IR 05000369/1987041
| ML20238D285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1987 |
| From: | Guenther S, William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238D228 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-87-41, 50-370-87-41, NUDOCS 8801040185 | |
| Download: ML20238D285 (9) | |
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p Rfoug'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOid y" -
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Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2 Docket Nos:
50-369 and 50-370 License Nos:
NPF-9 and NPF-17 Inspection Conduc ed:
ctober 21 - November 20, 1987 Inspectors:
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Senior sident Inspector
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5.'GDenther,RespentInspector M tv 5igned Accompanying Personnel:
D. Nelson Approved by:
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T. A. Peebles', Section Chief Date(51gned SUMMARY Scope:
This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations l
safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, follow-up of previous inspection findings and Unit I refueling and startup activities.
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Results:
In the areas inspected, one violation involving two examples of procedure non-compliance was identified.
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l 8801040185 871228 PDR ADOCK 05000369
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Person Contacted Licensee Employees T. McConnell, Plant Manager
- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance
- B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
- R. Ban'er, Compliance n
- J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
- R. Gill, General Office - Licensing Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, i
technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection findings identified below were summarized on November 20, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of their inspection.
Unresolved Items An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
One Unresolved Item concerning Component Cooling Water system operability was identified and is discussed in paragraph 4.
Plant Operations
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The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requiremer.ts. Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement
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of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2 electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, Unit I reactor building and the station yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
During a tour of the auxiliary building on the evening of November 3, it was noted that door number 952 on the 767 elevation was blocked fully open with a lead brick.
Two signs attached to the door indicated that it formed part of the auxiliary building pressure boundary.
One red engraved plastic sign read as follows:
" Auxiliary Building Pressure Boundary Keep Door Closed."
The second laminated printed sign said, " Notice Auxiliar Building Pressure Boundary Open Only For Passage Do Not Block Open." y There were no personnel in the area at the time and the door was not being used for passage.
The auxiliary building ventilation system consists of supply fans and filtered and unfiltered exhaust fans which are sized and operated in a manner to maintain a negative pressure in the auxiliary building with respect to the outside atmosphere (i.e., the capacity of the operating exhaust fans always exceeds the capacity of the operating supply fans).
This minimizes the uncontrolled spread of contamination to the environment by ensuring that any leakage of air is into the auxiliary building and all contaminated exhaust is released through the unit vent stacks after processing through an exhaust filter train, Air flow within the auxiliary building is also controlled such that the spread of contamination into clean areas is minimized.
An uncontrolled, open auxiliary building pressure bcundary door could jeopardize the design negative pressure differential between the auxiliary l
building and the environment and contribute to the uncontrolled spread of contamination within the auxiliary building.
The fact that the licensee does not have a program to control degraded auxiliary building (pressure boundary doors will be tracked as an Inspector Follow-up Item 50-369,-
370/87-41-01).
a.
Unit 1 Operations Unit I began the reporting period in Mode 5 (cold shutdown), in the l
final stages of a refueling outage; most remaining activity was directed at equipment / system testing and restoration.
(Refueling and startup activities are further discussed later in this report.)
Emergent equipment problems and repairs delayed the entry into Mode 4
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(hot shutdown) from the eriginally scheduled date of October 19 until about 4:30 a.m.
on November 8.
Heatup to Mode 3 (hot standby)
followed at about 3:30 a.m. on November 10.
The unit entered Mode 2 (startup) at 3:36 a.m. on November 12 and was taken critical for zero power physics testing at 4:15 a.m.
Mode 1 (power) operations were commenced at 6:23 a.m. on November 14 and the unit was placed on line at 7:05 a.m.
The unit progressed to full power operations and reached 100% power at 5:30 p.m.
on November 17.
Early on November 19, operators detected primary coolant unidentified. leakage at approximately 2.3 gpm, in excess of the TS allowed maximum of 1 gpm.
The source of the leakage could not be identified nor isolated and a unit shutdown and Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) were initiated at 6:52 a.m.
The unit entered mode 3 at 11:27 a.m.
The source of the leak was subsequently identified as packing leakage from charging flow control valve INV-238.
The packing was adjusted and leakage reduced to 0.6 gpm by 3:30 p.m.
The NOUE was secured at 4:50 p.m. and the reactor was made critical at 1:15 a.m. on November 20.
The unit entered mode 1 at 4:45 a.m. and was on line at 5:01 a.m.
During the startup the bypass valve (CF-107) for D feed regulating valve would not fully open and the 8 auxiliary feed (CA) pump was manually started to prevent a reactor trip on low-low steam generator water level.
The CA pump was used until power level was sufficient to allow using the feed regulating valve for normal feed.
Unit 1 achieved full power at 8:37 a.m. on November 21.
b.
Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 began the reporting period at full power and operated without significant incident until the morning of November 5. At about 6:30 that morning, personnel on Unit 1 initiated an air sparge agitation /
cleaning system on the IB containment spray (NS) heat exchanger.
The licensee, believes air leakage through the heat exchanger discharge valve allowed the pressurized air to be transported through the nuclear service water (RN) discharge header to the main condenser circulating water (RC) discharge crossover header, which is common to both units.
The lower pressure and flow velocities in the RC system allowed the entrained air to expand and collect in the piping high points.
A significant volume of air succeeded in backing up both Unit 2 main feedwater (CF) pump turbine condensers' discharge piping,
thereby blocking RC flow through the upper tubes in the CF turbine condensers and reducing vacuum.
The 2B CF pump tripped on low vacuum at 6:43 a.m., initiating a runback in power to about 56 percent, within the normal capacity of a single oper6 ting CF pump.
The 2A CF pump's capacity was also degraded by the ' lowered vacuum and was incapable of maintaining steam generator water levels.
The reactor tripped on low level in the B steam generator at 6:46 a.m.
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The unit responded normally during the trip and was placed back in l
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service the following day.
The restart was delayed slightly when I
both trains of the control room area chill water and ventilation system (VC/YC) failed the control room pressurization performance test, thereby invoking the requirements of Technical Specification 3.0.4.
The unit was placed back on line the morning of November 6 i
after both trains of VC/YC were restored to an operable status.
This event will be carried as an Inspector Followup Item pending review of the Problem Investigation Report and Post Trip Review (IFI 370/87-
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41-02).
c.
Component Cooling Water System Operability Concerns As discussed above, unit two tripped at 6:46 a'.m.
on Thursday, November 5.
Later that morning the licensee discussed performing required flow tests on the component cooling water (KC) heat exchangers.
The applicable tests were due on the following day for the A heat exchanger and on Monday, November 9 for the B heat
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exchanger.
It was alluded to in these conversations that if the tests were performed, it was probable that the heat exchangers would not pass and that cleaning them would impact unit restart.
Ultimately, neither heat exchanger was tested until after unit restart, at which time both failed.
This issue is currently under review and will be carried as an Unresolved Item pending completion of that review (UNR 50-370/87-41-03).
d.
Unit 2 Fuel Element Defect Licensee personnel are continuing to track the status of the fuel element defect, first evident on August 26.
The dose equivalent Iodine 131 (I-131) concentration was stable at approximately 0.08 microCuries/ gram during sl.eady state full power operation but peaked to a level of 1.3 ni crocuries/ gram after the unit trip on November 5.
i The dose equivalent I-10 concentration was well below the 1.0
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microcurie / gram Technical Specification limit before the unit was restarted on November 6.
Since the unit restart, the I-131 concen-tratfor. has decreased and stabilized at about 0.04 microCuries/ gram.
The inspectc'rs will continue to monitor licensee activities in this area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testing Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
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Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed and test results were tiequate.
Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:
Procedure Component PT-1-A-4200-28 Slave Relay Test PT-1-A-4209-03P NV Valve Stroke Timing PT-1-A-4252-018 M/D Aux Feedwater Pump Test
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PT-1-A-4204-018 ND Pump 1B Pe-formance Test PT-1-A-4204-01A ND Pump 1A Performance Test PT-2-A-4252-01B M/D Aux Feedwater Pump Test PT-2-A-4206-01B NI Pump 28 Performance Test PT-2-A-4204-01A ND Pump 2A Performance Test
Inadequate Surveillance Procedure At 12:05 a.m.
on September 5,1987, operators started Residual Heat Removal (ND) pump 18 and observed that the pump's recirculation (mini flow) valve,1kD-67B, did not open as required.
Automatic operation of the valve is controlled by flow instrument 1MNDPG5050 whose purpose is to sense ND flow and to cause the mini flow va?ve to open if insufficient ND flow (500 g pump from 'pm) exists, thereby providing recirculation flow protecting the dead headed" operation.
The operator then actuated the OPEN pushbutton for the valve and observed that the valve opened but then closed.
ND train IB was declared inoperabb, and a work request was issued to determine and correct the proble.
At 1:46 a.m.
licensee personnel discovered the flow instrument's local flow gauge indicating 1200 gpm due to the instrument's high pressure side being isolated, trapping high pressure fluid.
The 1200 gpm indication was above the 1000 gpm high range setpoint and was appropriately causing the mini flow valve to remain closed.
(This signal overrides manual push-button operation from the control room.)
The instrument was placed in service, ND pump IB i0 started, and the mini flow valve operated as designed.
ND train B was declared operable at 2:30 a.m.
The licensee determined that the irstrument was isolated in conjunction with the performance of a surveillance work request to calibrate the instrument (WR) by Instrumentation and Electrical (IAE) personnel on August 28, 1987.
After completing the calibration procedure and making signoffs and Independent Verification for unisolating the instrument, the technicians noticed a leaking fitting on the instrument housing and re-isolated it to repair the leak.
Neither a procedure nor the applicable l
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portions of the WR were used to perform this action.
After completing the repairs, the technicians do not recall unisolating the instrument and leaving it inoperable.
The details of this event are discussed in Licensee Event Report 369/87-020.
Several NRC concerns arise.
The WR for calibration was deficient in that it did not identify the flow instrument as being safety related and no retest or functional verification was required.
This contributed to a personnel error in that ND train 8 was not declared inoperable when the WR was released on August 28, and resulted in train 8 of ND being unknowingly inoperable until 2:30 a.m. on September 5.
The IAE personnel re-isolated the instrument and conducted repairs without a procedure, leaving the instrument isolated, in spite of having just made signoffs in the WR placing the instrument in service following. calibration.
For the first six days of ND train IB's inoperability, Unit I was in Modes 1, 2 and 3, requiring both trains of ND to be operable.
The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for the applicable Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2, allowing one train to be inoperable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> was therefore exceeded.
This constitutes a violation of TS 3.5.2.
The procedural inadequacy is considered to be a violation of TS 6.8.1. and collectively with another example detailed immediately below, constitute Violation 369/87-41-04.
The significance of the mini flow valve being inoperable becomes apparent not in the worst case accident, but in more likely small break loss of coolant accidents or inadvertent ESF actuations.
In these cases the ND pumps will start and operate at shut off head conditions requiring recirculation flow until operators determine the pumps are not needed and secure them.
IE Information Notice 85-94 described circumstances where damage to emergency core cooling system pumps could occur in as little as one minute of operation at shut off head without the minimum required flow.
Further discussion of this issue is contained in IE Information Notice 87-59.
Another incident involving licensee personnel performing work without a procedure occurred on September 16 in Unit 1.
In this case IAE and Relay personnel were performing a test to verify proper operation of busline lockout relays and associated 5dicating lights on which wiring modifi-cations had been performed.
i % p ocedure used to test the lockout relays
. allows for a jumper to be plau! mross two terminals to ensure that only a specific relay energizes and its associated light illuminates.
The procedure also states that the busline associated with the relays to be tested must be de-energized.
However, IAE personnel wanted to test beyond I
the requirements of the procedure to ensure that no circuits had been inadvertently altered during the modification.
These additional checks l
included energizing other relays which, in turn, energize a lockout relay.
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This was performed by Relay personnel beyond the scope of the procedure, l
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using only the McGuire Electrical Elementary Drawings as a guide.
Since-the busline associated with the relays was not de-energized, a loss of off site power resulted when the lockout relays energized.
The details of this event are discussed in Licensee Event Report 369/87-21.
This constitutes a second example of a violation of the requirements of TS 6.8.1. and collectively with the example delineated above constitute Violation 369/87-41-04.
6.
Maintenance Observation Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and maintenance results were adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(CLOSED) Violation 50-369/85-30-01 Background:
Failure to maintain two trains of pressurizer heaters with emergency power as required by TS 3.8.1.1 and 3.4.3.
Resolution:
This incident was addressed with the licensed staff during 1986 requalification training segment 1.
Since the time of the incident, the operations staff has been provided with additional guidance in making TS operability determinations through publication of a Station Directive (SD 2.8.2) which clarifies Nuclear Production Department policy on the subject.
b.
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item 50-369, 370/87-36-03 Background:
Unit 1 loss of off site power and Unit 2 trip on September 6, 1987.
Resolution:
This item is closed based on its inclusion in Violation 50-369/87-41-04 discussed in paragraph 5 of this report.
8.
Unit 1 Refueling /Startup Activities Unit 1 completed its refueling outage commenced on September 4.
Refueling and startup activities were observed to ascertain whether Technical Specification requirements were satisfied and activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
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The following startup surveillance tests were witnessed / reviewed:
PT/0/A/4600/77 Full Length Rod Control Cluster Assembly Drop Testing PT/1/A/4150/01A Reactor Coolant System Leak Test PT/0/A/4150/12 Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Measurement No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Hydrogen Skimmer System On November 10, 1937, during a routine post refueling containment close-out inspection, the inspectors detected that two Unit 1 manual, butterfly, air flow control valves, VX-15 and VX-16 in the hydrogen.
skimmer system appeared to be fully closed.
The inspectors compared the positions with those of valves VX-27 and VX-28, which serve the same purpose in a different compartment.
It was found that VX-27 and 28 were throttled open approximately 30 degrees.
Upon exiting the containment, the inspectors reviewed the applicable operating procedure which specified that VX-15,16, 27, and 28 were all to be throttled, but the procedure gave no specific position.
After discussing the issue with the licensee, it was determined that the valves were aligned to paint markings on the valve operators which are l
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supposed to be the proper positions, set up during pre-ops.
The licensee concedes however, that if the valves were painted when in the incorrect position, they are in the incorrect position now.
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The ifcensee has committed to conduct a VX flow balance on both units during the next outage of adequate duration.
In the interim, having been assured by the licensee that the VX systems on both units are currently operable, the matter will be carried as an inspector follow-up item pending completion of the flow balances (IFI 369,370/87-41-05).
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