NT0L review. ;Spe:1fically item I.B.1'.2 of NUREG-06601
(May 1980) with respect to the '/ndependent Safety Evaluation Group .
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(ISEG).had not been clearly develemd at-_that. time.
Item I.B;1.2 of
NUREG-0757 (November 1980) later described the. ISEG as a functional
entity with prescribed functions. Station 0irective. 3.1.32, the SSRGJ
Charter, and finally the McGuire Technical . . Specification parallel
staff development'of the ISEG.- The'ONRR review concludes that the.
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MSRG, 'as required by Section 6.2.3 ~ of . the McGuire Technical
Specifications, reflects' the staff's current _ position as'shown in'the
corresponding section of the ' Standard Technical Spect fications1(STS) ~
dated August 6, 1981.
Based on a review of the references-listed earDer and discussions
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with ONRR and RII staff, the resident' staff redew was ~ refocused
to deal exclusively'with MSRG compliance ' with applicable . Technical
Specifications.
Discussions .with the MSRG chaiman, review of the. SRG Work Assignment
Log covering the period of 1986.through the present, .and review of
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the Inplant Reviews conducted by the MSRG during that time, led to
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the following conclusions:
(1) The majority of the MSRG's time is .. spent generating incident
investigation reports (IIR).
The Work Assignment Log revealed
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that during the period 1986
present, 203 :IIRs' were generated'
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but only 15 inplant reviews were - performed (inplant reviews
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are independent reviews. of station- activities, and are ' not
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necessarily coupled with IIRs; these. come closer .to' meeting
what was intended by TMI action item I.B.1.2).1This reveals.that.
93% of the MSRG's ef forts were devoted to. the generation of'
IIRs.
(2) Other than - those reviev;d in the course of pctforming a'n
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incident ' investigation, procedures are not reviewed program-
matically to determine adequacy.
(3) Other than those reviewed in the course of' performing , an
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incident investigation, de,1,1n changes are not programmatically
reviewed to insure all suety concerns are properly andressed.
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Ultimately, technical specification 6.2.3. Station - Safety ' Review
Group, 1s the culmination of the-negotiations of commitments-relative
to TMI . Action Item I .B.1.2.
To reiterate, the intent -of an ISEG
.(MSRG) is . to examine plant operating- characteri stics, NRC issuances, -
Licensing Information Service adviso. ries,. Licensee. Event Reports, and
other appropriate sources which may indicate-areas for ~ improving.
plant safety.
It is expected that this group develop detailed.~
recommendations for revised procedures, equipment modifications, :or
other means of achieving the goal .of improved plant Lsafety.
A'
principal function of the independent safety engineering group is to
maintain surveillance of plant operations and maintenance activicies
to provide independent verification that these activities . are
performed correctly and . that human errors are reduced as far as :
practical.
These fi.1 dings were~ discussed. with the NSRB and ' MSRG
Chairmen on June 13, 1988. . The NSRB Chairman indicated that the
current-operation of the SRG's at the Duke facilities were patterned
after the description of an ISEG as. described in NUREG 0800, Standard
Review Plan, (SRP) Section 13-4. , .and that the resident's findings
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were a redefinition of the requirements.
A subsequer.t review of that section of the SRP confirmed the
following-
(1) The -ISEG is to perform ' independent reviews of plant operations
in accordance with the guidelines of item I.B.1.2 of NUREG-0660
and NUREG-0737.
(2) The group is to function to examine plant operating character-
tstics, NRC issuances, Licensing-Information Service advisories,
and other appropriate - sources of ' lant design and. oper_ating
p
experience information fo'r areas to impro've plant. safety; and
to perform surveillance of plant operations and -maintenance
activities to provide independent verification that . these
activities are performed correctly and that h' man ' errors 'are
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reduced as far as practicable,
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(3) The group is to perform independent reviews and audits of plant
activities including maintenance, modifications, operational
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problems, and operational analysis, and aid'in the establishment
of programmatic requirements for plant activities.
Based on the resident inspection staff review, it is concluded that
the intent of technical specifications 6.2.3.3 and 6.2.3.4 are not
being met by the current operation of the MSRG. A meeting is-going
to be held to discuss this issue.with licensee and NRC management.
This is unresolved item (50-369,370/88-14-03) pending . review and -
results of the meeting.
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9.
Fisher Valve Problems
On June. 19', 1988, +.he inspectors became aware of a concern with the design:
.of pre-1977 air : operated Fisher Valves.
Apparently Fisher did not
consider p'acking; and seating' loads for sizing of valve springs ~ prior to
1977. The. significance of the concern is that the Fisher Valves used in
safety related ~ applications may-not go to their safe positions-on a loss
of air under. design basis conditions.
The licensee'is evaluating.and/orL
testing all active Fisher . Valves :in this Jcategory.
The licensee has
stated that problems- with Fisher' Valves failing to: go to _ their safe
positions have not been identified in ' the . plants' hi story.
Licensee-
personnel were working with Fisher to: develop means of. testing the actual-
packing loads on the valves in question.
This issue was still -under
review at the end of the inspection period.
10. -Refueling Activities (60710)
Unit 2 commenced . its End-of-Cycle' 4 refueling outage on May 27.
The
outage is scheduled to last 60 days.
Preparations and refueling activities were observed and monitored to
ascertain whether-Technical Specification requirements were satisfied and
activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
Portions of the following activities were observed:
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Core Off Loading
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Ultrasonic Inspectiot, of Fuel Pins
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Control Rod Inspection
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Design Engineering On Site Support
The licensee completed staf fing of a design engineering group on site in
mid May of this year.
The on site group consists of 5 design' engineers
and a supervisor.
On site support is intended to strengthen engineering
review and evaluation of problems which arise.
This group has been of
benefit in evaluating issues such as the Fisher valve problem described in
this report.
The inspectors consider -the presence of an on site design
staff to be a strength.
12.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection findings identified below were summarized on June 24, 1988,
with those persons-indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The following items
were discussed in detail:
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(CLOSED)
Licensee
Identified
Violation
370/88-14-01,
Inadequate
Procedure / Failure To Follow Procedure With Respect To Safety Injection
Check Valve Testing (see paragraph 4). This violation is classified as an
LIV.
(OPEN) Violation 370/88-14-02, Failure To Follow Procedure And Failure
To Use A Procedure To Perform Safety Related Work When Adjusting Diesel
Generator Power Output Without A Work Request Or A Procedure '(see
paragraph 5).
(OPEN) Unresolved Item 369, 370/88-14-03, Failure Of The McGuire Safety
Review Group (MSRG) To Perform The Activitie.s Intended By Technical Specifications 6.2.3.3 and 6.2.3.4 (see paragrapr. 8).
Weakness with respect to recent procedural compliance (see paragraphs
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4 and 5),
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Strength with respect to on site design engineering support (see. paragraph
11).
Inspector concern with regard to Fisher valve design questions (see
paragraph 9).
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor
did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the
inspectors during the course of their inspection.
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