ML20245G978
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| ML20245G978 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1989 |
| From: | Croteau R, Shymlock M, Vandoorn K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245G941 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-89-05, 50-369-89-5, 50-370-89-05, 50-370-89-5, NUDOCS 8905030282 | |
| Download: ML20245G978 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1989005
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hRic UNITED STATES
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o NUCL EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
' y ' , REGION H
< j 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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C ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
%t )?*****
Report Nos. 50-369/89-05 and 50-370/89-05 ]
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Licensee: Duke Power Company l
422 South Church Street 1
Charlotte, NC 28242 l
Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2
Doc.ket Nos: 50-369 and 50-370 j
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License Nos: NPF-9 and NPF-17 1
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Inspection Conducted: Fe ruary 28 1989 - March 29, 1989 j
Inspectors: 8 9-
~ K. VanUoorn,~ Seniorpsident Inspector Ta'te41gned
"R.
/7RW/ 77 J A V
Cr au
~Rei'dentpspector 4a' e4 gried J
Approvedb$ - /
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cf-11. B. Shymlock, Section Chief Oate Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
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Scope: This routine unannounced inspection involved' the areas of operations i
safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities,
and follow-up on previous inspection findings.
Results: In the areas inspected, two violations and one inspector followup !
item were identified.
Inspector Follow-up Item 369/89-05-01, High Radiation Door Blocked
Open, involved two instances of a door to a high radiation area being
found unlocked and blocked open. One instance was identified by the
inspector. The as found radiation levels were below the 10 CFR 20
requirements for locking. A previous violation was identified in i
this area. Regional Specialists will: follow-up on this issue during
the next routine health physics inspection.
Violation 369/89-05-02, Failure -to Follow Procedure, was identified
by the inspector when observing work.on.1VG-40, DG. Starting Air Tank
182 drain valve. Two hold' points were passed without performing the
required actions, obtaining the required signatures, or changing the
procedure. Procedural adherence and adequacy continue. to - be a ,
problem area.
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8905030282 890421
PDR ADOCK 05000369
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Violation 369,370/89-05-03: Inoperable Die 21 Generators due to
Starting Air Interface with Instrument Air System. This issue
involves a design deficiency identified by the licensee involving the
diesel generator Starting Air system interface with the non-seismic,
non-safety Instrument Air system and supply to the blackout header. '
It appears that the diesel generators were inoperable under certain
conditions from initial operation until May,1988. This issue is
being considered for escalated enforcement and therefore a Notice of
Violation is not being issued with this report.
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REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
*G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services
*R. Gills General Office, Regulatory Compliance
*T. McConnell, Plant Manager
W. Reeside, Operations Engineer
M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenatice
*R. Sharp, Compliance Engineer
J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
R. White, IAE Enaineer
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office
personnel.
* Attended exit interview
*A. Herdt, DRP Branch Chief I
*T. Cooper, Region II Inspector
2. Plant Operations (71707, 71710)
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The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to !
verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room j
logs. shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment
removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were l
conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, j
and performance personnel. j
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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at
shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as
prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement-
of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required ;
by Technical Specifications.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not '
limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2
electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable . spreading rooms, and the
station yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activitics, housekeeping, security,
equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
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On March 1,1989, the inspector found the normally locked high radiation
door to room 602E (Unit 2 pipe chase, 716' elevation), unlocked and tied
open. Health Physics personnel were contacted and the door was secured.
This was the second time that the door was found tied open. Licensee
personnel had previously been working in the room. Health Physics
performed a survey of the unlocked area and found maximum radiation levels
of 100 mr/hr on contact. A violation was issued in Inspection Report j
369,370/88-06 for a similar occurrence on Unit 2, however, as found '
radiation levels at that time were 800 mr/hr at 18 inches.
Due to the radiation levels involved, it appears that the door was not
required to remain locked by regulations. Blocking the door open,
however, did violate Station Administrative requirements. This item is
identified as Inspector Followup Item 369/89-05-01, High Radiation Area
Door Blocked Open, and will be reviewed by a Regional Health Physics
Inspector.
a. Unit 1 Operations
Unit 1 started the report period operating at 100 percent power.
On March 7,1989, at 11:46 p.m., Unit I was manually tripped due to
indications of a steam generator tube leak in the B steam generator.
The unit had returned to operation after a refueling outage in early
January and had been experiencing slight tube leakage of 10-20 gpm in
the B steam generator. At the end of the report period the unit
remained in cold . shutdown. An NRC Augmented Inspection Team was
dispatched to the site. More information on this event can be found
in Inspection Report 369,370/09-06,
b. Unit 2 Operations
Unit 2 started the report period operating at 100 percent power.
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On March 3, 1989, at 8:19 a.m., while operating at approximately 100
percent power, Unit 2 tripped. Plant personnel were conducting a rod
movement test on Shutdown Bank E when one or more rods dropped into
the core causing a high negative flux rate reactor trip. The plant
responded as expected. The licensee could not determine which rods i
fell or why. The unit was critical at 3:16 a.m. on March 4, 1989 and
returned to approximately 100 percent on March 6, 1989.
On March 14,1989, at 4:12 a.m., while operating at 98 percent, Unit
2 lost the 28 Main Feedwater Pump. At 4:15 a.m. the unit tripped on
low-low level in *he B steam generator. This transient does not
normally result ir a reactor trip, however, the C heater drain pump was
out of service at the time and CM-420, load Reject Bypass Valve,
failed to open making the SG level decrease more severe. CM-420
normally opens on a load rejection aligning water from the hotwell to
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the suction of the condensate booster pump. The licensee later l
determined that the feedpump tripped because one of the pressure !
transmitters in the suction and discharge lines had developed a ;
leaking diaphragm allowing water to enter the electrical portion and !j
flow through the conduit to a common junction box. From the junction
box water flowed to the other pressure switches, eventually
generating a pump trip signal. CM-420 failed to open due to a failed
solenoid. The unit was back on line at 11:01 p.m., March 14, 1989,
and ended the period at 100 percent power.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Surveillance Testing (61726)
Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the
inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance
with applicable Technical Specifications.
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Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved
procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was
calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was
completed and test results were adequate.
Procedure PT/2/A/4403/02, Valve Stroke Timing Test, was witnessed this
report period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Maintenance Observations (62703)
Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the
resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy
and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where
applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use,
that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and
maintenance results were adequate.
ACTIVITY W
_ORK REQUEST / PROCEDURE
Rod Out 1A KD HX WR 09281PM
, Lap VG Valve Seat MP/0/A/7600/06
VG Filter Replacement
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MP/0/A/7150/77
Coupling Alignment 2A1 KC Pump MP/0/A/7150/04
During observation of MP/0/A/7600/06, Kerotest Y-Type Globe Valve
Corrective Maintenance, on IVG-40, DG Starting Air Tank 1B2 Drain Valve,
the maintenance personnel passed hold points without obtaining the
required signatures prior to proceeding.
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The first hold point involved clearing of the valve parts and maintenance
personnel were to sign for this action being completed. Maintenance
personnel stated that the cleaning would be done prior to reassembly of
the valve and that it was not needed prior to lapping the seat. This is
technically correct, however, the procedure specified cleaning of parts ;
prior to lapping the seat.
Another hold point that was bypassed without performing the action
involved obtaining and inspection by Quality Control (QC) personnel of
sealing surfaces. Again, this step was required by procedure prior to
lapping the seat. Maintenance personnel again stated that this step would
be done just prior to reassembly and that they did not want to call QC
down to the job several times.
In both cases, plant personnel did not think that they were violating the
procedure although they were performing steps out of order and bypassing
" HOLD" points. Tnis illustrates the continuing problem on the worker
level with procedural compliance. This is considered a violation of TS
6.8.1, Violation 369/89-05-02, Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedure.
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Plant management stated that this procedure had not been through the
upgrade program and that changes were needed. The licensee also stated
that requirements for not passing hold points prior to obtaining the
signature was not written in any stations policy but it was understood by
plant personnel.
One violation was identified.
5. Licensee Event Report (LER) And Part 21 Followup (90712, 92700)
a. The following LERs were reviewed to determine whether reporting
requirements have been met, the cause appears accurate, the
corrective actions appear appropriate, generic applicability has been
considered, and whether the event is relat6d to previous events.
Selected LERs were chosen for more detailed followup in verifying the i
nature, impact, and cause of the event as well as corrective actions !
taken. The following LERs are closed:
LER 369/88-05-R1
LER 369/88-30-R1
LER 370/88-07-R1
b. (0 pen) Part 21 369,370/P2189-01: Lack of Slow Close Rebound Spring )
l for ABB Power Distribution K-Line Electrically Operated K-225 through l '
K-2000 Circuit Breakers. ABB Power Distribution, Inc. issued a 10CFR
Part 21 report on the subject problem on January 13, 1989. The
letter stated that breakers manufactured prior to 1974 did not have
the rebound spring and that persistent sine dwell vibration from a ;
seismic event could occasionally cause the slow close bar to move
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into a position such that the breaker would go into a slow close
rather than close normally. Another letter dated February 16, 1989
provided specific seismic data and indicated that the breaker could
jam and fail to close in a situation of simultaneous dislocation of
the slow close latch with a close signal. The inspector verified
that the licensee had the letters and had evaluated the problem and
scheduled inspection and corrective action. The licensee has
scheduled inspection and addition of springs during the normal
preventive maintenance frequency which would- be completed by
December, 1992. The licensee indicated that the vendor had been
contacted and that discussions indicated that McGuire breakers were
still seismically qualified despite recent laboratory failures. The
failures occurred during conditions not expected to occur during
normal operations or a seismic event.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
The following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that
the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in
compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been
completed. Selective verification included record review, observations, -
and discussions with licensee personnel. .
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 369,370/88-31-03, Verify Procedures OP/1
& 2/A/6450/17 Clarified For Containment Releases. The inspectors verified ;
that these procedures had been changed. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 370/88-30-02, Failure to Follow Administrative 1
Procedure with Respect to Training Operators on Modified Systems. The !
required training was conducted and procedures changed. Operations ;
Management Procedure 1-11, Operations NSM Implementation Process, was
revised to more clearly specify training requirements and to provide for
urgent training on NSMs when warranted. This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-369,370/88-32-02, ISI _ Program B Percentage
Basis. This issue questioned whether the percentages in ASME B & PV
Section XI Code Committee's Table 2412 were based on Category (as the
McGuire Program is based) or by item. The Licensee indicated that they
would submit an inquiry to the committee for resolution.
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The Committee, by a May 6,1988 letter made the following rep y to a
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similar inquiry made by others November 22, 1985:
- " Question: Is it a requirement of Section XI, Division 1, to apply the
i schedule requirements of IWB-2412 and IWC-2412 to each examination
category or to each item number listed in Tables IWB-2500-1 and
IWC-2500-1?"
Reply: " Schedule requirements are applied by category".
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Based on the above it is clear that the Licensee's Program is consistent
with the Code Committee's in that this matter is considered closed.
7. Diesel Generator Inoperability Review '
(Closed) Unresolved Item 369, 370/88-33-06: Diesel Generator
Inoperability to Air problems. The McGuire Diesel Generator (DG)
Starting Air (VG) system which supplies air to start and maintain ;
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operation of the DGs is also automatically aligned as a backup air supply
to a portion of the Instrument Air (VI) system in the event of a loss of
off-site power when the DGs are running. VI is a non-seismic and
non-safety related system. .;
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The purpose of the VG system to VI system blackout header tie, as
described in the FSAR is to allow the plant to be brought to a Hot
Standby condition in the event of a Control Room evacuation coincident
with a loss of normal electrical power. During this scenario, power to 4
the VI compressors would be lost and the VG system would supply air to -{ '
the blackout header. The VI blackout header allows control of valves
which fail to their safe position but control of the valves would be
desirable, but not required by the accident analysis, in response to an
event. If a blackout had occurred, VG may have bled down through VI
causing the Diesel Generator (DG) fuel racks to be positioned to a
fuel-off position causing the DG to stop.
During a Duke Self-Initiated Technical Audit (SITA) in May 1988, the
licensee discovered the blackout header could depressurize the VG system
during a seismic event and shut down the DGs. Furthermore, the design
had not been analyzed or tested to show that VG could supply the blackout
header air demand as well as the DG control demands. Also, there was no
assurance that the blackout header or other portions of the VI system 1
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Inunediate licensee actions included closing the VG isolation valves.
Long term corrective actions included testing and analysis. Testing was
completed in late February. Af ter several tests, the licensee decided
that the most conservative test would be to determine the amount of air
the VI regulator would pass assuming open piping down stream. A like
regulator was shop tested. Results showed that the DG would shutdown in
approximately 10 minutes. The licensee is continuing to perform
l additional analysis including an evaluation of the seismic ruggedness of l VI, additional time to damage after DG shutdown and credit for the Safe
Shutdown facility. Additional information is contained in Licensee Event
Report 369/88-36.
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Sequence of Events J
04/29/88 Licensee began a SITA of the VG system.
05/16/88 Two design deficiencies identified: i
- a portion of VG was not seismically qualified.
- VG/VI interface could lead to DG inoperability.
05/20/88 VG System determined to be " seismically rugged". VG
isolation valves closed and operating procedures
changed to assure DG operability.
06/28/88 DG 2B header tested (licensee required unit to be in
no-mode operation). Results were inconclusive due to
most blackout loads being isolated.
07/20/88 DG 2A header tested. Test vias aborted when VI blackout
header reached 79 psig and decreasing. VI regulator
2VI-31 did not apparently pass enough air to maintain VI
pressure. VG apparently remained operable. This test was
not conclusive because of dependence on regulator setup.
Regulator was not in test or PM programs.
11/'c/;d DG 1A header tested. VI check valve IVI-122 failed to
reseat. Test only maintained VI load of 30 cfm. Test
inconclusive due to unknown blackout loatis, however, failed
check valve would have probably bled down VG.
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11/18/88 Licensee determined situation reportable and NRC notified.
12/21/88 LER submitted - long term resolution still outstanding.
02/17/89 Additional testing of like regulator shows possible DG
shutdown in approximately 10 minutes. I
02/23/89 NRC informed of results of 2/17/89 and that additional
analysis should be completed by late March /early April.
It appears that all DGs were potentially inoperable under certait.
postulated conditions from initial startup (1981 and 1983 for Units 1 and
2. respectively) until May,1988. This is an apparent violation of :
L. Technical Specification 3.8.1.1. which requires two separate and l independent DGs to be operable in Modes 1 through 4 and is identified as , '
Violation 369,370/89-05-03: Inoperable Diesel Generators Due to Starting ]
Air .'nterface with Instrument Air System. This apparent violation is ;
being "onsidered for escalated enforcement and therefore a Notice of 2
Violation is not being issued with this report.
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One apparent violation was identified as described above. ]
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8. Exit Interviev: (30703)
The inspection findings identified below were summarized on March 29,
1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The following
items were discussed in detail:
Inspector Followup Item 369/89-05-01, High Radiation Door Blocked Open
(Paragraph 2).
Violation 369/89-05-02, Failure to Follow for Procedure Maintenance
(Paragraph 4).
Violation 369,370/89-05-03, Inoperable Diesel Generators Due to Starting
Air Interface with Instrument Air System (paragraph 7) (Potential
Escalated Enforcement).
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The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor
did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the
inspectors during the course of their inspection.
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