IR 05000369/1999006
| ML20217C477 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217C453 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-99-06, 50-370-99-06, NUDOCS 9910130268 | |
| Download: ML20217C477 (23) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 Docket Nos: 50-369,50-370 License Nos: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report No: 50-369/99-06,50-370/99-06 Licensee: Duke Energy Corporation Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: August 1,1999 - September 11,1999
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Inspectors: S. Shaeffer, Senior Resident inspector M. Franovich, Resident inspector R. Hagar, Resident inspector - Harris Nuclear Plant (Sections 04.1, M4.1) D. Starkey, Resident inspector - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant J. Kreh, Senior Radiation Specialist (Exercise Team Leader) (Section P4) M. Miller, Senior Reactor Engineer (Section P4) G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness Specialist (Section P4) Approved by: C. Ogle, Chief, Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure 9910130268 991004 PDR ADOCK 05000369 G PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-369/99-06,50-370/99-06 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covered a six-week period of resident inspections and also included regional inspections in the area of emergency preparedness and securit Operations
. Operators and maintenance technicians' initial response to problems with the Unit 1 rod control system was adequate to assess the probicm and assure the unit was maintained in a safe configuration. Management's attention to the problem was appropriat (Section O2.1) . The licensee appropriately followed established regulatory processes to address a required Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement associated with the rod control system that could have impacted operation of Unit 1. (Section O2.1) . Following a reported fire in the *E" instrument-air compressor motor, the response of the control room and maintenance staff was appropriate, thorough, and timely. (Section 04.1)
Maintenance
. T he licensee's consideration of recent instrument air system failures under the Maintenance Rule program has been appropriate. (Section M4.1)
Enaineerina t . A non-cited violation was identified for failure to perform an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for use of fuel assemblies with coarse or fine mesh plates. The original evaluation approving the new fuel assemblies did not address clogging of the fuel assemblies with debris following a postulated loss of coolant accident. (Section E8.1) Plant Sucoort
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The licensee's overall performance in responding to the simulated emergency during the biennial exercise on August 24,1999, was satisfactory, and the exercise was judged to be a successful demonstration of the licensee's emergency response capabilitie (Section P4.2)
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An exercise weakness was identified for the misclassification of the (nitiating event as a Notification of Unusual Event instead of an Alert during the biennial exercise on August 24,1999. (Section P4.2)
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The tumover from the Technical Support Center to the Emergency Operations Facility was rushed and was not conducted in a manner consistent with the licensee's
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2 l f I I procedures during the biennial exercise on August 24,1999. (Section P4.2) I
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The licensee's initist briefing of the NRC team in the Emergency Operations Facility was I incomplete during the biennial exercise on August 24,1999. (Section P4.2) l l
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, Report Details ! Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent of licensed thermal power throughout the inspection perio Unit 2 Unit 2 , <" 'ed at approximately 100 percent of licensed thermal power throughout the inspection perio l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707) The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Other specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections which follo , O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Operability of Unit 1 Control Rod Drive Circuits Lrgoection Scope (71707. 37551) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to problems with the Unit 1 control rod drive circuitry that were identified during surveillance testing. After reviewing the i problems associated with the control rod drive circuitry, the inspectors assessed the l
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problems for impact on plant safety and Technical Specification (TS) applicability. The inspectors also evaluated the licensee's analysis for continued operatio Observations and Findinas Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (TSSR) 3.1.4.2 requires that the licensee verify rod freedom of movement by moving each rod not fully inserted in the core greater than or equal to 10 steps in either direction. This surveillance is performed every 92 days. The performance of this surveillance is intended to provide assurance that the rods are trippable (not mechanically bound). During the performance of the surveillance testing on August 21,1999, the Unit 1 rod control system experienced an electrical control system failure which prevented movement of some of the control rods and completion of the scheduled surveillance. The affected rods were in Group 1, Shutdown Bank A and were powered from power cabinet 1 AC. Control Banks A and C were also powered by powered by cabinet 1 AC. Upon identification of the problem, through plant annunciation (rod control urgent failure alarm), operators secured the
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testing in progress and verified that no unexpected rod movement had occurred. The operators then entered Abnormal Procedure (AP) AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, Revision 4, and took the required steps to verify the unit was stable and began diagnosing of the problem. No TS limits were exceeded due to the control rod system malfunction and the rod control urgent failure alarm was reset shortly after identification of the problem. Subsequent licensee testing concluded that the rod control problem was repeatable. In addition, the licensee performed analysis to confirm that not being able to move certain rods in manual or automatic was bounded by previously established accident analysis. Formalized Operations Special Orders weru established to provide operator specific guidance on what actions should be taken for certain operational transients which require rod movemen Based on subsequent investigation, the licensee concluded that the affected rods were operable, due to an engineering determination that the rods remained trippable. This conclusion was based on diagnostic information indicating that the apparent failure was electrical in nature consistent with the logic described by the bases for TS 3.1. However, the licensee also considered that further attempts to complete the required TSSR could result in a potential risk to the operation of the unit. This determination led the licensee to develop and submit a proposed TS amendment regarding TS 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits. The proposed amendment was submitted on August 27,1999, and requested a one-time exigent license amendment to allow continued operation of Unit 1 until the upcoming Unit 1 End of Cycle 13 refueling outage scheduled to begin on September 17,1999. The next performance of the required TSSR 3.1.4.2 with the extension allowed by TS 3.0.2 would have been due September 12,1999. The NRC staff reviewed the proposed amendment and approval for the amendment was granted on September 8,199 Conclusions Operators and maintenance technicians' initial response to problems with the Unit 1 rod control system was adequate to assess the problem and assure the unit was maintained in a safe configuration. Management's attention to the problem was appropriate. The licensee appropriately followed established regulatory processes to address a required TSSR associated with the rod control system that could have impacted operation of Unit Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Control Room Response to an Eauipment Fire Inspection Scope (71707) The inspectors observed the control room staff's response to a fire in an instrument air compressor motor on August 31,199 i
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! Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that in response to the fire in the "E" instrument air compressor motor, the control room staff promptly dispatched the fire brigade, monitored key plant parameters to determine whether the fire had affected any plant system, entered the appropriate procedure for responding to a fire, and promptly reviewed related reportability requirements. The inspectors noted that: l
. a maintenance technician extinguished the fire approximately 4 minutes after it began, before the fire brigade fully assembled at the scene, . the fire affected only the "E" instrument air compressor motor, and . the licensee appropriately determined that the fire was not reportable to offsite agencie The inspectors observed that the control room operators were not distracted by the fire, and maintained an appropriate focus on plant safety. Maintenance Rule applicability of this and other instrument air system failures is discussed in Section M Conclusions Following the repotting of a fire in the "E" instrument air compressor motor, the response of the control room and maintenance staff was appropriate, thorough, and timel Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901,90712,40500)
O8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-370/99-003. Revisions 0 and 1: Inadvertent l Actuation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump l The inspectors reviewed LER 50-370/99-003, Problem investigation Process report 1
' (PIP) 2-M99-2905, and associated corrective actions for the event involving the inadvertent start of the Unit 2 TDAFW. As documented in inspection Report (IR) 50-369,370/94-04, on June 16,1999, the TDAFW pump inadvertently started while maintenance was being performed at the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF). The inadvertent starting of the pump was caused by the de-energizing of a non-safety related instrument that provided an SSF control function of the TDAFW. The licensee identified several root causes which contributed to the event. The root causes included inadequate station policy or directives, internal communication problems, and an inadequate work plan to complete the SSF maintenance. The licensee's root cause evaluation identified that the SSF maintenance activities should have been performed with a technical procedure in lieu of a work plan using general removal and restoration practices and procedures. Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 703, Appendix 1, Procedure Requirement Questionnaire, provides an aid in determining if a technical procedure should be written for plant activities. Specifically, one question asks if the activity could adversely affect reactivity. The event did result in a minor positive reactivity addition. Corrective actions included discussions with the involved personnel regarding work practice expectations l
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for complex maintenance activities. A licensee followup review of a station maintenance directive and lower level directives was planned to ensure an adequate determination is performed to identify when use of technical procedures is required to coordinate plant evolutions involving risk significant activities. The inspectors concluded that the implemented corrective actions were adequate, the proposed long-term corrective actions were appropriate, the root cause evaluation was thorough, and that the violation of TS 5.4.1 for failure to follow the procedural requirements of NSD-703 constituted a minor violation. This non compliance of a TS constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action. This violation was in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP 2-M99-2905. This LER is close II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Inspection Scope (61726. 62707) The inspectors reviewed a variety of maintenance and/or surveillance activities during the inspection period, focusing on testing and maintenance activities that included the following specific items:
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PT/0/A/4150/002A, Revision 58, Core Power Distribution and Incore/NIS Correlation Check
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PT/0/A/4200/002, Revision 20, SSF Operability Test
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PT/0/B/4700/065, Revicion 7, Monthly Fuel Oil Reprt Observations and Findinos The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance tests to verify that approved procedures were available and in use; test equipment was calibrated; test prerequisites were met; system restoration was completed; and acceptance criteria were met. In addition, the inspectors reviewed or witnessed routine maintenance activities to verify, where applicable, that approved procedures were available and in use, prerequisites were met, equipment restoration was completed, and maintenance results were adequate. The maintenance and surveillance activities were properly approved by operations personnel and were included on the plan of the day. Work associated with risk significant structure, systems, or components was properly evaluated to determine its impact on the plant's risk profile. Appropriate TS action statements and selected licensee commitments were implemented. Applicable TSSR and/or the Core Operating Limits Report limits were l also satisfie Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the reviewed routine maintenance and surveillance activities were adequately completed.
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, : 5 M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance . M4.1 Maintenance Rule Disposnion of Instrumcnt Air System Failures Inspection Scope (62707) . .The inspectors reviewed the recent failures of components in the instrument air system i
to determined whether the failures had beeri properly considered by the licensee's L Maintenance Rule program.
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The inspectors observed that:
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the licensee has determined that six functions of the instrument air system place it within the scope of the Maintenance Rule;
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components within the instrument air system experienced 21 documented i failures between January,1,1998, and September 3,1999; and
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the licensee determined that only ona of the reviewed failures was a Maintenance-Preventable Functional Failure (MPFF).
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l- The inspectors noted that the relatively low number of MPFFs was due in part to the design of the instrument air system. Specifically, the system includes eight air compressors, therefore, the failure of a single compressor does not impact the system enough to cause a loss of system functio Conclusions l L The licensee's consideration of recent instrument air system failures under the Maintenance Rule program has been appropriat . Enaineerina l l E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903) l E8.1 ~ (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-369.370/99-01-01: Post-Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Clogging of Mark BW Fuel Assemblies With Coarse or Fine Mesh Plates Inspection Report 50-369,370/99-01 documented the inspectors' conceme tvith the potential for containment debris passing through the containment sump screens and clogging the fuel assembly nozzles following a LOCA. The licensee developed an analysis and revised the subject 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation (Calculation DPC-1553.26-00-093/MCC-1553.26-00-170) approving use of the new fuel design with coarse or fine mesh plate .
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Supported by a recent vendor analysis, the licensee's assessment focused on both the likelihood and the consequences of core blockage. The first aspect focused on the l likelihood of debris particles, smaller than the containment sump screens, migrating through the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)into the lower plenum of the reactor vessel. The analyses indicated that flow velocities in the suction of the containment sump were slow due to geometry of the containment recirculation sump and the location of the sump being outside the polar crane wall and inside the pip' :hase. Other considerations included buoyancy effects of small debris such as paint chips and insulation which reduced their transportability to the sump. Also, ECCS injection velocities during recirculation mode were slow such that particles entering the reactor coolant system would likely settle to the bottom of the reactor vessellower plenum and not be swept onto the fine mesh plates. The second aspect of the analyses focused on the consequences of core blockage assuming 100 percent clogging of all 193 fuel assemblies. This bounding approach indicated that sufficient bypass flow existed between the core and core baffle plates to cool the fuel. The inspectors also reviewed sump screen sizing information due to a discrepancy in sizing between Catawba and McGuire documented in IR 50-369,370/99-01. No information was available to explain the different sized screen used at McGuire; however, the licensee indicated that long-term core cooling, the ECCS and containment spray pumps, and the containment spray nozzles would perform their safety function The inspectors concluded that the effects of introducing a coarse or fine mesh plate to the bottom nozzle of fuel assemblies did not result in an unreviewed safety question as defined per 10 CFR 50.59 due to specific design features of the McGuire recirculation sump design and location, core geometries, and the time of postulated clogging of the fuel (long-term cooling mode). However, the licensee initially did fail to appropriately 5 analyze for these potential effects. This was subsequently corrected with a revision to ' the 10 CFR 50.59 analysis. The licensee's original evaluation noted that the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) did not increase because the bottom filter nozzle performance in accident conditions is unaffected by the new designs. The basis for this conclusion was inadequate because the licensee did not evaluate potential effects of debris clogging fuel assembly filters following a design basis LOCA. This inadequate evaluation was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. Specifically, the written safety evaluation which provided the bases for the licensee's change pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 was inadequate. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in i the licensee's corrective action program as PIP 0-M98-3073 and 0-M99-0681 and is 1 identified as NCV 50-369,370/99-06-01: Failure to Perform an Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Use of Fuel Assemblies with Coarse or Fine Mesh Plates. This URIis close E8.2 [ Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369. 370/97-15-05: Reduction of UFSAR Drawing Detail I Inspection Report 50-369,370/97-15 documented that the licensee had revised a number of site drawings in the UFSAR into summary flow diagrams. The inspectors questioned !
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i whether the licensee's actions were appropriate and in accordance with NRC policy or requirements. Concurrent with the identification of the subject IFI, the NRC was reviewing this practice and other issues related to updating the UFSAR and acceptable methods for maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). On September 8,1C99, the NRC approved the intent of utilizing the Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI) guidance document NEl 98-03, Revision 1, as an acceptable method for licensee's to comply with the requirements for maintaining UFSARs current. This guidance will be incorporated into NRC Regulatory Guide 1.181, which provides guidance for modifying the content and format of the UFSARs, including the revision of site drawings into summary flow diagrams. Based on the NRC inspection staff review, the drawing revisions described in the subject IFl would be consistent with the approved guidance and therefore in compliance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). This IFl is close IV. Plant Support P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP) P4.1 _ Review of Exercise Obiectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors i pection Scope (82302) The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine if it was of sufficient detail and challenge to demonstrate exercise objectives and meet regulatory requirement b. ' Observations and Findinas The complete scenario package for the 1999 McGuire exercise, including the scope and objectives, was submitted to the NRC in advance of the exercise. The exercise scenario provided a sequence of simulated emergency conditions sufficiently detailed and challenging to demonstrate the designated objectives and test the licensee's onsite and i offsite emergency organization ) Conclusion
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The licensee's submittals of the scope and objectives as well as the scenario package were timely and appropriate for this biennial emergency preparedness exercis ) P4.2 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors Inspection Scope (82301) During the period August 23-26,1999, the inspectors oberved and evaluated the McGuire Nuclear Station biennial, full-participation emergency preparedness exercise as I well as selected activities related to the licensee's conduct and self-assessment of the exercise. Licensee activities inspected during the exercise included those occurring in the Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Suppori Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The inspectors !
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evaluated the licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, adherence to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), and the overall implementation of the licensee's Emergency Plan. The exercise was conducted on August 24,1999, from 9:00 a.m. to l 2:40 ! Emeraency Response Facility (ERF) Observations and Findinos b.1 Control Room Simulator The initiating event for the exercise scenario commenced at 9:05 a.m. on August 24, 1999. The event included a steam generator tube leak and an enisolable steam line break outside containment. (For further details, see the narrative summary of the exercise scenario in the attachment to this report.) Despite the fact that the Operations Shift Manager (OSM) and the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) independently reviewed the emergency classification criteria, the initiating event was incorrectly classified at 9:24 a.m. as a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). Controller intervention at 9:31 a.m. resulted in an immediate upgrade of the classification to an Alert. A post-exercise interview with the OSM and STA revealed that each had made a different error in the classification process. These individuals acknowledged in the interview that a brief discussion of their respective bases for the NOUE classification (instead of simply comparing their results) would have disclosed their errors. Failure to correctly classify emergency conditions in accordance with EPIP RP/0/A.5700/000, " Classification of Emergency", was identified by the inspectors as an exercise weakness, IFl 50-369, 50-370/99-06-02: Exercise Weakness for Failure to Correctly Classify the Initial Set of Emergency Conditions as an Alert. This also constituted a failure to meet exercise objective A.1 (see attachment). This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action system as PIP 0-M99-373 l The OSM provided timely briefings on plant conditions and emergency declarations to the CRS crew and to plant personnel using public address system announcements. An effective formal briefing was provided by the OSM to the Emergency Coordinator (EC), i stationed in the TSC, prior to the tumover of responsibility to the TS b.2 Technical Support Center i The TSC was staffed expeditiously upon the declaratinn of an Alert at 9:32 a.m. The TSC staff received the first of a series of frequent briefings on plant conditions at 10:07 a.m., and the TSC was activated at 10:11 a.m. The briefings of the staff occurred at intervals of 15 to 30 minutes and were effective in maintaining cognizance of events in progress. A site assembly, begun at 9:45 a.m., was reported to the TSC as being complete, with the exception of three individuals, at 10:25 a.m. The three individuals H question were located shortly thereafter.
l Soon after arriving at the TSC, health physics personnel began to estimate the j radiological conditions resulting from the main steam line break and steam generator
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tube rupture. The inspectors noted that, while health physics personnel coordinated appropriately with engineering personnel, difficulties were encountered in developing an estimate of the magnitude of the steam leak. Ultimately, an engineering default value which assumed a stuck-open main steam power operated relief valve was used in dose estimates, which significantly overestimated the leak rate. While this resulted in conservative dose estimates, the licensee identified the need to develop methodologies to more accurately characterize steam leaks as an area for improvement that had been a problem in the pas In general, the conduct of activities in the TSC was professional and appropriate. Work activities were prioritized, logs were properly maintained, and procedures were followe The inspectors noted that TSC personnel were forward-looking, often stressing (during briefings) the most important components and systems for the maintaining safety functions and identifying potential pitfalls. While there was no clear indication that a site evacuation would be required, at 12:10 p.m. the TSC took advantage of a relative lullin activities and directed that nonesseritial personnel be identified by group in case an evacuation was required. While the bulk of activities were conducted satisfactorily, areas for improvement were identified in the turnover of emergency response functions to the EOF (discussed in greater detail below) and participation on the health physics network, with NRC response personnel having to request that a TSC communicator call into the networ . b.3 Occrations Sucoort Center The inspectors did not observe activities at the OS b.4 Emeroency Operations Facility The EOF group pagers activated at 9:39 a.m., instructing personnel to respond to and staff the EOF. Minimum staffing in the EOF was satisfied at 10:15 a.m., and the EOF was declared " operational" at 10:23 a.m. This was well within the licensee's procedural goal of achieving operational status within 75 minutes of initial staff notificatio The various groups within the EOF worked well together. The Accident Asse3sment group was pro-active and worked with the CRS so as to keep informed of plant conditions and procedural progress. The group used facility computers and other resources effectively. The field monitoring teams, communicator, and dose
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assessment / meteorology personnel worked effectively in gathering, analyzing, and forwarding radiological data to the Radiological A asment Manager. The Radiological Assessment Manager and Accident Assessment wager were continuously informed I by their respective groups, and they in turn were effective in keeping the EOF Director informed of changes in plant condition , l The EOF Director exercised adequate command and controlin the EOF. An increase in l the size of the steam generator tube leak prompted the EOF Director to contact the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the TSC and recommend upgrading the emergency classification to a Site Area Emergency (SAE). The EC disagreed and a discussion
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10 I ensued, during which the EOF Director declared a SAE at 10:48 a.m. The Assistant l EOF Director and Emergency Planner informed the EOF Director that he could not classify an event unless the EOF was activated. The TSC and EOF commenced a
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turnover that was rushed and was not conducted in a manner consistent with licensee's procedures. The EOF Director declared the EOF activated at 10:55 a.m., and reiterated that he had declared a SAE at 10:48 a.m. The emergency notification was made to offsite agencies at 11:03 a.m., within 15 minutes of the emergency declaration as required. The inadequate TSC-to-EOF tumover constituted failure to meet exercise objectives B.8 and D.6 (see attachment). I i The Assistant EOF Director supported the EOF Director in the execution of his I responsibilities and in the use of procedures. The NRC response team received a briefing on the statu; of the plant from the Assistant EOF Director at 11:06 a.m., immediately following the EOF activation. The inspectors observed that the Assistant EOF Director was not prepared for the briefing, and omitted critical plant data. Some basic unanswered questions asked by the NRC were answered at a later time by the Assistant EOF Director. The inspectors attributed the lack of preparation on the part of the Assistant EOF Director to the rushed TSC-to-EOF turnove I b.5 Licensee Exercise Critiaue Following the exercise, the licensee conducted facility critiques in which the players assessed their own performance and identified areas for improvement. The player critiques for the CRS, TSC, OSC, and EOF were observed to be thorough, open, and , self-critical. On the day after the exercise, the licensee's controller / evaluator I organization held detailed discussions, reviewed documentation, and conducted interviews as required to develop its critique results. The licensee's critique identified the significant issues discussed in this report. On August 26,1999, the Emergency Planning Supervisor made a detailed presentation of the critique findings to licensee managemen Overall Exercise Conclusions The licensee's overall performance in responding to the simulated emergency was satisfactory, and the exercise was judged to be a successful demonstration of the licensee's emergency response capabilities. The Site Area Emergency and General Emergency declarations were timely and correct, and all offsite notifications were initiated within 15 minutes. Command and controlin each of the ERFs was generally effective. Staffing of emergency response facilities was timely. An exercise weakness was identified for the misclassification of the initiating event. The TSC-to-EOF turnover was rushed and was not conducted in a manner consistent with the licensee's procedures. The licensee's initit ' briefing of the NRC team in the EOF was incomplete.
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P8 Miscellaneous EP issues (82301) P (Closed) IFl 50-369.370/97-12-01: Exercise Weakness - Notifications Following the Alert Declaration Did Not Keep Offsite Agencies Aware of the Changing Plant Conditions The inspectors reviewed the licensee's November 6,1997, response to the NRC regarding this finding. Based on review of procedural changes, retraining efforts, and the performance of licensee personnel during the 1999 exercise, the inspectors concluded
: that corrective actions had been implemented effectivel R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1' General Comments (71750)
The inspectors made frequent tours of the controlled access area and reviewed radiological postings. The inspectors observed that workers were adhering to the
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I requirements of wearing protective clothing. The inspectors also determined that locked high radiation doors were properly controlled, high radiation and contamination areas were properly posted, and radiological survey maps were updated to accurately reflect radiological conditions in the respective area V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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The resident inspcctors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 20,1999. The licensee - acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED 1.icensee
Barron, B., Vice President, McGuire Nuclear Station Bhatnagar, A., Superintendent, Plant Operations Byrum, W., Manager, Radiation Protection Cash, M., Manager, Regulatory Compliance Dolan, B., Manager, Safety Assurance Evans W., Security Manager Geddie, E., Manager, McGuire Nuclear Station Geer, T., Manager, Civil / Electrical / Nuclear Systems Engineering Jamil, D., Superintendent, Maintenance Loucks, L, Chemistry Manager Peele, J., Manager, Engineering Thomas, K., Surserintendent, Work Control Travis, B., Manager, Mechanical Systems Engineering
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 71707: Conduct of Operations IP 71750: Plant Support , IP 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302: Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors IP 90712: Event Reports IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92903: Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-369,370/99-06-01 NCV Failure to Perform an Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Use of Fuel Assemblies with Coarse or Fine Mesh Plates (Section E8.1)
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50-369,370/99-06-02 IFl Exercise Weakness for Failure to Correctly Classify the Initial Set of Emergency Conditions as an Alert (Section P4.2.b.1) Closed 50-370/99-003-(00,01) LER Inadverterit Actuation of the Turbine Driven
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Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Section 08.1) 50-369,370/99-01-01 URI Post-LOCA Clogging of Mark BW Fuel Assemblies with Coarse or Fine Mesh Plates (Section E8.1) i 50-369,370/97-15-05 IFl Reduction of UFSAR Drawing Detail (Section E8.2)
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50-369,370/97-12-01 IFl Exercise Weakness - Follow-up Notifications Following the Alert Declaration) Did Not Keep ,
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Offsite Agencies Aware of the Changing Plant Conditions (Section P8.1)
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r i 13-L l: LIST OF ACRONYMS USED l AF : Auxiliary Feed Water
' AP - Abnormal Procedure CRS - Control Room Simulator EC - Emergency Coordinator
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Emergency Core Cooling System EDG - Emergency Diesel Generator EOF - Emergency Operations Facility EP - Emergency Procedure EPI Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure ERF -- Emergency Response Facility IFl - Inspector Followup item IR - Inspection Report LER - Licensee Event Report LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident MNS- - McGuire Nuclear Station MPFF --
- Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure NCV -
Non-Cited Violation NEl - Nuclear Energy Institute NIS - Nuclear instrumentation System NOUE -
- Notification of Unusual Event NRC -
Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR - NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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NS Nuclear System Directive OSC - Operations Support Center OSM .- Operations Shift Manager PIP - Problem investigation Process PORV . Power Operated Relief Valve SAE - Site Area Emergency SSF -- Standby Shutdown Facility ~ STA - Shift Technical Advisor TDAFW -- Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump TS - Technical Specification TSC - Technical Support Center TSSR - Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement UFSAR - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
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MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SITE 1999 EMERGENCY EXERCISE EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF SCENARIO SIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM I Demonstrate ability of the Operations Shift Manager to recognize conditions,. classify emergencies, and assume the initial responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator in a timely manne . Demonstrate ability of the Control Room staff to make timely determination of the cause of the incident, perform mitigating actions, keep onsite personnel ir. formed of the emergency situation through periodic r.nnouncements prior to TSC and OSC activation, and a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the { Emergency Coordinator in the Control Room to the ' Emergency Coordinator in the Technical Support Center-
, Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to r-notify the State and Counties within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency -
classificatio . Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to alert, notify, and staff the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert or higher emergency classificatio . Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to notify the NRC no later than 1 hour after decla' ring one of the emergency classification ; Demonstrate the assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a simulated emergency and provide
, accountability for any not present at the assembly -
locatio . Test primary off-site communications equipment to the State EOC and County Warning Points, and the NRC including Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification Syste . " Attachment
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. Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and staff the b;/fhyy-c,y .., ,' . . .a EOF after declari.ng.an Alert or higher emergency
.
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'\p w . classification or after a. decision by the Emergency
~
Coordinator during an Unusual' Even . Demonstrate proper use.of message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to the State and Countie ^1 Test the adequacy and operability of. emergency equipment and supplie TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) Demonstrate ability to perform a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room Emergency Coordinator to the TSC Emergency Coordinato . Demonstrate the' ability of the Site Emergency Coordinator to provide effective direction, command and control, to manage activities of classification, accident analysis, or. mitigation and to perform
,- periodic briefings for the-TSC/OSC staff and personne ~
.i
' \ Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to notify the State and Counties within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classificatio . Demonstrate proper use of message format and authentication methodology for. messages transmitted to the State and Countie . Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant extensions, intercoms, and on-site radio syste . . Test primary off-site communications equipment to the - - ~ .
State EOC and County Warning Points, and the NRC including Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification Syste . Test the adequacy and operability of emergency l equipment and supplie l l-t i
'
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..
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, * .5 ' , . ' Demonstrate ability to perform a precise and clear r.u m.ga , , . transfer of respon'sibilities from the TSC EmergencyE (g(/h. t-- Coordinator to the EOF Directo . Demonstrate the ability to transmit data in accordance with station procedures, and to distribute this data according to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures '(EPIP).
1 Demonstrate the ability to provide data to the TSC'and OSC in accordance with procedure . Demonstrate the ability.of the TSC staff to notify the NRC no later than 1 hour.after declaring one of the emergency classification . Demonstrate adequate communications between the off-site monitoring teams and the TSC/ EO . Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose projections in accordance with procedure . Demonstrate the ability to-continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure, f 1 ( , Demonstrate the ability to determine on-site radiation levels ~and airborne radioiodine concentration . ' Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and
. provide mitigation strategie OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)
. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposur . Demonstrate the ability to determine on-site radiation levels and airborne radioiodine concentration '
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3 .. Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment and supplie . Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigation strategie .. .-
[.
* .
,, ! [hy--hA..,,-EBERGENCYOPERATIONS< FACILITY (EOF) J
\ Demonstrate the ability of the EOF Director to provide effective direction, command and control, to manage activit'iesoof classification, accident analysis, or mitigation and to perform periodic briefings for the EOF staff ~and personne . Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Operations Facility staff to notify the State and Counties within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classificatio . Demonstrate' proper use of message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to the State and Countie . Test primary off-site communications equipment to the State EOC and County Warning Points, and the NRC including Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification System.
g- Test the adequacy and operability of emergency
*
, equipment and supplae . Demonstrate anility to perform a precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Emergency Coordinator to the EOF Directo . Demonstrate adequate communications between the off-site monitoring teams and the TSC/ EO . Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site do'se projections in accordance with procedure )
' Demonstrate the ability to collect soil, water and ;
vegetation samples in accordance with procedure , 1 Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and
-
provide mitigation strategies.
!
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e , s SCENARIO C099tITTEE i: -.
# . . 73 2. ;.., . . . . . r .#
1 -- Demonstrate the ability.to control the scenario and provide accurate data for player us . ' PUBLIC INFORMATION (NEWS GROUP) l '
- Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate informatio to the news media in'a timely manner and to provide effective rumor control' according'to the Emergency Plan-Implementing Procedure . Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with - state and county public information officers prior to its release.
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'~ McGuire Nuclear' Site Pkt.C~~:.u:wn~-; Biennial.. Exercise Scenario E s ..> . -
gy
.gg,g 24, 1999 Full Participation Exercise
Narrative Summary This exercise will be a full station exercise with the Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center-(TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staffed-with players, controllers and evaluator The Media Center and
'the Joint Information Center (JIC) will be staffed because the State of North Carolina and Counties of Gaston, Mecklenburg, Lincoln, Cabarrus, Catawba _and Iredell are playing in this exercis The NRC will also fully participate with a limited team dispatched to the site and the EO i Timg Ev,ent 0900 The plant is operating at full power with all redundant equipment availabl A steam break develops between the ID S/G PORV isolation [,, ' valve and the ID S/G PORV, equivalent to ~0.625% steam flo \ -
The motor operator for the ID S/G PORV isolation valve fails in the full open position when an attempt is made to close i The physical environment created in the area by the steam break does not permit manual closure of the 1D S/G PORV isolation valve to stop the steam lea A steam generator tube leak of ~30gpm develops in the ID S/G (>10gpm-but <50gpm).
. 0915 The operating crew diagnoses the unisolable secondary line break-outside Containment with a S/G tube leak greater than 10gpm, but less than 50gpm in 1D S/G. These events should result in the declaration of an ALERT Emergency Action Level
, (EAL).
0920 The operating crew commences a controlled unit shutdow ! 0930 ALERT declaration is implemente Off-site authorities are I notified. Alert and notification of responders is
;
implemented. Minimum staffing of state and county Emergency !
, . Operations Centers (EOCs) begin Site Assembly is !
. conducted on-site., l
. * !
[- ? o
?
o Time Event ,
.e ' ~ ? *.h. , . - .- *.". 5 K.L.. "IO'40 The size of the S/G bNbe leak starts to increase in 1D S/ The primary to secondary leak rate in 1D S/G has exceeded 50gpm and stabilizes at 60-70gpm. The steam leak cannot be isolate This should result in the declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level (EAL).
1100 SITE AREA EMERGENCY declaration is implemente Off-site authorities are notified. , Coordination of public notification should take place, with notification occurring via sirens, public address systems, and the Emergency Action System (EAS). Activity at this time should also include the establishment of relocation centers, traffic control and personnel / vehicle monitoring / decontamination station NQTE: There will be an actual activation of the sirens and the EAS at Site Area Emergenc C Reactor Coolant (NC) pump impeller mechanically fails and sends loose parts into the Reactor Vesse Fuel damage
.- commences due to flow from the remaining three Reactor
-{ . Coolant pumps. The radiological release rate at the steam
'-
leak begins to increas The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) diagnoses fuel damage with lEMF SlA and lEMF SlB valid readings greater than 117 R/hr (equates to 5% fuel gap activity released) This loss of all three fission product barriers should result in the declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level (EAL). . 1300 GENERAL EMERGENCY declaration is implemente Off-site authorities are notified. Recommendations concerning protective actions should be made to the off-site authoritie They, in turn, will coordinate public
,
notification among themselves, with actual notifications occurring via sirens and the Emergency Action System (EAS) NRTE: There will not be an activation of the sirens, or of EAS unless there was a problem with these activities at the l earlier activatio ,. 1500'- 1600 Termination of the exercise when all required objectives have been demonstrate ., t }}