ML20244E588
| ML20244E588 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1989 |
| From: | Shymlock M, Vandoorn K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20244E584 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-89-11, 50-370-89-11, NUDOCS 8906200405 | |
| Download: ML20244E588 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1989011
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION H
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101 MARIETTA ST
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ATLANTA. GEOPGIA 30323
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~ Report.Nos.: 50-369/89-11.and 50-370/89-11
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- Licensee
- Duke Power Company
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422 South Church Street
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Charlotte,LNC 28242
Facility: Name: McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2
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Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370
. License Nr>s.:
Inspection tondu ted:~M rch 30, 1 89 - April 21, 1989-
Inspector:fs
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-K. VanD6orn, Senior Resident Inspector
aie Signed
Accompanying Inspectors:-
T. Cooper, Reactor Inspector
S. Vias, Reactor Inspector
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Approved by:
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R. B.. Shymlock, Section Chief /)
Date Signed'
Division of Reactor Projects *
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations
safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities,
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'and follow-up on previous inspection findings.
_.Resul ts : In the areas inspected, one violation was identified (see paragraph
7.b.) involving three instances of temporary loss' of' the Residual
Heat Removal system, on Unit'1. Procedural weaknesses contributed to
two events and an. inadequate drawing contributed to the other.
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System function was regained in a timely manner .in each case.
The.
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unit was in mid-loop operation during the first of the three events.
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Several minor housekeeping discrepancies were also identified. (see
paragraph 3.c.)
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services
- 1. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling-
G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services
- T. Mathews, Site Design Engineering Manager
- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
- D. Murdock.-McGuire Design Engineering, Division Mv.ager
W. Reeside, Operations Engineer
- M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance
- R. Sharp, Compliance Manager
J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
- J. Silver, Unit 2 Operations Manager
- A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman
B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
R. White,_ Instrument and Electrical Engineer
Other licensec employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
.2 .
Unresolved Item:;
An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is
required to determine whether it is acceptahle or may involve a violation
or deviation. There were no unresolved items identified in this report.
3.
Plant Ope' rations (71707, 71710)
The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to
verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room
logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment
removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were
conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,
and performance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at
shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as
prescribed .in applicable station administrative directives. The complement
of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required
by Technical Specifications.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not
limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2
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electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading t00ms, and the
station yard zone inside the protected area.
During - the- plent tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,
equipment. status and radiation contrcl practices were observed.
In
addition the-. inspector conducted a ' detailed walkdown of the Diesel Air
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(VG)' system on both units.
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a.
Unit 1 Operations
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The unit was in mid-loop operation the entire period while testing
and evaluation of steam generator (SG) tubes centinued.
Eddy Current
testing had been completed , t the end of the period, tube plugging
was in progress and laboratory analysis continusd of pulled tubes.
The projected on-line date was May 5, 1989.
b.
Unit 2 Operations
Unit 2 began the period at 100% power. On April 6,1989 the unit was
manually tripped due to the Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) to
the C steam generator failing shut.
The licensee identified a
ruptured feedback bellows asscciated with the valve positioner as the
cause of the valve failing shut. The ruptured bellows and bellows of
the some age on oth:r FRVs were replaced. The unit was back on-line
on April 7.
The bellows is a metal part and had not been included in-
the preventive maintenance program. The unit ended the period at 60%
power for fuel conservation to support the upcoming refueling outage
scheduled to begin July 5.
c.
On April 4 the inspector noted that the distribution damper for the
Control Room Ventilation Fan 2A was labeled "CR Vent Fan 2B Dis Damp
CR 0AD8".
Also, the 2B fan damper was labeled "CR Vent Fan 2A Dis
Damp CR OAD7".
The license 6 was notified and a followup inspection
disclosed that the damper labels were corrected.
Several minor
housekeeping problems were noted in the Auxiliary Building which were
passed on to the licensee for corrective action. Two compressed gas
cylinders were r.oted whit.h had the " Firm Removal Date" marked over
and changed.
The licensee indicated that this was not the intended
way to change dates.
A wooden lead shielding support was noted at
column JJ56 on the 733-foot elevation with a housekeeping tag dated
10-6-86.
Two scaffolds without scaffold or housekeeping tags were
noted near the component cooling system on the 750-foot elevation.
Also component cooling heat exchanger end covers were noted draped
over piping and the heat exchangers horizontal surface.
d.
On March 10, 1989, the licensee questioned operability of the Control
Room Ventilation (VC/YC) system due to nori-seismically qualified
valve positioners on several YC and service water (RN) valves.
The
positioner is located between a qualified solenoid and the valve
actuator.
These valves fail open on a loss of air.
The valves
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affected are 1YC54, 76, 113, 135, 148, 162, 176, 192, 204, 218, 232
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and 246 and IRN442, 445, 457 and 460.
The licensee determined on
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. April 6,1989 that the affected valves may not fail open during a
-seismic event.
A Justification for Continued Operation was
documented and discussed with NRC on April 6,1989.
The licensee
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determined that sufficient time was available (30 minutes) to verify
valve positions using non-licensed operators (NL0s) if an earthquake
should occur.
On April 7 the inspector physically observed the
valves in question and verified appropriate instructions had been
given to operations personnel.
Since the valves were not all easily
accessible and were un three different elevations the inspector
verified that two NL0s had been assigned to the task. The inspector
verified later that the requirement to check the valves had been
incorporated into the earthquake procedure, RP/0/A/5700/07,
farthquake.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
SurveillanceTesting(61726)
Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the
nspector to ascertain procedural and performance acequacy and conformance
with applicable Technical Specificati.ons.
Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved
procedures were available and in use, that ' test equipment in use was
calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that systein v6storation was
completed and test results were adequate.
Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:
pROCE0VRE
EQUIPMENT / TEST
TT/0/A/9100/301
Control Area Ventilation Restricted Intake
Test
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
The only maintenance activities reviewed during the period were regular
dis::ussions with licensee person;.a1 regarding results and status of the SG
tube testing and evaluations.
This review is continuing under NRC/NRR
Materials Engineering Branch lead.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712,92700)
The following LERs were reviewed to determine whether reporting
requirements have been met, the cause appears accurate, the corrective
actions appear appropriate, generic applicability has been considered, and
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whether the event is rslated to previous events.
Selected LERs were.
chosen for more detailed followdp in verifying the nature, impact, -and
cause of. the-event as well as corrective ' actions taken.
These LER's are
noted with an asterisk (*).
The following LER's are closed:
- LER 369/88-37.
Two Groups of Ice Baskets in the Unit 1 Ice Condenser
Found to Weigh Below the Required Tech Spec Weight.
The inspector
reviewed periodic test results associated with this event.
LER 369/88-45, Rev. 1:
Auxiliary Feedwater System Train B Inoperable due
to Incorrectly Set Valve Travel Stop. The inspector reviewed this report
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for completeness, Verification of corrective actions will be accomplished
through followup of Violation 369/88-33-09.
LER 369/89-03:
Doghouse Wat_er i.evel Feedwater Isolation Actuattor.
Instrumentation for Unit 1 and 2 was nJt tcsted as required by Technical
Specifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 7.
Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92701,92702)
The following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that
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the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in
compliance with regulatory requirelaents and corrective actions have been
completed.
Selective verification irdluded record review, observations,
and discussions with licensee personnel.
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a,
(' Closed) Violation 369/87-41-04, Failure to follow procedures and
failure to perform retest, resulted in inoperable ND pump miniflow
valyc.
Both examples included in the violation were attributed to
personnel error.
The licensee has completed corrective action for
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the violation. The follcwing items were reviewedt
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Counseling letter dated 12/2/87 to both of the technicians,
stating the staticn policy on adherence to proceduras.
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Process Procedure rec 6rd ID No. TT/1/A/9100/206, Change No 1
dated 10/20/87, " Post modifications test procedure for ' lockout'
releys 186A/1B and associated indicating lights."
Section-
13.13, added specific steps necessary to perform adequate
verification of the loc'kout relay modifications.
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Pevised PM/PT work request computer program for instruments
1&2MNDPG5050 and 1&2MNDPG5051 to reflect that the status is
safety related and that there 1s the potential that the work
could be a Technical Specification (TS) item.
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Station Dircctive {SD) 4.2.1 which was revised to include the
directive St6ted in a memo from the station manager to all
McGuirc NPD employees, dated 10/27/87. After reviewing the memo
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and then Station Directive 4.2.1., the inspector noted that SD
4.2.1 had been revised as stated but that the statements as
stated in paragraphs (A) & (B), from the memo were not
incorporated.
This type of concern is discussed in further
detail with other examples in Report 50-369,370/89-01.
b.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 369,370/88-33-02:
Losses of RHR Requiring
Further Followup.
This item involved three losset of Residual Heat
Removal System 6,D) which occurred on Unit I which appeared to
involve procedural or drawing weaknesses. The events were previously
-disc.ribed as follows:
"On November 23, 1988 tne licensee experienced a loss of the residual
heat removal (ND) system for approximately 40 minutes.
Reactor
Coolant (NC) temperature increastd approximately 25 degrees F.
The
unit was in Mode 6, Refueling. The event occurred while valve stroke
timing Containment Spray (NS) valve INS-1B (HS pump 1B suction from
containment sump).
Apparently, ND pumo IB lost suction pressure due
to inadequate system venting in the horizontal piping between valve
its-18 and valve 1NI-184 (reactor building sump to train IB of ND and
NS).
Apparently the inrush of NS water into the voided containment
sump piping forced air into the ND IB pump suction and air bound the
pump.
The pump was trippea to avoid darage.
Recovery consisted of
cross-tying ND pump 1A to ND heat exchanger 1B, assuring fill and
vent cf the ND 1A sump and starting the 1A pump.
Problems with
venting the ND pump 1B casing delayed restart of 10 pump.
The
licensee checked both ND trains on both units and found significant
hmount's of air in some of the piping.
The licensee is evaluating
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past ND operability for both units and is planning to add more
controls an testing interfaces, tc upgrade ND procedures and to
evaluate the need for improved fill and vent practices and
procedures.
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On November 29, 1988, while in cold shutdown, Unit 1 experienced a
loss of ND when a train B blackout occurred.
The blackout occurred
when Operations (.losed the B train 6900 Volt Bus standby breaker
which was in the test position for testing causing the normal breaker
to open as designed.
This action deenergized the B train including
the operating ND p:np and started the B train emergency diesel
generator.
Reactor coolant temperature increased 4 degrees F during
the approximately seven minutes that the ND pump was not operating.
LER 369/86-B was submitted on this event.
The licen ee assigned a cause of management deficiency to the event
since the unit superviso' did not provide adequate written and/or
verbal instructions to the operator for testing the standby breaker.
A defective procedure was assigned as a contributing cause since
Op/1/A/6350/08, " Operation of Station Breakers", did not contain
precautions to alert operators of interlocks associated with the
breakers to be tested. The licensee stated that a general precaution
would be added to OP/1/A/6350/08 to review the effects of interlocks
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prior to ' testing breakers.
Also a caution ~ would be added. fcr the
6900 volt breakers to prevent this from recurring.
On December 1, 1988, while in cold shutdown, ND was lost again when
.ND-1B (reactor coolant system inop 10 to ND system containment
isolation) closed. Licensee personnel were deenergizing a circuit
associated with the Resistance Temperature Detector-(RTD)
modification when ND-1B closed on a simulated high pressure signal
securing ND flow.. ND-1B closed at 12:06 a.m.,
the ND pump was
secured at 12:07 a.m. and ND finw was restored at 12:17 a.m.
Plant
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temperature increased approximately 5 degrees during this time.
Personnel involved had misread the drawing and did not realize that
ND<-1B would close."
The licensee cenducted additional evaluation of the November 23
event.
A concern was that air trapped in the lines downstream of
either valves NI-184B or NI-185A could be drawn into the ND pumps if
the valves were open at the start of a post accident recirculation.
The analysis showed that water remaining in the Refueling Water
Storage Tank (RWST) would provide enough pressure to push any air to
the Containment Sump and not toward the ND pumps.
The air would be
dissipated through the sump before the RWST was isolated.
The
inspector reviewed this analysis.
It does appear that procedural
weaknesses contributed to the event in that adequate fill and vent
was not required by PT/1 & 2/A/4200/08, NS System Valve Stroke Timing
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and further, there was no operations procedural guidance for filling
and venting of specific systems other than' the Reactor Coolant
system.
The Removal and Restoration procedure (0MP 2-17) is
typically used for filling and venting.
The 39 minutes it took to place 1A train in service appears
raasonable considering operations was assuring the train was
adequately vented and closely monitoring temperature.
As described above, procedural inadequacies also contributed to the
November 29 event.
Further evaluation of the December 1 event disclosed that a drawing
(MC41399.03-0300-001) was not properly updated which resulted in a
misinterpretation by Instrument and Electrical personnel.
The unit was in mid-loop operation during the first event .
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were full during the other events.
10 CF0 50s Appendix B, Criterion V requires that activities affecting
quality be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or
drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
The above three examples
are considered in the aggregate a violation of this criteria.
This
is Violation 369,370/89-11-01:
Inadequate Procedures and Drawings
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Leading to Loss of Residual Heat Removal on Three Occasions.
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(Closed)
Violation 369,370/88-33-05:
Failure to Follow TS for
Heatup'and Cooldown.
Corrective actions for this violation included
appropriate _ training and procedural improvements which were described
in the licensee response dated March 16, 1989 and in LER 370/87-20.
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The inspector verified completion of the ' corrective actions during
the review described in Report 369,370/88-33 and, therefore, this
item is closed.
d.
(0 pen)
Inspector Followup Item 369,370/89-01-06:
Written Guidance
on Use of Procedures.
The inspector discussed the licensee's
progress in this area and reviewed Revision 7 of Operations
Management Procedure 1-2: Use of Procedures. The General Statements
of philosophy, which address the first concern described in Report
369,370/89-01, paragraph 11, have been reordered.
In addition the
new procedure now provides guidance for use of Abp'ormal and Emergency
Procedures.
Other concerns described in the previous report are not
yet addressed. Therefore, this item remains open.
One violation was ident.ified as described above.
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection findings identified below were summarized on - April 21,
1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The following'
items were discussed in detail:
(0 pen) Violation 369,370/89-11-01:
Inadequate Procedures and Drawings
Leading to Loss of Residual Heat Removal on three occasions. (paragraph
7.b.)
The housekeeping comments described in paragraph 3.c.were also discussed.
The licensee representatives present effered no dissenting comments, nor
did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the
irispectors during the course of their inspection.
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