IR 05000424/1990002

Insp Repts 50-424/90-02 & 50-425/90-02 on 900106-0216. Non-cited Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Security,Maint & Quality Programs

ML20012C523
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/07/1990
From:	Aiello R, Brockman K, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20012C520	List: IR 05000424/1990002
References
50-424-90-02, 50-424-90-2, 50-425-90-02, 50-425-90-2, NUDOCS 9003220150
Download: ML20012C523 (19)

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Nazg'o UNITE 3 STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p-j g.

REGION 11

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• ATL ANTA, GEORG1 A 30323 k*..*[-

Report.Nos.:- 50-424/90-02 and 50-425/90-02

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Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201

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Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81

Facility Name:

Vogtle Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

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Inspection Conducted:: January-6 - February 16, 1990 Inspectors:

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R. F#1ello, Acting SenionWesident Inspector Date Signed 3-f-$0 s

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R. Dr3tarkey, Resident }nspector Date Signed

' Accompanied By:

L. Trocine

? Approved By:

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J-7-90 K. J. Brockdeff( Ei Chief Date Signed

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Di#ision of Reac cts

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SUMMARY Scope:.

This routine inspection entailed resident inspection in the

'following areas:

plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance, surveillance, security, and. quality programs and administrative controls affecting quality,

'Results: -Four non-cited violations were identified pursuant to the

. discretionary provisions of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Two are in the area of operations for failure to maintain procedure 11744-1, Essential Chilled Water System Alignment, as required by TS 6.7.1.a (paragraph 2.b(1)) and for failure to complete an LC0 action statement within the allowed time when it was found that a safety related battery component was not meeting its operability require-ments (paragraph 3.b(2)(a)).

The third violation is in the area of surveillance for failure to perform a required technical-specifi-cation surveillance on a high energy line break valve for steam generator blowdown isolation (paragraph 4(b)).

The fourth violation

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occurred in the area of safety assessment and quality verification for failure to maintain ISEG staffing level as required by TS 6.2.3 (paragraph 4(c)).

Two strengths and one weakness were identified during this inspection period as follows:

9003220150 90030s PDR ADOCK 05000424 Q

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Communications between the NRC and VEGP management are strengthening..

This is evidenced by an increase in management interfacing with the resident inspectors on information regarding potential regulatory issues, maintenance forecasting, and management tours as they arise.

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The inspector's review of allegation Ril-89-A-0081, indicated that a thorough and timely investigation was conducted by QCP to determine the magnitude and validity of the concern. The professional attitude and. eagerness in resolving quality concerns. were noted by. the inspector and is considered a strength (paragraph 6).

A1 generic weakness was identified when the inspector conducted a walkdown of the Essential Chilled Water System.

In particular, the inspector-identified several valves with missing plastic label tags (paragraph 2.b(1).

A similar weakness was identified when the inspector walked down the SI system several months previous. This is indicative of plant personnel failing to report these oiscrepancies as they arise.

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REPORT DETAILS

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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J.- Aufdenkampe, Manager Technical. Support

• G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Plant C. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent

• E. Dannemiller 11. Manager Security G.-Frederick, Safety Audit and Engineering Group Supervisor H. Handfinger, Manager Maintenance

• K. Holmes, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness j

• W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations

• R. Legrand,. Manager Health Physics and Chemistry

• G. McCarley, Independent Safety Engineering Group Supervisor

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A. Mosbaugh, Assistant General Manager Plant Support W. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor

• R. Odom, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager

• C. Stinespring, Manager Plant Administration

• J. Swartzwelder, Manager Operations

I Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors, engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors,

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and office personnel.

• Attended Exit Interview

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An alphabetical list of acronyms and initialisms is located in the last

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paragraph of the inspection report.

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Operational Safety Verification - (71707)(93702)

The facility began this inspection period with both units at 100 percent power. -On January 10, 1990, utility personnel conducting road work cut

- the phone cables for the commercial and ENS phone systems.

ENN was verified operable at 2:13 p.m. EST.

ENS was restored to service three hours later.

Unit 1:

l On January 24,1990, at 1:33 a.m. EST, the reactor automatically tripped due to a low level in SG #4 caused by a fast closure of MSIV 3036A during a partial stroke test.

Later that same day, the reactor went critical, entered Mode 2 ~ (Startup), and entered Mode 1 (Power Operation).

On January 25, 1990, the generator was synchronized to the grid.

The unit remained at full power with the exception of minor power reductions for maintenance through February 12, 1990.

On February 13, 1990, the unit began coasting down in preparation for its second refueling outage.

The unit continued to coast through the end of this inspection period.

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Unit 2:

The unit remained at full power with the exception of minor power

. reductions _for maintenance through the end of this inspection period.

a.'

Control Room Activities

Control Room tours and observations were performed to verify that facility operations were being safely conducted within regulatory requirements.

These inspections consisted of one or more of the

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following attributes as appropriate at the time of the inspection.

- Proper Control Room staffing

- Control Room access and operator behavior

- Adherence to approved procedures for activities in-progress

- Adherence to technical specification limiting conditions for operations

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- Observance of instruments and recorder traces of safety-related and important-to-safety systems for abnormalities

- Review of annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct

- Control Board walkdowns

- Safety parameter display and the plant safety monitoring system operability status

- Discussions and interviews with the On-Shift Operations Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operators, and-the Shift Technical

. Advisor (when stationed) to determine the plant status, plans, and to assess operator knowledge

- Review of the operator logs, Unit logs, and shift turnover sheets No' violations or deviations were identified.

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Facility Activities Facility tours and observations were performed to assess the effectiveness of the administrative controls established by direct observation of plant activities, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, ~ independent verification of safety systems status and LCOs, licensee meetings, and facility records.

During these inspections, the following objectives were achieved:

(1) Safety System Status (71710)

Confirmation of system

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operability was obtained by verification that flowpath valve alignment, control and power supply alignments, component conditions, and support systems for the accessible portions of the ESF trains were proper.

The inaccessible portions are confirmed as availability permits.

Additional indepth inspection of the Unit 1 ESF Chiller Train "A" was performed to

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review the system lineup procedure with the plant drawings and as-built configurations. The inspector verified that the lineup was in accordance with licensee requirements for. system operability.

Walkdowns were expanded to include hangers and supports and electrical equipment interiors.

The walkdown

identified 31 valves as missing plastic label tags.

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discrepancies have been noted regarding missing plastic label

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tags in previous ESF system walkdowns, in particular the SI system (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-424/89-14 and 50-425/89-15). This is identified as a generic weakness in that plant personnel failed'to report these discrepancies as they arise.

Furthermore, the nomenclature-on ten valve tags did not agree verbatim with the nomenclature in Operations Procedure 11744-1 Essential Chilled Water System Alignment, Rev 7.

The following seven valves had plastic label tags attached but were not listed in Operations Procedures 11744-1:

Component Number Description 1-1592-U4-912 ESF CHLD WTR Chiller "A" PI-22568A Press Test 1-1592-04-916 ESF CHLD WTR Chiller "A" PI-22566A Isolation 1-1592-U4-918-ESF CHLD WTR Chiller "A" PI-22566A Press Test 1-1592-U4-926 ESF CHLD WTR Chiller "A" PI-22569A Isolation

- 1-1592-U4-140 ESF CHLD WTR AB RM CLG Coils Line Drain I:

1-1592-U4-141 ESF CHLD WTR AB RM CLG Coils Line Drain 1-1592-U4-930 ESF CHLD WTR Chiller "A" Purge Drum Press Test One valve,1-1592-U4-043, had a plastic tag attached which described the valve as a test connection when in fact it was a bypass valve around 1-TV-12124.

Operations procedure 11744-1, however, did correctly described 1-1592-U4-043 as a bypass valve.

The above described discrepancies in operations procedure 11744-1 represent a violation of Technical Specifi-cation 6.7.1.a. which requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities

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referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, February 1978.

However, this NRC identified violation is not being cited-because criteria specified in Section V.A of the NRC

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Enforcement Policy were satisfied. This item is identified as:

NCV '50-424/90-02-01, " Failure To Maintain Procedure 11744-1, Essential Chilled Water System Alignments, As

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Required By TS 6.7.1.a."

On February 15, 1990, the. Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations issued an Interoffice Correspondence to the Manager -

Operations which stated the licensee's corrective actions which L

will be taken. According to that Interoffice Correspondence the following plan will-be implemented:

- The retagging program should systematically replace all valve tags on Unit 1.

- The retagging effort will include a review for technical accuracy which will be incorporated into the system lineup procedure.

- ESF Chilled Water should be given high priority for retagging.

The retagging is anticipated to begin in approximately three

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months.

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- Retagging of all Unit 1 is a large task which is anticipated l

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Storage of material and (2)

Plant Housekeeping Conditions

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l-components and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine' whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.

l On-January 10, 1990, the inspector toured the Emergency -

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Equipment Room located in the Control Room.

Emergency supplies i

L of food, water, and other essential emergency equipment are I

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stored in this room and are available for use by control room j

personnel in the event of a prolonged emergency. This room, in j

. terms of - housekeeping, was in an unsatisfactory condition.

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Trash was on the floor, a vacuum cleaner was in the middle of the room, chairs were positioned in front of storage cabinets restricting entrance to the cabinets, and other miscellaneous equipment, which would have served no apparent purpose during an emergency, was stored in the room. The inspector brought these housekeeping discrepancies to the attention of the Manager - Operations.

The licensee took prompt action to

restore the Emergency Equipment Room to a more useable

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condition.

The- -inspector also reviewed the most recent inventory audit of the contents of the Emergency Equipment Room dated January 4,.1990.

The audit identified that all required

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. items were accounted for.

On = January 22, 1990, the Resident Inspectors toured several

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areas outside the protected area with the Assistant General

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t Manager - Plant Operations.

Specifically, the areas-toured were-

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the cooling towers, river intake structure, and the fire brigade r

training area. No_ deficiencies were noted by the inspectors.

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(3)

Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing, and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade _ staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.-

(4) Radiation Protection Radiation protection activities,

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staffing, and equipment were observed to verify proper program-implementation.

The inspection included review of-the plant program effectiveness.

Radiation work permits and personne1'

compliance were reviewed during the daily plant tours.

. Radiation Control Areas were observed to verify proper identification and implementation.

(5) Security - Security controls were observed to verify that -

security barriers were intact, guard forces.were on duty, and access to the Protected Area was controlled in accordance with

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the _ facility security plan.

Personnel were observed to verify proper display ~of badges and that personnel requiring escort were properly escorted.

Personnel within Vital ~ Areas were e

observed to ensure proper authorization for the area.

Equipment

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operability _or proper compensatory activities were verified on a periodic basis.

L On January 31, 1990, the inspectors examined the protected area perimeter with the Acting Security Manager. The inspectors were informed that the licensee is planning on installing -several more cameras to improve Protected Area boundary coverage. _The inspectors were also informed that the Unit 1 microwave system will be upgraded to Unit 2 standard following completion of the alternate PESB. The inspectors examined the security armory and

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emergency DG. MWO A9000104, dip stick replacement, was observed while examining the security DG.

The inspectors had no comments.

(6) Surveillance (61726)(61700) - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used, qualified personnel were conducting the tests, tests were adequate to

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verify equipment operability, calibrated equipment was utilized,

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and TS requirements were followed.

The inspectors observed portions of - the following surveillances' and/or reviewed completed data against acceptance criteria:

Surveillance No.

Title

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14545-1, Rev. 5 MDAFW Pump Monthly Operability Test 14807-1(2), Rev. 6(2)

MDAFW Pump IST

14808-2, Rev. 4 CCP And Check Valve IST 14980-2,'Rev. 3 Diesel Generator Operability Test

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24905-C, Rev. 3 Personnel Airlock Leak Rate Test 88023-2, Rev. 2 Incore/Excore Detector Calibration l

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(7) Maintenance Activities (62703)

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maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment i

clearances were in effect; work _ requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being fol. lowed; quality control personnel were available for :inspecti_on-

. activities as required; retesting and return of systems to service was prompt and correct; and -TS requirements were. being followed. The Maintenance Work Order backlog was reviewed.

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. Maintenance was_ observed and/or work packages were. reviewed-for i

'the following maintenance activities:-

MWO No.

Work Description 19000076 Replace-MSIV (3036A) Fuses.. Rework As Necessary To Restore Normal Operation, q

19000104 Repair Outboard Pump Bearing On CCW

Pump 4-j

19000166 Investigate / Repair 1RE006-Monitor Goes Into Low-Fail Alarm 19000290 Spent Fuel Pit Hi/Lo Level Switch PM 19000338 Repair Pulse To Analog Converter On Rod Control System

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Work Description (Continued);

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r 29000104 Air Compressor #3 Will Not Load And Unload Properly a

A9000104 Replace Dip Stick On Security.DG

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A9000209_

Repair 10 Meter Windspeed Monitor At Met Tower

A9000282 DG Air Start Compressor "A" Has Excessive Noise And Vibration

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On February 5, 1990, the Resident Inspectors toured the

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Predictive Maintenance Laboratory with the Manager

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Maintenance.

The inspectors examined the operation of the

licensee's ferrography and vibratory analysis equipment and were

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shown how that equipment is used in the. predictive maintenance

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E program.

No deficiencies were noted by the inspectors.

On February 14, 1990, the inspectors examined the maintenance tool room.- the torque wrench calibration room and calibration equipment, and the hot machine-shop under the guidance of the q,.

Manager - Maintenance.

The hot machine shop is undergoing T

renovation to make it a more usable and functional area. Also, t

di.scussed was the plan to use bar codes to identify and track m

the issuance of tools.to maintenance personnel. The licensee is planning to implement this tool identification system prior to the second Unit I refueling' outage which is scheduled to begin in September 1990.

One non-cited violation in paragraph 2.b(1) was identified.

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3.

Review of Licensee Reports (90712)(90713)(92700)

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In-Office Review of Periodic and Special Reports

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This inspection consisted of reviewing the below listed reports to determine whether the information reported by the licensee was technically adequate and consistent with the inspector knowledge of the material contained within the report.

Selected material within

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the report was questioned randomly to verify accuracy and to provide a reasonable assurance that other NRC personnel have an appropriate document for their activities.

Monthly Operating Report - The reports dated January 12 and February 9, 1990, were reviewed. The inspector had no comments.

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Special Report - The special report dated January 29, 1990, regarding

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'the inoperability of-the Unit 2 Lcontainment radiation level high range monitors was reviewed..The inspector had no comments.

Special Report - The special report dated January 29, 1990, regarding an invalid failure of diesel generator IB was reviewed.

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inspector had no connents, b.

-Deficiency Cards and Licensee Event Reports.

Deficiency Cards and Licensee Event Reports were reviewed for l

potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.

Events which were reported pursuant to = 10 CFR 50.72, were reviewed following occurrence to determine if the1 technical. specifications and other regulatory requirements were satisfied.

In-office review of LERs may result in further followup to verify that the stated corrective actions have been completed or to identify violations in addition to those described in the LER.- Each LER was reviewed for enforcement action in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, and where the violation.

was not cited the criteria specified in Section V.A. or V.G.1 of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied.

Review of DCs was performed to

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maintain a realtime status of deficiencies, determine regulatory compliance, follow the licensee corrective actions, and assist as a basis for closure of the LER when reviewed..Due to the numerous DCs

. processed, only those DCs which result in enforcement action or further inspector followup with the licensee at the end of the inspection are listed below.

The DCs and LERs denoted with an

. asterisk indicates that reactive inspection occurred following the event and prior to receipt of the written report.

(1) The'following Deficiency Cards were-reviewed:

• DC 1-90-0017, " Reactor Trip Due To ' Inadvertent Closure Of Main

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Steam Isolation Valve."

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On January 24, 1990, electricians were assisting plant operators in the performance of partial stroke testing of a Main Steam Isolation Valve.

The electricians were to install a jumper to re-open the-valve if it failed to re-open at the 10 percent closed position as it had 'done during a previous test.

This would verify that a failed contact was the cause of the failure to re-open.

The - test began and at 10 percent closed, an indicator illuminated as expected, but the valve continued to close.

The electricians were advised, and they installed the jumper to ;nitiate valve re-opening.

However, position indication was lost, and the MSIV went fully closed.

MSIV closure resulted in a rapid decrease in water level in Steam Generator #4 to its low-low setpoint, and an automatic reactor

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t trip was initiated.

An investigation determined that the MSIV control fuses -had blown when the jumper was installed.

In addition, it was found that the "10 percent closed" indicator and the "re-open" contact utilize different limit switches-on the valve.

When the "10 percent closed" indicator illuminated, the re-open limit switch had not yet actuated.

Thus, the MSIV did not promptly re-open when the "10 percent closed" limit p

switch-was actuated.

This event will be further followed up when submitted as a LER.

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(2) The following LERs were reviewed and closed.

(a) 50-424/89-19 Rev.- 0 " Procedure Inadequacy Leads To Technical-Specification Violation."

On November 22, 1989, an electrician was performing monthly

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_ preventive maintenance on a Class 1E battery bank.

Several parameters on each battery cell were measured and recorded on a data sheet ~and attached to the PM work order. The PM t

was completed and signed-off as approved by the electrician's foreman.

On December 6,1989, the system engineer was reviewing the work order and found that the measured voltage of one. cell was recorded as 2.10 volts.

Technical specifications require entry into a limiting condition for operation when the voltage is not greater than 2.10 volts.

Therefore, a TS violation occurred

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because a LC0' action statement was not completed within allowable time.

The causes of this event were a' cognitive personnel error and an inadequate procedure. Although the

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voltage limit identified in the procedure was not met, the maintenance foreman erroneously. approved the measurements

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and failed to alert the Shift Supervisor.of the abnormal parameter. The forema'n has been counseled, and a memo will be sent to other appropriate personnel describing this event and the need: for adequate reviews of documentation.

Secondly, the precedure used did not indicate that cell voltage limits were tied to TS requirements.

This procedure will be changed.

This licensee-identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.

In order to track this item, the following is established.

NCV 50-424/90-02-02 and 50-425/90-02-01, " Failure To Complete An LC0 Action Statement Within The Allowed Time When It Was Found That A Safety Related Battery Component Was Not - Meeting Its Operability Requirements - LER 1-89-19."

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. (b)*50-425/89-22 Rev. O " Potential Operation Above Maximum Power Level Specified in Operating License."

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On June IS, 1989 The licensee determined that between May 27 and June 14, 1989, Unit 2 had potentiall operated above the maximum power level (3411 MW) y been s

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in Operating License NPF-81, Section 2.c due to calorimetric instrument errors.

This determination was.

based on an increase in indicated. reactor power observed on np, June 14, 1989 during preparations for the ASME performance test on Unit 2.

When the temporary high precision flow

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U transmitters were vented, indicated reactor power on the process computer increased from '3411 MW to 3427 MW.

y Following the increase in ~ indicated reactor power, the i

m plant operator reduced indicated reactor power to below 3411 MW (approximately 10 minutes after the indicated thermal power increased).

Subsequent investigations indicated that the reactor may have been operating at a rated thermal power greater than that permitted by the operating licensee.

The suspected causes for this event

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were improper venting of the feedwater flow transmitters and drift in the common power supply for the feedwater j

temperature transmitters.

This -item was cited as a

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~ iolation in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-425/89-26.

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i review of reactor data demonstrated that none of the-reactor trip limits were approached. Although the licensed

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power limit may have been exceeded, this event did not result in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition. The plant was not operated above 102 percent of Rated Thermal Power.

A review of the operating data also i

indicated the reactor safety limits shown. in Technical i

Specification Figure 2.1-1 were not exceeded.

Based on j

these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant

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safety or public health and safety as a result of this event.

Actions to prevent recurrence of this event are as l

follows:

s properly vented all sensing lines on the Unit 1 and 2

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flow transmitter, recalibrated the final feedwater computer points,

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b replaced a drifting. power supply for the feedwater

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temperature transmitters, and

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completed a review of the Preventive Maintenance

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Program to ensure that the instruments that provided input to U1118 are calibrated at the appropriate frequency.

l The inspector has no further comments.

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(c) 50-425/89-26, Rev. O, " Incomplete Coninunications Lead To

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Missed ASME Section XI Valve Testing."

On September 3, 1989, the Shift Supervisor noticed that a

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high-energy line break valve for steam generator blowdown

_ isolation had not been tested per ASME Section XI within-

the specified time interval.

Testing was immediately E

initiated and successfully completed.

The cause of this

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event was cognitive personnel error resulting from-

incomplete communications.

The Shift Supervisor responsible for completing the testing noted on the test

e completion documentation that the valve was not tested when originally scheduled.

However, the Surveillance Tracking Coordinator did not fully understand the note and did not

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reschedule the test prior to its due date.

In addition, the Shift-Supervisor did not appropriately notify the necessary personnel emphasizing procedural requirements to be followed when testing is not completed. This report was submitted as a voluntary LER.

The inspector reviewed with management personnel their

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criteria utilized to arrive at the conclusion that a missed surveillance of a required component had not ' occurred.

TS 3.3.3.11 requires that the high energy line break instrumentation listed in Table 3.3-11 shall be " operable."

The Table lists eight temperature elements and four flow

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transmitters as instrumentation for achievement of the-isolation function " Steam Generator Blowdown Line Isolation."

Each of the four blowdown lines is designed.

with two, train separated valves (HV-15212, HV-15216).

Automatic closure occurs when any one of the four temperature or the one f?ow transmitter for each respective valve reaches the high setpoint.

The valves are subject to L

TS 4.0.5 surveillance requirements for testing of ASME Code

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Class 2 components. TS 4.0.5.d stipulates that performance of the above inservice inspection and testing activities shall be in addition to other specified surveillance

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requirements.

TS 4.0.5.c stipulates that provisions of

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TS 4.0.2 are applicable.

Generic Letter 87-09 states that failure to perform a surveillance within the allowable L

surveillance interval defined by specification 4.0.2 constitutes a

reportable event under 10 CFR i

50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) because it is a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

The inspector raised the concern that the licensee views TS

3.3.3.11 as requiring only one valve to be operable and not two, therefore, concluding that a reportable condition could not exist.

The licensee initially determined that

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since no action statement was provided for a single lost component, that no requirement to have two existed.

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I item was considered unresolved in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-424/89-27-06 and 50-425/89-31-06.

The licensee has since then admitted to violating TS 4.0.5, which is

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discussed and documented in paragraph 4(b).

The inspector has.no further comments.

One non-cited violation in paragraph 3.b (2)(a) was identified.

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4.

ActionsonPreviousInspectionFindings-(92701)(92702)-

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(Closed) IFI.50-424/89-27-03 and 50-425/89-31-03, " Verify Complete Implementation Of Canvas Bags Over Equipment."

The inspector had observed several examples of chain hoists in safety-related pump rooms which had chains suspended directly above or resting against the safety related pump, motor, or piping.

The licensee's solution was to attach a canvas tool bag to each chain, place the chain inside the bags, and move the chain from directly above the pump to-a non-compromising position.

The bags were installed on hoists associated with the following-pumps on both

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units:

CCPs, ACCW, CCW, AFW, CS, and SI.

Signs were also installed

in each of these pump rooms which read, " Park Overhead Hoist At This End Of Room When Not In Use."

Signs and canvas bags will be installed in the future in the RHR pump rooms. The licensee has also

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agreed to install bags and signs on non-safety related pumps as time and materials permit. The inspector has no further comment.

b.

(Closed) URI 50-424/89-27-06 and 50-425/89-31-06, " Resolve Licensee Use Of Action Statements To Performance Requirements Of Limiting Conditions Of Operation."

On September 3, 1989, the Shift Supervisor noticed that a high-energy line break valve for steam generator blowdown isolation had not been tested per ASME Section XI within the specified time interval.

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Testing was immediately initiated and successfully completed.

(For

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details of this event, see paragraph 3.b.(2)(c)).

The lack of an action statement does not alleviate the responsibility to do the surveillance.

TS Section 4.0.2 is to be applied to

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L surveillance requirements only and has no applicability to the q

limiting conditions for operability or the action statements. Action statements invoking surveillance requirements should be met without

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benefit of 4.0.2 provisions since the unit is in a degraded condition and licensee attention is focused on ensuring that the plant is maintained in the safest condition.

This event represents a condition prohibited by technical specification due to a surveillance not being performed.

Furthermore, the licensee had failed to report this event pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

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The inspector concluded that a violation of NRC requirements did not exist regarding reportability due to the fact that a voluntary LER was submitted to the NRC within the required time frame of 30 days.

However,_ a violation of NRC requirements did exist for failure to conduct a technical specification required surveillance.

This

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licensee-identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in section V.G.1 ~ of the NRC Enforcement policy were satisfied. This item is identified as:

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NCV! 50-424/90-02-03 and 50-425/90-02-02, " Failure To Perform A Required Technical Specification Surveillance On A High Energy _-

g" Line Break Valve For Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation - LER 2-89-26."

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n c.

(Closed) URI 50-424/89-27-08 and 50-425/89-31-08, " Resolve ISEG Membership Replacement Requirements When Less Than Five ISEG Members."

Between mid-July 1989 and October 22, 1989, the staff of the ISEG was

less than the five members required by Technical Specification 6.2.3.

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' To comply with T.S. 6.2.3 to address any future ISEG staffing

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shortages. - the licenses issued an Interoffice Correspondence,

SAER-00122, dated January 24, 1990, entitled, "ISEG. Staffing Level

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Policy." That policy stated that the following guidelines should be followed in order to comply with T.S. 6.2.3.

Routine Transfer to Another~ Group... Transfer delayed until replacement is assigned.

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t Sudden Loss of Service........ Replace by.1ormal GPC Process within approximately one month.

Employee Quits Fired j

Dies Minor Loss of Service No change.

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(less than one month)

Holidays Vacation

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Short Term Sick Leave Routine Training National Guard Reserves Military Duty

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1 Significant Loss of Service Temporary replacement

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.(greater than one month)

until employee returns.

.Long term Sickness p-Long Term Training Assignment Temporary Re-assignment

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ISEG staffing level less than that required by Technical Specifi-cation 6.2.3_ represents a violation of technical specifications.

However, this violation is not being cited-because criteria specified

in Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. - This item is identified as:-

NCV 50-424/90-02-04 and 50-425/90-02-03, " Failure to Maintain ISEG Staffing Level As Required By TS 6.2.3."

Two non-cited _ violations (paragraphs 4.b and 4.c) were identified.

5.

Three Mile-Island Task Action Plan Followup - (425401B) - Unit 2 This inspection consists of verification that-the licensee has implemented the requirements of NUREG 0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," as committed to in the facility FSAR or other appropriate documents.

Verification consisted of one or more of the following attributes, as appropriate, to determine acceptability for each listed action item:-

- Program or procedure established

- Personnel training or qualification

- Completion of item.

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- Installation of equipment

- Drawings reflect the as-built configuration.

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- Component tested and in service or. integrated into the preoperational a

test program The following documents were utilized in performing the review, as appropriate:

NUREG 0578 TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report NUREG 0660 NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident L

NUREG 0694 THI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses-

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NUREG 0737 and Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements Supplement 1 FSAR and Final Safety Analysis Report Amendments NUREG 1137 and Safety Evaluation Report Supplements

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-15 (Closed) I.C.6, " Guidance On Procedures For Verifying Correct Performance Of Operating Activities."

- NUREG-0660- requires that licensees' procedures be reviewed and revised, as necessary, to ensure that an effective system of verifying the correct j

performance of operating activities is provided as a means of-reducing

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p human errors and improving the quality of normal operations.

This reduces l

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human errors 'and provides the quality of normal' operations, therefore

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reducing the frequency of occurrence of situations that could result in or contribute to accidents. Such a verification system may include automatic system status monitoring, human verification of operations and. maintenance r

activities independent of the people performing the activity, or both.

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This TMI action item was closed for Unit 1 in NRC Inspection Report.

i Nos. 50-424/86-74 and 50-425/86-35.

This Unit 2 item should have been closed along with the Unit 1 item due to the common nature of procedures 00304C (equipment clearance. and tagging) and 00308C (independent i

verification policy) original drafts dated April 13, 1984, and May 12, i

1985, respectively.

Due to the previous administrative oversight, the inspector considers this item closed for both Units 1 and 2.

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6.

Allegations Allegation RII-89-A-0081, a supervisor was alleged to be unstable because i

of alcohol abuse and displaying aggressive management.

l Concern

Several instances were cited where the alleged supervisor ridiculed, hazed and showed prejudice against contract personnel.

j Discussion The inspector reviewed the result of the QCP investigation and actions taken as described in QCP file numbers 85V0603, 87V0064, 87V0141, 88V0167, 88V0183, and 88V0364.

Throughout the history of these concerns, only two quality issues arose which related to the supervisor.

Conclusion At the conclusion of these investigations, neither of these concerns were substantiated.

Based on this review, the inspector considers this item to be closed.

The quality concerns program investigation regarding this allegation was considered to be thorough.

A professioaal attitude and eagerness to resolve quality concerns in a timely manner was noted by the i

Ic inspector and is considered to be a strength.

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Exit Interviews - (30703)

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 16, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection

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results.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The

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licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to

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or. reviewed by the. inspec_ tor during this inspection.

Region based NRC.

F exit interviews were attended during the inspection period by a resident inspector.

This inspection closed two Unresolved items (paragraphs 4(b)

and 4(c)), one Inspector Followup Item (paragraph 4(a)), one TMI Action Item-(paragraph 5), three-Licensee Event Reports (paragraph 3.b(2)), and

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one allegation (paragraph 6). The items identified during this inspection were:

NCV' 50-424/90-02-01, " Failure To Maintain Procedure 11744-1, Essential Chilled Water System Alignment, As Required By TS 6.7.1.a"

- paragraph 2.b(1).

NCV 50-424/90-02-02 and 50-425/90-02-01, " Failure To Complete An LCO Action Statement Within The Allowed Time When It Was Found That A Safety Related Battery Component Was Not Meeting Its Operability Requirements" - paragraph 3.b(2)(a).

NCV 50-424/90-02-03 and 50-425/90-02-02, " Failure To Perform A Required Technical Specification Surveillance On A High Energy Line Break Valve For Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation" para-

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graph 4(b).

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NCV 50-424/90-02-04 and 50-425/90-02-03, " Failure To Maintain ISEG Staffing Level as Required By TS 6.2.3" - paragraph 4(c).

8.

Acronyms And Initialisms AB Auxiliary Building ACCW Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System ASCO (trade name)

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CCP Coolant Charging Pump CCW Component Cooling Water System CFR Code of Federal _ Regulations CHLD Chilled CLG Cooling CS Containment Spray System DC Deficiency Cards DG Diesel Generator ENN Emergency Notification Network ENS Emergency Notification System ESF Engineered Safety Features EST Eastern Standard Time FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

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Georgia Power Company IFI-Inspector Followup Item f'

LISEG Independent Safety Engineering Group

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Limiting Conditions for. Operations-

-LER-Licensee Event Reports

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MSIV:

Main Steam Isolation Valve MW; Megawatt-

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MWO; Maintenance Work Order

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i NCV Non-cited Violation

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' Nuclear Power Facility NRC Nuclear Regulatory Conunission PESB Plant Entrance Security Building pm post meridian

'QC Quality Control-QCP Quality Controls Program Rev:

Revision RHR Residual. Heat Removal. System A

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.Three Mile' Island

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.Vogtle' Electric Generating Plant

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