IR 05000369/2015001
| ML15111A397 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/2015 |
| From: | Frank Ehrhardt Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Capps S Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2015001 | |
| Download: ML15111A397 (21) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ril 21, 2015
SUBJECT:
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2015001 AND 05000370/2015001
Dear Mr. Capps:
On March 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. On April 14, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17
Enclosure:
NRC Integrated IR 05000369/2015001 and 05000370/2015001 w/Attachment - Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report No.: 05000369/2015001, 05000370/2015001 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: January 1, 2015, through March 31, 2015 Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector R. Cureton, Resident Inspector M. Riley, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R18)
M. Coursey, Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA3.2)
Approved by: Frank Ehrhardt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR05000369/2015001, IR05000370/2015001; 01/01/2015 - 03/31/2015; McGuire Nuclear
Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors and one regional inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision, Revision (Rev.) 5. No findings or violations of greater than minor significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) until February 6, 2015, when the unit was shutdown to Mode 5 to repair a reactor coolant system (RCS) leak from the pressurizer manway diaphragm seal weld. The unit was restarted on February 13 and reached full power operation on February 14. The unit was operated at essentially full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period except for a planned power reduction to 89 percent RTP on March 6, 2015, to perform turbine valve movement testing.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions: The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of the licensee's cold weather protection program during extreme cold weather conditions that were experienced January 7-9, 2015 and February 18-20, 2015.
This included field walkdowns to assess the functionality and reliability of risk significant freeze protection equipment associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling water storage tank level instrumentation, auxiliary feedwater storage tank level instrumentation, exterior doghouses, Unit 1 and 2 main feedwater flow transmitter enclosed structures, and the standby shutdown facility (SSF). The inspectors verified the implementation of applicable actions required in procedure PT/0/B/4700/070, On Demand Freeze Protection Verification Checklist, and discsussed the details of specific severe cold weather compensatory measures with operations personnel. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdowns: The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following four systems to assess the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable or degraded. The inspectors focused on discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and potentially increase risk.
The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures and walked down control systems components to verify selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- 1B residual heat removal (ND) system while the 1A ND system was out of service for scheduled preventive maintenance
- 2A motor driven auxiliary feedwater (CA) pump and Unit 2 turbine driven CA pump while the 2B motor driven CA pump was out of service for planned maintenance
- 2B containment spray (NS) system while the 2A NS system was out of service for planned maintinance
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 120-volt DC shared vital batteries EVCA, EVCB, and EVCD while EVCC was out of service for scheduled battery cell replacement
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Fire Protection Walkdowns: The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following five plant areas to determine if associated defense in depth features were consistent with the UFSAR and the fire protection program. The features assessed included the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, firefighting equipment, and passive fire features such as fire barriers. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees compensatory measures for fire deficiencies to determine if they were commensurate with the significance of the deficiency. The inspectors reviewed the fire plans for the areas selected to determine if they were consistent with the fire protection program and presented a adequate firefighting strategies. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- Unit 2 essential switchgear room 2ETB and auxiliary building 733 elevation electrical penetration room (fire areas 10-12)
- Unit 1 auxiliary building 695 elevation (fire area 1)
- Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary building 716 elevation (fire area 4)
- Unit 1 and 2 vital battery rooms (fire area 13)
- Unit 2 reactor trip breaker and motor generator set room (fire area 23)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Resident Inspector LOR Activity Review: On January 21, 2015, the inspectors observed operators in the plant simulator during a licensed operator requalification examination. The simulator examination scenario involved a 1D steam generator power operated reliefe valve (PORV) failure, a loss of normal letdown, and a medium break loss of coolant accident with a failure of the turbine to automatically trip. The inspectors assessed overall crew performance, clarity and formality of communications, use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics and supervisory oversight. The inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to determine if the licensee identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Quarterly Resident Inspector Licensed Operator Performance Review: On February 6-7, 2015, the inspectors observed operators in the Unit 1 main control room during the shutdown of Unit 1 for a scheduled forced outage to repair a leaking pressurizer manway. On February 13-14, 2015, the inspectors observed operators in the control room during the subsequent reactor startup following the outage. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of overall crew performance, clarity and formality of communications, use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, thoroughness of pre-job briefings, reactivity management controls, and supervisory oversight. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the two issues listed below for items such as: 1) appropriate work practices; 2) identifying and addressing common cause failures; 3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the Maintenance Rule; 4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; 5) charging unavailability for performance; 6) balancing reliability and unavailability; 7) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; 8) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and 9) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1). The inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- Problem investigation program (PIP) M-14-11129, During 1A sequencer testing the 1A emergency diesel generator (EDG) inadvertently started due to failed relay
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees risk assessments and risk management actions used to manage risk for the plant configurations associated with the five activities listed below. The inspectors assessed whether the licensee performed adequate risk assessments and implemented appropriate risk management actions when required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors verified that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, that appropriate risk management actions were promptly implemented, and that work activities did not place the plant in unacceptable configurations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Yellow risk on Unit 2 due to the 2B motor driven CA pump being out of service for planned maininance
- Yellow risk on Unit 2 due to the 2B EDG being out of service for planned preventive maintenance
- Yellow risk Unit 1 due to removal of the pressurizer hatch plug to conduct RCS leakage inspections in the pressurizer cubicle
- Yellow risk on Unit 1 during planned outage to repair pressurizer manway diaphragm leak while RCS was not intact and secondary heat sink was unavailable
- Risk on Unit 1 and Unit 2 during replacement of vital battery EVCC
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the four technical evaluations listed below to determine whether technical specification (TS) operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed any compensatory measures taken for degraded SSCs to determine whether the measures were in place and adequately compensated for the degradation. For the degraded SSCs, or those credited as part of compensatory measures, the inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) to determine whether the measures resulted in changes to the licensing basis functions, as described in the UFSAR, and whether a license amendment was required per 10 CFR 50.59. In addition, the inspectors conducted the annual review of the licensees identified operator workarounds (OWAs) and other equipment and/or non-conforming conditions that might be potential OWAs to verify the licensee was identifying OWAs at an appropriate threshold and addressing them in a manner commensurate with safety.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- PIP M-15-00555, Heatup of trapped water between steam generator CA check valves and downstream motor operated isolation valves during a design basis event could result in pressure exceeding the ASME code allowable stress
- PIP M-15-01384, A train control room air handling unit fan tripped during testing
- PIP M-15-01414, CA storage tank freeze trace circuit #4 reading low during low ambient outside temperatures Annual Sample Review of Operator Workarounds: The inspectors reviewed the licensees list of identified OWAs, equipment deficiencies, and plant concerns to determine whether any new items since the previous review conducted in the first quarter of 2014 would adversely affect any mitigating system function or affect the operators ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures. The inspectors reviewed the classification assigned to the identified OWAs to ensure they were properly prioritized based on the licensees program requirements. For high priority OWAs where compensatory actions were developed, the inspectors verified the feasibility of implementing these prescribed actions. The inspectors verified that long term corrective actions were developed to adequately address the underlying issues identified in the OWAs. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following two temporary plant modifications to verify the adequacy of the modification packages and 10 CFR 50.59 screenings. The modifications were evaluated against the TS, UFSAR, and licensee design bases documents for the systems affected to ensure they did not adversely affect the availability, reliability, and functional capability of important SSCs. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Engineering Change (EC) 114460, Increase the alarm setpoint for the 1NC-1 (Unit 1 reactor coolant system pressurizer safety vavle) discharge temperature from 150 degrees Fahrenheit to 160 degrees Fahrenheit
- EC 113222, Install temporary battery during vital battery EVCC replacement
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the six post-maintenance tests listed below to determine if procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensees test procedures to determine if the procedures adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activities, that the acceptance criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedures had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the tests and/or reviewed the test data to determine if test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- 2A EDG functional testing following scheduled preventive maintenance
- 1A ND pump functional testing following scheduled complex work activities
- 2B motor driven CA pump functional testing following scheduled work on the pump coupling
- 2B EDG functional testing following scheduled preventive maintenance
- 1A containment air return fan functional testing following failed relay replacement
- Vital Battery EVCC functional testing following replacement
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed the inspection activities described below for the scheduled Unit 1 forced outage to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to repair an RCS steam leak from the pressurizer manway diaphragm seal weld. The outage began on February 6, 2015 and ended on February 13, 2015. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Reviewed the outage work plan, independent outage risk review, and risk management actions to ensure that appropriate risk control, defense-in-depth, and TS requirements were considered in the configuration of important plant safety equipment, and outage personnel scheduling took into consideration fatigue management requirements.
- Observed portions of the plant shutdown to ensure that TS and licensee procedural requirements were met for controlling key safety functions and plant configuration changes, and that defense-in-depth was maintained commensurate with the licensees outage risk control and reactivity management plans.
- Reviewed and observed personnel containment entries to verify that the licensee controlled the entries and work activities in accordance with the appropriate TS and licensee procedural requirements for maintaining containment integrity, foreign material exclusion, security access, and radiological controls.
- Conducted several containment building walkdowns during and following the completion of licensee work activities to ensure that items were not left in containment that might contribute to emergency core cooling system sump screen blockage.
- Observed reactor restart, mode changes, and changing plant configurations to verify that TS, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites were met during these activities.
- Reviewed various problems that arose during the outage to verify that the licensee was identifying problems related to outage activities at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP.)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the five surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors witnessed testing and reviewed the test data to determine if the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures. In addition, the inspectors verified that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.
Surveillance Tests
- PT/1/A/4200/008B, NC Pressure Isolation Valve Leak Test, Rev. 59
- PT/0/A/4200/002, Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test, Rev. 62
- PT/1/A/4208/002B, NS Train B Valve Stroke Timing - Quarterly, Rev. 26 In-Service Tests
- PT/1/A/4252/001 B, 1B CA Pump Performance Test, Rev. 96 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Testing
- PT/2/A/4150/001B, Reactor Coolant Leakage Calculation, Rev. 91
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Site Emergency Preparedness Training Drill: On March 25, 2015, the inspectors evaluated the performance of a quarterly licensee emergency preparedness training exercise from the control room simulator and technical support center. The exercise scenario involved a feedwater pipe break outside containment, followed by a loss of all AC power and subsequent RCS loss-of-coolant-accident. The inspectors assessed licensee emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendation development. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees conduct of the drill and post-drill critique performance. The inspectors verified that the drill critique identified drill performance weaknesses and that the licensee entered these items into their CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee data and submittals relative to the PIs listed below for the period January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014 to confirm the accuracy of reported PI data for the following six indicators. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, the inspectors compared the licensees basis in reporting each data element to the PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 7, as well as licensee procedural guidance for reporting PI information. The inspectors independently screened licensee event reports (LERs), TS narrative logs, and the licensee's CAP database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified the number of scrams and unplanned power changes greater than 20 percent that occurred during the period and compared this number to the number reported in the PI. The inspectors also reviewed the accuracy of the number of critical hours reported and the licensees basis for determining that there were not complications for each of the reported reactor scrams. In addition, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel associated with the PI data collection, evaluation, and distribution. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Initiating Events Cornerstone
- Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (Units 1 and 2)
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications (Units 1 and 2)
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (Units 1 and 2)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program: As required by IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of condition reports, attending some daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensees computerized CAP database.
Annual Sample Reviews: The inspectors reviewed the issue listed below in detail to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees corrective actions for important safety issues.
- PIP M-14-07424, Condition prohibited by TS 3.8.1 due to failure of cylinder 5L inlet valve stem on the 1B EDG The inspectors assessed whether the issue was properly identified; documented accurately and completely; properly classified and prioritized; adequately considered extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences; adequately identified root causes/apparent causes; and identified appropriate and timely corrective actions. The inspectors evaluated the licensee documents against the requirements of the licensees CAP and implementing procedures, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOED)
.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI)05000369/2014004-02, Review NOED 14-2-002
Granting Exercise of Enforcement Discretion to Complete 1B EDG Repairs (Closed) LERs 05000369/2014-001-00 and 05000369/2014-001-01, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) due to Emergency Diesel Generator 1B Failure
a. Inspection Scope
This URI was initiated for the NRC issuance of Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) 14-2-002, dated August 27, 2014, in order to review the circumstances that led to the NOED request to determine if any performance deficiencies or violations contributed to the need for the NOED. The inspectors reviewed the licensees LERs associated with the failure of the cylinder 5L intake valve stem on the 1B EDG, the licensees root cause investigation, and their corrective actions to address the failure.
Previous evaluation of the accuracy and details of the licensees request for the NRC to exercise discretion not to enforce compliance with the required action completion time for TS Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.8.1 to allow extra time for the engine to be repaired was documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000369, 370/2014005.
The licensee established a formal root cause team consisting of six team members, including an outside industry diesel expert, to evaluate the failure and to determine applicable corrective actions. An extensive metallurgical laboratory analysis was conducted on the failed parts and further analysis was conducted by the disassembly of other cylinder heads on the 1B EDG during the subsequent fall 2014 refueling outage when the engine was removed from service. The inspectors found the licensees root cause evaluation to be detailed and exhaustive. The licensee determined the cause of the 1B EDG cylinder 5L intake valve failure was due to the combined effects of three inlet valve sub-parts which were manufactured by a third party supplier outside of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) (i.e., Norberg) specified tolerances. These manufacturing discrepancies included: 1) the inlet valve stem hardness/tensile strength was below specifications, 2) the hydraulic valve lash adjuster, which dampens the force between the intake valve and its seat, did not function properly due internal clearances being out-of-specification, and 3) the inlet valve spit rings, connecting the valve stem upper end to its rocker arm, was found with a larger radius. The combined effects of these out of tolerances resulted in inlet valve stem stresses beyond the endurance limit and subsequent valve failure due to high cycle fatigue.
The licensee implemented a number of corrective actions to address the causal factors identified. Actions were taken to place a hold on the procurement of the three out of tolerance components until the EDG parts procurement specifications were revised. The revision would add additional vendor verifications that the components meet the original Nordberg specifications. To address the immediate extent of condition to limit the vulnerability of similar cylinder components being out of tolerance, the licensee reviewed cylinder vibration and ultrasonic signature testing of each of the cylinders of all four EDGs to detect any inlet valve closure anomalies. In addition, during the Fall 2014 refueling outage, both the 1B and 1A EDGs were inspected to ensure no similar out of tolerance components were installed. Similar inspections are planned for the remaining 2A and 2B EDGs. In the interim, the licensee plans to continue conducting periodic cylinder performance signature testing to detect any abnormal change in cylinder performance. The inspectors verified that an adequate extent of condition review was performed for all EDGs, and concluded that there were no licensee performance deficiencies associated with the August 18, 2014, 1B EDG failure. This URI and associated LERs are closed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 (Closed) LERs 05000370/2014-001-00 and 05000370/2014-001-01, Degraded Condition
due to Rejectable Flaw on Safety Injection Piping
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the LERs described above, the associated root cause report (PIP M-14-3153), and discussed the issue with licensee staff. The licensee determined the direct cause of the rejectable flaw in the 1.5 inch 2D injection line nozzle, to be a legacy issue, due to leakage through the 2NI-3 valve, which created a thermal stratification condition. This thermal stratification initiated the nozzle fatigue cracks identified in the 2D reactor coolant system cold leg during the 2014 ultrasonic testing (UT) inspection. Additionally, it was determined that a high cycle thermal fatigue condition was created by periodic leakage from valve 2NI-3, which also contributed to the flaw initiation. The licensee also identified a skill-based human performance error, in that, the UT performed in 2012 missed the flaw. The size and age of the flaw, as determined by metallurgical analysis, indicates the flaw was present for several years.
The rejectable flaw in the 1.5 inch 2D line was subsequently cut out, repaired, and replaced with new piping. The weld was examined satisfactorily before being returned to service. The identified leakage through the 2NI-3 valve was repaired during a prior maintenance period, and leak tests were performed in April 2014 to confirm no leakage.
Additionally, the qualifications of the examiners involved with the 2012 UT of the missed flaw were suspended, and the examiners must recertify under licensee and ASME procedures and requirements. LERs 05000370/2014-001-00 and 05000370/2014-001-01 are closed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exits
On April 14, 2015, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Steven Capps, Site Vice President, and members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- B. Anderson, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Black, Security Manager
- D. Brenton, Maintenance Superintendent
- S. Capps, Vice President, McGuire Nuclear
- K. Crane, Senior Licensing Specialist
- J. Gabbert, Chemistry Manager
- J. Glenn, Organizational Effectiveness Manager
- M. Kelly, Outage and Scheduling Manager
- S. Mooneyhan, Radiation Protection Manager
- C. Morris, Station Manager
- J. Robertson, Regulatory Affairs Manager
- P. Schuerger, Training Manager
- S. Snider, Engineering Manager
LIST OF REPORT ITEMS
Closed
- 05000369/2014004-02 URI Review NOED 14-2-002 Granting Exercise of Enforcement Discretion to Complete 1B EDG Repairs (Section 4OA3.1)
- 05000369/2014-001-00 LER Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) due to Emergency Diesel Generator 1B Failure (Section 4OA3.1)
- 05000369/2014-001-01 LER Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) due to Emergency Diesel Generator 1B Failure (Section 4OA3.1)
- 05000370/2014-001-00 LER Degraded Condition due to Rejectable Flaw on Safety Injection Piping (Section 4OA3.2)
- 05000370/2014-001-01 LER Degraded Condition due to Rejectable Flaw on Safety Injection Piping (Section 4OA3.2)