| Site | Start date | Title | Description |
---|
ENS 57146 | South Texas | 26 May 2024 12:20:00 | Two of Three Essential Chilled Water Trains Declared Inoperable | The following information was provided by the licensee by phone and email:
At 0210 CDT 5/24/24, essential chiller A train and cascading equipment was declared inoperable for maintenance to correct a temperature control malfunction.
At 0720 CDT 5/26/24, essential cooling water B train and cascading equipment (including B train essential chiller) was declared inoperable due to a through wall leak discovered on the essential cooling water return header temperature element thermal well.
This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on two out of three safety trains for the accident mitigating function, including the train A and train B high head safety injection, low head safety injection, containment spray, electrical auxiliary building heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), and essential chilled water. All C train safety related equipment remains operable.
This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
- * * RETRACTION ON 6/13/24 AT 1552 EDT FROM RAY RULEY TO BILL NYTKO * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee by phone and email:
This is a communication to retract the 8-hour notification Event Notification (EN) 57146 reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) on 05/26/2024. Based on a subsequent engineering review of the conditions that existed at the time of discovery, it was determined that:
1) The maximum postulated leak rate, conservatively estimated, from the B Train essential cooling water return piping thermowell in the mechanical auxiliary building sump room would have been less than the administrative allowable limit for leakage in this room during a design basis accident,
2) No adjacent safety related components or functions would have been adversely affected, and
3) the return line leakage represented a negligible impact regarding essential cooling water system inventory and the system ability to cool required components.
Therefore, it was recommended that the B Train essential cooling water system with the as-found leakage condition be considered operable. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R4DO (Taylor) |
ENS 57019 | South Texas | 10 March 2024 08:53:00 | Essential Chilled Water Trains Declared Inoperable | The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
On 3/9/2024 at 2126 CST, train C essential cooling water was declared inoperable due to a through-wall leak on the discharge vent line. This would also cascade and cause train C essential chilled water to be inoperable.
On 3/10/2024 at 0353 CDT, train B essential chilled water was declared inoperable due to chilled water outlet temperature greater than 52 degrees F following startup of essential chiller 12B. Chilled water outlet temperature was adjusted to less than 52 degrees F at 0440 CDT, and train B essential chilled water was declared operable.
This condition resulted in the inoperability of two of the three safety trains required for the accident mitigating functions including: high head safety injection, low head safety injection, containment spray, electrical auxiliary building HVAC, control room envelope HVAC, and essential chilled water.
This is an 8 hour reportable condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because it could affect the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
IR 05000220/2023004 | Nine Mile Point | 1 February 2024 | Integrated Inspection Report 05000220/2023004 and 05000410/2023004 | |
IR 05000354/2023004 | Hope Creek | 1 February 2024 | Integrated Inspection Report 05000354/2023004 | |
IR 05000382/2023010 | Waterford | 31 January 2024 | Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000382/2023010 | |
ML23319A245 | Watts Bar Sequoyah | 29 January 2024 | Issuance of Amendment Nos. 366 and 360; 164 and 71 Regarding the Adoption of TSTF-567, Revision 1, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues | |
2CAN012403, Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 | Arkansas Nuclear | 11 January 2024 | Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 | |
ML24012A049 | Calvert Cliffs | 11 January 2024 | Request for Additional Information Regarding Final Response to Generic Letter 2004-02 | |
AEP-NRC-2024-01, Emergency Plan Revision 48 | Cook | 8 January 2024 | Emergency Plan Revision 48 | |
ML23319A387 | Comanche Peak | 20 December 2023 | Issuance of Amendment Nos. 185 and 185 Regarding Implementation of Full Spectrum Loss-of-Coolant Accident (Fsloca) Methodology | |