IR 05000369/1987024
| ML20237H139 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1987 |
| From: | Conlon T, Hunt M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237H118 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-87-24, 50-370-87-24, NUDOCS 8709030132 | |
| Download: ML20237H139 (9) | |
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[p.n mio og UNITED STATES
'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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n REGION ll
j-101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
.T AT LANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-369/87-24 and 50-370/87-24 Licensee:. Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17-Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: July 21-24, 1987 Inspector:
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t Date'Si ned
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Approved y.
6/f6 87 T.
onlon, Chief Date' Signed
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gi ering Branch iv ion of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was-in the areas of licensee actions regarding violations, deviations, inspector followup items, licensee identified items (10 CFR 50.55(e)) and 10 CFR Part 21 items.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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8709030132 870828'
PDR ADOCK 05000369
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REPORT DETAILS (
1.
Persons Contacted I
Licensee Employees
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- T. L. McConnell, Station Manager
- P. B. Nardoci, Licensing Engineering
- R. W. Pierce, Compliance
- N. C. Atherton, Compliance
- J. A. Oldham, Design Engineering
- R. A. Dickard, Design Engineering
- D. B. Mayes, Nuclear Production Engineering
- S. E. LeRoy, Licensing R. Smith, Design Engineering R. Branch, Quality Assurance H. D. Brandes, Design Engineering NRC Resident Inspector
- S. Guenther
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 24, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting coments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
the inspector during this inspection.
I 3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (0 pen) Deviation. 369/83-12-01, 370/83-16-01, Substandard Automatic Sprinkler Systems for Reactor Buildings Annulus Areas, DPC submitted a j
response to this deviation in a letter to RII, dated April 14, 1983.
The a
letter justified the use of a different type of sprinkler system control
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valves in order to meet seismic requirements. The control valves incorpo-i rated in the system have a visual position indicator as well as limit i
switches which are wired to operate indicating lights and alarms for l
remote indication of the valve position.
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The licensee's letter committed to make changes to provice complete supervision (of both electrical circuits and sprinkler piping integrity)
as described below:
Automatic supervision circuits will be added to the local control panels in order to supervise the power cables from the station 125VDC batteries to the local control panels.
Two circuits will also be added to auto-matically supervise the valve actuation cables and the electrical solenoid location at the valves themselves.
The link from the fire detection data gathering panel to the valve local control panels will be modified with extra circuitry in order to provide automatic supervision capability.
Supervision alarms will be fed to the fire protection alarm panel in the control complex.
The sprinkler system piping will be supervised by installing a ;.ressure switch downstream of the closed control valve.
The control valve will be opened to pressurize the system and then closed. The pressure switch will be set to alarm at loss of pressure.
The letter stated that these modifications would be completed by the end of the first major outage after March 1,1984 on Unit 1 and prior to commercial operation on Unit 2.
A review of engineering documents and inspection of accessible equipment revealed that the alarms were displayed at a common data collection panel located in the cable spreading room. The valve position indicating lights were located on E1.733 on a valve test panel in each unit.
Engineering design summaries for Nuclear Station Modifications ID Nos.
MG-1-H352 and MG-895 which covered the addition of supervisory circuits to monitor the integrity of cables and upgrading of the control valves to a pre-action system in conjunction with smoke detectors located in the annulus areas were reviewed by the inspector.
However, review of electrical drawings MCEE-133-00.28, Rev. A and MCEE-118-68 Rev. 18, end Mechanical Drawing MC-1599-2.2, Rev. 6 indicated that the pressure switch for monitoring the sprinkler piping pressure had not yet been incorporated into these drawings, therefore, installation of the switch had not been accomplished.
In view of the commitment made in the DPC April 14, 1983 letter, it appears that the installation of the sprinkler piping monitoring pressure switch has not been accomplished in a timely manner for either unit.
The licensee recognized this fact during a commitment review and issued a station problem report (MGPR-0831) August 25, 1986, but no documents were at the site or readily available that would indicate design work had progressed further.
This item remains open until the committed plant modification for installation of sprinkler piping monitoring pressure switches has been satisfactorily implemented.
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(Closed) Violation 369/85-41-02, Failure to Follow Procedure Resulting in Inadvertent ESF Actuation. This violation was the result of a failure of personnel to properly identify and verify the component being actuated and
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to properly follow procedure steps.
The licensee's letter, dated March 7,
1986, agreed with the violations and stated that all appropriate tech-nicians were retrained on January 14, 1986. To avoid the possibility of testing activities being attempted in the wrong safeguards test ccbinet, procedures PT/1/A/4200/28 and PT/2/A/4200/28 now permit only one safe-guards test cabinet key to be checked out at any time dur'.c.g Slave Relay Tests.
The retraining of personnel and the revision of the listed procedures appear adequate to prevent reoccurrence of this event. This violation is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items l
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Inspection Followup Items (IFI)
(Closed) IFI 370/83-16-02, Pre-operational Test Required to be Conducted Prior to Fuel Load for the Halon Extinguishing Fire Detection and Actuation Systems.
The inspector reviewed reoperation test TP/2/A/1400/05c, Halon System Test for Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room which was conducted during the period between January 19, 1983 and February 14, 1983.
The test method was to substitute freon for the halon.
The test verified that no nozzles were blocked, gas concentration was adequate and the proper alarms were actuated.
The results of this test were reviewed and accepted February 17, 1983.
This item is closed.
(Closed) IFI 369/85-41-01, Environmental Equipment Qualification / Solenoid Value Sealin The licensee determined that the solenoid valves (2 for each train) g.for the Train A and B Hydrogen Analyzers apparently did not
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have adequate sealing materials installed between the wires during initial installation during construction. The discovery was made after the Train A
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Analyzer did not operate properly during Surveillance Testing.
This model of solenoid valve is furnished with ten wires, eight connected to limited switches and two to the coil. All wires exit through the same cover opening.
The sealing material used was placed around the bundle of ten wires and not around each conductor.
The failure was due to water leaking directly into the improperly sealed wire bundle.
As a result of the Train A failure, the Train B solenoid valves were examined and the same condition was found.
Corrective action was taken and the wires were properly sealed.
The Unit 2 Hydrogen Analyzer solenoid valves were found properly seale _
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The licensee's letter committed to' make changes to provide complete supervision (of both electrical circuits and sprinkler piping integrity)
as described below:
Automatic supervision circuits will be added to the local control panels
-in order to supervise the power cables from the station 125VDC batteries to the local control p:ncls.. Two circuits will also be added to auto-matica11y. supervise the valve actuation cables and the electrical solenoid location at the valves themselves.
The. link from the fire detection data gathering panel to the valve local control panels will be modified with extra circuitry in order to provide automatic supervision capability.
Supervision alarms will be fed to the fire protection alarm panel in the control complex.
The sprinkler system piping will be supervised by installing a pressure switch downstream of the closed control valve.
The control valve will be opened to pressurize. the system and then closed. The pressure switch will be set to alarm at loss of pressure.
The letter stated that these. modifications would be completed by the end
- of the first major outage ' after March 1,1984 on Unit 1 and prior to commercial operation on Unit 2.
A review of engineering documents and inspection of accessible equipment revealed that the alarms were displayed at a common data collection panel located in the cable spreading room.
The valve position indicating lights were. located on E1.733 on a valve test panel in each unit.
Engineering design summaries for Nuclear Station Modifications ID Nos.
MG-1-H352 and MG-895 which covered the addition of supervisory circuits to monitor the integrity of cables and upgrading of the control valves to a pre-action. system in conjunction with smoke detectors located in the annulus areas were reviewed by the inspector.
However, review of electrical
= drawings MCEE-133-00.28, Rev. A and MCEE-118-68 Rev. 18, and Mechanical Drawing MC-1599-2.2, Rev. 6 indicated that the pressure switch for monitoring the sprinkler piping pressure had not yet been incorporated into these drawings, therefore, installation of the switch had not been accomplished.
In view of the commitment made in the DPC April 14, 1983 letter, it appears that the installation of the sprinkler piping monitoring pressure switch.has not been accomplished in a timely manner for either unit.
The licensee recognized this fact during a commitment review and issued a station problem report (MGPR-0831) August 25, 1986, but no documents were at the site or readily available that would indicate design work had progressed further.
l This item remains open until the committed plant modification for
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installation of sprinkler piping monitoring pressure switches has been
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satisfactorily implemented.
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(Closed) Violation 369/85-41-02, Failure to Follow Procedure Resulting in Inadvertent ESF Actuation.. This violation was the result of a failure of.
personnel to properly identify and verify the component being actuated and to-properly follow procedure steps.
The licensee's letter, dated March 7, 1986, agreed with the violations and stated that all appropriate tech-nicians were retrained on January 14, 1986. To avoid the possibility of testing activities being attempted in the wrong safeguards test cabinet,
' procedures PT/1/A/4200/28 and PT/2/A/4200/28 now permit only-one safe-guards test cabinet key to be checked out at any-time during Slave Relay Tests.
The retraining of personnel and the revision of the listed. procedures appear adequate to prevent reoccurrence of this event. This violation is closed.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Inspection Followup Items (IFI)
(Closed) IFI 370/83-16-02, Pre-operational Test Required to be Conducted Prior to Fuel Load for the Halon Extinguishing Fire Detection and Actuation i
Systems.
The inspector reviewed reoperation test TP/2/A/1400/05c, Halon System-Test for Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room which was conducted during the period - between January 19,1983 and February 14, 1983.
The test method was to substitute freon for the halon. The test verified that no nozzles were blocked, gas concentration was adequate and the proper alarms were actuated. The results of this test were reviewed and accepted February 17, 1983.
This item is closed.
(Closed) IFI 369/85-41-01, Environmental Equipment Qualification / Solenoid Value Sealin The licensee determined that the solenoid valves (2 for each train) g.for the Train A and B Hydrogen Analyzers apparently did not have adequate sealing materials installed between the wires during initial installation during construction. The discovery was made after the Train A Analyzer did not operate properly during Surveillance Testing.
This model of solenoid valve is furnished with ten wires, eight connected to limited switches and two to the coil. All wires exit through the same cover opening.
The sealing material used was placed around the bundle of ten wires and not around each conductor.
The failure was due to water
~1eaking directly into the improperly sealed wire bundle.
As a result of the Train A failure, the Train B solenoid valves were examined and the same condition was found.
Corrective action was taken and the wires were properly sealed.
The Unit 2 Hydrogen Ana'lyzer solenoid valves were found properly sealed.
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The station has now. removed the eight limit switch conductors and resealed
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.the two: coil wires for the Unit I containment atmosphere hydrogen sampling / analyzer system.
The installation of other solenoid valves of this model have been inspected and corrected.
The inspector' examined record copies of Work Requests (WR) for inspection and replacement of coil wires and top hats to insure adequate moisture seals.
Listed below are the WRs and the valves covered:
Work Request Valves Date Number Involved Completed 65823 IMNSSV 5550 5551 8/15/86 65525 2MMISV 6870, 6880, 5581, 5583 6/3/86 65528 2MMISV 6910, 6920 6/3/86 56824 2MNSSV 5550, 5551 4/22/86 42242 1MMISV 6850, 6856, 6880, 6870 3/8/86 65820 1MMISV 5581, 5583 8/18/86 The actions taken appear adequate and.the records document the proper corrective actions. This item is closed.
6.
Licensee Identified Items (LII) 10CFR 50.55(e) (Closed) LII 80-06-06, l
ITE-Gould Overcurrent Relay SCR Failure.
The station submitted a station problem report which advises that sporadic tripping is occurring on some Gould-ITE relays that controlled. rectifier (SCR) problem was traced to a deteriorating silicon have an SCR' output.
The-which caused incorrect tripping.
Work requests were issued to the Transmission Department to perform tests on Unit 2 main protection relaying for Unit 2 electrical boards EPB, EPC,
EPM and ERD.
All relays were found to be within the tripping limits.
j This item is closed.
7.
10 CFR Part 21 (Closed) P 2184-02, Cracks in ASME Class 2, SA 194 2H, 1 Inch Hex Nuts.
The licensee reported this item to RII on December 26, 1984.
Visual indications on 2H grade nuts used in safety-related piping were identified by QA during inspection of valve INC3 in the ISI program.
An NCR (No.
626) was written against the nuts used on valve INC3 and the remaining nuts in stock from that heat lot.
A metallurgical examination report dated November 2,1984 showed that the indications were circumferential and axial cracks appearing to be quench cracks related to the manufac-turing process.
The supplier identified 803 nuts shipped to this site with the identified heat number.
Plant installation records indicated that 394 of this lot of nuts had been installed in safety-related equip-ment.
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Due to the number used, the licensee tested additional nuts from this lot.
The nuts were tested and found to meet the cone test (preload) in accor-l dance with ASTM A-370-77, SI4.1 for a tension loads of 90,900 lbs. per
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table 3 of ASTM A-194-82 a.
In order to avoid a future possible materials control problem, the licensee disposed of the remaining material from that lot that was in stock.
As a result of this problem, the licensee has rewritten maintenance procedures involving 2H grade nuts used on pressure boundaries to now require QA inspection of the 2H grade nuts for indications that may be questionable.
A sign off of this inspection is now part of the maintenance procedures. Questionable indications are tested further.
The nuts in stock for ASME code application are ncw inspected visually.
If a questionable indication is found the nut is cleaned and reinspected.
The nuts are coated with cutting oil at the time of receipt inspection.
When used, the nuts are cleaned and QA inspected per the maintenance procedure.
The purchase specifications for 2H grade nuts have been rewritten and require compliance to the Industrial Fastener Institute Standard Nos. 105 and 106.
The actions take by DPC appear adequate to insure that only qualified 2H grade nuts will be installed in future maintenance activities. This item is closed.
(Closed) P 2185-01, Name Plates Falling Off Control Transformers in Low Voltage Motor Control Centers. The licensee has either removed and discarded the manufacturers name plates that were attached to the control power transformers for the safety-related motor control centers or relocated those involved in this Part 21 report. These are identified for both units as follows:
EPE-MX-EMXB EPE-MX-EMXC EPE-MX-EMXD EPE-MX-EMXE EPE-MX-EMXF EPE-MX-EMXG EPE-MX-EtiXH The Work Requests Nos. 65492 and 65493 are completed and on file.
This itan is closed.
(Closed) P2185-02, Defective Analog Level Detector. The Acoustical Valve Flow Monitor manufacturer, Technology Energy Corporation, reported to the NRC on July 19, 1985, that some of the flow monitor modules failed to reset after indicating full flow through the PORV valve which the system monitors.
Flow through the valve caused the monitor to " latch up" and not return to zero volts when the valve is closed.
Corrective action was to l
bench test the units and if the " latch up" condition occurred, replace the defective component.
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G DPC tested the units that were in service and a unit in stock and found that all modules passed the manufacturers recommended test. This item is closed.
(Closed) P2185-03, Faulty AK and AKR Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers by GE.
The licensee advised that this Part 21 report was not applicable to McGuire station.
(Closed) P2185-04, K-Line Circuit Breakers.
The inspector was advised that DPC had only the K2000 and K1600 breakers installed at the McGuire s tation.
The K-225, K-600 and K-800 cir.cuit breakers are not used in safety-related circuits.
The licensee performed an inspection and found no condition in which the dust shield came in contact with the control wires on the 8 pole auxiliary switch. All breaker inspection and preven-tive maintenance is performed by personnel assigned that duty and
_ performed throughout the f1PC system.
The observation of conditions similar to that described in this Part 21 is included in the breaker maintenance / inspection activities.
There is a total of eight K-2000 and
K1600 breakers installed in the four safety-related load centers 2ELXA 2ELXB, 2ELXC and 2ELXD.
This item is closed.
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