IR 05000369/1987046

Insp Repts 50-369/87-46 & 50-370/87-46 on 871107-880113. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations Safety Verification & Surveillance Testing

ML20149D634
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	02/04/1988
From:	William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149D602	List: IR 05000369/1987046 ML20149D599 ML20149D615
References
50-369-87-46, 50-370-87-46, NUDOCS 8802090571
Download: ML20149D634 (30)

Text

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pm Rtcp UNITED STATES l g 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

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n REGION 11 g' ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET,t =

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l Report Nos.: 50-369/87-46 and 50-370/87-46 l i

Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street ,

Charlotte, NC 28242 ,

Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 Inspection Conduc e - vember 7 1987 - January 13, 1988 Inspector:, , b 1. Vrde'rs, Senior Re ident Inspector M[

/Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel

D Nelson -

j Approved by: /

' W/

AT Pfebres, Section b

~i e f dM Cate Signed

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Division of Reactor Pro ects a

SUMMARY [

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Scope: This special unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations safety verification and sccveillance testin Results: In the areas inspected, one violation involving an inadequate a surveillance test program which led to inoperable safety related equipmerit was identified.

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8802090571 080204 l PDR ADOCK0500g9  ;

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REPORT DETAILS

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t Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• T.-McConnell, Plant Manager

• B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations i *B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services

! *N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer

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Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and '

office personne '

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 4,1988,'with ,

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those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The licensee

representatives present offered no dissenting comments nor did they

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identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of their inspectio Subsequently, a management nveting was held in the NRC Region II offices on January 13, 1988, at the request of the licensee. In'that meeting, the licensee explained the background behind, the scenario leading to, and !

corrective actions taken relative to the event described in this repor l

! A list of meeting attendees is enclosed as attachment 2. A copy of the I handout issued by the licensee during the meeting is enclosed as Attachment . Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified in this repor Executive Summary

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On November 7,1987, McGuire Unit 2 was restarted from a trip which occurred on November 5. Details of the trip are delineated in inspection report 50-369,370/87-41. At the time of the restart, based on the current test acceptance criteria, both trains of component cooling water (KC) i l

would have failed the test due to fouling of the system heat exchanger l

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l The heat exchanger fouling was verified later when the Unit 2 KC heat exchangers were tested and failed to meet the test acceptance criteri This testing was devised to detect fouling of the tube side of these

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components which is cooled by nuclear service water (RN), a raw lake water system. Testing of these particular heat exchangers is an element of a comprehensive test program implemented in early 1986 as a result of operability concerns involving the fouling of various components in the RN !

syste This test program incorporated flow balance testing and heat exchanger testing along with heat exchanger cleanin {

Of concern are the following:

' The effectiveness of the testing progra The restart of Unit 2 with both trains of KC inoperable, which in turn made both trains of the residual heat removal system (NO)

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inoperabl The decision to restart the unit when it appears there was ample evidence available prior to restart to challenge the operability of the KC syste . Background In October 1985, a problem was identified concerning the fouling of heat exchangers cooled by Nuclear Service Water (RN). For more detail relative

to the generic issue refer to report 50-369/85-38, 50-370/85-39. Stemming from that problem, which ultimately resulted in escalated enforcement, the 1

licensee implemented an extensive heat exchanger testing program which i encompassed the KC heat exchangers.

i As illustrated on page 2 of Attachment 1, a plot of the McGuire Unit 2 KC i heat exchanger test data for 1986 and 1987, there was at least one i occurrence in the fall of 1986 and two in the fall of 1987 prior to the ;

November 7 event, during which both trains of KC appear to have been l inoperable simultaneously. Furthermore, if the Unit 1 KC heat exchanger :

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test results are included in the analysis, there were five failures out of the six tests performed between September 4 and October 9, 198 . Event Scenario l

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During a routine staff meeting on the morning of November 4, 1987,

licensee management discussed the fact that the Unit 2 KC heat exchanger i

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tests were due cn Friday, November 6 on the A train and on Monday, 1 November 9 on B train, j

On the following morning, November 5,1987, at about 7:00 a.m., Unit 2 tripped from full power due to a loss of vacuum in the main feedwater pump

turbine condensers (Details in report 50-369,370/87-41). Later that l l

morning during a routine staff meeting, licensee management again discussed the scheduled KC tests and the probability that the heat exchangers would need to be cleaned when tested, i 4  !

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Neither heat exchanger was tested until Saturday, November 7 after the unit had been restarted. It is of particular interest here to note that had the test been perforrred as scheduled on Friday, November 6 the heat exchanger would have failed. This statement is made based on the test results illustrated on Attachment 1. This would have precluded unit restart in that Technical Specification 3.0.4, applicable to the KC system, prevents a unit from changing modes while in the action statement of a The A train KC heat exchanger was tested on Saturday, failed the test, was declared inoperable and subsequently cleaned. The heat exchanger was retested and declared operable on November 1 During the period between November 7 and 10 the operability of the B KC heat exchanger was not considered. It is routine practice to assume a component is operable if it is within its surveillance perio This assumption, hcncver, i: predicated upon an adequate surveillance progra On November 10, after returning the A heat exchanger to service, the B

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heat exchanger was tested, it also failed,and was cicaned. The component was returned to service later that da Of concern is an apparent pattern of inoperability of these heat exchangers, and the restart of the unit on November 7, with what appears to be adequate information available prior to the unit restart forecasting the heat exchangers' degradation. This pattern is graphically depicted on Attachment 1.

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' KC System Design Basis The Component Cooling System is designed to: Remove residual and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System, via the Residual Heat Removal System, during normal station shutdown and during accident conditions.

1 Cool the letdown flow to the Chemical and Voluma Control System during power operation.

l Cool the spent fuel pool water, l provide cooling to dissipate waste heat from various primary station comporents during normal operation and under accident conditions.

KC System Description l

l The Corrponent Cooling System for each of the McGuire units normally l functions as two independent sub-systems and consists basica'.;y of four pumps and two heat exchangers.

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Cooling water is normally available to all components served by the system, even though one or more or these con:ponents may be individually isolated. Valves actuated by an Engineered Safety Features (ESF) signal are used to provide essential safety equipment with cooling water should it become necessary to place these compenents in service under loss-of-coolant accident condition The component cooling heat exchangers are the shell and straight tube type, Raw *iver water from the Nuclear Se.rvice Water System is circulated through the straight tubes. During normal Station operation, two pumps and one heat exchanger provide the necessary cooling requirements. Two pumps and one heat exchanger are adequate for nonnal cooldown, refueling, and in the event of a LOCA. The remaining pumps and heat exchanger serve as a backu Some of the more important equipment serviced by the KC system is: residual heat removal heat exchangers fuel pool cooling heat exchangers letdown heat exchanger excess letdown heat exchanger e, reactor coolant pump motor bearings and thermal barriers residual heat removal pump mechanical seal heat exchanger System Safety Evaluation As discussed in the FSAR, sufficient cooling capacity is provided to fulfill all system requirements under normal and accident condition Adequate safety margins are included in the size and number of components to preclude the possibility of a component malfunction adversely affecting operation of ESF equipmen Active system components considered vital to the operation of the system are redundant. Any single passive failure in the system should not prevent the system from performing its design functio In consideration of single failure criteria, the Component Cooling System contains separate flow paths to the tuo trains of ESF Features equipmen Any piping connecting the separate flow paths contain isolation valves in series.

1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in

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service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits

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contained in applicable design documents. The test program shall {

include, as appropriate, proof tests prior to installation, ;

preoperational tests, and operational tests during nuclear power plant operation, of . structures, systems, and components. Test .

results shall be documented and evaluated to assure that test j requirements have been satisfied, j 4 Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3 requires that two independent -

> component cooling water loops be operable for modes 1, 2, 3, and i With only one loop operable, both loops must be restored to an

, operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the unit be in hot standby within ;

the next six hours and cold shutdown within the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> >

11. Conclusions

)I The test program, established to demonstrate that the KC system will >

perform satisfactorily in service, was inadequate in that five of the six tests performed between the dates of September 4 and October 9, ,

J 1987 failed. The test program, by design, was established to -

j maintain system operability. The repeated test failures of the KC l 4 heat exchangers is, sufficient to question program adequac l'

Detailed below are the dates, components and results of KC heat l exchanger fouling tests conducted between September 4 and November 2S, 198 ;

i Acceptance l

KC Heat Criteria Actual  ;

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) Date Exchan g DELTA P (PSID) DELTAP(PSID1 Results

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1 Sept. 4 2A .00 Failed !

Sept. 10 2B .00 Failed i

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4 Oct. I 1A .00 Passed

' Oct. I la Failed .00 l Oct. 7 2A .60 Failed I

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Oct. 9 20 .59 Failed i Nov. 7 2A .15 Failed l 1 Nov. 10 2B .18 Failed l Nov. 25 IB .00 Failed This test data is depicted graphically in Attachment I l

i Test data indicates that both Unit 2 KC heat exchangers were inoperable simultaneously; once during the Fall of 1986 and a number of times during the Fall of 1987, when the unit was operating in modes requiring both trains to be operable, i

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Subsequent licensee analysis revealed however that based on a model l

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assuming uniform depositing of silt on the HX tubes, the limiting DP !

for design basis heat transfer is 16.0 psid. Assuming that type of i debris geometry, only one KC HX (2B) was actually inoperable during -

the Fall of 1987. The licensee's safety analysis is entailed in LER

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370/87-2

The above is identified as a violation (50-370/87-46-01).

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McGUIRE 2 CO!JPONE!4T COOUNG HX TEST RESULTS

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f ATTACHMENT 2 l

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Duke Management Meeting Attendees January 13, 1988 i

l Name Oroanization Position

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T. Peebles NRC Section Chief Region !! !

W. T. Orders NRC Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire -l M. Thomas NRC TPS, RII i j C. Hehl NRC Deputy Director, DRP j

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M. L. Ernst NRC Deputy Regional Administrator :

A. F. Gibson NRC Director, DRS  !

J. E. Synder Duke MNS/ Performance Engineer ;

R. L. Gill Duke McGuire Licensing j J E. O. McCraw Duke McGuire Compliance Engineer !

! M. A. Haller Duke G. O. Tech Service  !

M. D. McIntosh Duke General Manager - NRC Support l l Support of Tech Services - MNS

B. H. Hamilton Duke i j Tony L. McConnel Duke Station Manager /MNS j

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,o r ATTACPMENT 3 f

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- UNIT 2 COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) '

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t INOPERABILITY IN THE FALL OF 1987 '

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AS A RESULT OF THE McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION'S NUCLEAR SERVICE WA

SYSTEM (RN) TEST PROGRAM WE DISCOVERED THAT THE )(bPERASILITY O

! THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) CAN NOT BE ESTABLISHED FOR S PERIODS OF TIME DURlhG THE LATE FALL OF 198 THE PERIOOS IN QUESTION ARE BETWEEN THE MONTHLY SURVElLLANCES BEING CONOUCTED THAT TIM i i i

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AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION

BRIEF STATEMENT OF PURPOSE OF THE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) AND THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC)

DESCRIPTION OF THE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) TEST PROGRAM AT McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

DISCUSSION OF "WHAT WE KNEW", ON NOVEMBER 5, 1987

DISCUSSION OF ADDITIONAL INCORMATION OBIAiNED AFTER NOVEMBER 7, 1987

F.cGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION'S IMME,DIATE REACTI0N TO THE

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AD -:i 7 l ONAL INFORMATION

CHANGES MADE TO THE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) TEST PROGRAM AS A RESULT OF THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

FUTURE PLANS AND ADDITIONAL STUDIES

CONCLUSIONS

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PURPOSES OF THE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) AND THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (KC)

NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) THIS SYSTEM PROVIDES ASSURED COOLING WATER FOR VARIOUS AUXILIARY SUILDING AND REACTOR BUILDING HEAT EXCHANGERS DURING ALL PHASES OF STATION OPERATIO EACH UNIT HAS TWO REDUNDANT "ESSENTIAL HEADERS" SERVING TWO TRAINS OF EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR SAFE STATION SHUTDOWN, AND A "NON-ESSENTIAL HEADER" SERVING EQUIPMENT NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOW IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, COMPRISED OF LAKE NORMAN AND THE STANDBY NUCLEAR SERVICE VATER POND, THE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) IS DESIGNED TO MEET DESIGN FLOW RATES AND HEADS FOR NORMAL STATION SHUTDOWN NORMALLY OR AS THE RESULT OF A POSTULATED LOC THE SYSTEM IS FURTHER DESIGNED TO TOLERATE A SINGLE FAILURE FOLLOWillG A LOCA, AND/OR SEISMIC EVENT CAUSING A LOSS OF LAKE NORMAN,,AND/OR LOSS OF STATION POWER PLUS OFFSITE POWER (STATION B LACKOUT) .

COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC)

THIS SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO: REMOVE RESIDUAL AND SENSIBLE HEAT FROM THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM, VIA THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM, DURING STATION SHUTDOWN, COOL THE LETDOWN FLOW TO THE CHEMICAL S VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM DURING POWER OPERATIO COOL THE SPENT FUEL POOL WATE PROVIDE COOLING TO DISSIPATE WASTE HEAT FROM'

VARIOUS PRIMARY STATION COMPONENTS DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND ACCIDENT CONDITION .

DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) HEAT EXCHANGER THESE HEAT EXCHANGERS ARE STANDARD ONCE THROUGH, SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGERS WITH THE FOLLOWING SPECIFICATIONS:

NUMBER PER UNIT 2 ,

DESIGN PRESSURE, PSIG 150 O

DESIGN TEMPERATURE, F .

200 DESIGN FLOW (SHELL SIDE), LB/HR 2,610,751 DESIGN FLOW (TUBE SIDE), LB/HR 4,97G,600 SHELL SIDE INLET TEMP, O F 106 SHELL SIDE OUTLET TEMP, O F 95 TUBE SIDE INLET TEMP, F 90 TUBE SIDE OUTLET TEMP, O F 96 SHELL SIDE MATERIAL CARBON STEEL TUBE SIDE MATERIAL INHIBIT 3D ADMIRALTY OVERALL HEAT EXCHANGER LENGTH, FT 4 OVERAL HEAT EXCHANGER DIA, FT TUBE LENGHTH, FT

TUBE O.D., INCHES ... 5/8 NUMBER OF TUBES PER HEAT EXCHANGER d 10 0 ,

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NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) TEST PROGRAM AT MCGUlRE NUCLEAR STATION AS A RESULT OF OPERABILITY CONCER.NS INVOLVING THE FOULING OF VARIOUS COMPONENTS IN THE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) A COMPREHESIVE TEST PROGRAM WAS IMPLEMENTED FOR THE SYSTEM IN EA 198 THIS TEST PROGRAM INCORPORATED FLOW BALANCE TESTING AND HEAT EXCHANGER TESTING WITH AN AGGRESSIVE HEAT EXCHANGER CLEAN PROGRAM AND A PRE-EXISTING PUMP AND VALVE TEST PROGRA THIS PROGRAM, AS CONFIRMED BY OU? SURVEYS AND BY THE MANY

INQUIRIES FROM OTHER STATIONS, it THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND AGGRESSIVE PROGRAM IN THE COUNTR ...

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CURRENT NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER TESTING PROGRAM l

NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER FLOW BALANCE

QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE

CLEANING ANY TWO OF THE FOLLOWING HEAT EXCHANGERS RN/NS, RN/KC, AND RN/KD ON ONE TRAIN REQUIRES A FLOW B/, LANCE WITHIN 7 DAYS (OR WITHIN 7 DAYS AFTER THE UNIT REfURNS TO NCRMAL OPERATION).

PERIODIC CLEANING OF ALL OTHER HEAT EXCHANGERS DOES NOT REQUIRE A NEW FLOW BALANC CONTAINMENT SPRAY (NS) HEAT EXCHANGERS

QUARTERLY HEAT BALANCE TEST

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TEST BIENNIALLY

CLEAN YEARLY OR AS REQUIRED BY TEST RESULTS COMPONENT COOLING (KC) HEAT EXCHANGERS

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QUARTERLY DIFFERIENTIAL PRESSURE TEST (MONTHLY l DURING SEPT. - NOV.)

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CLEAN AT REFUELING OR AS REQUIRED BY TEST RESULTS I i

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OlESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER (KD) HEAT EXCHANGER

SEMI-ANNUAL HEAT BALANCE TESTINGX

CLEAN AS REQUIRED BY TEST RESULTS X

TESTING HAS BEEN SUSPENDED WHILE CONFLICTING RESULTS ARE EVALUATE IN THE INTERIM THE HEAT EXCHANGERS ARE CLEANED EVERY 6 MONTH MOTOR COOLERS AND NI Olt COOLERS

NO TESTING PERFORMED

PERIODICALLY CLEANED DEPENDENT ON OBSERVED FOULING LEVELS FROM TWO OR MORE SUCCESSIVE CLEANINGS CURRENT NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER TESTING PROGRAM

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CENTRI FUGAL CHARGING PUMP (NV) OI L/ GEAR COOLERS

QUARTERLY DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TEST

CLEAN AS REQUIRED BY TEST RESULTS BUT NOT LESS THAN ONCE PER FUEL CYCL CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION (VC/YC) HEAT EXCHANGERS

SEMI-ANNUAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TEST

CLEAN AS REQUIRED BY TEST RESULTS BUT NOT LESS THAN ONCE PER FUEL CYCL . - _ -

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SPENT FUEL POOL (KF) PUMP AIR HANDLING UNIT

QUARTERLY DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TEST

CLEAN AS REQUIRED BY TEST RESULTS BUT NOT LESS THAN ONCE PER FUEL CYCL CONTAINMENT SPRAY (NS) AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL'(ND) PUMPS AIR HANDLING UNITS

SEMI-ANNUAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TEST

CLEAN AS REQUIRED BY TEST RESULTS i

RETEST POLICY

RETEST IS REQUIRED AFTER MAINTENANCE WHEN THE COMPONENT WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO TESTIN PERIODIC CLEANINGS AND OPTIONAL CLEANING WILL NOT REQUIRE RETEST BEFORE RETURNING TO SERVIC RETEST WILL BE PERFORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN BASELINE DAT .

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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION COMPONENT COOUNG HX TEST RESULTS 22 -

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MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION'S IMMEDIATE REACTION

DISCUSSION OF THE NEED OF PROGRAM ENHANCEMENT BETWEEN PERFORMANCE PERSONNEL AND THE SUPERINTENDENT OF TECHNICAL SERVICES

COMMUNICATION OF RESULTS TO SENIOR STATION MANAGEMENT (SEE DATED PROFS NOTE)

DISCUSSION OF TEST FAILURES WITH THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTORS

DOUBLING THE SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY OF THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) HEAT EXCHANGER PRESSURE DROP TESTING

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CHANGES MADE TO THE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) TEST PR l

TEMPORARY INSTRUMENTATION IS BEING INSTALLED TO ALLOW DAILY MONITORING OF COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) HEAT EXCHANGER INSTALLATION WILL BE COMPLETE BY 3/1/88 AND WILL ALLOW A FULL 6 MONTHS OF BASELINE DATA TO BE COLLECTED PRIOR TO THE FALL OF 198 l

ALL "FAILED" SURVEILLANCES IN THE PERFORMANCE TEST PROGRAM WILL RECElVE A FORMAL, DOCUMENTED REVIEW AND l

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APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT WILL BE INVOLVE THIS PROGRAM WILL BE IN EFFECT BY 3/1/8 (SEE DRAFT VERSION)

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REV. 4/ 01-11-88 LOGIC DIAGRAM SURVEILLANCE FAILURE v

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_-Y COMMON MODE ANALYSIS i FAILED COMPONENT SECTION HISTORY REVIEW SECTION FOCUS FOCUS

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OPERABILITY OF OTHER OPERATIONAL, MAINT.,

SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS AND SURVEILLANCE HISTORY OF FAILED COMPONENT

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REV. 4/ 01-11-88 LOGIC DIAGRAM 1.0: COMMON MODE (CM) ANALYSIS DOES CM Y IDENTIFY CN HAS CM POTENTIAL > MECHANISMS / > OCCURRE EXIST? COMPONENTS (1.3)

(1.1) (1.1/1.2) Y N N l

E V PROVIDE BASIS <

(1.1/1.3)

V I

GO TO IS IDENTIFY (ARE)

INOPERABLE < CM COM < COMPLETE <-

COMP'TS N PERABLE? . OEF (1.3)

(1.5) (1.4)

Y OEF: OPERABILITY V

EVALUATION V FORM f

NOTIFY RECORD NEXT OPS / COMPLIANCE SURVEILLANCE DATE >

(1.5-1.6) (1.7)

V PROVIDE Y UFFICIENT

< BASIS . < MARGIN?

(1.8) (1.8)

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RESCHEDULE NEXT GO TO .< SURVEILLANCE <

(1.8)

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REV. 4/ 01-1t-88 LOGIC DIAGRAM 2.0: FAILED COMPONENT HISTORY REVIEW COMPLETE PAST COMPLETE WR MNT OPERABILITY > HISTORY -> PROBLEM REVIEW REVIEW IDENT.?

(2.1) (2.2.1) 2. N Y

INDEP'T REVIEW / ASSIGN PIR APPROVAL < TO MNT FOR (3.0) RESOLUTION

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A A y y >

Y ASSIGN PIR OOT TO OPS FOR CAUSE.. .

RESOLUTION IDENT.?

(2.2.1)

N

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V ROOT -

DEFINE OPS CAUSE <._ OPS __< IMPACTS (

IDENT.? PROBLEM Y IDENT.?

.2.3) (2.2.2) 2. N N v

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->_ PER MGT >

j FREQUENCY INPUT REVIEW (2.2.4) (2.3)  !

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REV. 4/ 01-11-88 LOGIC DIAGRAM 2.3: SURVEILLANCE / TEST FREQUENCY REVIEW '

SHORT TERM REPEAT N 2.1.4 '%* N HISTORY > FAILURE? > GTE 25%?

REVIEW (2.3. (2.3.1.2)

(2.3.1)

Y Y V

< <

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INC PROVIDE SHORT TERM N BASIS /

SURV.FREQ ? >- APPROVAL >

2.3. (2.3.1.3)

V Y

>

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COMPLETE ONG TER

< CALCULATIONS < HISTORY <_

(2.3.2.1 .3) REVIEW Y PMPT N

'%' > SURV. FRE N-GTE 25%? INCREASED? i (2.3.2.3) 2.3. N Y V

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APPR'L APPROVAL (3.0) (2.3.2.4)  !

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e FUTURE PLANS AND ADDITIONAL STUDIES

THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) HEAT EXCHANGERS WILL BE PERMANENTLY INSTRUMENTED TO ALLOW CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF PRESSURE DROP BY THE PLANT COMPUTE *

BASED ON CONTINUOUS MONITORING OBSERVATIONS THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) HEAT EXCHANGERS WILL BE FLUSHED AT EARLY INDICATIONS OF FOULIN o THE DESIGN ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO

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CONSIDER VARIOUS ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS TO THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) HEAT EXCHANGER FOULING PROBLE ~

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CONCLUSIONS

BASED ON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON NOVEMBER 5, 1987, MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION DURING THE RESTART OF UNIT # *

BASED ON THE INFORMATION AVAI LABLE NOW, THE UNIT 2 COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) WAS DEGRADED AND UNABLE TO l PASS ALL ITS ASSOCIATED SURVEILLANCE TESTS FOR PERIODS DURING THE LATE FALL OF 198 THESE PERIODS WERE BETWEEN THE MONTHLY SURVElLLANCE INTERVALS USED AT THAT TIM *

THE MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (RN) TEST PROGRAM, ALTHOUGH THE MOST EXTENSIVE IN THE COUNTRY, WAS INADEQUATE IN REGARDS-TO ITS TREATMENT OF THF. COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM (KC) HEAT EXCHANGERS, IN THAT IT COULD NOT DETECT RAPID DEGRADATION DUE TO ACCELERATED FOULIN *

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION HAS REACTED APPROPRIATELY AND IN A TIMELY FASHlON TO ACCELERATED FOULING INCIDENTS OCCURRING DURING THE LATE FALL OF 198 PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS SHOULD PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE OF THIS PROBLE l l

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