IR 05000369/1998011
| ML20239A387 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20239A378 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-98-11, 50-370-98-11, NUDOCS 9809090117 | |
| Download: ML20239A387 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos: NPF-9 and NPF-17
, Report Nos: 50-369/98-11 and 50-370/98-11
' Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station. Units 1 and 2 Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville NC 28078 Dates: June 1-26 and August 5-7, 1998 i
' Inspector: N. Economos. Lead Inspector-S. Shaeffer. Senior Resident Inspector McGuire M. Franovich Resident Inspector McGuire M. Sykes. Resident Inspector McGuire Accompanying :J. Johnson. Deputy' Regional Administrator Personnel: R. Martin NRR Lead Ice Condenser Project Manager Approved by: Paul E. Fredrickson. Chief Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety i
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t 9809090117 980827 Enclosure PDR Ac(H:K 05CKN2369 l 8 PEWt l
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY McGuire Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report 50-369/98-11 and 50-370/98-11 This special report discusses aspects of the licensee maintenance and engineering programs. The report reviewed the maintenance. surveillance and material condition of the McGuire Unit 1 ice condenser (IC) syste Maintenance
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Appropriate resources and management attention were being applied to support activities associated with maintaining the Unit 1 IC system and its associated sub-systems in an operable state. (Section M1.1)
. Maintenance supervision responsible for servicing the IC exhibited a high degree of oversight and accountability for performing quality wor (Section M1.1)
. The licensee's use of an IC rotating team approach which utilized aggregate experience in servicing all four [McGuire and Catawba] of the licensee's IC units promoted an increased awareness of critical maintenance and surveillance practices. (Section M1.1)
. IC Technical Specifications (TS) surveillance requirements were being met and in many cases exceeded minimum TS requirements. (Section M1.2)
. Damaged ice baskets were effectively identified and appropriate repairs were performe (Section M1.3)
. Inspections for missing or broken screws were being performed in a conservative manner by adequately trained personnel. Supervision was present for guidance as needed and the level of licensee oversight was
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appropriate for the activity. (Section M1.3)
. The licensee's efforts to exclude foreign material from the IC during previous outages had not been rigorous as evidenced by the amount of debris found during this outage. The inspectors noted a relatively high current sensitivity in this area as evidenced by the absence of debris 1 and unnecessary tools in and around the work area and the work effort to i remove accessible debris from the IC. (Section M1.4)
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. System engineering oversight was considered to be good with personnel l actively pursuing resolution to identified technical problems in a i conservative manner. (Section M1.1)
. The licensee has an effective arogram in place to document and evaluate i issues for deportability / opera)ility. The inspectors' review of problem f reports involving IC components determined that the licensee's reviews and evaluations for deportability / operability were satisfactor (Section E1.1)
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e By observation of ice basket modification work. the inspectors verified that current activities were being appropriately performed; that technicians were adequately qualified to aerform their assigned tasks:
and that the level of oversight provided )y the contractor and the licensee was appropriate for the task. (Section E1.2)
. In general, previous modifications to the IC system have been completed '
in accordance with approved modification procedures. However. the NRC identified two minor changes to the facility which were not performed in accordance with approved modification processes. (Section El.2)
e No significant inaccuracy problems with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were identified by the NRC. The licensee was continuing their UFSAR review and update in accordance with industry guidance. (Section E3.1) ;
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y Reoort Details Summary of Plant Status-Unit 1 remained in a refueling outage (end of Cycle 12) for the entire perio Unit 2 operated at full- power during the entire perio II Maintenance
'H1' : Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments (62700)
During the Unit 1 end of: cycle 12 refueling outage, the inspectors reviewed a variety of-maintenance, surveillance. and engineering activities associated with maintaining the IC and its associated sub-systems in an operable state. -General observations of licensee activities concluded that appro)riate resources and management attention were being applied.to support t1e above activitie Maintenance supervision responsible for servicing the IC exhibited a high degree of oversight and accountability for performing quality wor System engineering oversight was considered to be good with personnel actively pursuing resolution of identified technical problems in a conservative manne The licensee used an IC rotating team approach which utilized aggregate IC personnel experience in servicing the two McGuire, as well as the two Catawba.IC units. This promoted an increased awareness of critical maintenance and surveillance practices which were considered necessary in maintaining the ICs in an operable statu M1.2 Ice Condenser Surveillance Testina (Unit 1)
- Insoection Scooe (62700)
The inspectors determined by observation, review of completed surveillance, procedures, and discussions with cognizant personnel, the adequacy of surveillance on the IC syste Observations and Findinas Ice Bed Surveillance Technical Specifications (TS) 3/4.6.5.1. requires that the ice inventory in the IC be distributed evenly through the 24 containment bays: that the ice contains a specified amount of boron and that it contains sufficient heat removal capability to r . condense the reactor coolant system volume released during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). In order to enable the IC to perform this function. TS requires that each IC basket contain a minimum amount of 1081 pounds of ice. This amount of ice contains a 10%
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allowance for ice loss through sublimation. This ice weight also contains an additional 1.1% allowance to account for instrument error during the weighing proces The total minimum weight of ice required to be in the IC is 2.099.790 pounds. TS requires a maximum ice bed temperature of s27 F. The ice bed temperature is monitored in the control room through the use of temperature sensors attached to the lattice frames through the ice bed. TS requires that the ice bed temperature is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The inspectors observed selected ice bed temperature monitoring devices in the IC and verified that temperature monitoring was being performed as require . Flow Passaae Surveillance As required by TS 4.6.5.1.b.3 at least once per nine months a minimum of two flow passages )er IC bay are visually inspected for blockage. The maximum allowa)le ice accumulation on lattice grid steel members in the space of these flow passages was 0.38 inche This surveillance was performed in accordance with Procedure '
SM/A/8510/001. Rev.1. Inspection of Ice Condenser Flow Passage The selection of flow passages for TS surveillance was performed with the aid of a computer program which was programmed to 3reclude repeat inspection of flow passages on subsequent outage y observation, the. inspectors noted that the flow passages associated with the first two rows of ice baskets, located nearest to the annulus / containment wall exhibited the only significant ice buildup and blockage, which was attributed to sublimatio The remaining flow passages in rows three through nine, next to the crane wall, were relatively free of ice accumulation. Through discussions with the licensee's system engineer the inspectors determined that the difference in ice accumulation was in part due to nonlinear sublimation rates observed between the containment wall and the crane wall. Typically the licensee has exceeded TS minimum surveillance inspection requirements by inspecting all flow passages at or near the completion of the outage, when all maintenance activity including replenishment of emptied and serviced ice baskets is completed. At the completion of this inspection, technicians were continuing to inspect and reduce ice accumulation in certain flow channels down to Lcceptable level .
The inspectors performed a walk-through ins)ection in the lower level, intermediate deck, and top deck of t1e IC and determined that the ice accumulation and material condition of inspected flow passages was satisfactory and would meet the TS requiremen . Ice Basket Weiaht Surveillance l TS 4.6.5.1.b.2 requires that at least once per nine months a representative sample of at least 144 ice baskets are weighed to verify that each ice basket contained at least 1081 pounds of ic ;
The representative sample is required to include six ice baskets i
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from each of the 24 IC bays. TS also provides additional requirements for selecting specific ice baskets from designated .
rows within specified IC bays. This preferential selection is intended to assure that weight. surveillance reflect conditions that are representative of the IC environmen In' order to avoid problems in accessing ice baskets for weighing, the licensee removed the intermediate deck- doors and associated structural steel supports from the work area in accordance with Procedure MP/0/A/7150-54,'Rev. 2. Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Center Beams and Door Frames Corrective Maintenance. Weighing of the baskets was performed in accordance with Procedure MP/0/A/7150/ 076. Rev. 003, Ice Basket Weight Determination. This procedure requires the use of a calibrated load cell assembly which utilizes a hydraulic jack, a digital readout. unit and a lifting bridge. The procedure also requires that 3rior to weighing, ice baskets be checked. to determine if t1ey are frozen or stuck. If an ice basket is found ' stuck and can not be. freed, it is emptied with the aid of vibrators, ins)ected, repaired as needed, replenished with ice and weighed. T1is weight is subsequently documented and becomes a part of the computer database program. The aforementioned procedure places limits on the lifting force (i.e., 3000 aounds maximum) that could be applied to raise and free stucc ice basket This limitation is imposed for the purpose of minimizing basket damage, i
By observation the ins)ectors verified that ice baskets were l weighed in the prescri)ed manner which provided the assurance that weight accuracy was within a 10 pound band. Up)er and lower l i
limits ~ controlled total weight for each ice bascet. The lower i limit was set at 1331 pounds while the upper was 1877 pounds. The '
licensee's program provided for weighing all the ice baskets prior to the startup from each refueling outage, which exceeded the TS requirement of weighing 144 baskets every nine month Approximately 85% of the baskets were weighed near the end of the fuel cycle while the plant was still on line. To perform ice basket weighing at this time, the licensee typically, on a daily basis. entered TS action statement 3.6.5.3.a., which permits continued plant operation with specific conditions being met. The remaining 15% of the baskets were weighed during the refueling outage. Through discussions with cognizant licensee personnel.
l the inspectors determined that the average ice basket weight i following replenishment was approximately 1553 pounds and that the total ice weight in the IC was 2.754,141 pounds. The inspectors noted that this weight did not include ice basket 10-5-4, whose L weight was rejected due to incomplete data. However, the j inspectors noted that the total amount of ice in the IC weighed '
- substantially nore than the minimum 2.099.790 pounds required by i TS 3/4.6. '
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. Ice Basket Damaae Surveillance l TS 4.6.5.1.c. requires that at least once per 40 months, two ice baskets shall be selected from each one-third of the IC and inspected to verify that they were free of detrimental structural wear, cracks, corrosion or other damage. The selected ice baskets were to be raised at least 12 feet for this inspection. This requirement was implemented with Procedure SM/0/A/8510/00 Rev. O. Ice Basket Inspectio The six ice baskets were selected l with emphasis on baskets whose. history showed no maintenance
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activities having been performed over recent outage Specifically, ice baskets selected for this inspection were ,
15-4-6, 20-4-3. 21-2-6. 3-6-4, 6-3-6 and 12-2-4. These baskets !
were inspected for material condition as stated above and the results were appropriately documented as required by Procedure SM/0/A/8510/002. This inspection revealed no evidence of material damage or degradatio In addition to the TS damage inspection. the licensee, as l discussed in Section M1.3 below, also inspects all ice baskets l that are emptied due to'being found stuck during the weighing l proces Conclusions !
The inspectors determined that IC TS surveillance requirements were l being met and in many cases exceeded minimum TS requirement Ice bed j surveillance were being performed in a timely manner in accordance with '
a)plicable procedures, and inspection of flow passages was conservativ l T1e weight of ice in IC ice baskets was closely tracked by a computer ;
program and weights were documented and evaluated to predict sublimation rates across the I M1.3 Ice Basket Corrective Maintenance: Insoection Scooe (62700)
The inspectors determined by work observation and record review .the adequacy of the licensee's inspection procedures and work practices for repairing ice basket components as well as for locating and retrieving broken or missing screw Observations and Findinas Ice Basket Insoection and Reoair During the refueling outage the licensee unloaded certain ice baskets that had been declared stuck during the weighing proces The unloaded ice baskets were inspected for damage and repaired as '
necessary in accordance with Procedure SM/0/A/8510/7, Rev. 3. Ice Basket Corrective Maintenance and Tracking. Essentially this procedure focused on vibration related damage to basket surfaces.
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and associated rings and cruciforms. By document review and discussions with technical Jersonnel the inspectors determined that a total of 227 ice bascets required ice replenishment during
.the outage. This included 184 that had been declared stuck, two that were found damaged as a result of other inspections and 41 that the computer tracking program had projected would lose sufficient ice due to sublimation, to fail the minimum weight required over a predetermined length of time (i.e. , one fuel cycle plus six months added for conservatism). Based on a material condition inspection of all 227 unloaded ice baskets, the licensee identified 14 that required some repairs. These repairs included removal of damaged basket sections and their re)lacement with short length sections (as discussed in Section El.2), removal and replacement of damaged cruciforms and repositioning of misaligned stiffener ring This work was performed on Work Order 97109280 -
01. Outage Maintenance on Ice Baskets. The inspectors observed work in progress which included vibration of ice to unload baskets: both visual inspections and remote inspections with the aid of a video camera: and removal and installation of coupling, stiffener and top rings. Damage to the top rings was associated with certain tools used to free-up frozen or stuck basket . Insoection for Missina or Broken Screws At the time of the inspection, technicians were performing j inspections of emptied ice baskets to look for maintenance-related i damage, using Procedure SM/0/A/8510/7. which included missing or l broken screws. Visual inspections were performed using the direct method or with remote video that provided sufficient resolution and magnification to detect abnormal condition Mispositioned or damaged ice basket sections and associated components. (i.e. rings), were replaced with com)onents produced from like material. The replacements were assem) led and fastened to their designated basket locations with locking torque-head self-tap)ing sheet metal screws. Typically the new screws were j driven t1 rough the material with the aid of a hand held drill and tightened until the joint was firmly secured. While observing this activity the inspectors noted that although technicians made an effort to capture old screws being removed from baskets during disassembly, on occasion, screws fell below to the lower IC level or on the grid of the flow channels. In addition, screw-heads that were chiseled-off to facilitate their removal also fell in a similar manner. Near the close of this activity the licensee retrieved 36 sheet metal screws. These screws were from the original screw design that was used during construction until torque-head screws were introduced. In addition, the licensee retrieved nine torque-head screws which appeared new/ unused and i six Phillias-head screw caps, whose fracture surfaces exhibited l
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t 6 4 This inspection did not identify any baskets or coupling rings having missing screws. However a small number of screws were !
retrieved and a)peared to be the result of maintenance activities J performed and t1erefore not a challenge to operability of the IC syste Discussions with the cognizant system engineer disclosed that their inspections of ice basket couplings and stiffening rings continue to produce no evidence of missing screws. The aforementioned screws found during the present refueling outage, were similar to those found during previous outages and appeared to vary with the number of ice baskets repaired. The licensee stated that they typically expected to find some screws during final inspection of the lower IC area and in the melt tank. The inspector observed the screws found by the licensee during this ,
outage and determined that most of them had been in service, that the broken screw heads had the appearance of having been chiseled off the shanks to facilitate their removal, and a few screws appeared new. In addition, the licensee was reviewing foreign material control practices in order to reduce or eliminate the number of screws dropped during repairs on subsequent maintenance activitie Conclusions Damaged ice baskets were effectively identified and appropriate repair was conducte Inspections for missing or broken screws were being performed in a conservative manner by adequately trained personne Supervision was present for guidance as needed and the level of licensee oversight was appropriate for the activit M1.4 Foreion Material Control Insoection Scooe (62700)
, The inspectors determined by work observation, walk-through inspections, discussions with the cognizant engineer and record review the adequacy of the licensee's control of. foreign material in the IC. Guidelines for implementing control of foreign material were included as Task Perform Debris Inspection of Ice Baskets, to Work Order 97109280-0 Observations and Findinas Early in the outage. the licensee discovered a roll of duct tape in IC ice basket'19-2-9. Further inspection of other baskets revealed small pieces of tape and other debris which appeared to have been l previously covered with ice and that were now exposed through
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sublimation. In response to these findings the licensee inspected 100 ;
percent of the IC basket bottoms to identify and retrieve all the accessible debris observed. This inspection was performed under Task i All debris found was segregated in terms of the bay where it was found and basket location (i.e., inside, outside). In general, material -
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l retrieved from the ice baskets included duct and electrical tape. tie l
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wraps. leather and cotton gloves, pieces of small gage electrical wir paper, and cellophane material. Of these materials, tape, cellophane
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and paper were considered to Jose the greatest risk to sump clogging based on their potential for aecoming neutrally buoyant and covering large surface areas. The licensee's calculation / evaluation determined that the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) sumps for Units 1 and 2 were operable and that the amount of debris found and assumed to be 3 resent in the Unit 2 IC was insufficient to constitute a serious alockage problem that could challenge design margins for sump screen Identification of the debris found and the ensuing evaluation was documented under PIP 1-M98-164 Through discussions with the licensee's cognizant engineer observations of collected debri inspections of ice basket bottoms and review of the aforementioned PIP, the inspectors determined that the licensee had taken adequate steps to determine that this debris would not prevent the sumps from performing their design and safety functio In addition to the above, the inspectors questioned whether small bore glycol piping insulation, located in the lower IC between each bay, was accounted for in the licensee's analysis for ECCS sum) plugging concerns. The subject piping insulation was not flasled with stainless steel sheeting as other glycol piping in the area and was degrading (fraying. )artial unwrapping, or cut). The amount of material in each of the 24 3ays was estimated at 2 cubic feet. The inspectors considered that during a LOCA event, the subject insulation would be dislodged and.could potentially impact the effectiveness of the ECCS sump. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee acknowledged the concern and was in process of reviewing documentation to determine if the insulation was accounted for in appropriate calculations. This issue will be identified as Ins)ection Followu) Item 369/98-11-01. Ice Condenser Insulation Effect on ECCS Sump Opera)ilit Conclusions Through this inspection effort, the inspectors determined that the licensee's efforts to exclude foreign material from the IC during previous outages had not been rigorous as evidenced by the amount of debris found during this outage and the evaluation discussed abov During this inspection, the inspectors noted a relatively high current sensitivity in this area as evidenced by the absence of debris and unnecessary tools in and around the work area and the work effort to remove accessible debris from the lower I An Inspection Followup Item was identified, however, to review the licensee's action with respect to a potential piping insulation accountability proble _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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III. Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering E1.1 -ReDortability/00erability Evaluations (Unit 1) Insoection Scone (37551 and 62700)
The inspectors determined through document review the adequacy of the licensee's evaluation with regards to items concerning deportability and operability issues relative to the I Observations'and Findinos The licensee used the Problem Investigation Process (PIP) program to document concerns identified in the field including those associated with material condition and documentation errors. Under this syste '
concerns are assessed. evaluated for plant operability and deportability to the NRC (i.e. .10 CFR 50 73 and 10 CFR 21), and appropriatel corrected or resolved. Issues with potential operability / deportability concerns are evaluated, and a determination made and documented using either PIPS or Problem Investigation Re) orts (PIRs). The inspectors reviewed PIPS and PIRs issued for both .icGuire Units between 1988 and the present that addressed problems associated with IC ice doors sheet-metal screws and ice baskets, for the purpose of verifying that 1 deportability and operability issues were adequately evaluated and i whether appropriate actions were taken as required. The inspectors .!
noted that only a relatively small population of the reviewed PIPS /PIRs i
.actually involved issues that would qualify as potential deportability !
candidates. The primary potentially reportable PIPS /PIRs were as j-follows: i PIP: 2-M93-1327 this PIP involved Unit 2 Lower IC doors that were found open and could not be closed due to ice buildu PIP: 2-M97-2686. this PIP involved a failure of certain Unit 2 inlet doors to open freely due to interference from the door flashin ' PIP.: 1-M97-1033. this PIP involved a finding-that a certain ice basket had 10 out of the 12 required sheet metal screws missing from an interconnecting coupling ring:
l' PIP: 0-M95-1019. this PIP involved a finding that material used j
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to fabricate certain basket cylinders and associated components did not meet the minimum yield strength requirements of the applicable specificatio PIR: 1-M92-0018. this PIR involved a finding that ice basket i swivel mounting brackets were manufactured from material whose yield strength was less than required by the W specificatio ,
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PIP: 0-M96-1247, this PIP involved a finding that the diameter of a certain cruciform exceeded drawing requirement PIR: 1-M90-0107. this PIR involved the use of certain stainless steel screws that were unsuitable for the ice basket coupling application. In all cases, the licensee's operability reviews were considered acceptabl Through this review, the inspectors determined that for the most aart, the findings as documented in these PIPS did not meet the reporta)ility However, in instances
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threshold of either 10 CFR 50.73 or *10 CFR 2 j where the licensee's evaluation determined that the problems identified I were reportable (i.e., PIP 2-M97-2686 and PIR 1-M90-0107). the licensee i performed detailed evaluations for operability and deportability requirements, and appropriately reported the issues to the NRC. In all cases, the licensee's operability reviews were considered acceptabl In addition. the inspectors reviewed product certifications for screws, l ice baskets and associated component This review disclosed that l fabrication deviation notices (DNs) were issued primarily for basket i replacement components and included the following DNs: 42079. 42080, ,
42081. 42082, 42085 and 42120. Through this review, the inspectors '
determined that these DNs adequately described the identified problems and that they were evaluated and dispositioned in a manner that was consistent with regulatory requirements. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's actions with respect to IC issues identified at other facilities. Specifically the inspectors reviewed an issue involving D. C. Cook ice baskets found in an unanalyzed condition due to bad or missing welds on the bottom crossbars and bottom basket grids of the IC ice baskets. This issue was reported to the NRC in June 1998. The licensee's initial review indicated the following: The problems identified appeared to be associated with welding practices and/or welding process control. Also, their review disclosed that McGuire's 1 and D. C. Cook's IC ice baskets and associated components were fabricated by different vendors. The inspectors determined that McGuire's past and present inspections on the affected IC ice basket areas had not identified similar problems. However, the licensee issued PIP 0-M98-2640 to further investigate the concern and to document their finding Conclusions Through document reviews and discussions with the licensee's cognizant engineer the inspectors determined that the licensee has an effective j program in place to document and evaluate issues for deportability / operability. The inspectors' review of PIPS /PIRs '
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El-.2 Ice Basket Modifications: Insoection Scone (37551)
The inspectors determined by work observation, document review and
.through discussions with the' cognizant engineer the adequacy of ice basket modifications-. Modifications were performed in accordance with Procedure SM/0/A/8510/007. The inspectors s)ecifically reviewed modifications of damaged ice baskets using s1 ort-length basket sections
' in lieu of full-length basket section replacement. Throughout the
~ inspection, the inspectors reviewed engineering design basis documents including the UFSAR, the McGuire Design Basis Document, and applicable as-built and design drawings. The inspectors focused on identifying unapproved modifications which may have been made to the IC syste b. ' Observations and Findinas Sections of ice baskets exhibiting torn or damaged ligaments were repaired using short length replacement sections. The replacement sections came in two, three and twelve foot lengths that were designed and a) proved by Westinghouse.for use on the Unit 1 and 2 IC ice basket The p1ysical description and assembly of these replacements appeared on licensee drawings MCM-1201.17-0984 sheets 1 and 2 and MCM-1201.17-0985 sheets:1 and 2 respectivel Use of these replacement sections was authorized under Westinghouse Qualification SID-2016.01-00-001.- and by letter from Westinghouse to R. L. Spade of Duke Power Company, dated-September- 19. 1991. In general, the subject letter stated that the short
' ice basket replacements were compatible with all existing plant ice baskets interfacing structures and hardware-in the ice bed; that they were made from similar material and were designed to fit the same specifications as the original ice baskets: that they were qualified by
- analysis to the . seismic and design basis accident -loads and criteria of the original Duke IC ice baskets. In conclusion, the subject letter stated that the additional coupling rings had no discernible effect on the thermal performance of the IC. The inspectors determined that the
- licensee had taken adequate steps to assure that the use of,short length replacement ice basket sections would not prevent the IC from performing its safety functio However.-the inspectors questioned whether the change to the facility was completed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.5 Paragraph 6 2.2.4.2. System Design, of the McGuire Updated Final Safety Analysis Report states the ice columns are composed of four baskets approximately 12 feet long each. The licensee reviewed this concern and stated ~that the change had not been accomplished via the performance of a 50.59.due to it not being considered a plant modification. Based on the Westinghouse qualification letter. the licensee had accepted use of f the 2 and 3 foot ice basket segments via performance of suitability l review completed in accordance with the Acceptable Substitutes Program.
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which did.not include a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluatio PIP 0-M98-2597 was l identified to address corrective actions for this proble Planned licensee corrective actions included an appropriate 10 CFR 50.59 u- _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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screening evaluation and drawing updates. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement actions.
l Walkdown reviews were conducted in all areas of the Unit 1 IC comparing l the as-built configuration to the design basis of the IC. In general.
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operated in accordance with the design basis and changes were being accomplished in accordance with approved procedures. One exception was identified during the walkdown of the upper plenum around the intermediate deck doors. Specifically. the inspectors identified a substantial amount of wire mesh installed in the crevice behind the IC air handing units (AHU) on both the containment and annulus side of the IC. The purpose of the mesh was to prevent tools, debris, and other foreign material from falling behind the AHUs in position where
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retrieval would be difficult. The inspectors informed the licensee of the wire mesh. The licensee confirmed that the installation of the i mesh, which was estimated to have been installed in the mid-1980s, was
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not in accordance with existing modification procedures. Planned licensee corrective actions included an appropriate 10 CFR 50.59 screening evaluation and drawing updates. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement
! action. 'The inspectors noted a more substantial wire mesh modification l was installed just above the older mesh in 1996 for the same purpose.
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The inspectors confirmed that this subsequent change was com)leted per the approved modification process and was considered accepta)le.
l In addition, the inspectors ex)anded their modification review to
! include previous PIP reports w1ich were related to a variety of issues l
between 1988 and the present. Throughout this time period, the inspectors confirmed that resolution of these sampled issues were completed within the licensee's approved modification processe At the time of the inspection, the licensee was in process of completing their review of the UFSAR for the IC system to assure the accuracy and completeness of the UFSAR. The ins)ectors did not identify any
! significant inaccuracy problems wit 1 the current UFSAR.
l Conclusions I By observation of ice basket modification work, the inspectors verified
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that the use of short length sections to re) air localized ice basket damage was being appropriately performed; tlat technicians were adequately qualified to perform their assigned tasks: and that adequate l oversight was provided by the contractor and the licensee. However, the NRC identified two changes to the facility which were not performed in accordance with approved modification processe No significant inaccuracy problems with the current UFSAR were identified by the NRC. The licensee was continuing their FSAR review in accordance with industry guidance.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors 3r,sented the inspection results to members of licensee management at tie conclusion of the inspection on June 26, 1998. A subsequent telephone exit on issues identified during the period August 5-7, 1998 was conducted on August 7. 1988. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee B. Barron. Vice President. McGuire Nuclear Station J. Boyle. Civil / Electrical / Nuclear Systems Engineering M. Cash. Manager. Regulatory Compliance B. Dolan. Manager. Safety Assurance E. Geddie. Manager. McGuire Nuclear Station J. Peele. Manager. Engineering B. Travis. Manager. Mechanical Systems Engineering INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 40500: Self-Assessment IP 37551: Onsite Engineering ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED OPENED 50-369.370/98-11-01 IFI Ice Condenser Insulation Effect on ECCS Sump Operability (Section M1.4)
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