IR 05000369/1996008
| ML20135C247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135C237 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-96-08, 50-369-96-8, 50-370-96-08, 50-370-96-8, NUDOCS 9612060245 | |
| Download: ML20135C247 (33) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 60-369. 50-370 License Nos:
50-369/96-08, 50-370/96-08 Licensee:
Duke Power Company Facility:
McGuire Generating Station. Units 1 & 2 Location:
12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.
Huntersville NC 28078 Dates:
September 8 - October 19. 1996 Inspectors:
S. Shaeffer. Senior Resident Inspector M. Sykes. Resident Inspector G. Harris. Resident Inspector R. Baldwin, Regional Inspector Approved By:
L. Wert. Acting Chief. Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
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ENCLOSURE 2 9612060245 961115 PDR ADOCK 05000369 o
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY McGuire Generating Station. Units 1 & 2 i
NRC Inspection Report 50-369/96-08. 50-370/96-08
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t This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineer-i
.ing, maintenance, and plant support.
The report covers a 6-week period of i
resident inspection.
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Doerations
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Engineered Safety Features (ESF) walkdowns of the Unit 2 Component
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Cooling Water System were completed during the inspection period.
Some minor material condition items were noted.
No operational or design i
concerns were identified (paragraph 02.1).
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Inspector review of operator actions taken in response to a Unit 2 power.
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range channel power supply failure concluded that actions taken to meet the LC0 requirements could have been more timely.
In addition, an Unresolved Item was identified to further evaluate the use of abnormal operating procedures and to clarify actions to be taken upon recognition of procedure entry conditions (paragraph 02.2)
The inspectors concluded that operations process and re-focus on the
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identification and resolution of operator workarounds was good (paragraph 04.1).
The inspectors concluded that a recent licensee self assessment of
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operator training was thorough and illustrated a good questioning attitude.
For example, weaknesses were identified for not ensuring operators received required immediate training (paragraph 05.1).
Licensed operator requalification (retraining) program was reviewed and
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determined to have been satisfactorily conducted.
Written examinations were acceptable: however, some areas were identified for improvement j
such as using Crew Critical Tasks (CCTs) as evaluative tools for
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determination of crew failures. The inspector considered that Operations Management participation during the examinations was considered to be excellent.
(paragraphs 05.2 to 05.6)
The completion of job performance measures by the non-licensed operators
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(NLO) was considered a good training tool to improve overall NLO i
performance.
(paragraph 05.7)
The PORC involvement in the review 3rocess for a TS change was
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determined to be good.
The PORC ex11bited a good questioning attitude i
and adequately addressed potential impacts of the change. (paragraph 07.1)
ENCLOSURE 2
Maintenance Good management involvement was evident in the planning and execution of
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the on-line leak repair of pressurizer liquid space sample isolation valve. INC45.
(paragraph M2.1)
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NRC review of a Unit 1 annulus ventilation system testing procedure
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identified that the surveillance test procedure did not ensure
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preheaters remained energized for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> during surveillance testing.
The issue was identified as a Violation of TS 6.8.1 regarding an inadequate procedure.
Another example in which procedures did not fully implement TS requirements was also identified. (paragraphs M3.1 and M3.2).
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The licensee identified and promptly corrected non-conservative RCS loop
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flow trip set)oints on Unit 1.
An Unresolved Item was identified relating to t11s issue in order to further establish safety significance of the problem and adequacy of licensee's TS surveillance testing in this area.
(paragraph M3.2)
The inspectors continued to note indications of an adverse trend related
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to planning and scheduling of retest activities.
The inspectors concluded that more management attention was required to address this repetitive problem (paragraph M4.1).
Enaineerino Inspectors identified a Design Basis Documentation inconsistency in
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describing instruments used to monitor room temperature (paragraph E2.1).
Inspector observations prompted a reevaluation of procedures for
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disseminating engineering guidance to ensure proper operations under special conditions.
(paragraph E4.1)
Engineering process (Action Register) for keeping management and plant
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personnel updated on plant high priority problems on a periodic basis was considered a strength.
(paragraph E4.2)
Plant Sucoort An emergency preparedness manning drill was conducted September 22,
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1996. The results indicated that all of the on-site required positions were manned within the required time frames. Manning of the EOF in downtown Charlotte was also verified to be acceptable and not adversely impacted by the coincident football stadium event.
Some desired positions were not manned.
(paragraph P2.1)
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ENCLOSURE 2
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i Corrective actions to resolve possible degradation of control room
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habitability caused by smoke or other exterior contaminant intrusion was good.
The inspectors identified that the FSAR description of the system
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was not accurate. An additional example of URI 369,370/96-04-02 was identified for the FSAR discrepancy list (paragraph F3.1).
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ENCLOSURE 2
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status I
Both units operated at 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.
Review of UFSAR Commitments A recent discovery by a licensee of operating their facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special focus review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the UFSAR description.
While aerforming inspections discussed in this report the inspectors reviewed t1e applicable portions of the UFSAR that were related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters.
As addressed in section M8.1 a discrepancy was identified between the plant configuration and the UFSAR for Post Accident Monitoring installation. As discussed in section F3.1 a discrepancy was identified in the UFSAR for control room ventilation operation
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to maintain control room habitability.
I. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707. the inspectors conducted frequent i
reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious: specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment (71707)
02.1 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns a.
Insoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors conducted detailed walkdowns of accessible portions of the Component Cooling Water System.
Visual inspections of system components were performed to identify any conditions that might degrade system operation.
System drawing and UFSAR reviews were conducted prior to completion of the actual system walkdown inspections, b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors verified selected portions of system valve lineups for the plant operating condition.
Main Control Board position indications were also used to ensure system flowpaths were in accordance with normal procedural lineups and UFSAR design.
Emphasis was ) laced on essential i
equipment necessary to perform safety functions.
T1e inspectors visually inspected pump lubrication levels and verified cooling water ENCLOSURE 2 i
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I supply system alignments.
No abnormal valves lineups were noted.
Licensee identified maintenance deficiencies were labeled with
appropriate maintenance request tags. The inspectors determined that
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i none of the labeled items were significant enough to require immediate
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corrective action and the inspectors also noted that none of the
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maintenance request labels were inordinately overdue.
The inspectors reviewed performance test data for the component cooling
j water system pumps and noted no significant degradation.
No system i
compensatory measures were in use.
However, instructions were
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to operators to perform periodic flushes of the system heat exc1 angers
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turnover. The inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation Process reports-i to confirm that corrective actions for identified deficiencies have been j
timely and appropriate.
Main control board valve position and power source verifications were also performed.
Some minor housekeeping and
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material ccndition deficiencies were identified such as a filled leak l
catch container above one of the KC pump motors. several valve gearbox i
leaks. un-sealed flood berm, and missing KC motor housing bolts. None of
i the items-were determined to immediately impact system operability.
The
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i items were communicated to the licensee for correction.
Prior to the
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end of the report period, the items were entered into the licensee Work Management System or immediately corrected by minor maintenance
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Conclusions No significant discrepancies were identified requiring immediate attention.
The licensee promptly corrected the inspector identified deficiencies. The inspectors concluded that the system was operated as designed and overall system performance and material condition was good.
02.2 Power Ranae 2NIS41 Power Sucoly Failure a.
Insoection Scooe (71707)
On September 30, 1996. The Unit 2 power range channel NIS41 was declared inoperable due to the failure of a -25 VDC low voltage power sup)1y.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions associated with t1e failure.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed log entries and noted that the control room operators received several power range detector Hi Voltage Failure annunciator alarms.
According to control room personnel and logs, the annunciator reflashed every few minutes indicating a continuing problem with the power supply.
IAE personnel reviewed data from a recorder that had been installed following an earlier bistable card failure and confirmed the failing power supply. After control room operators ENCLOSURE 2 j
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consulted with IAE personnel, the channel was declared inoperable.
Control room personnel reviewed Abnormal Procedure AP-16. Malfunction of
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Nuclear Instrumentation. Case III. The control room personnel concluded that the AP did not have to be entered at'that time since it appeared to the control room operators that the instrumentation may be degraded, but l
power range meters were not erratic.
Immediate repair of the power l
l range channel was hampered by problems with the replacement power supply and procedures.
In addition. the current IAE procedure assumed that AP-
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16 had previously been implemented to allow the instrument to be repaired. Additional delays occurred due to the inability to locate the proper jumpers to simulate the proper load on the replacement power supply. Technical Specifications require that protection bistables be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
The inspector reviewed log entries and determined that, despite delays. the bistables were tripped within the
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required time frame.
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l Technical Specification LC0 T.S. 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1. Action 2. required
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that thermal power be reduced within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to less than 75% rated thermal power and the high neutron flux trip setpoints be reduced to less.than 85% or that at least every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> the Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (0PTR) be verified by com)leting either a full core flux map or
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two sets of four symmetric thim]le locations per Technical Specification
4.2.4.2.
The option to perform the OPTR was not chosen when the power-
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range channel was initially declared inoperable, significantly delaying the notification of reactor group personnel to perform the required flux map.
Further delays were encountered by reactor group personnel due to t
software 3roblems complicating the completion of the required flux map.
Although ]oth the flux map and repairs to power range instrumentation were completed within the TS allowed outage time. the extensive delays almost required a unit shutdown.
A review of control room logs indicated that operators received several l
Power Range Hi Voltage Failure alarms.
Througl interviews with control i
room operators. the inspectors were informed that the appropriate annunciator response procedure was referenced, which directed them to refer to abnormal procedure, AP-16. Malfunction of Nuclear l
Instrumentation. Case III.
According to control room logs the operators l
reviewed, but did not enter the procedure.
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Conclusions
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The ins)ector concluded that operator actions, in response to declaring Unit 2 Power Range Channel I NIS-41 inoperable, could have been more timely. Specifically, the control room operators initially did not
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choose the TS option of performing a OPTR surveillance contributing to delays that almost caused the unit to be in a required shutdown.
An
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Unresolved Item was identified to further evaluate the control room
operators use of abnormal procedures during the event (URI 369. 370/96-l 08-01. Operator Abnormal Procedure Usage).
ENCLOSURE 2
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04 Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Workaround Identification and Resolution Process (71707, 40500)
Observations and Findinas During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's most recent implementation of processes used to identify and resolve operator workarounds. The site first began use of a formalized operator workaround program in 1994 as part of the top equipment problem resolution (TEPR) process. Historically, the TEPR consisted of two lists, one identified major equipment problems and the other workaround problems.
Recently, operations management determined that additional focus and enhancements could be made to better identify and resolve operator workarounds and that a consistent program should be implemented at all of the Duke Power sites.
The revised process is defined in Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 506.
The new process required a higher level of involvement by all o)erators in identification and awareness of workarounds.
Specific attri)utes of the process included: more efficient method to document potential operator workarounds by plant personnel, evaluation of each incoming work order for workaround potential, and OSM and control room tracking notebooks to monitor and track all identified items. The process defined performance goals for the number of deficiencies requiring operator actions. The process was also ex)anded to include evaluations of the aggregate impact of workarounds.
T1e aggregate impact was being evaluated by asking the initiator to define how much time was required for a compensatory action to resolve or " work around" the deficiency.
By adding total time requirements, aggregate impact could be evaluated and a priority for resolution established for each individual workaround.
i The inspectorc conitored the licensee's use of the new operator workaround croc as for several months and concluded that operations management ind wrsonnel had placed increased emphasis on identifying.
tracking, and resolving operator workaround issues. The new process appeared to allow for easier workaround identification and monitoring of existing problems by Operations management.
j Conclusions The inspectors concluded that 0)erations management and staff implementation of a revised worcaround identification and monitoring process was good. The inspectors also concluded that plant personnel
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were actively using the process to lower the existing workaround threshold and continue the elimination of identified workarounds.
However. based on the number of issues being identified as workarounds.
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the inspectors concluded that continued management emphasis on workaround identification and resolution was needed.
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ENCLOSURE 2
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05 Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Doeration Immediate Trainino Procram Deficiencies a.
Insoection Scoce (40500)
The licensee conducted a comprehensive self assessment of station functional areas including plant operations.
The self assessment included a review of operations training practices at the station. The inspectors reviewed the assessment.
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspectors reviewed Operations management procedures and noted that immediate training should be used when it is necessary to expeditiously inform licensed shift personnel of important and often safety related changes in station configuration and/or plant operating conditions or could result in operating in an unsafe condition.
Examples of immediate training topics covered included changes to abnormal and emergency operating procedures, guidance to shutdown the reactor due to equi) ment concerns, and plant modifications to safety related equipment.
T1e inspectors reviewed current station practices and noted that there was no established method to ensure that all licensed personnel had received required immediate training. The current operations procedure requires that the Control Room SRO ensure control room personnel are trained on the Immediate Training prior to or shortly after assuming licensed duties.
The inspectors verified that control room operators were knowledgeable concerning recently issued immediate training.
The self-assessment also identified that in some cases the immediate training was not followed by required reading packages as necessary.
Some examples where reading packages were required included changes to reactor coolant system leakage calculation and vital invertor modifications.
The current operations arocedures requires that the immediate training should remain with t1e current Shift Supervisor turnover package until its expiration date: typically three weeks from the date of issuance such that a required reading package can be developed and distributed.
The inspectors reviewed recently issued immediate training and verified that control room operators had received this training.
The inspectors noted that the licensee had begun to implement some corrective action at the end of the inspection period.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that a recent licensee self assessment of operator training was thorough and illustrated a good questioning attitude.
For example, significant weaknesses were identified for not ensuring operators received required immediate training.
ENCLOSURE 2
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05.2 Doerator Reaualification Proaram (71001)
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Insoection Scone (71001):
l During the period of September 17-20 1996, the ins)ector used
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l Inspection Procedure 71001 to review and evaluate t1e licensee's i
l operator requalification program in the area of written examination
quality.
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Observations and Findinas
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The inspector reviewed reactor operator and senior reactor operator
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written Part A-(Static Simulator) and Part B (0 pen book) examinations administered during the weeks of September 9 and 16.1996.
The inspector noted the following concerning the Part A portion of the examination.
One question contained a series of True and False statements concerning different to)ic areas.
One question concerning rod position did not discriminate 3etween a competent and non-competent o)erator. One question linked to the static simulator did not require t1e simulator for review to answer the question. The static examinations reviewed were comprised of 21 questions and 23 questions respectively.
The inspector noted the following concerning the Part B portion of the examination.
Four questions were written as direct look-up questions.
Fifty percent of the Part B examination was repeated from the previous week's examination.
The overall repeatability percentages met the facilities recuirements.
Both open reference examination's reviewed were comprisec of 18 questions.
I The inspector reviewed 0TP-4.2. " Examinations". Rev. O. 5/21/96 and determined that open reference written examinations are required to be developed in accordance with NUREG-1021. Operator Licensing Examiner
Standards. ES-602. Requalification Written Examinations, c.
Conclusions The inspector concluded that the written examination, while acceptable.
contained areas that needed improvement.
Examiner Standard Standards.
NUREG 1021. ES-602. Attachment 2. " Guidelines for the Development and
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Review of Open-Reference Examinations." and NUREG/BR-0122. " Examiners Handbook for Developing Operator Licensing Written Examinations."
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provides guidance for writing open reference questions.
The review of the examinations revealed that some of the questions on the examinations deviated from that guidance.
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ENCLOSURE 2 l
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1 05.3 Simulator Scenario Evaluation a.
Inspection Scope (71001):
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The inspector used Inspection Procedure 71001 to review and evaluate the licensee's operator requalification program in the area of simulator
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l scenario evaluation.
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Observations and Findinas:
The inspector reviewed dynamic simulator scenarios and noted that Crew Critical Tasks (CCTs) and crew competencies were used to evaluate crew performance.
Individual Jerformance was evaluated using individual competencies.
It should 3e noted that CCTs are not required by regulation to evaluate crew performance. The inspector determined that many CCTs were not based on specific plant parameters, but based on generic Westinghouse critical tasks. coupled to procedural anchors.
The inspector observed the administration of simulator scenarios by the licensee's evaluators.
The final facility evaluators'
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grading / evaluation was consistent with the inspector's.
The inspector noted that follow-up questions were being used to gather additional information following scenario administration.
However, additional questions could have been used to determine additional deficient areas, but were not.
The inspector reviewed documentation for two individual failures with an associated crew failure.
The inspector noted that the licensee failed the crew and individuals using crew and individual competencies.
The crew did not fail due to failure of a CCT.
The inspector also determined that the crew received only one scenario of the two scenario set because the crew failed the first scenario.
The licensee decided further evaluation was not warranted.
The inspector determined. by discussion with the Operations Training Manager. that the crew that failed would receive, as a retest, a scenario set comprised of two scenarios.
The inspector noted during the review of the two individual simulator failures and the crew failure that competency write-ups did not contain detailed documentation for areas that showed weaknesses (those areas that the operator or crew did not fail during examination administration). Competency areas with a value of a "2" were not described in the individual or crew write-ups.
OTP 6-5. Licensed Requalification Program. requires that two or more unsatisfactory marks in one competency (a grade of "1") would constitute a failure.
OTP-6-5 does not describe requirements for documenting weaknesses associated
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l with competencies that resulted in a competency grade of a "2."
The
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licensee did a good job describing competency grades of "1" in both the l
crew and individuals write-ups.
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ENCLOSURE 2
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Conclusions
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j The inspector concluded that CCTs could be improved to encompass more objective performance measures that contain measurable performance
indicators.
Objective performance measures allows a common ground for
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evaluators to objectively evaluate operator performance. The inspector concluded that CCTs. as written.. may fail to identify less than satisfactory performance. '
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The inspector concluded that improvements could be made in the area of follow-up questioning. With the use of additional questions, evaluators
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would be able to probe deeper into identified observed weaknesses which a
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areas necessary for ~emediation as well as areas concerning generic-plant deficiencies.
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The inspector concluded that administration of one only scenario of a j
two scenario set, when the first scenario is failed, may not identify all the weak areas associated with that crew.
Normally the second
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scenario requires operators to change positions, thus allowing additional evaluation and clarification of identified weaknesses as well as identification of additional problem areas.
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The inspector concluded that documentation for individual and crew failures was accomplished in accordance with licensee procedures.
Documenting competency ratings less than "3" could provide additional insight concerning crew and individual performance.
If weaknesses are not documented then these weaknesses may not be tracked and fed back into the program as required by OTP 6-5.
05.4 Crew Communications and Doerator Performance a.
Insoection Scoce (71001)
The inspector used Inspection Procedure 71001 to review and evaluate the licensee's operator requalification program in the area of crew communications and operator performance.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector observed two different crews during the annual simulator evaluations. The inspector observed that the crews, during page announcements, did not consistently provide comprehensive information to personnel outside of the control room. The inspector noted that plant announcements concerning major plant equipment (starting or stopping during plant evolutions and during emergency's) were not being performed one by the operators.
McGuire Site Directive (MSD) 589.5 "McGuire ENCLOSURE 2
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Communications Standard." does not have a requirement to do so. however.
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a safety hazard may be present to plant personnel in the immediate area
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of the equipment.
MSD 589.5 requires that paging announcements should i
be used to announce emergencies.
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The inspector observed when annunciators alarmed, the reactor operator verbalized the annunciator alarm to the crew.
However. he did not receive repeat-backs or acknowledgement from either of the senior i
reactor operators.
The operator who consistently acknowledged the annunciator was the other reactor operator.
MSD 589.5. requires that following annunciator reporting only one other operator is required to
acknowledge.
The MSD does not delineate who in the crew is required to
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response to the reporting of the annunciator.
The inspector observed during procedural transitions between emergency l
procedures the Shift Operations Manager (OSM) and SRO (Procedure Reader)
did not solicit " buy-in" from either of the reactor operators.
In general, the transitions were done without input from those control board operators.
OMP 4-3 "Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures."
requires that tailgate sessions be conducted at appropriate transitions or pauses discussing plant status, and Emergency Plan classifications.
While tailgate sessions were conducted, the senior reactor operators did
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not perform these on a consistent basis. When tailgate sessions were l
accomplished the senior operator did query the reactor operators for
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added information, while rarely concerning the correctness of the i
transition.
The inspector observed that proper alpha numeric language was not used
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at all times and that operators did not use the radio to send out operators during the evaluations.
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Conclusions The inspector concluded that communications in general were satisfactory, however, improvements could be made.
Concerning the plant
i paging system and plant announcements, the inspector concluded more
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l precise and succinct information could be provided to personnel outside the control room.
In the area of announcing changes to major plant j
equipment. the inspector concluded that additional attention is
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necessary in this area.
In the area of acknowledgement for verbalized annunciators, the inspector concluded that communications did not meet Operations Management's expectations in that neither of the senior j
operators acknowledged the initial message using proper three-way communications.
In the area of " buy-in" from the crew during procedural transitions, the
inspector concluded that the participation of the entire crew was
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important during major procedural changes to ensure all areas have been
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ENCLOSURE 2
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Senior Reactor Operators did not elicit information from reactor operators prior to procedural transitions which caused incomplete team participation.
05.5 Doerations Manaaement Practices j
a.
Insoection Scooe (71001):
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I The inspector used Inspection Procedure 71001 to review and evaluate the licensee's operator requalification program in the area of Operations l
Management practices.
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b.
Observations and Findinas:
The inspector observed for the second time in as many years an' excellent and cooperative relationship between Operations. Operations Management, and the Training Department.
The inspector observed the commitment that r
Operations Management has in participating in the annual requalification
examinations.
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Conclusions
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The inspector concluded that Operations Management continued to demonstrate excellent support and participation in the annual
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requalification examinations.
The inspector viewed this as a good
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practice.
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Insoection Scooe (71001):
The inspector' used Inspection Procedure 71001 to review and evaluate the licensee's operator requalification prograr; in the area Job Performance Measures (JPM)-evaluations.
b; Observations and Findinas:
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The inspector observed the administration of Job Performance Measures
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(JPMs) to eight (R0s and SR0s) operators in the plant and on the simulator.
The final facility grading was consistent with the i
inspectors.
There were no JPM failures observed.
The inspector observed the practice of providing the operator with immediate pass / fail results following the completion of the JPM.
In general, administration of the JPMs was consistent, in that, evaluators would read the initial i
conditions of the JPM to the operators. There was one evaluator who provided a written copy of the initial conditions to the operators and l
stated if they had questions to ask them.
The ins)ector observed one JPM of a five JPMs set which consisted of one step, w1ile another JPM had six steps where only two steps were actually ENCLOSURE 2
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required to accomplish the JPM. The other JPMs in that set were more
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extensive than those described above.
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Conclusions
The inspector concluded that the facility evaluators providing pass / fail results to the operators following completion of a'JPM could cause the
,i operator undue stress and may disrupt the examination process.
The
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licensee revised this practice during the inspection and provided i~
pass / fail information to the operators at the end of the week.
The
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inspector also concluded that examinations that contain JPMs of one to
two steps provide limited evaluative data.
Care should be taken to
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ensure JFM sets are comprised of evaluative tools that are able to
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discern competent from non-competent operators.
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05.7 Non-Licensed Ooerator (NLO) Trainina on Job Performance Measures
In addition to the above, the inspectors reviewed the completion of job l
performance measures by the non-licensed operators (NLO).
The process included many of the attributes of the licensed operator JPM program and was actively being implemented by Operations management.
The completion i
of job performance measures by the non-licensed operators (NLO) was
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considered a good training tool to improve overall NLO performance.
Quality Assurance in Operations (40500)
07.1 PORC Review of Primary to Secondary RCS Leakaae limit (40500)
a.
Insoection Scooe Following identification of a primary to secondary reactor coolant system leak of approximately 12 gallons per day (gpd) in the Unit 1 B
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steam generator, engineering reviewed the current administrative
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requirements for steam generator leakage and determined that the 50 gpd administrative limit was overly restrictive and provided little or no
1 additional protection against rapidly increasing leak rates or tube
ruptures.
As a result, a recommendation was presented to the Plant
!
0)erations Review Committee (PORC) for review. The inspector attended
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tie PORC review meetings to assess the licensee's ability to evaluate and resolve issues.
The McGuire TS safety limit for steam generator leakage is 500 gpd.
Leakage in excess of 500 gpd requires a unit
[
shutdown.
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b.
Observations and Findinas i
i The PORC reviewed a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and su) porting information i
i to judge the significance of increasing the allowaale primary to
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secondary leakage limit from the current 50 g)d administrative limit to i
a leakage limit of 100 gpd or step change leacage limit of 60 gpd/ hour.
{
The evaluation emphasized that the current 50 gpd leakage was well below
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ENCLOSURE 2 l
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the industry recommended leakage limit of 150 gpd and provided little or no additional protection against a rapidly propagating tube failure.
The increased leakage limit was designed to address the variety of potential degradation mechanisms that may occur. The higher total
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leakage limit would allow for degradation in the steam generators that was not structurally significant.
The licensee also included an additional shutdown limit of 60 gpd/ hour step change limit per generator for protection against rapid leakage increases indicative of a tube rupture. The evaluation also stressed the use of Nitrogen-16 monitors on each main steam line which has improved leakage detection and provided early warning indication of steam generator leakage.
The inspectors noted that the PORC exhibited a good questioning attitude and was adequately prepared to discuss the technical and nuclear safety aspects of the issue. The PORC reviewed the basis for the original leakage limit and questioned the justification for the proposed increase.
The PORC was provided technical documentation prepared using industry guidelines. The PORC discussed industry operating experience and was informed that the increased leakage was bounded by the current safety analysis assum)tions. The PORC evaluated the safety evaluation and chose to acceat tie recommendation to increase the administrative leakage limit wit 1 no exceptions.
c.
Conclusions The PORC review of the issue was of sufficient depth and detail to provide a good review of changes to facility operations and procedures.
The documentation provided to the PORC was considered adequate to support the PORC decision.
07.2 Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB)
On September 12. 1996, the inspector attended the McGuire third quarter s
1996 full board NSRB meeting held at the Catawba site.
Site presentations to the board included plant performance, reportable events, violations, trends, a corrective action audit, status of component mispositioning trends and Maintenance Rule A-1 systems.
In addition. a variety of management attention items, team reports and site tour results were discussed.
The ins)ector considered that the Site Vice-President 3 resented the NSRB wit 1 a candid reflection of site performance. T1e NSRB expanded a variety of subjects to explore the full extent of problems and probe ootential root or common cause of site issues.
The inspector considered that the NSRB was diverse and gave site management good oversight on numerous issues.
Hiscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1 (Closed) VIO 50-369. 50-370/95-023-01:
Failure to take adequate corrective actions for prior violations.
NRC Inspection Report 50-369.
50-370/95-23 identified that management oversight problems existed in E.YCLOSURE 2
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the area of compliance with 10 CFR 55.25 reporting requirements. Since that inspection, the licensee has revised the medical procedures which
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recuire extensive review and accountability for reporting changes of
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mecical status for licensed operators. The ins)ector verified the
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corrective actions and found them to be reasonaale and complete.
No j
similar problems were identified.
08.2 (Closed) DEV 50-369. 50-370/95-023-02:
Failure to meet Licensee
.
corrective actions described in reply to VIO 94-17-01.
NRC Inspection
Report 50-369. 50-370/95-23 identified that management failed to follow i
corrective actions described to the NRC in order to identify changes in i
medical status of licensed operators.
Since that inspection, the
,
licensee has revised the medical procedures which required additional I
review and double verification of changes to medical examinations of
licensed operators by a person knowledgeable with ANSI /ANS 3.4-1983. R.
i 1988.
The inspector verified the corrective actions and found them to i
be reasonable and complete.
No similar problems were identified.
II. Maintenance
l M1 Conduct of Maintenance j
M1.1 General Comments (61726 and 62707)
j The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance tests to verify that i
approved procedures were available and in use, test equipment in use was
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calibrated, test prerequisites were met, system restoration was i
completed, and acceptance criteria were met.
In addition, the
inspectors reviewed and/or witnessed routine maintenance activities to
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verify. where applicable, that approved procedures were available and in i
use, prerequisites were met, equipment restoration was completed, and j
maintenance results were adequate.
j a.
Insoection Scooe
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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work j
activities:
j
PT/1/A/4201/01A RWST Level Auto-Switchover Analog Channel j
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Operational Test
IP/1/A/3000/22A Reactor Coolant System Flow Calibration Loop A,
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i Protection Channel 1. Unit 1 1NCFT5000
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PT/0/A/4600/04 Incore Instrumentation Detector Calibration
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e PT/0/A/4150/07 Verification of OPTR Using Detectors j
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PT/0/A/4450/08A Control Room Outside Air Pressure Filter Train A i
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j Test j
ENCLOSURE 2
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IP/0/A/3000/01A Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure
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Calibration M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 On-line Leak Reoair of Pressurizer Liouid Soace Samule Isolation Valve.
}NC45 a.
Insoection Scooe (62707)
The licensee discovered that the pressurizer liquid space sample isolation valve. 1NC45. exhibited external leakage past the body to yoke threads and the secondary stem packing.
The valve. a 3/4 inch, manual globe valve. was used to isolate the pressurizer liquid space sample line.
Since the valve was the first isolation valve off of the pressurizer liquid space, failure could result in an unisolable reactor coolant leak requiring unit shutdown.
The licensee began routine monitoring of the leakage and initiated activities to perform an on-line leak seal repair. This maintenance evolution was performed at full temperature and pressure and could have potentially impacted nuclear safety. A Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meeting was convened to evaluate the proposed repair plans and supporting documentation prior to the start of this on ine maintenance activity.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors attended the meetings and noted that the ap3ropriate level of management involvement was present as well as tecinical staff members.
The maintenance plan included removing portions of the Incore Instrument Room Ventilation system duct work to establish an egress path for the workers condecting the leak seal of 1NC45.
Since the valve yoke was constructed of carbon steel, the PORC questioned the structural integrity of the valve due to the presence of the borated reactor coolant.
Selected calculations were provided to the PORC members for review to support the assumption that adequate yoke thread engagement was present, minimizing the potential for a significant structural failure of the valve prior to and/or during the repair activities.
The PORC also briefly discussed the isolation of portions of the incore instrument room ventilation system to provide an emergency egress path for workers involved in the leak repair and was assured that no operability issues, unreviewed safety questions, or other adverse effects would be introduced.
The PORC approved the evaluation of valve structural integrity and the proposed repair plan.
The PORC determined that since this was an infrequently performed and risk significant evolution, additional management overview was warranted. A management sponsor was selected to provide oversight of the activity to ensure that appropriate pre-job briefings were performed and contingency plans were established and approved.
ENCLOSURE 2 l
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The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing conducted by the management sponsor.
Representatives from the appropriate station organizations were in attendance.
During the briefing, the inspectors noted that adecuate emphasis was placed on the importance of procedure adherence, gooc communication, and personnel safety.
The inspectors independently reviewed the licensee's evaluation for the on-line maintenance activities and determined that an adequate review was performed. The inspectors also noted that the repair activities were completed as planned.
The inspectors verified that the volume of sealant necessary did not exceed predetermined specifications.
Following the repair, the inspectors performed visual inspection of the installed modification in the containment. After confirming that no visible leaks were present, the inspectors concluded that the modification should provide increased structural support and minimize external leakage from the RCS. The inspectors also verified that the licensee plans to replace INC45 during the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outage.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that a good questioning attitude and good planning resulted in a well executed on-line leak repair of the pressurizer liquid space sample isolation valve 1NC45.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Containment Annulus Ventilation System Train B Ooerability Test a.
Insoection Scooe (61726)
On September 29. during backshift observations of control room activities the inspector observed PT/1/A/4450/03B Annulus Ventilation System Train B Operability Test.
The purpose of the test was to demonstrate the operability of the 18 annulus ventilation fan. HEPA filters. and preheaters.
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance test procedure and the acceptance criteria in detail.
b.
Observation and Findinas The annulus ventilation system consists of two independent 100% capacity ventilation trains.
During and following an accident. each train is ca)able of producing and maintaining a negative pressure in the annulus (tle annular space between the steel containment vessel and the concrete Reactor Building wall) to ensure that airborne radioisotopes released from the containment are retained in the annulus.
Each train also provides long term fission product removal capability to minimize the release of these airborne products of radiation to the environment.
Each train consists of an annulus ventilation filter train, an annulus fan, dampers, instrumentation and duct work.
Each filter train consists ENCLOSURE 2
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of a moisture eliminator, a preheater, a prefilter, two HEPA filter
banks, and a gasketless carbon adsorber.
The preheater limits the incoming air to 70% relative humidity to ensure the efficiency of the
carbon adsorber used to remove radioactive iodine.
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Technical Specification 4.6.1.8(a) requires that flow be established
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through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers with the preheaters energized for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> monthly on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The-
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inspectors noted that areheater operations was verified at the beginning l
of the test and that t1is action was documented in the applicable
procedure.
The inspector reviewed applicable sections of the licensee's
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UFSAR and DBD and noted the function of the preheaters in system j
operation.
i Technical Specification Bases indicated that the operation of the j
l preheaters for at least 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient to'
reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. This
increases the safety margin of the filters.
The inspectors reviewed the l
applicable procedure and noted that it did not provide instructions to j
control room operators to verify that the pre-heaters had remained i
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energized for the duration of the surveillance test.
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The licensee reviewed the issue and declared the ventilation system past i
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i operable. The inspector reviewed records of previous surveillances.
No
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deficiencies were found that would have indicated that preheater failure
had occurred during previous surveillance.
In aodition, the licensee developed a team to perform a comprehensive review of surveillance
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procedures in use at the station to ensure TS surveillance requirements j
are met.
c.
Conclusions The inspector concluded that the l'
wee's current procedure did not I
contain adequate instructions to e."
e that the system preheaters were
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energized for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> as cequired by the Technical
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i Specification.
The inspectors have noted other examples in which i
i procedures did not fully incorporate TS requirements.
Section M3.2 of j
this report describes an example.
The failure to fully incorporate TS requirement into procedures is a Violation of Technical Specification e
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6.8.1. and is identified as Violation 50-369.370/96-08-02. Inadequate j
Containment Annulus Surveillance Procedure.
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M3.2 RCS Flow Measurements a.
Insoection Scooe (62707. 93702)
l On October 10. the licensee entered TS 3.0.3 on Unit 1 due to 2/3 J
channels of the Reactor Coolant Flow Loop A Low Flow Trip setpoints l
being below the minimum allowable value as specified by the TS.
The low i
setpoints were identified during a review of NC loop flow calibration
j ENCLOSURE 2 i
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17 procedures for the upcoming S/G replacement project.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions, b.
Observations and Findinas With the identification of two of three channels for Unit 1 RCS loop A flow trip non conservatively adjusted. the unit was placed in a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> shutdown LCO. According to TS requirements, the setpoints were to be adjusted between 90 and 91 percent of minimum measured flow per loop (95500 gpm).
However, the A loop channels did not meet the acceptance criteria because of non-specific loop flow procedural requirements. The actual change in RCS flow could have been affected by tube plugging, fuel core design changes, and reactor coolant pump performance.
The prior procedural method for determining RCS flow was based on use of a calorimetric heat balance on the plant secondary side divided by the
)rimary side differential enthalpy Over the years, the calorimetric
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Jased method of flow surveillance has resulted in a decreasing indicated
'i flow trend that is not consistent with the changes in the system
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hydraulics or other indications of flow.
The licensee stated that the-continuation of the trend resulted in an unacceptable penalty and an inability to predict a parameter that is essential for plant operation and safety. As a result the licensee submitted an amendment to change this method.
The method was reviewed and authorized by the NRC:
however, the licensee procedures did not appropriately ensure that l
individual loop flows met TS requirements.
To exit TS 3.0.3. the licensee immediately adjusted the A loop tri)
setpoints above the TS required flow setpoints and implemented worc orders to correct the loop flow trip setpoints. These changes established operability of the RCS flow trip setpoints.
Review of past operability of the system will be conducted and the licensee plans to issue a 10 CFR 50.73 report. Also, the licensee has begun an investigation into the inadequacy of communication between engineering and operations.
The discovery was made early in the day: however.
operations was not made aware of the concern until the discovery was confirmed.
Operations considered that prior notification would have i
provided on-duty operators additional time to prepare for unit shutdown.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensees identification and immediate response was good; however, this issue will remain open pending completion of the licensee's past operability evaluation.
This issue will be identified as Unresolved Item 50-369/96-08-03:
RCS Low Flow
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Trip Setpoints.
I ENCLOSURE 2
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M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledae and Performance M4.1 Plannina and Schedulina of Post-Maintenance Testina Activities a.
Insoection Scooe (62707)
The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of the licensee planning and scheduling of post maintenance testing, b.
Observations and Findinas During reviews of licensee documentation and discussions with station personnel, the inspectors determined that the actions taken to resolve
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deficiencies in the maintenance planning process for post maintenance
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testing have not been comaletely effective in correcting previously
identified concerns. Wea(nesses continue in the planning of post-maintenance test (PMT) activities reducing the certainty that structures, systems, and components will perform their design functions.
Affected equipment may be returned to service following maintenance without re-verification of component operability. Although no specific instances were identified, the inspectors determined that this process weakness has the potential to result in two train inoperability.
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances of recent."near misses" of required PMT activities (retest).
The inspectors noted that retest tasks had not been identified for the various maintenance activities requiring a retest.
However, the inspectors acknowledged that the deficiencies were detected and corrected prior to the returning the affected equipment to service or rendering the opposite train equipment inoperable.
The specific work packages did not include appropriate requirements for returning affected equipment to operable status.
The inspectors concluded that these retest omissions were due to inattention to detail, weaknesses in planning tools, and lack of clear process guidelines.
As a result of previous inspector concerns relating to the planning of retest activities documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-369.370/95-15.
the licensee had initiated an evaluation of the work control process, as i
it related to PMT to reduce the potential for additional retest task omissions from work packages.
Recommendations included requiring planners to review automatically generated preventive maintenance work orders for proper retest requirements and updating the model work orders to include retest tasks if necessary. The inspectors recognized that
,
these actions had resulted in some reduced retest task omissions.
Nevertheless, the potential for retest omissions is still present.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that additional management focus is necessary to ensure that post maintenance testing of equipment important to safety
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ENCLOSURE 2
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is scoped, alanned, scheduled and executed to minimize potential dual
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train opera)ility impact.
a M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)
M8.1 (CLOSED) URI 50-369.370/96-07-03:
PAM Recorder Isolator Wiring
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j Modification This item concerned the improper installation of isolators in post accident monitoring circuitry.
Following further review and technical l
discussions with the licensee on root cause and significance of the event, the inspectors determined that this item is closed.
However, since incorporation of isolators were part of FSAR requirements, the
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item will be listed as an additional example of URI 369. 370/96-04-02.
FSAR Discrepancies.
l III. Enaineerina
,
l El Conduct of Engineering i
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1 Safety Pumo Room Temoerature Detectors (37551)
a.
Insoection Scope While conducting a walkdown outside of the ND pump rooms, the inspector reviewed instrumentation that had been designated for use as room
temperature detectors.
The inspector noted that similar temperature detectors were found inside other safety-related pump rooms.
Room
temperatures are required to be monitored to ensure TS compliance. The j
inspectors reviewed this issue.
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b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector questioned the licensee whether the location of the
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instrumentation was appropriate since they were outside the safety pump l
rooms.
The inspectors reviewed the Technical Specification surveillance
requirements and noted that other safety-related equipment rooms were j
required to be monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The inspector
'
reviewed the auxiliary building ventilation system design basis document (DBD).
The licensee's DBD stated that the instrumentation outside of the ND pump room was used to monitor ND pump room temperature. The
inspector questioned the system engineering personnel.
The system
,
engineers conducted an investigation and provided electrical drawings that verified that the required instrumentation was located inside the
.
safety pump rooms and was monitored by the OAC providing indications of safety pump room temperatures to verify compliance with technical i
specifications.
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ENCLOSURE 2
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c.
Conclusions The inspector concluded that the safety pump rooms were appropriately monitored for temperature. The licensee developed and implemented a
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minor modification to correct the discrepancy in the DBD.
j E2.2 CA Temoerina Flow Elimination a.
Insoection Scooe (37551, 92903)
The licensee performed a safety evaluation to eliminate tempering flow.
The tempering flow had been a source of CA injection check valve heating resulting in steam void formation in the piping. This issue was previously discussed in IR 369.370/96-07.
The inspectors reviewed the tempering flow issues.
b.
Observations andfindinas Prior to the licensee's attemt.t to eliminate tempering flow, the inspectors verified that a 10 :FR 50.59 evaluation had been conducted to determine if an urreviewed safety question existed prior to implementing the modification.
The licensee attempted to implement the CA tempering flow modification out halted their efforts due to unexpected changes in some CA piping surface temperatures.
In addition, since installation of the new RTDs with tempering flow in the normal configuration, the licensee has observed unexplained cyclic changes in some CA piping surface temperatures.
The licensee formed a project team to further evaluate the elimination of CA tempering flow.
The licensee had earlier modified the alignment to bypass a
,
)ortion of the CF flow around both the A and B feedwater heaters. The
)ypass flow enters the common CF line upstream of the point where-tempering flow is extracted.
In this configuration, cooler water enters the tempering line.
Currently the Reactor Thermal Power Best Estimate (RTPBE) Calculation uses only final feedwater temperature when determining the enthalpy of the total feedwater entering the steam generator.
Since the tempering flow temperature is less than the final feedwater temperature and tempering flow is approximately 1.7 percent of total flow, indicated reactor power as calculated by the RTPBE is less than actual reactor power.
The inspectors noted that the overall effect of the lower tempering flow temperature effect on the RTPBE calculation was small, resulting in less than a 0.1% error.
The inspector verified that rated thermal power limits were not exceeded.
ENCLOSURE 2
c.
Conclusions The inspector concluded that the licensee's formation of a project team
,
to evaluate the proposed elimination of tempering flow and unexpected l
changes in CA pi nng surface temperatures was good.
The inspectors also
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concluded that tie effect of the lower tempering flow temperature on the
!
RTPBE was small and rated thermal power limits were not exceeded.
E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E4.1 Low Level Raw Water Intake Pumo Doeration a.
Insoection Scooe (37551)
i The licensee decided to run all three Low Level Raw Water Intake pumps to ensure proper operation of the pumps and increase the efficiency of the units.
Engineering guidance was provided to control room operators to secure the pumps if certain parameters were exceeded.
The inspectors reviewed the guidance provided to the control room operators.
b.
Observations and Findinas To facilitate running the station with three low level intake pumps, engineering personnel requested that operations monitor three parameters to ensure that this configuration would not have an adverse impact on plant operation. These parameters included Lower Containment Weighted Average Tem)erature. RV Temperature and Lower Containment Ventilation Unit D Disc 1arge Temperature.
In the event that any of these parameters exceeded established limits for one continuous hour, all three LLI pumps should be secured and System Engineering notified.
The inspector reviewed the guidance and noted that only one of the three parameters were alarmed to warn control room operators if the established limits were exceeded. The inspector also noted that the guidance did not provide a trending frequency or method to prevent parameters from exceeding established limits.
The inspector noted that the guidance had been reviewed by the Control Room SR0 and reactor operator and determined to be satisfactory.
The inspector reviewed the current operations procedure and noted that it contained no specific instructions concerning what critical information should be included in the engineering guidance.
The inspectors considered that engineering guidance should provide control room operators additional instructions under s)ecial conditions that are not covered by current procedures or cannot )e covered by changing existing procedures.
The licensee and inspectors concluded that operations should re-evaluate the guidance for potential procedural improvements.
ENCLOSURE 2
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that a re-evaluation of current procedural guidance was warranted to ensure proper plant operation under special conditions not covered by existing procedures.
E4.2 Trackina of Hioh Priority Doerational issues a.
Observations and Findinos (37551. 40500)
During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed one of the licensee's engineering based tracking mechanisms to better support resolution of plant problems.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed detailed expectations for implementation of the Plant Concerns and Action Register. The tracking process was developed by engineering to enhance operational focus by placing accountability on responsible groups for high priority, short term issues affecting the plant. The process is initiated by the Operations Shift Manager (OSM) identifying a problem for incorporation on the Plant Concerns list.
If the issue is not cleared within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the item is normally transferred to the Action Register for further monitoring, thereby leaving the Plant Concerns list small to highlight new and emerging issues.
The Action Register is integrated with the PIP process for continuity with long term resolutions.
The owners of Action Register issues are required to provide written updates on a periodic basis with a high level of detail to management and are asked to explain the progress on issues at the operations and management status meetings. The updates are continued until immediate operability or reliability has been addressed, the problem is resolved, or a satisfactory plan to address the problem is in
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place.
The inspectors monitored the licensee's use of the Plant Concerns and Action Register for the inspection period. The ins)ectors considered that plant personnel placed a high degree of ownerslip on their assigned Action Register items and that the updates given on a variety of issues were concise and provided real time status of the problem resolution process. The inspectors also noted that management utilized the process to monitor and ensure ap3ropriate emphasis was placed on operational issues.
Specifically, tie. inspectors noted good updates were provided for an intermittent MFW pump condenser vacuum change identified on Unit 2.
b.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Plant Concerns and Action Register was very beneficial in focusing plant ENCLOSURE 2
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resources on operational concerns.
The process was being implemented in a high quality manner and resultea in good management awareness and oversight of plant concerns and their resolution.
The inspector also considered that the process was being appropriately use by operations shift supervisors to alert plant managers to high priority issues.
IV. Plant Sucoort P1 Conduct of EP Activities P2
~ Status of EP. Facilities, Equipment, and Resources (71750)
P2.1 After-hours Auamentation Drill Derformed on SeDtember 22, 1996.
Observations and Findinos On September 22. 1996, the inspectors observed the licensee perform an emergency preparedness augmentation drill to test the ability of their EP staff to man both required and desired positions. This drill was specifically planned to coincide with an event at the recently opened Ericsson Stadium to evaluate whether traffic from the event would impact the augmentation of the EOF and onsite facilities.
The inspectors observed the augmentation of Jersonnel at the TSC. OSC. and the E0F (via the video monitor system).
T1e results indicated that all of the regulatory required positions had been filled at the locations: however, some desired positions were not filled, which indicated an area for improvement.
The inspectors were informed that subsequent augmentation drills for the missed desired positions were being planned to correct this concern under PIP 0-M-96-2713 Tne drill responders to the EOF
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i reported that the event traffic during the drill did not adversely impact response times.
Conclusions i~
was conducted in a professional manner and provided added assurance that The inspectors concluded that the observed special augmentation drill i
increased traffic during stadium events would not adversely impact E0F responders.
In addition, the licensee was taking corrective action for
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the desired positions not filled during the drill.
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ENCLOSURE 2
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F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities F3 Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation F3.1 Fire Protection System Followuo a.
Insoection Scooe (71750)
The inspector conducted followup on issues discovered during the last fire protection review.
During the fire protection review, the l
inspector noted that FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.6 stated that the Control Room has an independent ventilation system which maintains the control room at a slight positive pressure.
The FSAR further implied that the system
]revents exterior contaminants or smoke from entering the control room.
iowever, the control room ventilation system realigns to pressurize the control room only during accident conditions and no procedures were developed at the time for operations personnel to pressurize the control room if threatened by smoke or other contaminates.
Smoke or other exterior contaminates entry into the control room could significantly degrade control room habitability complicating safe plant operation.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector noted that the FSAR did not reflect the current normal configuration of the control room ventilation system and the practice of
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pressurizing the control room only during accident conditions.
In j
addition at the time of the inspection no procedural guidance was available to operations personnel to activate the control room ventilation system to prevent the entry of smoke and other contaminants.
As a result of the inspection. the licensee modified the FSAR to reflect the correct configuration of the control room ventilation system during normal operations. The FSAR was also updated to state that the system could be used during abnormal conditions to exclude smoke and other contaminants.
Also due to the inspection and other related events, the licensee developed and implemented procedural guidance for operators to
]ressurize the control room during challenges to the control room labitability caused by smoke or other exterior contaminants.
c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensees corrective action was adequate and should improve the control room operators ability to mitigate the consequences of smoke or other exterior contaminants that could degrade control room habitability.
This item will be added to Unresolved Item 96-04-02. FSAR Discrepancies.
ENCLOSURE 2
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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary t
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The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee
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management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on October 22. 1996. The
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licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
!
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was i
ide tified.
!
X2 NRC and Licensee Interface Meeting i
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On October 16. 1996, a periodic interface meeting was held at the McGuire site between the licensee. NRC headquarters and regional management, and the i
McGuire and Catawba Resident Inspector staffs. The meeting was considered to
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be beneficial in focusing all parties on important issues and improving NRC and Licensee communications.
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ENCLOSURE 2
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4 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
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Baxter. D., Shift Operations Manager i
Byrum. W., Manager. Radiation Protection j
Boyle, J., Mechanical / Nuclear Systems Engineering
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Cross, R., Technical Specialist II Deese. R., Outage Manager. Work Control
Dolan. B., Manager. Safety Assurance j
Geddie. E., Manager. McGuire Nuclear Station i
Herran P., Manager. Engineering l
Horne. M.. Supervisor. Maintenance
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Jones. R... Superintendent. Operations
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Lindsay. A.. Operations Training Manager
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Loucks. L.. Radiation Protection Manager (Acting)
Matthews. B., Supervisor. Engineering
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l McMeekin. T.. Vice President. McGuire Nuclear Station
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Michael R., Chemistry Manager
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Nazar. M., Superintendent. Maintenance l
Sample. M., Manager. Steam Generator Maintenance Group i
Snyder. J., Manager Regulatory Compliance i
Thomas, K.
Superintendent. Work Control l
Thrasher J., Manager. Modification Engineering j
Travis. B., Manager Mechanical / Civil Equipment Engineering i
Tuckman M., Senior Vice President. Duke Power Company
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NRC
S. Shaeffer. Senior Resident Inspector. McGuire j
M. Sykes. Resident Inspector. McGuire
G. Harris Resident Inspector.,McGuire i
S. Rudisail. Project Engineer RII
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R. Baldwin, Regional Inspector
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i ENCLOSURE 2
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors IP 71707:
Conduct of Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 40500:
Self Assessment IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 71001:
Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation
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IP 92901:
Operations Follow-up IP 92902:
Maintenance Follow-up IP 92903:
Engineering Follow-up ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Ooened URI 50-369.3'iO/96-08-01 Operator Abnormal Procedure Usage (paragraph 02.2)
VIO 50-369.370/96-08-02 Inadequate Containment Annulus Surveillance Procedure (paragraph M3.1)
URI 50-369.370/96-08-03 RCS Low Flow Trip Setpoints.(paragraph M3.2)
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l Closed VIO 50-369.370/95-23-01 Failure to take adequate corrective
action. 3 examples (paragraph 08.1)
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DEV 50-369. 370/95-23-02 Failure to meet Licensee corrective actions described in reply to VIO 94-17-01 (paragraph 08.2)
URI 50-369.370/96-07-03 PAM Recorder Isolator Wiring Modification
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(paragraph M.8.1)
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i Discussed
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URI 50-369.370/96-04-02 FSAR Discrepancies (paragraphs M8.1 &
F3.1)
ENCLOSURE 2
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28.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AP Abnormal Procedure CA Auxiliary Feedwater
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CCT Crew Critical Tasks
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DBD Design Basis Document
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DEV.
Deviation
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EOF Emergency Operations Facility EP Emergency Preparedness ESF Engineered Safety Features FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report I
gpd gallons per day HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air IAE Instruments and Electrical IP Inspection Procedure JPM Job Performance Measures KC Component Cooling Water System LC0 Limiting Conditions Operating LLI Low Level Raw Water Intake MFW Main Feedwater MSD McGuire Site Directive NC Reactor Coolant ND Residual Heat Removal NLO Non-Licensed Operator NSD Nuclear System Directive NSRB Nuclear Safety Review Board 0AC Operator Aided Computer OMP Operations Management Procedure OSC Operations Support Center OSM Operations Shift Manager OTP Operations Training Procedure PAM Post-Accident Monitoring i
PDR Public Document Room PIP Problem Investigation Process PMT Post-Maintenance Test PORC Plant Operations Review Committee OPTR Ouadrant Power Tilt Ratio RCS Reactor Coolant System R0 Reactor Operator RTD Resistance Temperature Detector RTPBE Reactor Thermal Power Best Estimate
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RV Containment Ventilation RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SR0 Senior Reactor Operator TEPR Top Equipment Problem Resolution ENCLOSURE 2
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TS Technical Specifications TSC Technical Support Center UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report URI Unresolved Item
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VIO Violation l
l ENCLOSURE 2