IR 05000369/1993021
| ML20059K897 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1993 |
| From: | Barr K, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059K877 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-93-21, 50-370-93-21, NUDOCS 9311160233 | |
| Download: ML20059K897 (27) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- I' .. , UNf7ED STATES ' _ /pn maa%e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k REGloN 11 ' s" g % 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 r; Oj ATLANT A, GEORGIA 303230199
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Report Nos.: 50-369/93-21 and 50-370/93-21 ' Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street i Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 , Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 , Inspection Conducted: October 18-21, 1993 MN w[[
- /7/93 Inspector:
r F. N.~ ~ Wright, Tealn Leader } ' Dat6 Si'gned - l Team Members: A. Gooden i J. Will J - Approved by: . Mwt
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K. P: Barr. M tif Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards -' SUMMARY ! ' Scope: This reutine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the Simulator Control Room;
Technical Support Center; Operational Support Center; and Emergency Operations
Facility. The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and
' observation of the licensee's post exercise critique. This announced exercise was conducted on October 20, 1993, between the hours of 3:00 a.m. and -; 2:00 p.m., with offsite State and local participation.
' Results: In the areas inspected, no violations, deviations, or exercise weaknesses were I identified. Overall, the licensee's performance. during the exercise was good, > with the licensee meeting most exercise objectives and demonstrating a capability to implement the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures in the event of a radiological emergency. The licensee demonstrated significant improvement in the preparation and issuance of Emergency Notification Messages i f during the exercise.
Five Inspector Follow-up Items were identified to review licensee corrective actions for issues identif'ad during the exercise.
I 9311160233 931110 PDR ADDCK 05000369 i ' G PDR .
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, ' REPORT DETAILS i . -1.
Persons Contacted , , Licensee Employees
- J. Boyle, Superintendent, Work Control /OSC Coordinator
- W. Byrum, Manager, Radiation Protection B. Carroll, Engineer, Service Accident _ Analysis Group
- M. Cloninger, Exercise Director
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- R. Cross, Technical Specialist, Compliance
' G. Cruzman, Accident Assessment Controller
- T. Curtis, Manager, Systems Engineering
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- M. Geddie, Station Manager / Emergency Coordinator
- G. Gilbert, Manager, Safety Assurance / Emergency Director'
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- M. Greene, Communications Specialist, Corporate Office
- B. Hall, Manager, Engineering
- B. Hamilton, Superintendent, Operations
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- M. Harley, Supervisor, Engineering
- B. Hasty, Manager, Emergency Planning
- F. Hayes, Manager, Human Resources
- F. Jarrett, Manager, Safety and Health Services
- T. Keenex, Manager, Security
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- E. Kerr, Nuclear Emergency Planning Consultant, E0F Lead Controller-
J.'Lukowski, Shift Manager, Simulator Lead Controller
- P. McHail, Instrumentation and Electrical Training
- T. McMeekin, Site Vice President
- c. McRee, Nuclear Emergency Planning Consultant
- G. Mitchell, Offsite Communications Controller.
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- R. Quellette, System Engineering
- M. Pacetti, Mechanical / Nuclear Engineer
' R. Pope, Simulator Controller j
- J. Reavis, Emergency Planning-i
- K. Surratt, Community Relations Representative
- K. Thomas, Manager, Instrumentation and Control Engineering.
.. ] Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included a engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,, technicians, 1j and administrative personnel.
' l Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. Barr, Lergency Preparedness Section Chief, Region II
- G. Maxwell, Senior Resident-Inspector
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- Attended exit interview
-# Participated in Inspection Findings Conference Call, October 26, 1993
Abbreviations used throughout this report are defined in the la'st .I paragraph.
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2.
Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios For Power Reactors (82302) The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency , Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, ' Section II.N.
, The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives. The scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the.
, licensee. However, there were some scenario problems identified by the.
licensee and the inspectors during the critique process. _ Observed scenario problems included the following:
For some events, the scenario did not have sufficient information- - for players.
For example, controllers were not prepared to give players information that was being requested by news personnel concerning the causes and the status injured personnel-transported offsite for medical treatment (the initial condition that began ' the exercise with a NOVE).
Incorrect data was provided to the controllers and then to the - i ' players. As part of the exercise scenario, valve IND-29 had failed open at about the same time that a seal on the Train A RHR
heat exchanger failed allowing a 500-1000 gpm leak to the Train A RHR heat exchanger room. The expected response for these simulated events was for the team to discover the leak when the Train A RHR heat exchanger room was entered in order to work on IND-29. However, the licensee RP Controller / Evaluator verbally supplied th( team with incorrect radio 1--# al data which indicated
that the leak was in the Train B RHR heat +,' hanger room. Due to i this error, the discovery of the RHR leak was delayed by j approximately one hour. The inspectors reviewed the radiation i survey data developed for the exercise, noting that the wrong RHR
heat exchanger room was annotated as having elevated contamination level s.
This contributed to the Controller providing erroneous i simulated radiological data to the team.
' Some information provided to players was out of sequence.
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example, players received high containment radiation alarms i 10 minutes before the core was uncovered.
Inspectors noted that the coordination between the controllers was - generally adequate but occasionally poor and some controllers did not appear confident in procedures for providing scenario information when requested.
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. s There appeared to be some player confusion on how to interface - with the controllers. The following observations were determined to be most notable for Task No. IE-20, which involved sending two IAE technicians along with an RP technician to force valve IND-29 closed. The inspectors observed that the RP Controller / Evaluator i verbally provided all of the simulated plant parameters to the i team during the conduct of this task. This included contamination levels, dose rates, and other radiological data. The inspectors determined that the use of message sheets could have been utilized . more effectively for this task. The IAE Controller / Evaluator assigned to this team was not effective in maintaining the . activity in accordance with the scenario.
In particular, 'when the l IAE players completed the simulated repair work on IND-29 , indicating that they had successfully simulated closing.the valve, l the IAE Controller / Evaluator failed to provide the exercise
message sheet to the players at that time which would have told ' the players that the valve could not be. closed. The Controller
wn: reluctant to provide any information to the players during ! this activity. The Controller indicated that this was the first i axercise he had been assigned this role, and during his training,
he had been instructed not to talk with the players unless he was
asked a direct question. The Controller appeared confused between his roles as a controller and evaluator indicating the need for more effective training / preparation for first-time individuals assigned to these dual functions, especially in the area of i understanding their roles and responsibilities.
Numerous scenario problems indicated the review of scenario data was not adequate. The inspector stated that the observed problems J indicated a need for improvement in scenario development process and improvements in quality controls for scenario data verification.
In general, the controllers provided adequate guidance and the inspector observed adequate interactions between i the controllers and the players, however, improvements.in training ' and coordination of controllers appeared to be warranted.
Some , players appeared to need a better understanding of exercise rules and their capabilities during scenario play. The inspector stated ' that a review of the licensee's corrective actions for improving the scenario exercise data and controls would be reviewed in a i future inspection as an IFI.
IFI 50-369, 370/93-21-01: Review adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions for improving emergency preparedness scenario exercise data and controls during a future inspection.
i The inspector noted that players worked hard throughout the exercise to implement the Emergency Plan and it's implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Assignment of Responsibility, Evaluation of Exercises For Power Reactors (82301)
The area of assignment of responsibility was observed to determine
whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee " had been specifically established and that adequate-staff was available
to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,
l Section II.A.
' l During pre-exere.ise reviews of the licensee's Emergency Plan and implementing procedures, the inspector concluded that the onsite and offsite emergency organizations were adequately described, the emergency- ., responsibilities of the various supporting organizations had been specifically established and key emergency response organization ' positions were clearly defined in approved plans and implementing
procedures. The inspector observed that adequate personnel were
available to respond to the simulated emergency.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301) i Implementation of the licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.B.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization-was adequately defined; the responsibility and authority for directing-actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear; that staff were available to fill key functional positions within the organization; and that onsite and offsite interactions and responsibilities were clearly defined.
. The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize Duke Power emergency response personnel.
Following the Alert i declaration, the on-shift emergency organization was augmented through mobilization of the Emergency Response Organization and activations of the TSC, OSC, and E0F.
Inspectors observed those activations and . determined that the required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's approved procedures and the licensee was able to staff and activate the facilities in a timely manner.
The Shift Supervisor assigned to the exercise assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the emergency response in the SCR until formally relieved by the Station Manager in the TSC.
Following the turnover the i Station Manager assumed the responsibilities of the Emergency i
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Coordinator and directed all emergency operations until relieved of some duties, including emergency classifications, by the Emergency Director in the E0F.
Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
However, the licensee did establish' a proposed relief shift during the ,
exercise.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301) This area was observed to determine that arrangements _for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements.
to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's onsite EOF have ' been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.C.
The inspector determined that State and local staff could be accommodated at the EOF and arrangements for requesting offsite assistance resources were in place.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Classificatica System (82301) i The emergency classification system was observed to determine th' t a a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by - the nuclear facility licen~ as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), i 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Pan ' raph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-
0654, Section II.D.
McGuire Nuclear Station RP/0/A/5700/00, Classification of Emergency, revision dated July 22, 1992, provided for off-normal events to be classified into one of the four emergency classification categories.
- The licensee's staff made the following emergency classifications: The conditions for declaring an NOUE was met at about 3:32 a.m.
- due to scenario request to transport an injured and contaminated person offsite for medical treatment. The Shift Supervisor in the SCR declared the NOVE at about 3:35 a.m. based on EAL " Transportation of a contaminated individual from the~ site to an offsite medical facility."
The conditions for declaring an Alert were met at about '5:12 a.m.
- due to primary coolant leak greater than 50 gpm. The Shift
, Supervisor declared the Alert 4 minutes later at 5:16 a.m., based on EAL "NC system leakage greater than 50 gpm in modes 1-4 and subcooling greater than 0*F and leak cannot be isolated within 15 minutes."
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, The conditions for declaring a Site Area Emergency ~were met at + about 9:03 a.m. due to primary leak increase causing safety . injection and loss of subcooling. The E0F Director declared the SAE four minutes later at 9:07 a.m., based on EAL "SI actuated in
udes 1-4 and the NV, NI and ND flow cannot maintain _ subcooling , greater than 0 F."
The conditions for declaring a General Emergency were met at about - 11:02 a.m. due to loss of offsite power causing loss of ECCS and
subcooling. The E0F Director declared the General Emergency four minutes later at about 11:06 a.m., based on EAL "LOCA with failure of both trains of ECCS injection and NC subcooling cannot be ' maintained greater than 0 F."
The Shift Superintendent in the SCR and the' Emergency Director in the E0F effectively evaluated existing conditions and declared appropriate emergency classifications.in accordance with approved procedures in a timely manner. The Emergency Coordinator in the TSC worked with the ' Emergency Director in the E0F to make the Site Area and General Emergency classifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Notification Methods and Procedures (82301) The Notification Methods and Procedures area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to rcsponse organizations was established.
This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph-IV.D ' of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
! ' A review of notification messages to Federal, State, and local ' agencies-was made to determine that completed notification forms to Federal, .j State, and local offsite authorities contained the following ' information; emergency conditions, emergency classifications, radioactivity release status, potentially affected population, projected. population doses, recommended protective actions, and.any changes to these conditions.
The timeliness of emergency notifications made during the exercise was i ' excellent and improvements in Emergency Notification Message content were also observed during the exercise.
In the 1992 NRC evaluated EP exercise, some prot.lems including clarity or simplicity of emergency descriptions, status of plant conditions, release duration times and message approval were characterized as an exercise weakness (50-369, 370/92-25-01).
During the 1993 exercise, licensee personnel issued . ._ .
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timely initial and follow-up notifications that accurately described site emergency conditions. The licensee also documented notifications made and simulated to the NRC Operations Center.
The inspector determined that one element of the 1992 exercise weakness, concerning release duration times, had not been corrected.
In the 1992 exercise, the licensee was not attempting to provide a estimated radiological release duration time. The licensee's computer program ' utilized for automating dose projection data, calculated the time of release duration as the time the release started to the time the offsite dose projections were computed. The licensee's response to the exercise weakness dated January 4, 1993, reported the licensee's corrective ! actions included a revision to the computer prog.am that was. scheduled for completion in October 1993. The inspector determined that the licensee's corrective actions for the computer program had not been completed and that the licensee's corrective action completion date had been revised to January 1, 1994. As reported in the licensee's.
January 4, 1993 response, dose assessment personnel were to utilize a
default value of two hours for estimated duration time when an estimate
of release duration was not made.
In discussions with the Emergency i J Planning Manager, the inspector determined that the licensee was also planning to change the default value to four hours to more closely match estimated EPZ evacuation time estimates. The inspector noted that only.
default estimated release times of two hours were recorded on Emergency-Notification messages completed during the exercise and that Messages 11 i through 14 did not include a value for " estimated duration" time at all.
The inspector reported that the exercise weakness would remain an open item pending the licensee's corrective action completion, including i procedures providing guidance on determining " estimated duration" and ' demonstration of proper use.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Communications (82301) i The Emergency Communications area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.F.
-l The licensee demonstrated the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communications equipment.
Players did a good job of transmitting drill. messages and identifying-the messages as drill messages.
In general, the inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301) The Emergency Facilities and Equipment area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific.
. criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.H.
. Licensee procedures required activation.of the TSC and OSC emergency facilities upon declaration of an Alert emergency classification. An Alert classification was made at 5:16 a.m. and the Emergency Coordinator i requested activation of the ERO. The ERO pagers were activated at about > 5:19 a.m. and an announcement was made over the plant PA system at 5:26 a.m. to activated the TSC and OSC.
Since this was an "off-hours" ' exercise, the initial staffing of the ERFs was with personnel from the on-shift departments. The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key ERFs, including the TSC, OSC, and EOF.
During a review of the licensee's procedures the inspector noted discrepancies concerning the meaning of terms " Operational" and " Activated" when utilized to describe emergency response facility
status. The inspector noted in licensee procedure RP/0/A/5700/13, , " Emergency Operations Facility Director Procedure," Revision dated
October 6,1993, that the term operational, when applied to the E0F y status, appeared to mean the facility was staffed and facilities were .! capable of performing the emergency preparedness functions as defined in the licensee's emergency plan and implementing procedures. The
procedure stated in Section 2.0, "The Emergency Operations Facility must-l be operational using 75 minutes as a goal for the minimum staff to be in .i place following declaration of an alert or higher classification."- The procedure required the Emergency Director gather plant status _ j information and conduct a turnover with the Emergency Coordinator before the EOF could be declared activated.
Procedure step 2.12 required the Emergency Director complete a turnover, utilizing a checklist, and document the "E0F Activation Time."
Procedure step 2.13 required the-Emergency Director "Announce to all E0F personnel that the EOF is activated.
Provide time of activation and name of EOF Director." While reviewing another procedure, EP Group Manual Section 1.1, " Emergency Organization", Revision dated August 3, 1993, the inspector found the following statement where the two terms (Operational. and Activated) were utilized together in procedure step 3.10.1: " Personnel ~ qualified to perform the following functions must staff the EOF before it can be declared operation utilizing a 75 minute activation goal." The statement appeared to conflict with the use of the terms as described in RP/0/A/5700/13. These discrepancies were discussed with representatives of the Emergency Planning staff. The licensee representative acknowledged the discrepancies and committed to clearly define the use of the terms as they relate to emergency response facility status and to review all of the emergency procedures and ensure proper usage of the terms. The inspector stated that a review of the licensee's corrective actions would be review in a future inspection as an IFI.
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l-g IFI 50-369, 370/93-21-02: Review licensee procedures for clarification of terms " operational" and " activated" in relation to emergency response facility status.
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Simulator Control Room I .; l The Shift Supervisor demonstrated good command and control L throughout the exercise and classifications and notifications were ,
accomplished efficiently and in a timely manner. The Shift . ! l Supervisor and the reactor operators demonstrated good tese of the I normal, abnormal, emergency operating procedures, and the Emergency Plan implementing procedures throughout the exercise.
Operations personnel maintained good communications with the ERFs ' and kept management well informed of changing plant conditions. ' A qualified staff member was available to notify the Federal, State and local authorities of the emergency and to maintain i communications 15 minutes after the emergency was declared.
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! No violations or deviations were identified.
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Technical Support Center The minimum staffing required for activation of the TSC was obtained at 6:08 a.m., 49 minutes after the~ activation of ERO ' , pagers at 5:19 a.m.
The TSC was activated, fully staffed and functional in a timely manner at 6:25 a.m.- ' The plant Station Manager entered the TSC and began a turnover with the Shift Supervisor / Emergency Coordinator in the simulator control room utilizing licensee procedures. Once turnover was ' completed, the Station Manager assumed the role of Emergency . ' Coordinator. The Emergency Coordinator appeared knowledgeable' of his duties and responsibilities and assumed the responsibility in a professional and organized manner.
Command and control as ' displayed by the Emergency Coordinator was very good. The Emergency Coordinator used the periodic " time-out" round table
l briefings of his TSC managers and his subsequent updates to keep
the TSC and OSC personnel apprised of plant status and his
' priorities for accident mitigation.
Technical assessment and mitigation activities were aggressively > u and properly pursued by the TSC staff and periodic briefings , ' regarding the incident status and on going mitigating actions were . frequently given.
' ! The licensee's TSC facilities and equipment were adequate to deal with the conditions described by the scenario.
Noise levels in
the TSC were high due to personnel conversations and ventilation ' i noise. The inspector noted that the noise did not prevent the , I performance of any duties in the TSC but made communication more , ' difficult.
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l l s Personnel in the TSC made a commendable effort to maintain . accurate logs of exercise events.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Support Center Upon the direction by the Emergency Coordinator in the SCR, the f l OSC was activated, fully staffed, and functional in a timely I manner at 6:25 a.m.
The inspectors noted that within approximately 20 minutes all but a chemistry department on-shift representative had responded to the OSC.
Initial staffing personnel promptly began completing pre-activation tasks, such as setting up emergency equipment, verifying the operability of emergency equipment, and completing pre-activation task lists used to make incoming personnel in the emergency activation organization aware of tasks already in progress. As members of l the emergency organization arrived, adequate relief briefings were ~
conducted by the on-shift personnel. The inspectors verified that l l the OSC was staffed with qualified personnel for each function as , designated in the licensee's emergency plan.
i The OSC Coordinator appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities and was effective in coordinating OSC activities.
' The OSC Coordinator periodically briefed the OSC staff, although, occasionally, there were long periods between these briefings.
The OSC Coordinator was responsive to controlling the congestion-l and noise levels in the OSC, making several announcements to the . staff to reduce these levels.
l The inspectors routinely observed teams dispatched from the OSC to ) ' perform various plant mitigation tasks. The OSC was effective in j controlling these teams. The teams were adequately briefed on j their purpose prior to leaving the OSC and RP personnel either accompanied the teams or discussed with them the potential radiological conditions and protective measures for the work j areas. During the course of this six hour exercise, a total of ' 42 teams were dispatched from the OSC. The OSC data board, although small in size, was adequately utilized to monitor the status of these tasks. This board was used to describe the task, the department the team members were from, the number of team members, the time that the team left the OSC, and the priority of the tasks in progress.
The inspectors accompanied several teams dispatched from the OSC.
During the accompaniments the inspector observed some scenario and controller problems that were discussed in Paragraph 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Operations facility i The E0F was promptly staffed and activated with qualified personnel.
The licensee's goal was to have the EOF operational within 75 minutes of ERO notification. The Alert declaration was j made at 5:16 a.m. and EOF activation was requested at about _ 5:19 a.m.
The E0F was operational at 6:24 a.m., approximately
' 68 minutes after the request for staffing was made. The E0F was activated at 8:03 a.m.
_ The E0F Director demonstrated good command and control, appeared.
knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities, and assumed the responsibilities in a professional and organized manner. The Emergency Director provided timely and accurate status updates to the EOF staff.
Emergency classifications were timely and correct and good Staff interaction was observed in PAR process. The ' Radiation Assessment Coordinator demonstrated excellent command-and control over staff including interface with the Accident AssessmeF. Manager and the Emergency Director concerning a PAR issue.
The E0F layout and supporting equipment were excellent and utilized accordingly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Accident Assessment (82301) The Accident Assessment area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or . potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.I.
j The accident assessment personnel in the TSC and EOF facilities analyzed plant conditions and developed appropriate strategies for combating equipment failures.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident. During the , exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment; to prevent release of radioactive materials; and to terminate the emergency condition.
Following the exercise, the inspector requested a review of the licensee's core damage assessments performed during the exercise.
Licensee personnel reported that while core damage assessments were being made during the exercise there was no document that showed the ,
results of specific core damage assessments that were made. The
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inspector determined that one of the documents _ utilized to make coreL damage assessments was not included in the licensees emergency procedures or referenced in the licensee's emergency plans or
implementing procedures. The Emergency Planner Manager acknowledged the need to document core damage assessments in accordance with approved and i controlled procedures and committed to the review the need to include i core damage procedures in the emergency preparedness procedures in whole or by reference. The inspector stated that a review of the' licensee's methods for determining and documenting core damage assessments would be reviewed in a future inspection as an IFI.
IFI 50-369, 370/93-21-03: Review the licensee's control, use and documentation associated with core damage assessment procedures.
Onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teanis were dispatched to , determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the simulated plume. The teams effectively demonstrated their capability to collect those data points and relay those data to the emergency response facilities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Protective Responses (82301) The Protective Responses area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal , guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG 0654, Section II.J.
, The inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency I
procedures for formulating PARS for offsite populations within the a 10 mile EPZ.
Following the declaration of a General emergency, the
licensee demonstrated the ability to promptly_ recommend offsite protective actions that were consistent with those in the emergency J pl an. The Emergency Director in the EOF provided timely and accurate PARS to State personnel. The PARS were routinely reevaluated for accuracy and status updates were provided to the offsite authorities.
Protective actions were initiated for ons-ite personnel following the Alert declaration by conducting a personnel accountability of those i ' personnel inside the protected area. The Shift Supervisor in the SCR requested the assembly and accountability of. site personnel with a PA announcement at about 5:30 a.m. followed by the siren for site assembly, in accordance. with licensee procedure RP/0/A/5700/11, " Conducting a Site Assembly / Evacuation," Revision dated February 9,1993. The initial accountability was reported to the Emergency Director at about 6:07 a.m.
with seven identified personnel missing.
The site accountability process exceeded the Emergency Plan objective of 30 minutes by seven minutes.
The inspector determined that the security staff had the primary responsibility for coordinating the site accountability process
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l and was impacted by numerous scenario demands and the in-processing of off-shift emergency response personnel into the protected area during the accountability.
The scenario demands increased the difficulty of the accountability process and licensee representatives reported-that t similar scenario demands and conditions had not been included in previous accountability drills. The inspector also determined that the licensee's process was not very automated. The inspector learned that_ the licensee had plans to automate the accountability process in the- . future but not until 1995.
The inspector stated that a review of the licensee's ability to perform site accountability in a timely manner under similar conditions would be reviewed in a future licensee drill or exercise as an IFI.
. " IFI 50-369, 370/93-21-04: Review licensee actions taken to improve timeliness of the site accountability process during an off-hours drill or exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Radiological Exposure Control j This area was observed to determine that means for controlling , ' radiological exposures during an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that these means included _l exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by i 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section j II.K.The TSC did follow good radiation protection procedures in attempting to maintain the Tsc and the TSC personnel free from radioactive contamination. Access to the TSC was restricted to single point access and a frisking station was set up outside the TSC; however, I the OSC did not implement similar radiological controls. The inspector i noted that shortly after initial activation of the OSC, radiological monitoring equipment, including hand held friskers and air samplers, were brought into the OSC.
However, during the exercise, this equipment i was not used, nor did the inspectors hear any discussions between RP personnel in the OSC on the need to periodically monitor or confirm the i habitability of the OSC. Following the exercise, the inspectors ! discussed this with an P.P Supervisor assigned in the'0SC and who was in i voice communication with the TSC and EOF. This individual also recalled _ no discussions on the need for conducting these assessments. The RP Supervisor indicated that procedures did not exist for consideration of the need to perform these assessments.
The inspector discussed the
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issue with licensee personnel who reported that the radiological controls utilized for the TSC should have been utilized for protecting the OSC and staff.
The inspector stated that a review of the licensee's-i radiological protective actions and controls for the OSC would be reviewed in a future inspection as an IFI.
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IFI 50-369, 370/93-21-05: Review licensee procedures for OSC radiological controls and the use of those controls during a emergency i preparedness drill or exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Exercise Critique (82301) - The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise'was observed to-determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, , Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.N.
l The licensee conducted critiques with exercise players following the exercise termination.
Licensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal critique to management on ' October 21, 1993.
Issues identified by the licensee's staff during the
exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the formal
exercise critique to McGuire Management. The licensee's critique ' addressed both substantive deficiencies and improvement areas.
The conduct of the critique was adequate. The licensee did not review the scenario and expected actions with the players and did.not address performance in the individual exercise objectives during the critiques.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during i subsequent NRC inspections.
i No violations or deviations were hientified.
I . 14.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) - (Closed) IFI 50-369,370/92-25-02: Review the licensee's radiological controls, activities and procedures for emergency response facilities.
) The inspector reviewed the licensee's radiological controls and response to the TSC during the 1993 emergency preparedness exercise and i determined that the licensee had taken appropriate radiological control measures to protect the TSC and staff in the event of a radiological emergency.
However, the inspector noted that the licensee had failed to take similar radiological control measures in the OSC facility. The - inspector stated that this item would be. closed but that a similar IFI j would be opened to review the radiological controls' for the OSC during
the next graded exercise (see Paragraph 12).
(0 pen) Exercise Weakness 50-369,370/92-25-01: Failure to provide clear and accurate Emergency Notification messages transmitted to the State and local agencies.
During the 1993 exercise the inspector determined that the licensee had made improvements in emergency notification message contents. However, the licensee had not completed all corrective actions regarding the estinated duration time for releases (see Paragraph 7).
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Exit Interview l , The inspection scope and results were summarized on October 21, 1993, i with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described , the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results which ! included three potential exercise weaknesses and three IFIs.
Following
a review of the issues and details of the exercise weaknesses it was ' determined that none of the issues constituted exercise weaknesses.
However, two of the issues warranted additional attention in a future
! inspection and two additional IFIs were established. On October 26, 1993, a conference call was made to report the changes in the inspection findings with licensee personnel identified in Paragraph 1.
The
inspector discussed the inspection results listed below.
Propriety ' information was not reviewed during the inspection. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Licensee management was informed - , that an open item (listed in Paragraph 12) was reviewed and considered j closed and another would remain open pending completion of revised corrective actions.
Item Number Descriotion and Reference 50-369, 370/93-21-01 IFI - Review adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions for improving emergency preparedness scenario exercise data and controls < during a future inspection (Paragraph 2).
{ 50-369, 370/93-21-02 IFI-Review licensee procedures for clarification of terms " operational" and l " activated" in relation to emergency response i facility status (Paragraph 9).
. 50-369,370/93-21-03 IFI - Review the licenses control, use, and [ documentation associated with core damage assessment procedures (Paragraph 10).
. ! 50-369, 370/93-21-04 IFI.- Review licensee actions taken to improve timeliness of the site accountability process
during an off-hours drill or exercise ! (Paragry) 11).
, 50-369,370/93-21-05 IFl - Review licensee procedures for OSC radiological controls and the use of those controls during a emergency preparedness drill or exercise (Paragraph 12).. 16.
Index of Abbreviations Used in this Report CFR Code of Federal Regulations EAL Emergency Action level ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Systems EOF Emergency Operations Facility EP Emergency Preparedness . _ .
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i . EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERF Emergency Response Facility , ERG Emergency Response Organization ! GPM Gallons Per Minute . . f - IAE Instrumentation -and Electrical _ Department IFI Inspector Follow-up Item Lj ' NC Reactor Coolant System ND Residual Heat Removal System NI Safety Injection . NOUE Notification of Unusual Event ! NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~ NV Chemical Volume Control System , OSC Operations Support Center l PA Public Address .i RCS Reactor Coolant System ! RHR Residual Heat Removal RP Radiation Protection SAE Site Area Emergency
SCR Simulator Control Room . SI Safety Injection TSC Technical Support Center i Attachments - Exercise Objectives, Scenario ll Abstract and Scenario Timeline ~ i - i
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i McGuire Nuclear' Station I.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES A.
Scope { i The 1993 McGuire Nuclear Station annual exercise is designed to meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, . Appendix E, Section IV.F.
The exercise will be conducted l on October 20, 1993.
This exercise will involve participation of McGuire Nuclear Station emergency response personnel.
The State and Counties will participate by staffing pre-designated - relocation shelters and vehicle monitoring and decontamination stations.
The Emergency Operations , Facility (EOF) will participate.
! The Annual Fire Drill and the Annual Medical drill will i be part of the annual exercise.
A formal critique including Duke Power and the NRC will ! , ' be held at 1430, October 21, 1993 at McGuire Nuclear Station.
This critique will be closed to the public.
B.
Exercise Obiectives (Duke Power Emergency Organization l Emergency Management ' 1.
Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency l classifications in accordance to procedures.
j , 2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the States and Counties within fifteen minutes after declaring an-i emergency or after changing the emergency .j classification.
3.
Demonstrate proper use of the message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to States and Counties.
4.
Demonstrate the ability. to alert, notify, and 'staf f the TSC, OSC, and EOF facilities af ter declaring an Alert or higher emergency class.
5.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Shif t Supervisor (Emergency Coordinator) in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC.
MNS ANNUAL EXERCISE 1993 ' , I i .- , m.
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Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC not later ] than one hour after-declaring one of the emergency i classes.
7.
Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within -30 minutes in a simulated emergency.and provide i accountability for any not present at the assembly locations.
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Test communications equipment among on-site ) emergency facilities including plant extensions and i intercoms.
, 9.
Test off-site communications equipment ~ to-the County and State warning points, County and State ] Emergency Operations Centers and to the NRC ' including the Selective Signal System and the NRC l Emergency Notification System.
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Test the - adequacy and operability of emergency equipment / supplies.
11.
Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment tools, as applicable: 1.
Drawings 2.
Data Displays l 3.
Maps - i ! 12.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Emergency Coordinator. in the TSC to the Emergency Operations Facility , Director.
l Accident Assessment
13.
Demonstrate the ability to transmit data using the ! " Emergency Operations Facility Data Transmittal ! System in accordance with procedures and to- ! distribute this data throughout the EOF.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to provide data to the TSC l and OSC in accordance with station procedures.
. , 15.
Demonstrate the ability - to locate a simulated, ' radioactive plume and to measure the of-site ! radiation levels.
16.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between the off-site monitoring teams and the TSC/ EOF.
! 17.
Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose , MNS ANNUAL EXERCISE 1993
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L . . . ~ i projections in accordance with procedures.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to collect soil, water and ! vegetation samples in accordance with procedures.
) 19.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and i control emergency worker exposure.
_, 20.
Demonstrate the ability to. determine on-site , radiation levels and-airborne radiciodine
' concentrations.
' Protective Action Recommendations 21.
Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and-l appropriate protective action recommendations to ' off-site officials in accordance with station
procedures.
! ! Plant Operations '
22.
Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigation strategies.
Fire Drill l 23.
Demonstrate proper plant personnel response to a . simulated fire emergency and timely . backup ! assistance from the off-site fire support agency.
Medical Drill 24.
Demonstrate proper response to a simulated medical ' emergency involving a contaminated patient in accordance with station procedures.
Other , , 25.
Demonstrate resolution of previous exercise findings (weaknesses, deficiencies) identified by evaluators, QA, or NRC, as applicable.
-l i MNS ANNUAL EXERCISE 1993
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. MNS ANNUAL EXERCISE OCT. 20,1993 0330 SIMULATOR TURNOVER , ' 0335 SIMULATE INJURY TRANSPORT DECLARE NOUE 0500 25 GPM LEAK e 0520 75 GPM LEAK i DECLARE ALERT ACTIVATE OSCITSCIEOF SITE ASSEMBLY 0600 ASSEMBLY COMPLETE 0645 TSC/OSC ACTIVATED / FUNCTIONAL 0645 COtR,4MINATED INJURY 0645 EOF STAFFED & FUNCTIONAL 0715 . BOMB THREAT CALL 0800 FIRE - , 0900 500- 1000 GPM LEAK ON ND Hx 0905 SAFETY INJECTION I LOSS OF SUBCOOLING { SITE AREA EMERGENCY ' 0930 COUtRIES ACTIVATE SIRENS AND EBS 1050 LOSS OF POWER , LOSS OF ECCS 1052 D/G TRIPS ON OVERSPEED 1055 VA FILTER BYPASS FAILS
GENERAL EMERGENCY CORE UNCOVERS 1105 . RETURN OF OFFSITE POWER C O A N C M T C i l i T N D l U E G E N A T T I O N 1430 TERMINATE EXERCISE ALL TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE AND ACTUAL TIMES WILL BE DETERMINED BY PLAYER ACTIONS. FIRE AND MEDICAL PORTIONS MAY VARY DUE TO AVAILABIUTY OF OFFSITE SUPPORT, --n._ ~.. -w-N' WW
. . . , -. ~ , ' CONFIDENTIAL McGuire Nuclear Station ' Annual Exercise
. Event Sequence ! October 20, 1993 . . ! . IldITIAL CONDITIONS UNIT 1
100% Power 144 EFPD . _.
"A" D/G - Replacing #14 Cylinder Liner expected complete 11:00 AM 10/21/93 SM: 589 pcm, Xe: 2774 pcm, SM Eq. Diff 2.90'pcm ' NCS [B): 623 ppm, Pzr.[B): 623 ppm Controlling procedure: OP/1/A/6100/03- " Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation", Enc. 4.1 " Power Increase" complete j NOTE FOR TURNOVER: There-has been an employee injured.
- in the Aux. Bldg. MERT has responded. j and MEDIC is on the scene preparing ' to transport-the contaminated ( employee to Carolinas . Medical Center.
, UNIT 2 100 % Power 320 EFPD, 130 day continuous run D/G 2B in maintenance for PM's on auxiliary pumps
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.. . . CONFIDENTIAL McGuire Nuclear Station Annual Exercise Event Sequence October 20, 1993 ' . WEATHER FORECAST Tuesday 10/19/93 .i Fair tonight with a slight chance of showers. Clouds will be " increasing on Wednesday with a chance of afternoon thunderstorms.
Low temperature tonight will be 63 deg. with a high on Wednesday of 82 degrees. Winds from the South at 3-5 mph.
Wednesday 10/20/93 ~ ' Clouds increasing throughout the day with a chance of afternoon thunderstorms. Temperatures will remain moderate throughout the day with a high of 82 and a low Wednesday night of 62.
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-; i CONFIDENTIAL McGuire Nuclear Station
Annual Exercise-4l Event Sequence l October 20, 1993 . SCENARIO ' .i 0330 Simulator turnover with normal full power-
operations.
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. 0335 Simulate an ambulance tram porting, a contaminated medical injury offsite for further care.
PREDICTED RESPONSE Declare Notification of Unusual Event Nake notifications to State and Counties and NRC TbeNCSystem'developsa25gpmleak.
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PREDICTED RESPONSE Enter AP/1/A/5500/10 Case 2, "NC System Leakage ' Within Capability of Both NV Pumps".
1kerform Enclosure 1 of AP/1/A/5500/10
- Enter OP/1/A/6150/04 " Monitor and Control of PRT" ' !
3:lassify, Notification of Unusual Event
~ . i Enter OP/1/A/6300/01 " Turbine Generator Operation" Jtnter OP/1/A/6100/03 ' Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation" ! 0510 Talve 1NI-173 will not close (mechanically bound)
.; .- 1MREDICTED RESPONSE , dispatch NLO to close lEMXA R2A, (MCC breaker for.
1NI-173).
t Dispatch NLO to close lEMXB l-6B (MCC breaker for
1NI-178) Dispatch NLO to manually close NI-173. (Will not be opened during exercise).
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. CONFIDENTIAL McGuire Nuclear Station Annual Exercise E"ent Sequence ! , October 20, 1993 ' Dispatch Mechanical, Instrument And Electrical, and Radiation Protection to assist in closing INI-173.
' 0520 Leak size increases to 75 gpm.
PREDICTED RESPONSE Classify, ALERT , Activate TSC/OSC/ EOF Conduct Site Assembly Enter OP/1/A/6100/02 " Controlling Procedure for . Unit Shutdown" 0530 Control Room receives notification that the employee sent to Carolinas Medical Center was not contaminated and that events are secured at the hospital.
0645 Contaminated med al injury takes place in Waste Shipping ( 2 patients, I will go to Carolinas Medical Center as contaminated, the other will be a , non-life threatening injury and will be , . decontaminated prior to leaving the site for ' further medical care ). PREDICT"D RESPONSE Request off-site medical easistance . 0715 PBX Operator receives a cal, stating that there is ' 3 bomb on one of the main transformers on Unit 1.
i UREDICTED RESPONSE Aequest off-site assistance from Mecklenburg County i Sheriffs Department in determing if the bomb is real.
" Dispatch station fire brigade to standby in case of j fire.
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1 CONFIDENTIAL McGuire Nuclear Station . Annual Exercise ] Event Sequence October 20, 1993 . 0800 Fire at the Chemical Mix House.
The~ fire will be a tractor pulling buggies full of trash.
The fire will be called in however. as being at the Mix ' House.
- 0900 Seals fail on the ND Heat Exchanger to allow a 500-1000 gpm leak to the Auxiliary Building Floor.
l PREDICTED RESPONSE-l Enter EP/1/A/5000/01, " Safety Injection".
Enter OP/1/A/6200/14 " Refueling Water System" i Enter EP/1/A/5000/08, " Loss of Coolant Accident i Outside Containment".
i 0901 lEMF36 is indicating off scale due to leak to floor 0905 Loss of Subcooling PREDICTED RESPONSE Declare Site Area Emergency Enter EP/1/A/5000/06 " Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation".
l ! Enter EP/1/A/5000/14.1 " Response to-Imminent i Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions".
Evacuate Site non-essential personnel ] 0915 Valve IND-29 fails intermittent PREDICTED RESPONSE Dispatch a NLO, Mechanical, and Instrument and Electrical to manually open , 1050 Loss of offsite and onsite power due to direct l lightening strike in Switchyard. Loss of ECCS.
.! ! PREDICTED RESPONSE i
Enter EP/1/A/5000/09 " Loss of All AC Power" l !
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! . . "FIDENTIAL McGuire Nuclear Station .,. Annual Exercise Event Sequence October 20, 1993 1052 "B" D/G trips on overspeed PREDICTED RESPONSE ! Dispatch a NLO to investigate (while investigating the NLO will also find the 1A D/G Day Tank level t instrument leaking fuel oil on the floor.
Approximately 5 gallon has leaked out).
Enter EP/1/A/5000/9.2 " Loss of All AC Power with SI . Required" t 1055 Bypass on VA Filters fails open i 1100 Declare General Emergency based on Loss of
Recirculation when needed. Core uncovers.
PREDICTED RESPONSE l Recommend sheltering of persons within the 5 mile - radius of the station and monitor EBS for persons within a 10 mile radius of the station.
1105 Return of offsite power
1300 Unit 2 "A" Feedwater Pump " Low Oil Level" alarm due to a leaking flange.
(If an NLO is dispatched and- ! arrives within 15 minutes, he/she will be allowed to tighten the flange with no impact on Unit 2. If greater than 15 minutes there will be a successful runback on Unit 2 with messages indicating 100 gallons of oil had leaked onto the floor).
NOTE: During the Site Area Emergency, the State and Counties will be setting up relocation shelters, vehicle'. decon and monitoring stations _and personnel monitoring and decon.
There will be simulation of school.
evacuations. The sirens will sound at Site I Area Emergency and be simuleted at General Emergency.
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