IR 05000369/1987035
| ML20236W046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1987 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712070243 | |
| Download: ML20236W046 (27) | |
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DEC 0 31987-Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370
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. License Nos. NPF-9, NPF-17-
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- Duke. Power. Company ATTN:
Mr. H. B.' Tucker, Vice President
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Nuclear Production Department 422 South Church Street'
Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:. ENFORCEMENT' CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-369/87-35 AND 50-370/87-35)
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This letter refers to ~ the Enforcement Conference held at our request on November 6, 1987.
This meeting concerned activities authorized for your McGuire facility.
The issue discussed at this conference related to the inoperable missile shield on Unit 2.
A summary,. a Llist of attendees, and a copy'of your handout are enclosed.
It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and has provided a better
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understanding of the inspection findings, the enforcement issues, and the status of your corrective actions.
We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the. appropriate enforcement action.
In-~ accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal' Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will.be placed in.the NRC Public Document Room.-
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.
Sincerely, M.CTfL mm cy,
'L 1;iLm c;;;;5 J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator Enclosures:
1.
Enforcement Conference Summary 2.
List of-Attendees 3.
Handout cc w/encis:
T. L. McConnell, Station Manager Senior Resident Inspector - Catawba bec w/encls:
(See page 2)
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DEC 0 31987 i
bec w/encls:
J. Lieberman, DOE G. R. Jenkins, EICS NRC Resident Inspector
State of North Carolina j
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ENCLOSURE 1 l
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY On November 6,19'87, representatives of Duke ' Power Company (DPC) met with the I
NRC in the Region II office in Atlanta, Georgia to discuss the inoperable missile shield at McGuire Unit 2.
A list of ' meeting attendees is in Enclosure'2.
Following opening remarks given by M.
L. Ernst, NRC, RII Deputy Regional Administrator, DPC.gave a presentation (See Enclosure 3) which addressed NRC concerns. 'The presentation covered the sequence of events, root cause, corrective action and the potential safety consequences of this incident.
The NRC is presently considering enforcement action on these issues.
This meeting served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's
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plans to prevent recurrence of similar problems.
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ENCLOSURE 2 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE LIST OF ATTENDEES U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator T. A~ Peebles, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A, Division of Reactor
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Projects (DRP)
W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, DRP E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff, (EICS)
B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS B. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba D. Hood, Project Manager, NRR Duke Power Company D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance, McGuire J. W. Hampton, Manager, Catawba Nuclear Station, (CNS)
H. B. Barron, Superintendent of Operations, CNS G. Smith, Superintendent of Maintenance, CNS F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer, CNS G. E. Swindlehurst, Superintendent Design Engineer T. L. McConnell, Plant Manager, McGuire E. O. McCraw, Compliance Engineer, McGuire H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production N. A. Rutherford, System Engineer, Licensing i
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ENCLOSURE 3
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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
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ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE MISSILE SHIELD INOPERABILITY l
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OVERVIEW (1)
FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF MISSILE SHIELD I N RELATION TO
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McGUlRE'S ICE CONDENSER CONTAINMENT.
(ATTACHMENT 1 OR OVERHEAD)
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PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF MISSILE SHIELD AND BOLTING CONFIGURATION (ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 OR OVERHEADS)
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LOCATION OF MISSING OR LOOSE BOLTS AND GROUTED HOLE, UNIT 1 AND UNIT.2.
(ATTACHMENT 2 OR OVERHEAD)
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IMPACT OF LOCA WITH MISSING BOLTS.
WOULD HAVE LIFTED BLOCK WITH GROUTED HOLE.
(5)
A RELATED EVENT, ASSOCIATED W!TH CONTAINMENT CIVIL STRUCTURES THAT SERVE A PASSIVE SAFETY FUNCTION, OCCURRED IN JANUARY, 1987. IN THIS EVENT, THE WATER CURBS THAT PREVENT FLOODING OF THE CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FAN PIT WERE DISCOVERED MISSING.
THIS EVENT WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN EARLIER ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE, HELD IN APRIL, 1987 AND DOCUMENTED IN LER 369/87-03.
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(6)
THE WATER CURB INCIDENT PROMPTED THE STATION TO REQUEST OUR DESIGN ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT TO CONDUCT AN IN DEPTH DESIGN STUDY OF CERTAIN CONTAINMENT SAFETY RELATED civil STRUCTURES.
THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY IS TO IDENTIFY DESIGN FEATURES WHICH
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ARE SHOWN ON CIVIL DRAWINGS THAT DO NOT HAVE AN APPARENT OR OBVIOUS SAFETY FUNCTION.
THE STUDY WILL IDENTIFY AND DESCRIBE CIVIL ITEMS WITHIN CONTAINMENT WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO SAFETY.
THE INTENT IS FOR STATION PERSONNEL TO THEN TAKE THE INFORMATION FROM THIS STUDY AND ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE PROCEDURAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ARE IN PLACE TO CONTROL THE OPERABILITY OF THESE CIVIL STRUCTURES.
THIS DESIGN STUDY WAS IN PROGRESS WHEN THIS MOST RECENT EVENT OCCURRED.
DAN RAINS WILL DESCRIBE THE SPECIFIC SEQUENCE OF E <NTS AND COVER OUR ROOT CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THE SHIELD BLOCKS WERE FABRICATED IN THE LATE SEVENTIES AND EARLY EIGHTIES ACCORDING TO APPROVED DESIGN ENGINEERING DRAWINGS.
MISSILE SHIELD BLOCKS (HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS BLOCKS) HAD BEEN INSTALLED NUMEROUS TIMES DURING HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING AND REFUELING OUTAGES.
THE EVENTS INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF PROBLEM IS AS FOLLOWS:
UNIT STATUS - UNIT 1 - MODE 3 UNIT 2 - 100% POWER I
DATE TIME EVENT A MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE PERSON NOTICED 8/13/87
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FIVE(5) MISSILE SHIELD BOLTS STORED IN THE DECONTAMINATION HOLDING AREA.
MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ENTERED THE 8/14/87
UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING TO VERIFY SHIELD BOLT INSTALLATION AND DISCOVERED THE HOLD-DOWN l
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BOLT ON THE EAST END OF SHIELD BLOCK ONE WAS MISSING AND THE BOLT HOLE HAD BEEN j
GROUTED, UNIT 1 WAS INSPECTED TO IDENTIFY ANY MISSING I
BOLTS.
1006 MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL NOTIFIED l
OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IN THE CONTROL ROOM OF
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THE MISSING BOLT.
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1145 DESIGN ENGINEERING WAS CONTACTED FOR I
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ASSISTANCE IN DETERMINING OPERABILITY OF SHIELD BLOCKS.
1730 DESIGN ENGINEERING CONTACTED THE STATION AND l
ADVISED THAT THE SHIELD BLOCKS WERE INOPERABLE.
OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DECLARED THE SHIELD BLOCKS INOPERABLE.
OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT, AND MADE ALL THE REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF A SAFETY BARRIER.
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2000 OPERATIONS PERSONNEL BEGAN UNIT SHUTDOWN i
2345 UNIT 2 REACHED MODE 3.
i 8/15/87 MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL REDRILLED THE
SHIELD BOLT HOLE, REPLACED THE RETAINER PLATE, AND INSTALLED THE MISSING BOLT IN SHIELD BLOCK PC1.
8/16/87 0415 MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL COMPLETED INSTALLATION OF THE BOLT, AND OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DECLARED THE SHIELD ELOCKS OPERABLE AND SECURED FROM THE UNUSUAL EVENT.
8/16/87 2335 UNIT 2 WAS PUT ON LINE
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UNIT ONE HAD BEEN PLACED IN MODE 3 FOR ADDITION OF OIL IN REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR.
THE THREE BOLTS NOT TORQUED WERE INSTALLED l
AND TORQUED.
REFER TO OVERHEAD FOR LOCATION OF BOLTS.
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ROOT CAUSE-
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i THE OBVIOUS CAUSE IS A DEFECTIVE PROCEDURE WHICH DID NOT HAVE l
SUFFICIENT OR SPECIFIC ENOUGH DETAIL.
THE PROCEDURE WAS VERY SPECIFIC AND DETAILED ABOUT THE BLOCKS " GASKET CONDITION", BUT
REGARDING THE BOLTING IT ONLY STATED THAT THE " BLOCKS ARE INSTALLED AND SECURED". WHAT LEAD THE MECHANICAL STAFF AND
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MAINTENANCE CREWS THAT WROTE THE PROCEDURE AND INSTALLED THE BLOCKS INTO NOT REALIZING THAT ALL BOLTS WERE REQUIRED IS
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- FIRST IS THAT THE MASSIVE SIZE AND WEIGHT (70,000 to 80l000 POUNDS) OF THE BLOCKS CREATED THE MISPERCEPTION THAT ACCIDEtiT i
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CONDITIONS COULD NOT POSSIBLY " LIFT" THEM.
THE EMPHASIb WAS
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PLACED ON THE GASKET INSTALLATION TO PREVENT STEAM.FROM BYPASSING THE ICE CONDENSER, VERSUS ASSURING BOLT DOWN TO PREVENT PRESSURE FROM LIFTING THE BLOCKS.
- SECOND IS THAT IT HAD BEEN PASSED DOWN THROUGH THE CREWS THAT HAD INSTALLED THESE BLOCKS SINCE HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING THAT-
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ONLY ONE BOLT PER BLOCK WAS ADEQUATE.
THE PERCEPTION WAS THAT,
THE BOLTS WERE TO ASSURE PROPER " POSITIONING OR ALIGNMENT" OF
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- THIRD IS THAT ALL THE ACCIDENT FUNCTIONS OF THE BLOCKS WERE NOT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD.
MCGUIRE COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANYTHING IN THE FSAR, TECH. SPECS, SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS OR OTHER DESIGN DOCUMENTS THAT DESCRIBED THE FUNCTION OF THESE BOLTS.
BECAUSE OF THIS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING, THERE WAS A FAILURE TO REVIEW
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ANY OTHER REQUIREMENTS ON BOLTING THESE BLOCKS.
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'a IMMEDIATE:
t INSTA.",IED BOLTS ON BOTH UNIT I & 2
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SUBSEQJENT:
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(A)
CIV2f STUA'
MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL HAS EXECUTED A y'
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BUILII?,b WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF DESIGN ENGINEERING \\l '\\
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PRIOP TO ENTERING MODE A IN THE CURRENT UNIT 1
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OUTAGE!. THIS WILL BE DordE ON' UNIT 2 I)URING THE NEXT t
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REFUELING OUTAGE. MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
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WILL PURSUE EXPEDITING TdE SCHEDULE FOR THS CURRENT DESIGN ENGINEERING CIVIL STURCTURES STUI.Y,
COORDINATE A WORKING GROUP TO INITIALLY REV7;W THE CIVIL STRUCTUEES' WHICH IMPACT OPERABILITY, AND
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ASSURE PROCEDURE PREPAiW ION t
AND APPROVAL PROCEEDS UNPEDITIOUSLY.
THIS ACTION WILL BE COMPLETED BY DECEMBER 5, 1987.
(B)
PROCEDURES i
MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE REVIEWED THE PROCEDURES FOR OTHER REMOVABLE BOLTED HATCHES AND UPGRADED THEM AS
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NECESSARY.
THI9 ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED.
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MP/0/A/7150/8.hNEW' PROCEDURE) WAS WRITTEN AND APPROVED ON OCTOBER 14, 1987 TO CLARIFY THE MISSILE SHIELD BLOCK
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REPLACEMENT REQUIRLENTS.
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MR. GREG SWINDLEHURST WILL COV R THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES OF THIS INCIDENT.
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ANALYSIS OF-THE SENSITIVITY OF THE-j
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T0' MISSILE SHIELD INTEGRITY
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ANALYSIS ~ METHODOLOGY.
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BREAKS THROUGH THE ICE CONDENSER INTO UPPER CONTAINMENT
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e MISSILE SHIELD PIECE'1. REPRESENTS AN ADDITI.0NAL BYPASS' FLOW AR'EA 0F'-85 FT2
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PEAK PREDICTED. CONTAINMENT PRESSURES OCCUR FOLLOWING ICE MELTOUT (~1 HR)
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's --IMPACT OF' LOSS OF' MISSILE SHIELD PIECE 1 INTEGRITY IS DURING
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POST-LOCA BLOWDOWN PHASE LASTING APPR0XIMATELY 20 SECONDS
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e ' ANALYZE THE SENSITIVITY OF THE-SHORT TERM CONTAINMENT RESPONSE T0: A LOSS OF MISSILE SHIELD PIECE 1 -INTEGRITY-Lj MISSILE SHIELD INTACT j
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e DO NOT ATTEMPT TO PREDICT THE DYNAMIC DISPLACEMENT OF THE MISSILE SHIELD PIECE
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ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY COMPUTER CODE
e EXISTING FSAR' ANALYSIS OF.THE SHORT TERM CONTAINMENT RESPONSE l
IS ANALYZED WITH THE WESTINGHOUSE "TMD" CODE-J l
e THE TMD CODE HAS NOT BEEN UTILIZED IN MANY YEARS SINCE THERE HAS BEEN N0 NEED FOR REANALYSIS, e
DUKE ASSESSES CAPABILITY OF WESTINGHOUSE TO PROVIDE QUICK TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND DECIDES TO PERFORM ANALYSIS INHOUSE
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e ANALYSIS USES " FATHOMS" CODE, WHICH IS BASED ON COBRA-NC (NUREG/CR-3262, MARCH 1986).
A WESTINGHOUSE VERSION OF COBRA-NC WAS USED TO ANALYZE POST-SLB SUPERHEAT ISSUE.
FATHOMS IS THE STATE-0F-THE-ART CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS CODE
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ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
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DETAILED MULTI-DIMENSIONAL MODEL 0F ICE CONDENSER CONTAINMENT, COMPARABLE T0 TMD MODEL
VOLUMES
FLOWPATHS o
PASSIVE HEAT SINKS e
ICE CHESTS MODELED BY SIX AZIMUTHAL SEGMENTS AND TWO VERTICAL LEVELS e
ESSENTIALLY ALL MODEL INPUT TAKEN FROM TMD INPUT DATA GIVEN IN FSAR e~ MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE DATA'FROM FSAR FIGURE 6.2.1-78 (0-0.1 SEC) AND. TABLE 6.2.1-21. P.5 (> 0.1 SEC)
e ICE MASS = 2.45 X 10 LBS BASED ON TMD INPUT VALUE e
ICE SURFACE AREA ADJUSTED TO OBTAIN UPPER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RESPONSE SIMILAR TO TMD RESULT, BUT CONSERVATIVELY BOUNDING e
MISSILE SHIELD BYPASS FLOW AREA MODELED AS A SENSITIVITY STUDY j
.TO THE BASE CASE l
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CONTAINMENT SECTION VIEW G
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FIGURE 6.2.1-18 l
1986 UPDATE
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AN ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY WAS DEVELOPED THAT COMPARES WELL WITH
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THE EXISTING FSAR ANALYSIS TMD-FSAR FATHOMS TIME OF MISSILF SHIELD LIFT 0,10 SEC 0,07 SEC MAXIMUM AP ACROSS MISSILE 8,84 PSID 6,5 PSID SHIELD 0,198 SEC 0,165 SEC
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UPPER CONTAINMENT 6 PSIG
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8,6 PSIG PRESSURE AT 3,0 SECONDS e
WITH MISSILE SHIELD PIECE 1 INTACT, THE PEAK CONTAINMENT PRES-SURE IS 8,2 PSIG AT 3 SEC, e
WITH MISSILE SHIELD PIECE 1 TOTALLY DISPLACED, THE PEAK CON-TAINMENT PRESSURE IS 20,4 PSIG AT 21 SEC, e
WITH MISSILE SHIELD PIECE 1 TOTALLY DISPLACED FOR 3, ECONDS, AND THEN ASSUMED TO PARTIALLY RESEAT AT 4 SEC T
BYPASS AREA) THE PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE IS 14,9 PSIG AT 26 SEC, o
CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE IS 15 PSIG e
NRC SER SUPPLEMENT N0, 7
"THE ULTIMATE CAPACITY OF THE CONTAINMENT ADOPTED
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BY THE STAFF WAS 48 PSIG"
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e THE-CONTAINMENT RESPONSE TO THE DESIGN BASIS LOCA ASSUMING A REALISTIC DISPLACEMENT OF PIECE 1 0F THE MISSILE SHIELD DOES NOT EXCEED THE CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE.
i THE ULTIMATE CAPACITY OF THE CONTAINMENT DESIGN WAS NOT APPROACHED.
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