ML20236E647
| ML20236E647 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1989 |
| From: | Shymlock M, Vandoorn K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236E641 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-89-14, 50-370-89-14, IEIN-87-024, IEIN-87-24, IEIN-88-051, IEIN-88-073, IEIN-88-51, IEIN-88-73, NUDOCS 8907270264 | |
| Download: ML20236E647 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1989014
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.-
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
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ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos. 50-369/89-14 and 50-370/89-14
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
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Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2
Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370
License Nos.: NPF-9 and-NPF-17
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Inspection Conducted: April 22, 1989 - June 1,-1989
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Inspettor:.
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Drte/Sigfied
K.'YafiDoorn, Seniof Resident Inspector
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Accompanying Inspectors:
T. Cooper, Reactor Inspector
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B. Bonser, Project Inspector
Approve
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M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations safety
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verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, Part 21' reviews,
and follow-up on previous inspection findings and Licensee Event Reports.
Results:
In the areas inspected, one cited violation was identified and' one non-cited
violations were identified as follows:
Violation 369,370/89-14-01:
Inadequate Surveillance Procedures for
MSIV's.
(paragraph 4.d)
Non-Cited Violation 369/89-14-02:
Failure to Meet Design Basis Flow for
Chilled Water for Control Room Ventilation due to Inadequate Calibration.
(paragraph 6)
It was noted that the licensee is not making consistent progress with
correcting control room indication problems.
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8907270264 890717
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It was also noted that the licensee has recognized that the persistent problems
with failure to follow procedures is a widespread problem.
The licensee
appears to be making a concerted effort at improving managements role in
assuring procedure compliance.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services
D. Baxter. Support Operations Manager
J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling
D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager
J. Foster, Station Health Physicist
M. Funderburke, Station Chemist
- G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services
C. Hendrix, Maintenance Engineering Services Manager -
T. Nathews, Site Design Engineering Manager
- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
D. Murdock, McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager
W. Reeside, Operations Engineer
R. Rider, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
- M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance
R. Sharp, Compliance Manager
J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
J. Silver, Unit 2 Operations Manager
- A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman
- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
R. White, Instrument and Electrical Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Unresolved Items
An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is
required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation
or deviation. There were no unresolved items identified in this report.
3.
Plant Operations (71707, 71710)
The inspection staff reviewed piant operations during the report period to
verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room
logs, shift npervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment
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removal and restoration records were _ routinely perued. Interviews were
conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,
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and performance personnel.
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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at
shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as
prescribed in applicable station administrative di"ectives. The complement
of 1 censed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required
by Technical Specifications.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not
limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2
electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the
station yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,
equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
a.
Unit 1 Operations
The unit began the pericd in mid-loop operation due to the steam
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generator tube rupture event described previously. Startup commenced-
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on May 6,1989 and the unit was placed on-line on May 9,1989. The
unit remained on-line the rest of the period ending the period at
100% power.
Some off-gas problems were experienced in the Auxiliary
Building after the Unit 1 startup. The licensee aggressively pursued
and corrected the problem.
b.
Unit 2 Operations
The unit generally ran at full power during the entire period with
some power reductions for fuel conservation.
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c.
Housekeeping issues described in a previous report (369,370/89-11)
were corrected during this inspection period. During this period the
inspector noted an argon gas bottle with no housekeeping tag near the
2B Nuclear Service Water pump.
The licensee appropriately responded
by removing the bottle.
The licensee indicated that a more positive
control program for both bottles and scaffolding is being developed.
The inspector also noted many open locks in various locations at
Motor Control Centers (MCC's). The licensee indicated that these are
locks which are available when needed for various valve lineups, many
of which are needed during outages.
The licensee's intent is to
store most locks in a central location near each MCC.
The licensee
was asked to review this issue.
d.
The inspector reviewed the Control Room Ventilation (VC) system
capabilities relative to degradation from smoke.
This review was
prompted by the fire experienced at the licensee's Oconee Nuclear
Station.
VC has two 100% capacity filtered trains with smoke
detectors.
Outside air intake is provided from two well separated
locations.
The system is capable of pressurizing the control room.
Also the system has the capability to purge the ductwork should it
become necessary.
Air packs are also provided for operators in the
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control room.
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e.-
During the Unit 1 outage the licensee discovered minor discrepancies
in vendor supplied flow control orificet . and discovered a
construction orifice in one train of the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA)
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system. This problem contributed to errors in the flow balance. The
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licensee replaced the construction orifice and conducted prototype
testing.- A Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) up to 20%
power was documented on May 8, 1989. A rebalance was accomplished at
approximately 15% power and a new JC0 issued (see paragraph 4.a).
The licensee inspected Unit 2 for construction orifices and found
none.
The licensee's judgement was that the Unit 2 CA system was
f.
Based on testing information from the licensee's Catawba Station
relative to Borg-Warner flexible wedge gate valves, the licensee ~was
required to evaluate operability of four.CA and four Main Feedwater-
(CF) system valves for each unit.
The primary purpose of these
valves is to close under certain conditions to limit energy input
into containment during a faulted steam generator (e.g. feedline -
break) event.
It is questionable whether these valves 'could close
under maximum postulated differential. pressure. Compensatory actions
were provided for the CA Valves ( 1 and 2'CA-38, 50, 54 and 66) on
May 16, 1989.
The actions involved use of an air-operated valve in
the lines or a local manual valve.
These compensatory actions
appeared viable since the. valves are accessible. The analysis for CA
assumes no operator action for 15 minutes and appropriate training
was provided to operators. The long term fix is under evaluation and
will probably include valve replacement.
The CF valves, normally shut during operation, were failed shut while
further testing and review could be accomplished.
A short term or
long term fix had not been developed at the end of the inspection
period.
Although the safe mode is closed, the-licensee would not be
able to startup with these valves inoperable. if shutdown occurred
since the valves are necessary for startup.
g.
The inspector noted that the licensee is not making consistent
progress in correction of Control Room Indication Problems (CRIPS).
The number of CRIPS has been high for an extended period of time and
has been previously noted by the NRC.
The number increased during
the period from 117 to 137.
A dedicated' repair crew and site goals-
were previously established, however, it appears this problem may.
need more attention if consistent progress is not.more. forthcoming.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
Selected surveillance ' tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the
inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance
with applicable Technical Specifications.
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Selected tests were witnessed or reviewed to ascertain that- current
written approved procedures were available and.in use, that test equipment
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in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met. .that system-
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restoration was completed and test results were. adequate.
Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:
PROCEDURE
EQUIPMENT / TEST
PT/1/A/4252/15
CA System Flow Leakage Verification
PT/1/A/4252/13
Motor Driven CA System Flow Balance
PT/1/A/4252/14
Turbine Driven CA System Flow Balance
PT/0/A/4600/4
Incore Instrument Detector Calibration
IP/0/A/3207/07
Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range
Detector Current Calibration
a.
The above Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) leakage test was performed
because previous testing had shown lower than expected flows to the
Leakage was determined to be occurring
through the valves which recirculate flow to the Upper Surge Tank
from the Motor Driven CA pumps (MDCAP).
The original design basis
requires pump capacities to be 98% of manufacturers head curve.
Present performance is 97.5%, 97.8% and 97% for the A MDCAP, B MDCAP
and Turbine Driven CA pump respectively.
Given the lower than
required pump performance and the leakage a special flow balance was
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performed to assure optimal flow to each SG. A special analysis was
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completed and a Justification for Continued Operation was issued on
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May 11, 1989.
There are no additional flow margins available in the
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analysis. Therefore, the licensee will attempt to repair the leaking
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valves and rebalance the system,
b.
A special inspection was performed which served to verify various
Technical Specification surveillance were being performed for Diesel
Generator Fuel Oil (See paragraph 8.)
c.
The licensee identified that leakage surveillance for Containment
Purge (VP) valves may be inadequate based on NRC Information Notice
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88-73: Direction-Dependent Leak Characteristics of Containment Purge
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Valves and vendor information.
Leakage rate is direction dependent
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for the Fisher Controls Series 9200 butterfly valves and the inside
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valves have been tested in a non-conservative direction.
While the
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surveillance is apparently inadequate, the licensee judged that their
valves were operable and documented the decision in an Operability
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Evaluation dated May 26, 1989.
Operability was based on several
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facts.
The licensee quarterly tests have all resulted in minimal
measured leakage.
The valves are not opened during operations to
assure that the seating characteristics are not disturbed.
The
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McGuire valves are 24-inches in diameter and the pressure requirement
is approximately 15-psig. The valves cited in the Information Notice
are 48-inches in diameter with an approximate 50-psig pressure
requirement.
Satisfactory containment integrated leak rate test
results further assure acceptable leak rates for the penetrations.
Further evaluation is in progress relative to a long term fix.
d.
On May 25, 1989 site personnel determined that the Main Steam
Isolation Valves (MSIV) for both Units may be inoperable based on NRC
Information Notice No.88-51:
Failures of Main Steam Isolation
Valves.
The valves are required to close within 5 seconds without
air assist per the FSAR, Section 10.3.2 and Technical Specification
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(TS) 3.7.1.4.
Routine surveillance on the MSIVs has been performed
which allows air assistance per surveillance procedures PT/1 and
2/A/4255/03A and 03B, SM Valve Stroke Timing (Shutdown).
The
licensee provided an operability evaluation that the valves were
operable based in part on the following information:
(1) The McGuire MSIVs, under the worst case flow / operating
conditions (full pressure, reverse flow) have an operator
closing margin of 2264 lb. or 24%,' assuming spring force only.
No credit is assumed for air assist.
(2) Atwood & Morrill (A&M), the manufacturer, has verified actuator
margins and stroke time by full flow testing, in both directions
at maximum pressure drop in both directions.
(3) The variables affecting stroke time are packing drag and the
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load imposed by the speed control cylinder.
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The values used for packing drag by A&M in the sizing
cciculations are conservative and according to the licensee, the
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packing system is original (0P-asbestos, graphite-& zinc).-
The speed control cylinders were rendered inoperative so they_
cannot adversely affect stroke times.
In addition, the licensee informed the inspector that like valves
were tested satisfactorily without air assist at the Catawba Station
and these valves had weaker springs and higher packing drag.
This
operability evaluation was documented on May 26, 1989.
Corporate personnel documented the concern in Problem Investigation
Report (PIR-0-M 89-0122) on May 16, 1989.
This PIR was signed out
and sent under a cover letter to the site on May 22, 1989. -Site
personnel became aware of the letter on May 25, 1989.
The letter
stated, " Corrective actions need to be taken at MNS since current
surveillance testing of the MSIVs does not assure that they will
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close within 5 seconds with spring forces alone.
The recommended
corrective action is for the MNS MSIVs to be surveillance tested
while closing with spring forces alone. The attached PIR was written
to initiate corrective actions and should be distributed
accordingly."
While the operability evaluation is appropriate, the inspector is
concerned that an inadequate surveillance was allowed to exist from
early August 1988 when the Information Notice was received until late
May 1989.
The inspector is further concerned with the process of
notification of the site by corporate personnel of a possibly
significant operability issue.
In that it took nine days to
identify an operability concern to site personnel and to initiate
corrective actions.
The licensee intends to perform the adequate surveillance during the
next available outage since the surveillance is not possible at
power.
It is noted that Unit I has had two extended outages since
the fall of 1988 which afforded the. opportunity to test the MSIVs had
the problem been addressed earlier.
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Because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee initiative
for self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not
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generally issue a Notice of Violation for a violatior that meets
specific criteria.
However, a violation for inadequate surveillance
procedures to test the MSIVs is being cited because corrective
actions were not accomplished in a reasonable time period.
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Violation 369,370/89-14-01:
Inadequate Surveillance Procedures for
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One violation was identified as described above.
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S.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
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Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the
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resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy
and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
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The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where
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applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use,
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that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and
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maintenance results were adequate.
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ACTIVITY
WORK REQUEST / PROCEDURE
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Valve Operator Testing of 2CF126
96698 NSM
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Trouble Shoot Spurious OP Delta T
Runback / Rod Stop Alert Alarm
Replace Control Room Switch for
WR 88828 MNT
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1A NI Pump Couplino Alignment
WR 097076PM/MP/0/A/7150/44
a.
The inspector noted during observation of the activities listed above
that procedures were being referenced and followed.
The Safety-
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Injection (NI) pump alignment procedure was a broad procedure written
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for complete teardown.
Specific sections to be used were referenced.
on the work request and were being followed.
It was noted that the
mechanic had to push in on the turning bar to obtain consistent
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readings on the coupling face.
Also the motor side flange was wired
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back to keep from interfering with the dial indicator mounting. The
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mechanics attempted to use a specially made NI Pump socket for the
motor bolts which would no longer work because heavier washers were
apparently being used since the socket was manufactured.
Also this
special tool was not referenced in the procedure. These observations
were passed on to the licensee for consideration of improvements in
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tooling and procedure guidance.
During the NI pump inspection a
mechanic indicated the Quality Assurance (QA) inspectors sometimes
require bolt torque to be verified by simply checking torque and
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other times by requiring bolts to be untorqued and retorqued while
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being observed.
The inspector inquired of QA Supervision why the
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inspections varied.
The inspector was informed that -the general
inspection procedure only requires verification of minimum torque,
however, some inspectors choose to occasionally verify that bolts are.
not being overtorqued and require the loosening and retorqueing to be
accomplished. This is an acceptable practice to QA management.
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b.
The inspector also discussed maintenance goals with the Maintenance
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Superintendent.
While a nuniber of goals are being met, those
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involving outstanding work requests and control room indicators are
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not being met.
The licensee indicated that management attention is
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being placed on these issues and improvement is expected.
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c.
The licensee appears to have recognized that the general problem of
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procedural compliance is a cultural one and appears to be making a
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concerted effort at improving managements role in assuring procedural
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compliance.
This comment is based on discussions with licensee
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management and a review of information presented by the licensee'in
recent line staff meetings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Licensee Event Report (LER) and Part 21 Followup (90712,92700)
a.
The below listed Licensee Event' Reports (LER) were reviewed to
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determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The
determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of
compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements,
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corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems,
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reportieg requirements satisfied, and the relative safety
significance of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and
discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for
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those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
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369/87-22, Rev. 1:
Fire Barrier Blanket Breached Without-
Compensatory Action.
Since this event occurred additional problems
have occurred.
However, the licensee has taken generic corrective
actions and problems in this area have diminished (see NRC Report
369,370/89-01).
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369/87-27:
Entered Hot Shutdown Without Containment Spray Heat
Exchanger 1B Cooling Water Inlet Valve Being Retested Due To
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Personnel Error.
Appropriate procedure chtnges were made and the
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retest of the valve was satisfactory.
In addition, due to a
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violation which occurred since this event (369,370/88-29-01), the
licensee has strengthened the retest program.
369/87-33:
Four Main Steam to Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Were
Omitted From The Inservice Valve Testing Program.
This problem was
identified during an NRC inspection and an Unresolved Item has been
established for followup (See UNR 369,370/88-31-18)
369/87-37:
Waste Gas Surveillance Sample Was Not Obtat.ed Within
Technical Specification Time Limit.
Appropriate procedure changes
have been made to require verification of sampling requirements by
two individuals and no similar events have occurred in recent
history.
- 369/88-17, Rev.1, A Containment Isolation Valve Was Inoperable Due
To Defective Procedure.
The inspector reviewed the corrective
actions taken as a result of this item and found them complete and
adequate to address the issue.
- 369/88-27, Rev. 1:
Surveillance Requirement Was Not Performed Prior
To Entering Mode 4.
This event was caused in part by weaknesses in
the work request program.
The licensee has made appropriate program
changes.
- 369/88-36:
Units 1 and 2 Diesel Generators Were .Potentially-
Inoperable Due To A Design Deficiency With Starting Air System.
Followup inspection of this issue has previously identified a
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possible violation (see 369,370/89-05-03).
Further followup will be
accomplished through followup of the violation.
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369/88-48:
Shrinkage of Boraflex Neutron Absorbing Material Could
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Cause A Resultant Increase In Reactivity Not Previously Considered
(Voluntary Report).
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369/88-49:
Residual Heat Removal Pump 18 Manually Stopped Due To Air
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Binding Causing A Loss of RHR (See Violation 369,370/89-11-01).
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- 369/89-02:
Design Basis Nuclear Service Water Flow To The Control
Area Chilled Water System Cannot Be Justified Between December 8,
1987 And February 24, 1989 As Required By Technical Spec. Licensee
Performance personnel' identified this problem.
Control Room
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Ventilation remained operable during the time period.
This violation
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is not being cited bei.ause the criteria specified in Section V.G. of
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the Enforcement Policy were satisfied for Sever"y Level .IV or V
violations identified by the licensee.
The lic.asee has performed
adequate retesting using properly calibrated equipment.
Also, the
licensee reviewed this event with appropriate personnel. Corrective
actions are considered complete.
This is Non-Cited Violation
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369/89-14-02:
Failure to Meet Design Basis Flow for Chilled Water
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for Control Room Ventilation due to Inadequate Calibration.
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- 369/89-05, Charging Pump Recirc Valves for Unit 1 And Unit 2 Were Not
Being Tested As Specified By Inservice Test Requirements. Corrective
actions were reviewed and were determined to be adequate to resolve
the issue.
- 370/87-09, Rev. 1:
Reactor Trip Breaker Failure Due To Mechanical
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Failure.
A detailed NRC Augmented Inspection Team previously
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reviewed this issue (see Report 369,370/87-22).
In addition an NRC
Bulletin 88-01 was issued.
The licensee changed the Reactor Trip
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procedure to require a local verification of the breaker trip and
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added appropriate inspections to the maintenance procedure which the
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inspector verified.
Additional inspections will be performed
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relative to the Bulletin.
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- 370/88-02, Rev. 1:
Both Trains Of Annulus Ventilation System Were
Made Inoperable Due To Deficient Communication And Planning /Schedu-
ling Deficiencies.
Analysis showed that the systen would have
functioned to prevent significant radiation releases. The plant was
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in Mode 3 and shutting down at the time of the event.
Licensee
Operations personnel discovered and reported the event. The licensee
has revised standing work requests to provide adequate control of
controlled access door (CAD) readers and reviewed this event with
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appropriate personnel. Corrective action is considered complete.
- 370/89-01:
Unit 2 Reactor Trip Because Of An Unknown Cause.
The
reactor tripped on High Negative Neutron Flux Rate during a routine
rod movement test.
While the root cause was not determined the
licensee have done all that could be reasonably expected to find the
cause and provided appropriate management review prior to start up.
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- 370/89-03:
Reactor ' Trip Occurred Due To Failure' 0f Positioner.For:
Cteam Generator 2C Main Feedwater Regulating Valve.
- 370/89-02:
Reactor Trip on B S/G Lo-Lo Level Following Loss of 2B
CFPT Because of Equipment Failure (Suction Pressure Switches).
The:
inspector verified completion of work requests -associated with _ this-
event.
b.
The inspector verified that_ the licensee- had received and evaluated'
10 CFR.21 reports applicable. to the plant and had .taken corrective t
actions as necessary. .The following Part 21 items are closed:
P2188-03 (Both Units): ' Gamma-Metrics Cable _ Assemblies Installed As'
Part Of The Neutron Monitoring System May Possibly Leak.
P2188-06 (Unit 1 Only):
Inconel 600 Steam ' Generator Tube Plugs
Susceptible To Stress Corrosion Cracking Supplied By B and W.s
P2189-01 - (Both Units):
Brown Boveri K-Line - Circuit L Breakers
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Delivered Prior To-1974 Need Rebound Spring Added To Slow Close Pin.
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No other violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
The.following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that-
the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in
compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been
completed.
Selective verification. included record review, observations,
and discussions with licensee personnel.
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a.
(Closed)
Violation 370/87-35-01:
Failure To Establish Or Implement
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An Adequate Procedure To Control The Installation Of CRDM Shield
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Blocks.
The licensee committed to do a generic review of civil
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structures in containment and to assure these structures were-being
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maintained. The inspector verified that this review was ~ accomplished
and appropriate inspections had been implemented.,
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b.
(Closed)
Violation 369,370/88-33-01:
Failure To Follow Proceoure.
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For Diesel Generator Testing. . The response to this item was
submitted on March 16, 1989.
The inspector verified implementation-
of corrective actions which included _ appropriate procedure _ changes:
and training,
c.
(Closed)
Violation 369/88-33-08:
Failure -To Follow TS For.-
Containment Integrity.
The response to this item _ was submitted on
March 16, 1989.
The inspector verified implementation of corrective
actions which included appropriate procedure changes and program
enhancements.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Special Inspection Of Prop (er Receipt, Storage,' And Handling Of Emergency
18.
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil TI 2515/100).
The inspector performed a special inspection.to assure that the licensee.
was properly receiving, storing and handling emergency Diesel Generator '
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(DG) fuel oil; that Technical- Specification surveillance were' being -
performed and covered by appropriate procedures; and.that the licensee had'
appropriately addressed NRC Information' Notice No. 87-04:
Diesel.
Generator Fails Test Because Of Degraded Fuel.
The licensee did evaluate the Notice and verify appropriate design' and
controls were in place to assure quality fuel'and an ope _ able flow path.
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A storage tank recirculation system with filters is regularly utilized
(monthly). Water accumulation is checked and removed from a low point off
the storage tanks and day tanks once per month.and in from the day-tank
whenever the DG is run for greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Storage tanks'.are cleaned
and inspected at 10 year intervals.
Fuel oil is sampled and analyzed prior to. addition to.the storage tanks-
and the storage tanks are sampled for particulate - monthly.
Fuel-
additives are used to prevent oxidation and bacterial growth.-
The fuel oil system utilizes transfer filters and. duplex fuel? oil filters
on each engine.
Differential pressure is monitored on the fuel oil
filters whenever the DG is run and filters are in the preventive
maintenance program.
Storage Tank and Day Tank levels are alarmed in the
DG rooms with a DG trouble alarm in the control room.
Level-instrument'
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tubing is seismically qualified, however, instruments.are not since.their
primary purpose is to assure enough fuel prior to an event. A tygon tube
or a dipstick could be utilized if necessary.
No violations or deviations were icentified.
9.
ExitInterview(30703)
The inspection scope and findings identified below' were summarized 'on
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June 1,1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The
following items were discussed in detail:
Violation 369,370/89-14-01:
Inadequate Surveillance Procedures For:MSIV's
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(paragraph 4.d.)
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Non-Cited Violation 369/89-14-02:
Failure To Meet Design Basis Flow For .
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Chilled Water For Control Room Ventilation Due To Inadequate Calibration:
,
(paragraph 6.)
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The licensee representatives present offered no' dissenting comments, nor-
did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the'-
1
inspectors during the course of their inspection.
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