IR 05000369/1987002
| ML20211A564 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1987 |
| From: | William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211A507 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-87-02, 50-369-87-2, 50-370-87-02, 50-370-87-2, NUDOCS 8702190192 | |
| Download: ML20211A564 (6) | |
Text
UNITED STATES
[pnip gD NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON o
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REGION 88 E
fC 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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Report Nos.:
50-369/87-02 and 50-370/87-02 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street
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Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2 Docket Nos.:
50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Inspection Conducted:
December 21, 1986 - January 20, 1987 Inspector:
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e W. Orders,SeniorResidentInspectof Date Signed
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Accompanying Personnel:
S. Guenther Approved by:
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T. A. Peebles, Section' Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, in-office review of written reports, and cold weather preparations.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance
- B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services
- N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer
- M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
- N. Atherton, Compliance
- P. Nardoci, General Office Licensing Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, techni-cians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 28, 1987 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. One Inspector Followup Item, concerning the dual-train control room ventilation / chill water system failures (paragraph 3), and one Licensee Identified Violation, concerning Technical Specifications (per control rod positions as required by the the failure to verify pro paragraph 4), were discussed.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Plant Operations The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period, to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.
Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely perused.
Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and perfor-mance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives.
The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not limited to, the turbine buildings, auxiliary building, units 1 and 2 electrical equipment rooms, units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected are '
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During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
Unit 1 Operations Unit I was on line for the entire reporting period. One brief load reduction occurred on December 25, 1986, to accommodate system generation demands. On
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January 7,1987, the unit entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3, when both trains of control room ventilation / chilled water (VC/YC) became inoper-able. The "A" train of VC/YC failed to start at 2:00 a.m., while attempting to swap operating trains for routine equipment rotation.
This placed both units in TS 3.7.6, which required the inoperable train to be restored within seven days.
The "B" train of VC/YC subsequently tripped on low refrigerant temperature at 3:28 a.m., and a dual-unit shutdown was commenced at 4:28 a.m.,
in compliance with TS 3.0.3.
The load decrease was suspended at about 85 percent power at 6:40 a.m., when the
"B" train of VC/YC has restored to an operable status.
The requirements of TS 3.0.3 were no longer applicable and the units were returned to full power.
Unit I remained at full power for the remainder of the reporting period.
The licensee is investigating the VC/YC system failures under Problem Investigation Report (PIR) Serial No. 0-M87-0006.
The inspectors will review the PIR upon completion and track the incident as an Inspector FollowupItem(IFI 50-369,370/87-02-01).
Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 was on line from the beginning of the reporting period until January 20, 1987.
A brief load reduction occurred when a unit shutdown was initiated on January 7, in compliance with TS 3.0.3 as discussed under Unit 1 Operations above.
The unit was at 100 percent power at 9:53 a.m., on January 20 when all three hotwell pumps (HWPs) tripped in response to an erroneous emergency low hotwell level signal. One of three hotwell level instruments had failed and a second experienced a brief downward spike, thereby satisfying the 2/3 logic required to trip the HWPs.
The resultant loss of condensate flow caused all three condensate booster pumps and both main feedwater (CF) pumps to trip on low suction pressure.
The total loss of CF resulted in a main turbine trip which, in turn, caused the reactor to trip since power was above the turbine trip permissive setpoint.
Safety system response during the transient was essentially normal, however, the secondary system transient response was more severe. The sudden loss of condensate and feedwater flow caused water hammer transients in portions of the feed and condensate systems.
The licensee thoroughly inspected the affected piping and components and found some damaged hangers which were repaired or replaced.
An alignment check of the
"B" CF pump / turbine
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revealed that the transient had misaligned the components, thereby precluding a prompt unit restart. The "A" CF pump oversped to greater than or equal to 7,000 rpm during the transient and the pump's seals failed, allowing water to enter the lubricating oil system.
At the close of the inspection period, the licensee was investigating the cause of the overspeed condition, the reason for the overspeed trip failure, and the extent of damage to the CF pump.
4.
Surveillance Testing Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was cali-brated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed and test results were adequate.
Technical Specification 4.1.3.1.1 requires that the position of each full-length rod be determined to be within the group demand limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except during time
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intervals when the Rod Position Deviation Monitor is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least cnce per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Technical Specification 4.1.3.6 requires that the position of each control bank be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except during time intervals when the Rod Insertion Limit Monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Technical Specification 4.1.3.2 requires that each rod position indicator be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the Demand Position Indication System and the Rod Position Indication System agree within 12 steps at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except during time intervals when the Rod Position Deviation Monitor is inoperable, then compare the Demand Position Indication System and the Rod Position Indication System at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
At 8:20 a.m., on January 14, the licensee discovered that the Rod Position Deviation Monitor and the Rod Insertion Limit Ponitor of the Operator Aid Computer became inoperable at 5:00 p.m., on the previous day, but the applicable TS surveillances were not performed on 4-hour intervals as required. The licensee has initiated a Problem Investigation (Report Serial No. 2-M87-0012) to detemine the cause for the missed surveillances and the appropriate corrective action.
As allowed by 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, no Notice of Violation will be issued for this violation of the Technical Specifications; it will, however, be tracked as a Licensee Identified Violation (LIV 50-370/87-02-02).
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5.
Maintenance Observations Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and maintenance results were adequate.
6.
In-Office Review of Written Reports (90712)
A systematic review was performed on the items detailed below to determine the following:
if additional inspection was warranted;
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if corrective action discussed in the report appeared appropriate;
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if the information reported satisfied reporting requirements; and
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if there appeared to be any generic issues.
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The review indicated that the reports were adequate; the items are herewith closed.
UNIT 1 Item Number Subject 78-PC-08 Spare Containment Penetrations 78-PC-09 Stem Mounted Limit Switches 79-05-01 Pipe Support Inspection 79-17-03 Barton Model 763 80-CI-16 Rosemount Trip Unit Deficiencies 82-03-03 Prevent Instrument Lines Freezing 82-36-02 Inspector Follow Up Item 83-15-01 Cross-Disciplinary Review 83-15-02 Turbine Trip Test 83-16-02 Quality Control Activities 83-16-03 Main Control Board Deficiencies 83-39-01 Noncompliance Containment Spray LER83-16 Loose Hanger LER83-18 ND System Water Hammers LER83-23 ND System Operability LER83-29 Boron Concentration Below 1900 ppm LER83-34 CLA Inoperable LER83-46 Ventilation System Inoperable LER83-48 VC Low Refrigerant Temp j
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LER83-50 VC Cutout Switch Failure LER83-51 Filter Package Fans Overload LER83-56 VC/YC Chiller B Trouble LER83-57 Overtemperature Delta T Inoperable LER83-65 Pressurizer Heater Grp Inoperable LER83-103 Overtemperature Delta T Inoperable LER83-104 Overtemperature Delta T Inoperable UNIT 2 Item Number Subject LER83-03 Reactor Trip Breaker LER83-59 Inoperable NI Valve LER83-64 Defective SA1 Relays 83-19-04 Ventilation System Components 83-19-05 Review Control Board Labeling 83-40-01 Control Rod Withdrawal Limits 83-43-01 Exceeded LC0 Not Reported 7.
ColdWeatherPreparations(71714)
The licensee has inspected systems susceptible to freezing under PT/0/B/
4700/038, " Verification of Freeze Protection Equipment and Systems", to ensure the proper functioning of heat tracing and/or space heaters.
A number of systems / components which have had a history of freezing during severe weather have been, or are in the process of being, modified to prevent freezing in the future.
Freeze protection features have been incorporated into susceptible components in the fire protection system, the condenser circulating water system, the feedwater and condensate systems, and the conventional waste water system, among others.