IR 05000369/1998010
| ML20198N898 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198N880 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-98-10, 50-370-98-10, NUDOCS 9901060247 | |
| Download: ML20198N898 (28) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - - - - - - -
. .
.
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll q Docket Nos: 50-369,50-370 License Nos: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report No: 50-369/98-10,50-370/98-10 1.icensee: Duke Energy Corporation Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: October 4,1998 - November 21,1998 Inspectors: S. Shaeffer, Senior Resident inspector M. Sykes, Resident inspector M. Franovich, Resident inspector J. Coley, Regional inspector (Section M7.1)
' E. Testa, Regional Inspector (Section R1, R2)
G 3alyers, RegionalInspector (Section P2)
, t. . Sartor, Regional inspector (Section P2)
W. Stansberry, Regional inspector (Section S2, S3, SS, S6, S8)
Apprrved by: C. Ogle, Chief, Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects 9901060247 981218 Enclosure PDR ADOCK 05000369 G PM
.
.
.
.
. . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
. . .
. .
.
.
.
l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
'
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-369/9810,50-370/98-10 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covered a seven-week period of resident inspection. In addition, regional inspections were performed in the areas of Maintenance Rule followup, radiological and environmental monitoring and controls, emergency preparedness, and plant physical securit Operations
-
An engineered safety features walkdown was performed on selected portions of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator systems. The visible material condition and housekeeping were satisfactory. No system misalignments were identifie (Section 02.1)
.
The licensee's freeze protection activities including annual functional checks were initiated and completed in a timely manner with frequent management attention to system health. Overall, the licensee's efforts to protect plant equipment and systems f.om freezing conditions were acceptable. (Section O2.2)
.
An electrical heat tracing monthly surveillance procedure did not include fire protection valves RY-113 and RY-114 and their associated lines, which was inconsistent with the intent of the freeze protection program. The licensee ir dicated that these valves will be included in the monthly functional procedure as an enhancement. (Section O2.2)
.
.
During a meeting of the Nuclear Safety Review Board held on November 18,1998,
! board members provided good independent review and assessments to plant management for potentialimprovements. (Section G7.1)
Maintenance
.
The licensee exhibited good teamwork between maintenance and engineering personnel to troebleshoot and repair a problem with inlet valve timing on a Unit 2 emergency diesel penerator. System engineers and maintenance supervisors provided strong presence and oversight for these activities. (Section M1.1)
l .
The Maintenance Rt le periodic assessment performed by the licensee took into account the performance, condition monitoring, associated goals and preventive maintenance activities for structures, systems and components, and met the guidance delineated in Nuclear Management and Resource Council (NUMARC) 93-01, Revision (Section M7.1)
(
l l
f
. - - ~ -..~ -- - ._ - - - .~_. _ _ - -_- _ . . -.
.
.
.
. I l
'
-
l
! Enoineerina '
.
The final operability evaluation of the degraded emergency diesel generator 2B with higher than normal cylinder firing pressures on all 16 cylinders had sound and i comprehensive technical bases for continued operability. (Section E1.1)
.
Engineering personnel did not initially recognize that high diesel generator cylinder pressures were above the operability limit in the vendor technical manual and required an operability evaluation for this non-conforming condition per Nuclear Site Directive 203. (Section E1.1)
.
Timeliness of corrective actions for the degraded emergency diesel generator 2B inlet valve timing condition was commensurate with safety. (Section E1.1) l
.
Engineering's use of advanced engine diagnostics on the McGuire emergency diesel generators was considered a strength. The use of this predictive maintenance equipment revealed a degraded condition on emergency diesel generator 2B inlet valve timing. (Section E1.1)
.
The licensee took approximately four months to evaluate and deterrrS,e that a manufacturing defect was responsible for a relay failure in the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator load sequencer. (Section E2.1) 1
a I Once a manufacturing defect was recognized with the Cutler-Hammer relay, the licensee's inspection criteria and schedule for evaluating the extent of conJition of the l subject Cutler-Hammer relays were appropriate. (Section E2.1)
.
The licensee's general office provided effective support in the identification of the root cause of the Cutler-Hammer relay's base metal cracking. (Section E2.1)
Plant Support I
!
.
The licensee was effectively maintaining controls for radioactive material storage and l radioactive waste processing. (Section R1.1)
l
.
Primary and secondary water chemistry were controlled and maintained well within program limit requirements. (Section R1.2)
l
.
Doses at the maximum location were small percentages of the annual dose Omits of 40 CFR 190 limits. (Section R2.1)
.
The licensee's emergency preparedness program was being maintained in a state of operational readiness. (Section P2.1)
{
l
.
y --e
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > _ . . _ . - _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ __ _ . . _ . _ . .
l-
l ",
l t . ,3
i
.
The performance of the personnel search equipment and the security personnel operating the equipment was a strength in the security program. (Section S2.4)
.
The vehicle barrier system was found functional, well maintained, and effective in its intended purpose._ The licensee met the Physical Security Plan commitments and regulatory requirements. (Section S2.5)
-
L The licensee's safeguards events were logged according to the Physical Security Plan commitments. The licensee's process of tracking, trending, analyzing, and resolving these events was a strength in the security program. (Section S3.3)
.
The security force personnel possessed appropriate knowledge to carry out their l assigned duties and responsibilities, including response procedures, use of deadly force, and armed response tactics. (Section S4.1)
.
The security organization responses to security threats, contingencies, and routine response situations, including drills, were consistent with the Security Plan Procedures, and the Physical Security and 6,curity Contingency Plan. (Section 84.2)
.
.
!
The licensee's training records were properly maintained and reflect current qualifications according to the training program commitments. (Section SS.2)
.
Site and security management provided good support to the physical security program and was effective in implementing the security program. (Section S6.1&2)
.
The total number of trained security officers and armed personnelimmediately available to fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the Physical Security and Contingency Plan. One full-time member of the security organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not have duties that conf!icted with the assignmerit to direct all activities during an incident. (Section S6.3)
t
,
!
!
.
F \
l
. _
~, -. - - - . . - -- - .- . .. .. .. -. - -.
. ..
<
t
.
Report Details I Summary of Plant Status l
l Units 1 and 2 l
l i
' Units 1 and 2 operated at approximately 100 percent power throughout the inspection perio I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (71707) l
'
l Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of :
ongoing plant operations, in general, the conduct of opcrations was professional and safety-conscious. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the ll sections which follo .2 10 CFR 50.72 and Other Reauired Notifications insoection Scope (71707)
During the inspection period, the licensee made the notification discussed below to the l NRC. The inspector reviewed the event for impact on the operational status of the
- facility and equipmen Observations and Findinas On November 12,1998, the licensee notified the NRC of voids discovered in fire retarding foam sealant used in certain plant penetrations. An update to this notification was made on November 13,1998, after the licensee identified two additional degraded penetrations. The plant Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) was ur;affected by the condition, therefore the plant was not operated outside of its design basis. This event is further discussed in Section F Conclusions The inspector concluded that the licensee appropriately reported the event in accordance with the requirements of Facility Operating License Condition C(4) and C(7) for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
!
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Unit 1 Emeraency Diesel Ganerator (EDG) Systems Walkdown (71707)
The inspector completed detailed inspections of selected portions of the Unit 1 EDGs and auxiliaries to assess material conditions and verify proper system alignment. Field verification of valve positions, electrical breaker alignment, and local control panel indication were performed. The inspector observed the system in standby status and during engine
-
- - . - . . ~
. .
j-
.
,
\
2 I operation. No significant fluid leaks were identified. The inspector confirmed that selected l _
portions of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator systems were properly aligned. The l visible material condition and housekeeping were satisfactory. No system misalignments were identifie O2.2 Cold Weather Preparations Inspection Scoce (71714)
.
l Reviews were conducted of the facility's readiness for cold weather. The inspector reviewed Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 317, Freeze Protection Program, Revision 1 and j interviewed the Freeze Protection Coordinator. Procedures and work orders were reviewed to determine what actions had been taken to prepare for cold weather. Selected portions of I critica plant iluctures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) that were considered vulnerable in freezing conditions were also independently inspecte i Observations and Findinas i
l In response to previous freeze protection program deficiencies identified in 1996, the i licensee revised NSD 317 in March 1997 to improve plant procedures and developed additional procedures for coping with extreme cold weather conditions. These programmatic and plant equipment improvements and corrective actions were evaluated and documented in NRC Inspection Reports (IR) 50-369,370/97-18 and 96-1 !
The inspector deussed the status of freeze protection preparations with the freeze protection coordinator. The annual planned maintenance (PM) activities had been completed. Pre-seasonal checkouts were executed via various work orders for inspection and testing of electrical heat trace and instrument box heaters. The freeze protection coordinator had performed inspections of vulnerable areas and worked with maintenance personnel to adequately resolve deficiencies. The inspector concluded that the appropriate priority was given and work orders completed to resolve deficient plant heating and I electrical heat tracing for accident mitigation systems, equipment important to safety, and balance of plant equipment that may cause plant transients.
i During the review of the freeze protection implementing procedures, the inspectors noted that the licensee had omitted two key fire protection valves from procedures which would have incre6 sed the operability verification frequency. Flow control valves RY-113 and RY-114 and their associated lines, which had been identified as being important to plant safety, are located in non-rain proof, metal covered pits in the yard around the auxiliary and reactor buildings. The inspector reviewed the licensee's freeze protection study (completed in January 1997) which noted unacceptable consequences if both supply valves were lost and some probability for loss of heat tracing. High reliability of these valves may be important if fire protection branch lines in the auxiliary building are isolated for maintenance l or other reasons (e.g., inadvertent isolation due to valve failures which occurred last summer and was discussed in IR 50-369,370/98-09). Isolation of branch lines in the auxiliary building, in general, removes the redundancy in the system due to the piping configuration in the auxiliary building, thereby increasing reliance on valves RY-113 and RY-114.
l:
l
'
- - , -. . - -_ , . -
. . _ _ _ - - _ _ m . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ .- - _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ .
,
!
l .
i
.
The inspectors discussed the information identified above with the licensee. Following the discussion, the licensee stated that the functional verification of heat tracing for valves RY- i 113 and RY-114 would be incorporated into the IP/0/B/3250/059A. The inspectors I considered this procedural enhancement acceptable to improve reliability of the l component i in addition, the inspectors evaluated plant design and layout for potential common mode failures of equipment due to cold weather conditions. During the evaluation, the inspectors l identified a potential common mode failure associated with fuel oil temperatures of the McGuire emergency diesel generators during cold weather conditions. The inspectors were concerned that fuel oil temperatures in the supply lines between the fuel tanks and the diesel building may fall below the licensee's cloud point acceptance criterion (23' Fahrenheit (F)) since there is no electrical heat tracing on these lines. Cloud point is defined, according to American Society for Testing and Material (ASTM) D-975, as the temperature at which a cloud or haze of wax crystals appear in the oil. Wax crystals could clog filters in the fuel oil lines to the engines. This condition could render the EDGs inoperable during a design basis event.
l !
At McGuire, the main fuel oil storage tanks are buried underground. However, the 3-inch l fuel supply lines (several feet on each side of maintenance isolation valves) are in a pit I between the tanks and each unit's EDG building. Chemistry sampling procedures indicated l that fuel oil with a cloud point above 23*F were unacceptable. Records indicated that l outdoor ambient temperatures at the McGuire site have been sufficiently low to result in fuel l
oil reaching its cloud point limit. Specifically, in 1996, during the refueling water storage tank (RWST) level instrumentation freeze event, outdoor temperatures were approximately 6*F. The licensee initiated Problem investigation Process (PlP) report 0-M98-4125 and a work request to measure temperatures of these lines under suitable environmental conditions to obtain data to support the acceptance criterion or establish corrective action Pending additional NRC review, this issue is identified as inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369,370/98-10 01, Potential Common Mode Failure of EDGs Due to Degradation of Feel Oil During Cold Weather Condition c. Conclusions Overall, the licensee's efforts to protect plant equipment and systems from freezing
,
!
conditions were acceptable. Freeze protection activities including annual functional checks were initiated and completed in a timely manner with frequent management attention to system health. However, an electrical heat tracing monthly surveillance procedure did not include fire protection valves RY-113 and RY-114 and their associated lines, which was inconsistent with the intent of the freeze protection program. The licensee indicated that these valves will be included in the monthly functional procedure as an enhancement. An inspector followup item was identified to address an NRC identified, potential common mode failure of EDGs due to degradation of fuel oil during cold weather conditions.
.
i l
,
-- ,
__ . - - . . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - . _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ .
! . .
'
!
.
.
!
07. . ' Quality Assurance in Operations -
07.1 Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB)
l l Inspection Scoce (40500)
i The inspector attended an NSRB meeting to assess how the licensee evaluated overall plant performance and responded to plant issues.
l Observations and Findinas On November 18,1998, the inspector attended the McGuire portion of the NSRB meeting L held at the McGuire site. Site presentations to the NSRB included plant performance,
- equipment reliability, reportable events, violations, trends, areas for improvement, and other
'
relative issues. The inspector considered that the information presented to the NSRB gave l
a realistic view of overall plant performance. Proposed plant equipment upgrades and l implemented modifications to address potential plant vulnerabilities were discusse Operational events such as the dual unit trip in September 1997, and the rod drop event in
! February 1998, were discussed with focus on abnormal procedure improvements and i- system modifications to ' reduce plant risk. In addition, a proposal to install large (non-i- ' s6ismic) condensate storage tanks was presented to improve auxiliary feedwater system l suction source reliability. Board members provided good focused discussion on operator performance issues, training, and lessons learned from the Catawba Ice condenser issue Numerous NSRB proposals for improved performance were suggested and documented for i
resolution.
l Conclusions i
NSRB members provided good independent review and assessments to plant management for potentialimprovement Miscellaneous Operations lasues (92901)
l '0 (Closed) Violations (VIO) 50-369/97-04-01: Failure To Report a Condition Required By l' 50.72 in a Timely Manner l .-
'
This violation involved an NRC identified condition in which the licensee failed to appropriately make a report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 for a degraded condition
- identified while snutdown. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the violation
- and discussed the corrective actions with licensing and engineering management. The
!
licensee concluded that the report was missed, in part, due to the complex nature of the operability evaluation and the extensive analysis which was completed over a two-week period. Corrective actions for the violation included the development and incorporation of a training package for plant engineering and licensing personnel which reviewed the identified
- _ problem and reportability requirements. The inspectors reviewed the training package and
. considered in adequate to address the root cause of the violation. This item is closed.
.
.
.
.
. . . .- .- - _ - - - - --- , - .-. . - - - . ..
. .
.
.
08.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-369/98-04: Missed Auxiliary Hoist Surveillance l The licensee corrected a human performance error associated with required testing of the fuel handling auxiliary hoist 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The testing was established to ensure operability of load cells and physical strength of equipment prior to manipulation of fuelin the reactor building. The licensee has counseled responsible supervisors and emphasized procedure adherence to alllevels of station personnel. The inspectors reviewed the completed actions and concluded that the actions completed were adequate to prevent recurrence. This item is close .3 (Closed) LER 50-369/98-02 : Unit 1 Reactor Trip Due To Failed Power Supply Fuse On February 9,1998, control and shutdown rods from Group 2 Bank B dropped fully into the core and Group 2 Control Bank D rods dropped approximately 50 steps. Maintenance tec'nnicians were completing troubleshooting activities which included replacement of a rod control system power supply. Control rods had been placed in manual by the reactor operators while troubleshooting activities were being performed. During the energization of the replacement power supply, an inadvertent loss of power occurred due to a failed fuse holder. This momentary loss of control power affected the red control system gripper mechanism. Operators manually tripped the reactor prior to reaching an automatic trip setpoin Maintenance procedures for calibration and troubleshooting of control rod drive system pov er cabinet and power supplies were enhanced to instruct technicians to check fuse holder condition, including spring tension, during fuse replacement. The licensee also I provided revised instructions to reactor operators instructing them to manually trip the !
reactor whenever more than one control or shutdown rod unexpectedly drops into the i reactor core. This item is close .4 (Closed) LER 50-369/97-04. Revisions 00 and 01: Main Steam Safety Valve Technical Specification (TS) Uncertainties l The licensee discovered that TS 3.7-1, Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux l _ High Setpoint With inoperable Steam Line Safety Valves During Four Loop Operation,
,
I specified a non-conservative maximum allowable flux setpoint. The licensee responded by submitting a Technicai Specification Amendment Request on May 8,1998. The amendment request was reviewed by the Staff and issued on September 17,1998. This item is close .5 (Closed) LER 50-369/97-02. Revisions 00 and 01: Inoperability of Feedwater isolation Valves Due To Hydraulic Oil Degradation During preventive maintenance on the hydraulic actuators for feedwater isolation valves 1CF28 and 1CF30, the licensee determined that phosphate salts and gel produced as a result of hydraulic fluid degradation interfered with the movement of critical parts within the
'
solenoid valves. As a result, the valves failed to stroke closed within the required time. The inspectors verified that the licensee replaced or cleaned the solenoid plungers and changed the PM frequency from 5 years to each refueling outage, in addition, the subject valves
- were replaced on Unit 1 in June of 1998 and were scheduled to be replaced on Unit 2
_ _ _ _ _
_
.
.
.
.
during the February 1999 refueling outage. The replacement valvcs are air operated and
,
not subject to hydraulic fluid problems. This item is close II. Maintenance
.
M1 ;onduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Insoection Scoce (61726 and 62707b The inspectors reviewed a variety of maintenance and/or surveillance activities during the inspectico period, including the following specific items:
.
PT/1/A/4350/002B 18 Diesel Generator Operability Test, Revision 046
.
PT/1/A/4350/055B 1B Diesel Generator Slave Start Test, Revision 008
.
PT/2/A/4350/025 Essential Auxiliary Power System Power Source Verification, Revi ion 009
.
WO 98104795-01 2B Diesel Generator Cylinder Firing Pressure
.
WO 98080417-01 1B NS (Containment Spray) Pump Clean / Inspect Seal Observations and Findinos The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance tests to verify that approved procedures were available and in use; test equipment was cakorated; test prerequisites were met; system restoration was completed; and acceptance criteria were met. In addition, the inspectors reviewed or witnessed routine maintenance activities to verify, where applicabic, that approved procedures were available and in use, prerequisites were met, equipment restoration was completad, and maintenance results were adequat The inspectors also observed, reviewed, and discussed with licensee personnel the troubleshooting and repair activities on EDG 2B. Follow. ; operation of EDG 28 on November 13,1998, system engineering determined that all 16 cyJnders had higher than normal firing pressures (see Section E1.1). During troubleshooting, the licensee confirmed that the variable inlet valve timing was not functioning as designed at fullload condition Maintenance personnel performed a detailed inspection of an air supply line to an air piston that controls the inlet valve t ming. A leak in the line was identified. The inspector concluded that through-wall corrosion attack combined with engine vibration likely initiated the leak. The affected air lines were original Nordberg supplied equipment and the failed
- piping was sent to the metallurgicallaboratory to confirm the root cause of the failure. Both engineering personnel and maintenance supervisors were present assessing troubleshooting and repair activities. The corroded line was replaced and the EDG successfully completed an operability run following the repai .
- m__.___m
.
7 The inspector walked down the air supply lines on the other three engines and no problems were identified. The system engineer also noted that engine diagnostic data for the other three engines were norma Conclusions The inspector concluded that the reviewed routine maintenance and surveillance activities were adequately completed. The licensee exhibited good teamwork between maintenance and engineering personnel to troubleshoot and repair a Unit 2 emergency diesel generator problem with inlet valve timing. System engineers and maintenance supervisors provided strong presence and oversight for these activitie M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities M7.1 Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment Inspection Scope (62700)
Paragraph (a) (3) of the Maintenance Rule requires that performance and condition monitoring, associated goals and preventive maintenance activities for systems, structures, and components (SCCs) be evaluated taking into account, where practical, industry-wide operating experience. This evaluation is required to be performed at least one time during each refueling cycle, not to exceed 24 months between evaluations. Adjustments are required to be made where necessary to ensure that the objective of preventing failures of SSCs through maintenance is appropriatelv balanced against the objective of minimizing unavailability of SSCs due to monitoring o, preventive maintenance. The NRC Maintenance Rule baseline inspection of McGuire was conducted on August 18-22,1997. At that time, the licensee had not completed the first periodic assessment since the Maintenance Rule did not take effect until July 10,1996. On June 1,1998, the licensee completed the first period assessment which included both Unit 1 snd 2 and covered the period of January 1, 1996, to December 31,1997. This inspection was conducted to verify the effectiveness of the periodic assessment and of corrective actions take bservations and Findinas i
The licensee had performed the assessment in accordance with the guidance given in Chapter 12 of Nuclear Management and Resource Council (NUMARC) 93-01, Revision 2
" Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." The inspector reviewed the completed periodic assessinent, held discussions with the Maintenance Rule Coordinator, and validated / verified documentation used to support conclusions reached in each area addressed in the periodic assessment. Specific areas validated by the inspector were: (a)(1) SSCs had been evaluated against their goalc for continued applicability; (a)(2) SSCs performance criteria had been assessed to determined maintenance effectiveness; performance monitoring of all systems in the Maintenance Rule was effective; balancing availability and reiiability was appropriate; and industry operating experience was used effectively. During the review, the inspector also observed a number of initiatives had been developed by the license to improve the effectiveness of the Maintenance Rule program. Some of the initiatives which added strength to the program
!
,
- O' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ . - . - - - _ _ . - . - . _ _ - - - . - _ - . - - - . -
. .
.
.
were the following: engineering feedback forms were used to address (a)(2) SSCs that were experiencing problems and the preventive maintenance program was enhanced to iroprove the performance of these SSCs to keep them from becoming (a)(1) candidates; a monthly list of SSCs in (a)(1) and SSCs that had reached 50 percent of their perfoc ance criteria or unavailability limits was being sent to management for their awareness; and corrective actions for weaknesses identified by the NRC Maintenance Rule Team were addressed in the licensee's corrective action program and appropriate actions had been taken.
, in addition to the above, at the time of the Maintenance Rule team inspection, the licensee i
' had only completed 50% of the inspections required for structures. Industry experience with the rule and NUMARC 93-01 during the pilot site visits and the initial period following the
, effective date of the rule indicated that specific guidance for monitoring the effectiveness of l maintenance for structures was needed. As a result of insufficient guidance, licensees l Including Duke Power Company had generically failed to complete inspections of all l structures by the July 10,1996, Maintenance Rule implementation date. In Revision 2 of l Regulatory Guide 1.160, dated March 1997, the NRC provided the guidance needed.
i During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the completed documentation for structures and concluded that this portion of the Maintenance Rule program had been conducted effectively by the license Conclusions The periodic assessment performed by the licensee took into account SSCs' performance, condition monitoring, associated goals, and preventive maintenance activities; and met the guidance given in NUMARC 93-01. Based on the documentation reviewed and the proactive l enhancements validated, this assessment was considered a strength under the Maintenance Rul Ill. Enaineerina i
E1 Conduct of Engineering E Dearaded Unit 2 Emeroency Diesel Generator (EDG)
l- Ln_soection Scope (37551 and 40500)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of a degrac'ed 2B EDG condition. The
- operability evaluation and the Nordberg diesel engine technical manual were reviewed and I
discussed with the system enginee Observations and Findinas On November 16,1998, system engineering identified that the 2B EDG had abnormal cylinder firing pressures based on data obtained from the November 12,1998, operability run Using a new Beta analyzer engine diagnostic software, engineers determined that all
, 16 cylinders had high firing pressures with an average of approximately 1550 pounds per
,
square inch gauge (psig) per cylinder in lieu of the 1250 psig normal range at fullload conditions. Engineering documented the issue in PIP 2-M98-4084 and initially
,
-. - - - . _ _ _ - - - .- - ~ - _ _- .
.
.
characterized the issue as a reliability issue only. A work order was written to troubleshoot and repair the EDG on Friday, November 20,1998. There were no scheduled work activities on the 2A EDG between November 16 and November 20,199 During the morning management meeting of November 17,1998, the inspector observed
- that the subject PIP was discussed. A management team member questioned if there were applicable limits in the vendor technical manual. Engineering management did not I:now and proceeded to resolve the issue with involved engineering personnel. The following day, an operability evaluation, in accordance with the requirements of NSD-203, was initiated by engineering personnel because the firing pressures were determined to have been a non-conforming condition. This observed cylinder firing pressure exceeded the maximum 1350 psig limit specified in the vendor technical manual table on page 4.1, Operability Limits for McGuire Emergency Diesel Engine On November 18,1998, the PIP was updated to incorporate an operability evaluation. The evaluation included technical evaluation of effects on engine subcomponents. The limiting issue was effects on cylinder heads and stud tension. With the elevated firing pressures, the licensee reevaluated the head preload calculations and determined that the safety factor had eroded from 1.35 to approximately 1.2; however, sufficient safety margin existed. Also during the run, there was no evidence of head lift or gasket leaka;;r Engineering also assessed the meaning of the vendor technical manual operability lin.. s. The limits were established by the licensee in cooperation with another utility and former Nordberg engineers to provided guidance and prompt evaluation of abnormal condition On November 20,1998, the inspector observed repair of an air supply line leak to the air piston that controls inlet valve timing which corrected the degraded EDG condition. (See section M1.1 for details.) Conclusions Engineering's use of advanced engine diagnostics on the McGuire emergency diesel generators was considered a strength. The use of this predictive maintenance equipment revealed a degraded condition on the EDG 2B inlet valve timing. The operability evaluation of the degraded EDG 2B with higher than normal cylinder firing pressures on all 16 cylinders had sound and comprehensive technical bases for continued operability. However, engineering personnel did not initially recognize that high cylinder pressures were above the specified operability limit in the vendor technical manual. This delayed the operability evaluation for this non-conforming condition required per Nuclear Site Directive 20 Overall, timeliness of corrective actions for the degraded condition was commensurate with safety.
,
. . . - - - . . . - - . - - - - .. . - . . . .
.
.
.
)
l E2
'
Status of Engineering Facilities and Equipment E Failure of Cutler-Hammer Relav l Inspection Scope (37551. 40500. 62707)
l The inspector reviewed the facts and circumstances related to the failure of a Unit 1 diesel :
generator load sequencer relay. Root cause evaluation, metallurgy reports, inspection scope and criteria, and proposed corrective actions were also reviewed. Involved licensee l personnel were interviewe Observations and Findinas I
On June 24,1998, during a B train engineered safety features (ESF) blackout test, sequencer relay LRB3 failed to actuate. This relay was a Cutler Hammer (C-H) model D26 electrical relay. The relay did not energize to actuate. Consequently, several containment ,
fans did not sequence onto the 1B EDG, PIP 1-M-98-2248 was initiated. The relay was !
replaced and was sent to the metallurgical laboratory for failure investigation. The relay had
'
visible signs of severe cracking and distortion in the base metal. On September 24,1998, the lab issued a report with no identified root cause for the failure, i in October, the licensee's general office was reviewing the lab's efforts and determined, based on the data and industry experience, that the zinc casting failure was attributed to '
interdendritic corrosion from excess levels of contaminates of lead, cadmium, and ti Because of the metal cracking and distortion, the licensee indicated that the most likely failure mode of the relay was due to qeometry changes in the relay that caused binding of internal components. The conclusions were finalized by October 28,1998, with a revision to the metallurgicallab report. Engineers from the corporate office informed the inspector that this type of zinc-casting failure was considered a typical case of a metal failure. The licensee also indicated this was the first time a C-H relay was identified to have failed from .
this failure mechanism. The licensee contacted the vendor who noted that the contaminant l levels present did not meet the C-H specification for zinc-castings. The vendor also noted this was the first reported case of this type for their product. Cutler-Hammer also informed the licensee that their current cupplier of zinc-castings had reported that castings made (other than for C-H) with this type of problem were observed to literally crumble on the shel In 1981, C-H switched to an aluminum casting materia In fate October 1998, the licensee inspected all C-H relays installed in both units' EDGs !
sequencer cabinets. Other relays were identified that had signs of paint blistering, minor l cracks, and some distortion; however, none were as severe as the LRB3 relay failure. The results were documented in PIP 2-M98-3733. Based on a look at the date and stamp codes on the affected relays, it appears that some C-H relays manufactured between March and May 1975, had contaminates above C-H allowable levels. The inspector independently field i verified the condition of selected relays in the EDG sequencer cabinets. The inspector l observed relays conditions consistent with those documented in PIP 2-M98-3733. While no l additional failures of the C-H relays occurred, the 'nspectors noted that the licensee took approximately four months to determine the root cause of the failur ,
.
.
Safety significance with respect to past operability and present operability with installed defective relays was discussed with the licensee. The inspector was specifically concerned with seismic qualification of these relays in their present condition and past operability of LRB3 relay. For present operability, the licensee stated that the installed suspect C-H relays were currently operable based on previously perforrned surveillences, engineering judgement, lack of severity in physical deterioration, and the method of anchoring the relays in the cabinets. Concerning past operability, the safety-related C-H model D26 relays that were installed during construction were commercially procured and dedicated by the licensee for nuclear service. The relays were not individually seismically tested; however, they were qualified based on seismic tests performed on a completed diesel sequencer cabinet constructed for seismic qualification testing. During the interview with the involved engineers, the licensee indicated that the failed LRB3 relay would not have likely functioned under a postulated seismic event. Pending completion of the extent of condition review, the inspector considered the licensee's technical conclusions satisfactorily addressed operability issue The inspector raised issues of generic industry implication and potentially reportable under 10 CFR Parts 21 and 50 reporting requirements. The licensee informed the inspector that they were investigating reportability again under a third PIP for this issue; however, the other two PIPS needed to be updated to address past operability and the significance of the loss of the LRB3 relay's function. In November 1998, a revised past operability was included in PIP 1-M98-2248. The past operability noted that the failed relay was a blackout relay and probably would not have functioned under a seismic event; however, it generally supported the licensee's position that loss of LRB3 would have had minimalimpact during a seismic / blackout event. The licensee also believed that this failure was not reportable
,
under 10 CFR Part 21 because it was not reportable under Part 50 reporting requirement The inspector considered this acceptable based on a review of the NUREG-1022, Revision 1 and the statement of considerations for the 10 CFR Part 21 rule. However, the inspector noted that a report may still be required pending the results of the extent of condition review for other installed C-H relays in safety-related application The proposed corrective actions were to replace suspect relays during the upcoming 1999 refueling outages for each unit. An extent of condition evaluation was in progress at the end of the inspection period. The licensee was conducting inspections of allinstalled C-H relays of this type in both safety and non-safety applications to inventory the installed relay date codes and identify affected relays. These inspection activities were being performed by maintenance personnel using specific and detailed inspection criteria for material condition assessment. The licensee used a low-threshold for documenting the condition of each rela Conclusions While no additional failures of the C-H relays occurred, the licensee took approximately four months to evaluate and determine that a manufacturing defect was responsible for a relay failure in the Unit 1 EDG load sequencer. Once the manufacturing defect was recognized, the licensee's inspection criteria and schedule for evaluating the extent of condition of the ,
subject Cutler-Hammer relays were appropriate. The licensee's general office provided effective support in the identification of the root cause of the Cutler-Hammer relay's base metal crackin .. .
.. ..
.
. .
. .
.. ._- _ - _ - -
_ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ _ _ ___ __ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l
'
.
.
I
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E (Closed) URI 50-369.370/96-11-03: Environmental Qualification of Safety Related !
Snubbers in Containment
!
!
This item addressed the environmental qualification of Grinell piping supports (snubbers) in containment that did not meet the original licensee environmental criteria referenced in the I snubber purchase specification. In particular, a sub-component of the snubber would l l degrade at 250*F; therefore, the 350*F specified criteria was not met. The licensee stated that following a main steam line break, the design load restraint function of the snubbers ;
l was no longer required, therefore the snubbers were adequate!y qualified. This item was j unresolved pending additional NRC review of the snubber design and environmental '
l qualification requirements. The NRC review was completed on October 21,1998, j (TIA 97-02), and concluded that the Grinell snubbers were adequately qualified for the
'
design application and anticipated environmental conditions. This item is closed, j l
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R Tour of Radioloaical Protected Areas Inspection Scope (86750)
, The inspectors reviewed implementation of selected elements of the licensee's radiation j protection program as required by 10 CFR Parts 20.1902 and 1904. The review included j observation of radiological protection activities for control of radioactive material, including postings and labeling, and radioactive waste processing.
l Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed survey data of radioactive material storage areas. Observations of independent radiation and contamination survey results, determined the licensee was j effectively controlling and storing radioactive material and all material observed was
! appropriately labeled as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1904. All areas observed were I
appr'opriately posted to specify the radiological conditions. The inspectors determined the licensee was processing radioactive waste to maintain exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and to minimize quantities of radioactive waste stored on sit Conclusions The inspectors determined the licensee was effectively maintaining controls for radioactive material storage and radioactive waste processing.
, R1.2 Water Chemistry Controls Inspection Scope (8475_0)
i The inspectors reviewed implementation of selected elements of the licensee's water l chemistry control program for monitoring primary and secondary water quality as described l in TS, the Station Chemistry Manual, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report i
L
, -_
.. . ._ _- . _ . . _ . _ --_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .-___
. .
.
(UFSAR). The review included examination of program guidance and implementing procedures and analytical results for selected chemistry parameters, and observation of chemistry technicians collecting water sample Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed selected analytical trends recorded for Units 1 and 2 reactor coolant samples taken between January 1,1998, and October 9,1998, and secondary samples taken between January 1,1998, and October 9,1998. The parameters reviewed for primary chemistry included dissolved oxygen, chloride, pH, and fluoride. The parameters reviewed for secondary chemistry included hydrazine, iron, and chlorid Primary parameters reviewed were maintained well below the relevant TS limits for power operations. Secondary parameters reviewed were maintained below the limits of the Station Chemistry Manua The inspectors observed required weekly sample collections from the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Vent Gas and Tritium Grab Sample plant locations, using Enclosure 5.2 of Procedure HP/0/B/1003/036, Unit Vent, Revision 003 dated March 18,1993. The results of the sample analysis indicated values which were small percentages of limits and consistent with Radiation Monitor (EMF) 36, Unit Vent Monitor, setpoint Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's water chemistry control program for monitoring primary and secondary water quality had been effectively implemented in accordance with TS requirements and the Station Chemistry Manual for water chemistry. The inspectors also concluded that the collection of the samples was performed in accordance with the licensee's sampling procedure R2 Status of Radiation Protection (RP) Facilities and Equipment R Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors Inspection Scope (84750)
The inspectors reviewed selected licensee procedures and records for required surveillances on process end effluent radiation monitors. The inspectors also reviewed licensee records regarding radiation monitor availability and the results of the licensee's 1997 Annual Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Report and Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report 199 Observations and Findinas During tours of the auxiliary building and radwaste building, and interim radwaste building, the inspectors observed the physical operation of process radiation effluent monitors in service. The inspectors reviewed selected radiation and process monitor surveillance procedures and records for performance of channel checks, source checks, channel
_ _ _
_ _ _ _
.
.
calibrations, and channel operational tests. The inspectors determined the licensee was performing checks described in TS and Chapter 16 of the UFSAR. For the EMF 12-month rolling availability, monitors required by TS were available 96.98 percent of the time and monitors not required by TS were available an average of 99.13 percen The inspectors selectively reviewed the 1997 gaseous and liquid releases and their associated dose calculations and determined that the doses at the maximum location (site boundary,0.5 miles, north-northwest sector) were small percentages of the annual dose limits of 40 CFR 190.10(a). These limits are 25 mrem whole body,75 mrem to the thyroid, and 25 mrem to any other organ. The reported values were 9.83E-02 mrem whole body, 3.05E-01 mrem maximum organ dose Concentrations of radioactive isotopes observed in the environment in 1997 for the l licensee's related radionuclides were reviewed and compared to data from previous years ;
and it was determined that the releases from 1997 were generally within concentrations l observed in past Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports. The total body dose estimated to the maximum exposed member of the public as calculated by environmental sampling data, excluding thermoluminescent dosimetry results, was 3.12E-02 mrem for 199 Conclusions
\
The inspectors concluded radiation ana process effluent and environmental monitors were being maintained in an operational condition to comply with TS requirements and UFSAR l commitments. Offsite doses from effluents were small percentages of the annual dose '
Tmits of 40 CFR 190.10(a).
R2.2 Meteoroloaical Monitorina Eauioment Inspection Scope (84750)
The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures to verify licensee compliance with Section of the UFSAR which described the operational and surveillance requirements for the l meteorological monitoring instrumentation, Observations and rindinas The inspectors toured the location of the new meteorological tower and data collection building and determined the meteorologicalinstrumentation was operable and that data for wind speed, wind direction, air temperature, and precipitation were being collected as described in the UFSAR. Based on a review of records, the licensee had maintained a high level of operability for meteorology equipment during 1998.
j At the time of the inspection, the licensee was analyzing data collected at the old and at the
,
new tower location. This data comparison was scheduled to be completed within the next several months.
l
!
l i
- . _ _ - . . _ . _ _ .. _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
. .
.
.
. _ Conclusions it was concluded that the meteorological instrumentation had been adequately maintained and that the meteorological monitoring program had been effectively implemented. The new meteorological monitoring equipment was operational and functioning as designe !
l P2 Status of Emergency Planning (EP) Program
) {
l l P2.1 ' Operational Status of the Emergency Planning Program '
l Insoection Scope (82701)
Inspection objectives were to determine whether the licensee's emergency preparedness
!
i program was maintained in a state of operational readiness, and to determine whether changes to the program since the last inspection meet commitments, NRC requirements, and decrease the licensee's overall state of emergency preparednes Observations and Findinas !
'
The inspector reviewed Revisions 96-2,97-1 thru 97-3, and 98-1 thru 98-5 to the McGuire Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. The changes to the Plan were submitted in accordance with regulatory requirements and did not adversely affect the licensee's overall state of emergency preparednes One Emergency Plan implementation for a Notification of Unusual Event occurred on June 3,1998, due to a loss of off site power to Unit 1 while in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).
The inspector's review of documentation indicated the classification and notifications were correct and timel The inspector toured the emergency facilities, and verified that equipment, instrumentation, and supplies were being satisfactorily ma:ntained. Facilities were neat and organized. Improvements since the last inspection were the installation of video conferencing between facilities and a new digital in-plant cordless phone syste l The inspector reviewed documentation of maintenance and testing of the siren system used for public alerting. The documentation revealed that in addition to maintenance and testing, the licensee was also tracking and trending individual siren problems. The documentation indicated that the sirens were being satisfactorily tested and maintaine The system's reliability was greater than the Federal Emergency Management Agency's 90 percent criteri The organizational structure of the EP staff had changed since the last inspection. The EP training responsibilities had been transferred to the training department, and the previous EP Manager had been reassigned to the training department with that responsibility. A new EP Manager had been selected to handle the day-to-day l management of the EP program. Additionally, the staff had been augmented with
- another emergency planning specialist with senior reactor operator experience to assist with the implementation of the Severe Accident Management Guidelines. Also, a senior engineer had been assigned on a one-year developmental assignment to the EP l Manager to assist with special projects. The inspector observed that all aspects of the program reviewed reflected a more organized and timely response than had been l
._
.-. - -
,
observed in the past inspection. The inspector concluded that the increased staffing to support the EP program was an enhancemen The inspectors reviewed the emergency response organization (ERO) training program and exercise / drill schedule. New text and visual aids in support of an upgraded training program were being developed. The changes were an improvement to the previous initial and re-qualification classroom training program. Tracking of individual ERO qualification was organized and maintained with the aid of a computer generated listing that was reviewed monthly. A random sampling verification of training recorde by the inspector identified no deficiencies. The ERO drill schedule provided for satisfactory participation by control room shifts and ERO personnel. The inspector verified drill comments were tracked and resolved, and that their resolutions were satisfactory. The inspector noted the timeliness of drill reports had improved greatly since the '
organizational chang The inspector reviewed Safety Audit Reports 97-46 and 98-11 and concluded the audits were comprehensive and met NRC requirements. Corrective actions taken in response to issues identified during drills and exercises were becoming more thorough and timely since the organizational change Conclusion The licensee's emergency program was being maintained in a state of operational readines S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S Personnel Search Eauiomenj Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's personnel search equipment to ensure that the criteria in Sections 7 and 8 of the Duke Power Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan (PSP), Revision 7, dated October 5,1998 and appropriate security plan procedures (SPPs) were implemented, Observations and Findinas The inspectors verified that the walk-through and hand held metal detectors, explosive detectors, and X-ray equipment in the new primary access portal (PAP) to the protected area were functioning appropriately. The PAP also had new hand geometry palm readers and new turnstiles for access control to the protected area. The inspectors reviewed randomly selected documentation of the licensee's testing and maintenance program for the personnel search equipment. The observation of the equipment in operation and the review of the testing documentation verified that the personnel search equipment performed according to the commitments of the PSP. The inspectors found that the north vehicle access gate was not equipped with a hand geometry palm reade The cabling was installed in the gate house, but the hand geometry unit was not installed. Consequently, the licensee implemented administrative compensatory measures. The attention to detailin the layout of the PAP and the performance of the
.
-
. _
.
.
l 17
~
l
!- security personnel operating the personnel search equipment was a strength to the !
security progra ! Conclusion i The performance of the personnel search equipment and the security personnel operating the equipment was a strength in the security progra l S2.5 Vehicle Barrier System )
I Inspection Scope (81700)
l I
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's vehicle barrier system (VBS) to verify that it was '
in place and functioned according to Appendix 2 of the PSP and SPP EXAO 1 Observations and Findinas j
.
The inspectors toured the protected area perimeter to review the committed placement of the anchored jersey barriers, cables, cable rod systems, bollards, and the active and ,
passive vehicle gates of the VBS. The inspectors found that the licensee had extended 1 the protected area perimeter around the engineering building causing a minor change to the VBS. The changes were reflected in the PSP and did not degrade the VBS. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for inspecting, testing, and maintenance of i the VBS. The review of the VBS quarterly inspection documentation revealed that the licensee provided means for monitoring and maintaining the VB Conclusion
- The vehicle barrier system was found functional, well maintained, and effective in its intended purpose. The licensee met the PSP commitments and regulatory requirement S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.3 Security Event Loas
. Insoection Scope (81700)
The inspectors reviewed a sample of event logs generated since the last inspection to verify that the licensee appropriately analyzed, tracked, resolved, and documented safeguards events that the licensee determined did not require reporting to the NRC within one hou . Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the last six quarterly security events logs (SEL). This review found that the licensee tracked, trended, analyzed, and had taken corrective actions to resolve the recurring events listed in the SEL. The highest number of logged events was in unsecured vital doors, badges, and perimeter intrusion detection system alarm Logged events that showed a trend were made a subject of a PlP. The PIP analyzed and implemented necessary corrective actions. The inspectors found that the
-
_
,
.
.
.
unsecured door problems were directly related to the number of contractors and vendors onsite during an outage. This problem was being addressed with outage personnel during in-processing and with contractor and vendor management. Most of the badge events had been resolved with new badges and the hand geometry access control system. The perimeter intrusion detection system alarms were caused by adverse weather and ageing equipment. The licensee was replacing the perimeter intrusion detection equipment as it became inoperable. The tracking, trending, analyzing of the trends, resolving, and documenting the corrective actions were found by the inspectors to be concise, timely and effective. This process was a strength to the security progra Conclusion The licensee's safeguards events were logged according to the PSP commitments. The licensee's process of tracking, trending, analyzing, and resolving these events was a strength in the security progra S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance S Security Force Reauisite Knowledae inspection Seppe (81700)
The inspectors interviewed security personnel to determine if they possessed adequate knowledge to carr/ out their assigned duties and responsibilities, including response procedures, use of deadly force, and armed response tactics, Observations and Find!nas The inspectors randomly reviewed approximately 20 security personnel including supervisors, and witnessed approximately 10 others in the performance of their duties during normal operations. Members of the security force were knowledgeable in their duties and responsibilities, response commitments and procedures, and armed response tactics. The inspectors found that armed response personnel had been instructed in the use of deadly forca as required by 10 CFR Part 7 Conclusion The security force personnel possessed appropriate knowledge to carry out their assigned duties and resp asibilities, including response procedures, use of deadly force, and armed response tactic S4.2 Response Capabilities Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors evaluated the response capabilities of the security organization to security threats, contingencies, and routine response situations, including drills, to ensure compliance with the security plan proc.edures, the PSP and Security Contingency Pla ~
1 .
l l
!
19 l
\ Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed 20 response drill and exercise critique sheets conducted since I the beginning of January 1997. The licensee had conducted 72 force-on-force drills during the first three quarters of 1998. Most critique sheets had documented the drills'
objectives, weaknesses and strengths of the drills. Documented critique sheets indicated that the shifts were adequately balanced in the number and frequency of drills and exercises conducted. In addition, the inspectors noted that three response p. rsonnel on eacn shift were either trained or being trained on Tactica! Response, at Central Piedmont College by the Gastcn County Special Weapons and Tact 5s tea {
The inspectors noted that site management was supporting the continuation of the number of drills being conducted. The inspectors also noted that adversaries for these drills were being exchanged between the three Duke nuclear site security organization The inspectors determ;ned during discussions with security management that the number of armed respcaders had been reduced since the Operational Safeguards 1 Response Evaluat!.sn (OSRE)in 1995. The PSP had been changed to reflect this
'
reduced number of responders. The licensee had conducted force-on-force drills and {
felt that the reduced number of responders did not degrade the PSP or the ORSE results. The inspectors informed the licensee that this matter would be reviewed with the Of' ice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and addressed during a future inspection.
, Conclusion
,
! The security organization responses to security threats, contingencies, and routine response situations, including drills, were consistent with the Security Plan Procedures,
- and the Physical Security and Security Contingency Plan l S6 Security Safeguards Etaff Training and Qualification S5.2 Trainina Records
! Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors evaluated security force training records to verify that the records were properly maintained and reflected current qualifications.
! Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the train;ng records of 12 security force personnel against the
!
training commitments in the Training and Qualification Plan and PSP. Security personnel were interviewed by the inspectors to verify that the training documentation was correct. All records reviewed by the inspectors indicated that basic training, medical and fitness testing, firearms training and qualification, and task qualification
- ere completed. Interviews of the security force verified that the training documentation was accurate and correct. The records reviewed were neat, orderly, and well i maintaine
!
- . _ _ _ . . _ . .
.
.
.
l 20
. Conclusion The licensee's training records were ' properly maintained and reflected current qualifications according to the training program commitment S6 Security Organization and Administration S Manaaement Supoort and Effectiveness Inspection Scope (81700)
The inspectors interviewed management and non-management personnel and reviewed security related documents to determine the breadth and depth of the support provided j
and program effectiveness resulting from that suppor I Observations and Findinas The inspector's interviews indicated that the range of support provided by management was from good to excellent, depending on the individual interviewed. The inspectors determined that licensee management exhibited an awareness and favorable attitude toward physical protection requirements. The following items demonstrated a strong support system for the security program:
-
There is funding provided for an enhanced response mode to reduce the time lines for armed response to the designated target set The testing and maintenance support, as mentioned in NRC IR 50-369,370/97-20 was a strong element of the security program. Review of the maintenance request records by the inspectors revealed a significant reduction in requet,ts since 1996; May 1996 to May 1997 = 268 requests; June 1997 to June 1998 =
131 request Average time of compensatory measures used to compensate for equipment failures were less than three hour There had been no turnover in security personnel since the beginning of 199 The performance of the personnel search equipment and the security personnel operating the equipment was a strength to the security progra The licensee's process of tracking, trending, analyzing, and resolving tha logged security events was a strength to the security progra .
The reduction in the number of hardware and human error event The licensee had installed " delaying fencing" at one of the more attractive target sets.
l
'
!
'
l
!-
'
-
To enhance the site access program, the licensee reduced the number of days between entry dates a person had to er!sr the protected area before the badge was put on hold, from ten days to five day The continued implementation of an effective vehicle barrier syste Conclusion Licensee management provided strong support to the physical security program and was effective in implementing the security progra S Staffino Level
. Insoection Scope (81700)
The inspectors evaluated the total number of trained security officers and armed personnel immediately available to fulfill response requirements specified in the PS The inspector also evaluated the availability of one full-time member of the security organizatica, who had the authority to direct security activities, and to ensure that he did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an inciden Observations and Findinos The inspectors verified that the licensee had an onsite physical protection system and security organization. Their objective was to provide assurance against an unreasonable risk to public health and safety. The security organization and physical protection system were designed to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a). At least one full-time manager of the security organization was always onsite and had no duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an incident. This individual had the authority to direct the physical protection activities of the organization. The four shifts had the number of trained security officers and armed personnelimmediately available to fulfill response requirements and commitments of the PS Conclusion The total number of trained security officers and armed personnel immediately available to fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the Physical Security and Contingency Plan. One full-time manager of the security organization was always onsite who had the authority to direct security activities and did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an inciden .
.
\
,
.
S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.3 Actions on Previous Inspection Findinas Inspection Scope (92904)
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions to three violations, three escalated enforcement actions, and one licensee event report, Observations and Findinas (1) The corrective actions for the following open items were documented in PIP 0-M97-386 Enforcement Action EA 97-41101013,01023, and 02014
-
VIO 50-369,370/97-20-04 and 07-20-05 (a) An employment termination video and a presentation package had been made for in-processing outage personnel. The licensee indicated that the video or presentation package will be shown to new vendor supervision during pre-outage orientatio (b) The licensee conducted an assessment of the 31-day review performed by badge sponsors. This review was to ensure that badges for terminated individuals were suspended according to NSD 218. The assessment showed that all terminated individual's badges were processed according to NSD-21 (c) A new access control system (hand biometrics- palm geometry) was installed at the PA (d) The North PAP was d6:ommissione (e) All security personnel received human error reduction trainin (f) All site badging spor. sors and vendor supervisors were retrained on the termination process. All site badging sponsors were retrained on the 31-day review proces (2) The corrective actions for VIO 50-369,370/97-19-01 were documented in a letter from Duke Power Company, dated April 10,1998, and PIP 2-M98-0185. The site security staff implemented a change to the Nuclear Security Manual providing guidance from Regulatory Guide 5.62, * Reporting of Safeguard Events," regarding reportability of tampering events as it relates to significant physical damag (3) The corrective actions for LER 370/97-04(S) were documented in PlP 2-M97-4569. Security personnel were immediately placed at the containment access points for continuous monitoring. A;l personnel with plant surveillance responsibilities were asked to heighteri their awareness of surroundings with an
. .
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- .- . - - -
.
.
'
i t .
23 '
-
!
emphasis on mispositioning or tampering events. Security force patrol frequency was increased.
, Conclusion l
The licensee's corrective actions for these issues were thorough. The inspectors closed 1
' EA 97-411,01013,01023, and 02014; Violations 50-369,370/97-20-04,97-20-05, and 97-19-01; and LER 50-370/97-04(S).
j l
F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment '
F Identification of Dearaded Fire Penetration Seals 1 inspection Scope (71750) )
i On November 12,1998, the licensee reported per the provisions of the McGuire Faciiity l Operating License Condition C.(4) for Unit 1 and C.(7) for Unit 2 that silicon foam fire l penetration seals were not properly installed. The inspectors reviewed the known extent of condition for the identified issue and evaluated the adequacy of c r.ipensatory rreasures take i Observations and Findinas During a formalized, intrusive sample review of the installation of certain fire seal penetrations, the licensee identified that five out of seven seals initially inspected did not meet applicable acceptance criteria for proper installation. The subject penetrations consisted of silicon foam sandwiched between fiber board. Immediate corrective actions were to declare the identified degraded and other similar type seals inoperable and initiate remedial actions in accordance with Selected License Commitment (SLC)
16.9-5, which included a roving fire watch. The inspectors reviewed the requirements of the applicable SLC and concluded that immediate corrective actions for the identified problem were adequately implemented until the full extent of the condition was '
evaluated and repair of the degraded degraded seals could be planned and implemented. The licensee also submitted a required 14-day report on November 24, 1998, regarding the event. The licensee s inspection activities of fire penetration seals was previously discussed in IR 50-369,370/98-07, as an IFl. The inspectors will review the total extent of the fire penetration seal degradation and licensee repair of the condition during closure of IFl 50-369,370/98-07-10, Review of Licensee's Revalidation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Conclusions The licensee identified degradation of fire penetration seals through an intrusive visual inspection. The identified seals and other similar design seals were appropriately declared inoperable. Immediate compensatory measures were adequately defined and implemented in accordance with applicable licensing commitment _ _ _ .. _______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
.
,,
.
A V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on November 30,1998. The licensee acknnwledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identifie <
Y
, .
,
.
.
-
l
.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Barron, B., Vice President, McGuire Nuclear Station Bhatnagar, A., Superintendent, Plant Operations Boyle, J., Civil / Electrical / Nuclear Systems Engineering Byrum, W., Manager, Radiation Protection Cash, M., Manager, Regulatory Compliance Dolan, B., Manager, Safety Assurance Evans W., Security Manager Geddie, E., Manager, McGuire Nuclear Station Peele, J., Manager, Engineering Loucks, L, Chemistry Manager Thomas, K., Superintendent, Work Control Travis, B., Manager, Mechanical Systems Engineering INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 71707: Conduct of Operations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 6172G: Surveillance Observations IP 62706: Maintenance Rule IP 40500: Effectiveress of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems
'.
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 71750: Plant Support IP 71714: Cold Weather Protection IP 82701: Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program IP 84750; Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring IP 86750 Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials IP 90712: LER Review IP 92901: Followup Operations IP 92903: Followup Engineering
,
l l
_ _______
- - . . _
.
, .
.
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED t
OPENED l
l 50-369,370/98-10-01 IFl Potential Common Mode Failure of EDGs Due to }
Degradation of Fuel Oil During Cold Weather 1 Conditions t 'ection O2.2)
l CLOSED I
50-369/97-04-01 VIO Failure to Report a Condition Required by 50.72 In a Timely Manner (Section 08.1)
50-369/98-04 LER Missed Auxiliary Hoist Surveillance (Section 08.2)
50-369/98-02 LER Unit 1 Reactor Trip Due To Failed Power Supply ,
Fuse (Section 08.3)
50-369/97-04-01 LER Main Steam Safety Valve Technical Specification Uncertainties (Section 08.4)
.,. 50-369/97-02-00 & 01 LER Inoperability of Feedwater isolation Va'/es Due To
, Hydraulic Oil Degradation (Section 08.5)
EA 97-411-01013 EA Failure To Follow Procedures For Security Badge
"
and Access Control (Section S8.3)
50-370/97-04(S) LER Deliberate Tampering Causing Damage To Airlock Door Seals (Section S8.3)
EA 97-411-01023 EA Failure To Follow Procedures For Security Badge and Access Control (Section S8.3)
EA 97-411-02014 EA Failure To Control Protected Area Access Badges, and the Badges Were Taken Outside the Protected Area (Section S8.3)
50-369,370/97-20-04 VIO Failure To Deactivate and/or Deny Protected Area Access To Terminated Employees (Section S8.3)
! 50-369,370/97-20-05 VIO Failure To Control a Protected A;ea Access Badge p (Section S8.3)
l 50-369,370/97-19-01 VIO Failure To Report a Tampering Event Within One Hour of Discovery To the NRC Operations (Section
- S8.3)
h
.
k y _ . _ . . . _ . -
-
,, ,
. . - .. . .- . . _ . - - . . .
-. ,
.- .
.
27
-
,.
- AMSAC -
ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry
'
ASTM -
American Society for Testing and Materials
!
ATW5 -
Anticipated Transient Without Geram
!
BOP -
Balance Of Plant C-H -
Cutler-Hammer
- CFE -
Containment Floor and. Equipment !
CFR -
Code of Federal Rego!ations '
DC -
Direct Current DEC- -
Duke Energy Corporation EA -
Enforcement Action EDG -
Emergency Diesel Generator EMF -
Radiation Monitor EP -
Emergency Planning ERO' -
Emergency Response Organization ESF -
Engineered Safety Features F -
Fahrenheit l GL -
Generic Letter IFl .. -
-Inspectcr i'ollow-up Item IR -
Inspection Report
LCO --
Limiting Condition for Operation LER- -
Licensee Event Report
' LOCA' -
Loss of Coolant Accident MNS -
McGuire Nuclear Station NRC -
Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
NRR -
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSD -
Nuclear Site Directive NSRB -
Nuclear Safety Review Board-OSRE -
Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation P/.P - -
Personnel Access Portal PDR- -
Public Document Room '
PIP -
Problem investigation Process PM -
Preventive Maintenance PM -
Planned Maintenance (PM)
- PSIG -
Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge PSP -
Duke Power Company Nuclear Security and Contir?gency Plan P Periodic Testing RC Radic 'ically Controlled Area
' RP -
Radiat i -n Protection -
RWST Refuelir, j Water Storage Tank
. SEL -
Security Jvent Logs SLC -
Selected Licensee Commitments
- SP Security Plan Procedures SSCS - -
Structures, Systems, and Component SSF -
Safe Shutdown Facility TIAL -
Task Interface Agreement
. - _ _
- .. _
-
. . . .. , . . . . . . _ , . . _ . . ..- ... . . - - - . _ . . _ - -. ~ ~ _ . . -
p .. ,
-
-
V l
, . ..
..
'
TS
'
,
'
.- Technical Specifications .
UFSAR' --
Updated Final Safety Analysis VBS
-
-
Vehicle Barrier System D VIO -- Violation - :
'. WO ~
-
-
Work Order
.
F - r
, -
'
g t
>
t t
'
. >
!
.
,
'
t I
. a l
i
-
I
'
,. , ]
t r
i.
l
{' ,
i
'
-
?
<
)
l j
j ;
.
s a
f
,1
+
'
[1 - 4 .- _ . . . . _ , _
. .,_ l