IR 05000369/1987010

Insp Repts 50-369/87-10 & 50-370/87-10 on 870323-27. Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Required Annual Emergency Response Training to Three Members of Emergency Organization

ML20206G196
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	04/03/1987
From:	Decker T, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206G134	List: IR 05000369/1987010 ML20206G131 ML20206G156 ML20206G196
References
50-369-87-10, 50-370-87-10, NUDOCS 8704140474
Preceding documents:	ML20214P884 (15 May 1987)
Download: ML20206G196 (7)

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UNITED STATES

[$2 Klogo NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O\ .f/^ REGION li h

• ".( ). ' MARIETTA STRE ET, C ATL ANT A. GEORGI A 30323

% .' ,' '. . # APR07IW Report Nos.: 50-369/87-10 and 50-370/87-10 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Inspection Conducted: Marc 23-27, 1987 Inspector: O. N MNA _; '/- 3-87 A. Gooden~ I - Date Signed

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Approved by: i / [N/' ('.1 T. R. Decker, Chief

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'[ f - 6 7 Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Date Signed SUMMARY Scope: This routine unannounced inspection was conducted in the area of emergency preparednes Results: One violation was identified - failure to provide the required annual energency response training to three members of the emergency organizatio ;

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REPORT DETAILS

Persons Contacted i

L. W. Abernathy, Shift Supervisor

• N. G. Atherton, Associate Chemist

! *T. K. Beal, Operations Administrative Supervisor

! M. E. Connell, Health Physics Specialist

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R. M. Cloninger, Safety Assistant

• T. L. McConr. ell, Station Manager

• B. H. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services

• R. B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations

• J. R. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner i R. E. Harris, System Emergency Planner

, *E. O. McCraw, Compliance Engineer i R. R. Tracey, Shift Supervisor i R. A. Lindsay, Shift Supervisor

• O. Reeside, Operations Engineer

*J. E. Snyder, Performance Engineer

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D. J. Walcott, Health Physics Specialist

! *R. B. White, Jr., Instrument & Electrical Engineer I *S. E. LeRoy, Production Specialist

! *B. M. Gragg, Production Specialist

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, security office members and office personnel.

j Other Organization i J. B. Kinney, Fixed Nuclear Facility Planner, North Carolina Emergency l Management Agency

' NRC Resident Inspector I

• T. Orders

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• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were surmiarized on March 27, 1987, with l those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the j j areas inspected and discussed in detail the violation identified in ,

paragraph 6 belo No dissenting cormients were received from the !

l license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the 1 material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

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i This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

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4. Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)

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Pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Sections IV.B and IV.C, this program area was inspected to determine whether the licensee used and understood a standard emergency classification and action level schem The inspector reviewed the following classification procedures.:

RP/0/A/5700/01 - Notification of Unusual Event RP/0/A/5700/02 - Alert RP/0/A/5700/03 - Site Area Emergency RP/0/A/5700/04 - General Emergency

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The event classifications in the above-referenced procedures were

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consistent with those required by regulation. The classification procedures did not appear to contain impediments or errors which could

lead to incorrect or untimely classificatio Selected emergency action levels (EALs) specified in the classification procedures were reviewe The reviewed EALs appeared to be consistent with the initiating events specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-065 The

inspector noted that some of the EALs were based on parameters obtainable i from Control Room instrumentatio The inspector verified that the licensee's notification procedures

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included criteria for initiation of offsite notifications and for i development of protective action recommendation The notification procedures required that offsite notifications be made promptly after i declaration of an emergenc f The inspector discussed with licensee representatives the coordination of EALs with State and local officials. A licensee representative provided the inspector with documentation dated May 29, 1986, which showed that the licensee had contacted State and local officials during 1986 to review the EALs used for event classification and protective action decision-makin In addition, the inspector reviewed documentation from the offsite authorities providing concurrence with the EALs used by the license ,

! Interviews were held with three Shift Supervisors to verify that they i understood the relationship between core status and such core damage indicators as containment dome monitor, inadequate-core-cooling indicator, i high-range effluent monitor, containment hydrogen monitor, and

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)ost-accident primary coolant analysi All interviewees appeared

) (nowledgeable of the various core damage indications and their l

relationship to core statu .

! The responsibility and authority for classification of emergency events I and initiation of emergency action were prescribed in licensee procedures and in the Emergency Pla Interviews with selected key members of the

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licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel understood their responsibilities and authorities in relation to accident classification, notification, and protective action recommendation Selected Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) were reviewed by the inspector and discussed with licensee personnel. The EPIPs provided directions to users concerning timely classification of accidents. All personnel interviewed appeared to be familiar with the classification information in the EPIP Walk-through evaluations involving accident classification problems were conducted with three Shift Supervisors. All personnel interviewed promptly and properly classified the hypothetical accident situations presented to them, and appeared to be familiar with appropriate classification procedure The inspector verified that the appropriate notifications and followup actions were taken by the licensee following the declaration of an unusual event on January 30, 1987. The inspector reviewed the initial and followup notification fonns in addition to a letter from the Station '

Manager addressed to each of the offsite authorities (dated February 2, 1987) which summarized the event and actions leading up to the event. No problems were noted in event classification, notification, or followu No violations or deviations were identifie . Protective Action Decision-Making (82202)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and (10) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee had 24-hour-per-day capability to assess and analyze emergency conditions and make recommendations to protect the public and onsite workers, and whether offsite officials had the authority and capability to initiate prompt protective action for the publi The inspector discussed responsibility and authority for protective action decision-making with licensee representatives and reviewed pertinent portions of the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures. The Plan and procedures clearly assigned responsibility and authority for accident assessment and protective action decision-makin Interviews with members of the licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel understood their authorities and responsibilities with respect to accident assessment and protective action decision-makin Walk-through evaluations involving protective action decision-making were conducted with three Shift Supervisor Personnel interviewed demonstrated familiarity with the use of procedures which addressed the appropriate onsite and offsite protective action recommendations following the declaration of an emergency. Personnel interviewed were aware of the need for timeliness in making initial protective action recommendations to offsite official Interviewees demonstrated adequate understanding of

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the requirement that protective action reconmendations be based on core condition and containment status even if no release is in progres Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting responsible offsite authorities on a 24-hour basis. Backup conmunications links with offsite authorities were availabl The inspector confirmed that offsite decision-makers with authority for emergency response activities could be contacted on a 24-hour basis by observing a conmunications check (as discussed in Paragraph 6 below) via the Selective Signaling Phone to the State and county warning points from the Control Room. In addition, the inspector requested a communications drill via the backup communications link by conducting a radio check from the Control Room to the county warning point No violations or deviations were identifie . Knowledge a' d Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F, this area was inspected to determine whether emergency response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could perform their assigned function The inspector reviewed Section 0 of the Emergency Plan and Station Directive 2.5.1 for a description of the training program and training procedure In addition, selected lesson plans were revk ted and members of the instructional staff were interviewed. Based on these reviews and interviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had established a formal emergency training progra Records of training for key members of the onsite and offsite emergency organization for the period February 1986 to March 1987 were reviewed. It was noted that three members of the emergency organization, designated as Alternate Performance Technician, had not received the required annual retraining for station emergency response personnel. Although the specialized training, " Plant Data Transmission / Retrieval," specific for the before-mentioned personnel was completed, failure to attend the required annual retraining is inconsistent with training requirements as specified in the Station Emergency Plan, Section 0, and Station Directive 2.5.1 (Revision 2, dated January 7, 1987). A licensee representative acknowledged this finding as an oversight due to resources that were committed to a refueling outage during the period in which training was conducted. This item is identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) which requires the licensee to follow an emergency plan which meets the planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b).

Violation (50-369/87-10-01 and 50-370/87-10-01): Failure to provide annual retraining to personnel assigned to the station emergency organizatio __

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According to training records, with the exception of the finding stated i above, all other training provided to key members of the onsite emergency

organization was consistent with approved procedures. The inspector reviewed 1986 training records for various offsite support agencies and

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the Crisis Management Center (CMC) personnel. It was noted that training was provided in accordance with Section 0 of the Station and CMC Emergency

Plan In response to IE Information Notice No. 85-80, " Timely Declaration of an

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Emergency Class, Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency

Notifications," the inspector interviewed two Shift Support Technicians i and an Operations Administrative Supervisor who may be designated as an i Offsite Communicator for the Control Room. The Offsite Communicator is 4 responsible for initial comunications to the offsite agencies (State and l county) via the Selective Signaling Telephone System. The inspector conducted walk-through evaluations with comunicators using drill messages

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for transmission via the Selective Signaling Phone System and the backup comunications system (two-way radio) to State and county warning point The interviewees demonstrated familiarity with both comunication systems 1 and the responsibility as a comunicator during an emergency. A review of training records verified that interviewees had received annual trainin In addition, the inspector was informed by a licensee representative that i the Control Room Communicators periodically participate in conducting the i required monthly comunications checks between the Station and State / local warning point .

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The inspector conducted walk-through evaluations with selected key members of the emergency organization. During these. walk-throughs, individuals '

, were given various hyrethetical sets of emergency conditions and data and

asked to respond as if an emergency actually existed. The individuals demonstrated familiarity with emergency procedures and equipment, and no problems were observed in the areas of emergency detection and

classification, notifications, dose calculation, assessment action (to

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include plant conditions, in-plant sample collection and analysis), and protective action decision-makin One violation and no deviations were identified.

) Emergency Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies (82210)

i l The inspector verified the operational readiness of protective equipment i

and supplies by direct observation and records revie Records of

equipment inventory and operability checks for the period May 1986 to January 1987 were reviewe In addition, discussions with cognizant

. personnel and direct observation of an inventory and/or operability check conducted on the Operation Support Center Kit, Technical Support Center Kit, and the Personnel Survey Kit for North Personnel Access Portal (PAP),

i disclosed no discrepancies. It appears the . inventory and operability checks are being conducted in accordance with Plant Procedure PT/0/A/4600/11.

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7 Inspector Followup (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/84-31-02: Required improved management and administrative controls in routine operation of TSC. The inspector reviewed the October 1986 annual exercise report (86-27) and noted that required operation of the facility proceeded in an orderly manne Assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and fi r (Closed) IFI 50-369/85-42-01: Establish a range for iodine-131 increase rate to trigger incident classification. A review of the licensee's EALs disclosed that a range for iodine-131 increase rate was established for triggering the appropriate incident classificatio (Closed) IFI 50-369/86-27-01 and 50-370/86-27-01: Restore to operational i status and assure continued operation of all sirens located in Mecklenburg County, NC. A review of licensee documentation disclosed that followup

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siren tests fere conducted after replacing a faulty encoder and resulted in the subsect sirens as being operationa . IE Information Notice (92717)

(Closed) IFI 50-369/86-IN-98 and 50-370/86-IN-98: Offsite Medical Services. The inspector reviewed the licensee's letters of agreement with Offsite Medical facilities to verify that agreements were current for providing medical services to licensee personne In addition, discussions with a representative from the State Emergency management l Agency disclosed that the State Department of Human Resources has identified and periodically evaluates the capabilities, procedures, and willingness of North Carolina hospitals to accept and treat members of the general public who may be victims of a radiation acciden i i

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