IR 05000424/1990009

Insp Repts 50-424/90-09 & 50-425/90-09 on 900322-23 & 26-30. No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Occupational Radiation Safety During Extended Outages & Followup on Info Notices

ML20034C193
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	04/18/1990
From:	Gloersen W, Potter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20034C190	List: IR 05000424/1990009
References
50-424-90-09, 50-424-90-9, 50-425-90-09, 50-425-90-9, NUDOCS 9005020156
Download: ML20034C193 (12)

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NUCLEAR RET _ULATORY COMMlZION

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REGION ll y

,h 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

's ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30323

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APR 2 319?]

Report Hos.:

50-424/90-09 and 50-425/90-09 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.:

50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and CPPR-109 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 2 23 and 26-30, 1990

]DateSigned

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Approved by:

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Facilities Radiation Protection Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of occupational radiation safety during extended outages and followup on Information Notices.

In addition, this report documents a reactive inspection involving an allegation from an employee of a laundromat in Waynesboro, Georgia who alleged that individuals from Plant Vogtle were washing protective clothing garments at the laundry facility.

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Results:

In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. Based on interviews with licensee management, supervision, personnel from station departments, and records review, the inspector found the radiation protection program to be managed adequately.

The licensee's programs for external and internal radiation exposure controls were effective.

In preparation for the Unit I refueling outage, the licensee installed a dedicated breathirg air system.

It was also observed that the licensee quickly responded to the need for a laundromat survey near Plant Vogtle to help alleviate public concern over possible radioactivity in certain washers and dryers, 9005020156 900423 PDR ADOCK 05000424

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• • J. Aufdenkampe, Manager Technical Support G. Brenenborg, HP Lab Supervisor K.Duquette,SeniorNuclearSpecialist(OutageALARACoordinator)

• • G. Frederick, Superintendent - SAER

• • W. Gabbard, Nuclear Specialist I

• fW. Kitchens, Assistant Gencral Manager - Operations

• • I. Kochery, Health Physics Superintendent

• R. LeGrand, Manager - Health Physics and Chemistry Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, mechanics, technicians, and administrative personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

• R. Aiello

• • R. Starkey

• Attended exit interview on March 23, 1990

• • Attended exit interview on March 30, 1990

• 1. Attended both exit interviews 2.

AuditsandAppraisals(83750)

Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.2.8 requires that audits of plant activities be performed under the cognizance of the Safety-Review Board (SRB) and that the audits shall encompass, in part, the following:

(a) the conformance of plant operation to provisions contained within the TSs and applicable license conditions at least once per 12 months; and (b) the Process Control Program (PCP) and implementing procedures-for processing and packaging radioactive wastes at least once per 24 months.

The inspector reviewed the Radioactive Waste Control Audit 0QA-89-340, dated November 15, 1989, which was found to be well planned and documented and contained items of substance relating to the radwaste/ transportation program.

The reports of audit findings to management were also reviewed and found to contain responsive commitments by management to effect

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corrective actions for the deficiencies noted.

It was observed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-424/89-15 and 50-425/89-17 that the audits were generally not thorough and lacked detail.

The inspector observed a

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significant improvement in this portion of the licensee's program.

It was-

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noted that one of the lead auditors for 00A-89-340 was an individual from s

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another utility who was technically qualified in radweste and

transportation matters.

I No violations or deviations were identified.

3.

Changes (83750)

The inspector reviewed any major changes since the last inspection in

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organization, facilities, equipment, and programs that may affect occupations 1 radiation protection.

The inspector observed that the licensee had made a major equipment purchase in the acquisition and

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installation of a dedicated compressor and breathing air system for Unit 1.

This equipment upgrade was considered a program improvement.

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Atlas /Copco (trademark) compressor was rated at 630 ft3/ min at

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140 lbs/in8 The compressor will be shared with Unit 2.

The dedicated breathing air lines were installed in Unit I containment at the beginning of this outage.

Dedicated breathing air lines are scheduled to be installed in Unit 2 containment during the Unit 2 first refueling (U2RI)

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outage this fall. The licensee performed an analysis of the breathing air onsite and sent a sample offsite for analysis.

The results indicated at least Grade D quality air.

The offsite analysis was performed on r

March 12, 1990.

i No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Planning and Preparation (83750, 92709)

The inspector ascertained whether the licensee had prepared contingency plans covering an imminent strike so as to ensure the minimum number of qualified and proficient personnel were available to ensure that adequate coverage in the area of radiation protection was maintained.

The impact of the contractor health physics (HP) technician strike at Plant Vogtle was minimal since the licensee was nearly 90 percent complete with the Unit I second refueling (01R2) outage when the strike began.

Approximately seven HP Technicians supported the strike, t

The inspector also reviewed the licensee's augmentation of the HP staff to support the U1R2 outage.

The licensee hired 72 contract HP Technicians to supplement the permanent staff of 41 HP Technicians.

With approximately

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1,700 radiation workers at the facility and 113 HP Technicians, the ratio of HP Technicians to radiation workers was approximately 1:15.

In addition, the inspector reviewed the licensee's overtime records for HP Technicians and authorization for working more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in seven days.

This authorization was required by TS 6.2 and Administrative Procedure 00005-C.

After reviewing the overtime authorization forms, the inspector observed that a significant number of authorizations had been signed by management a week or more after the overtime was required. The inspector made the licensee aware of this observation and noted that AP 00005-C stated that overtime should be approved before the overtime is required, but prior approval was not required.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

External Exposure Control (83750)

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10 CFR 20.202 requires each licensee to supply appropriate monitoring equipment to specific individuals and requires the use of such equipment.

i By direct observation, discussion with licensee representatives and a review of records, the inspector determined that personnel dosimetry was

used effectively and in accordance with requirements for monitoring external exposure.

During tours of the Auxiliary Building and Unit 1 Containment, the inspector observed the use of thermoluminscent dosimeters t

(TLDs) and electronic direct reading dosimeters (EDRDs).

Individuals wearing protective clothing (PC) placed their EDRDs in their outside PC

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pocket so that radiation dose could be frequently monitored.

TLDs were placed inside the PC.

The inspector reviewed selected dosimetry records to determine if any one exceeded 1,250 mrem during the first quarter 1990.

During that time period, four individuals exceeded 1,250 mrem. The range

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was f rom 1,258 to 1,401 mrem.

The inspector determined that for those

individuals, the licensee complied with the requiremehts of 20.101(b)

which allows a licensee to permit an individual in a restricted area to receive a total occupational dose greater than than permitted under paragraph 20.101(a) (1,250 mrem whole body; 18,750 mrem extremity; 7,500 mrem skin of whole body).

Additionally, the inspector reviewed the form NRC-4 for those individuals noted above and noted that the licensee had

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determined the individual's prior accumulated occupational dose to the whole body.

The inspector also reviewed accumulated individual dose data for Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump and motor repair (Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 90-6611).

No individuals exceeded any administrative

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dose limits and the licensee had made adequate use of personal dosimeter data for dose controls.

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The inspector also c'ebrmined that the licensee was in compliance with 10 CFR 20.202(c) which.equires that personnel dosimeters that are used in accordance with 10 CFR 20.202(a) be processed by a processor accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) for the appropriate types of radiation.

The licensee uses its own Georgia Power Company Environmental Lab to process the TLDs and was accredited in test Categories I through VIII which included accreditation to measure neutron dose equivalent.

Exposure control was accomplished, in part, by the EDRD system. When an individual picks up an EDRD, he enters the applicable RWP number into the computerized access system.

The computerized system predetermines two alarm setpoints on the EDRD, accumulated dose set point of 1/10 of the

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worker's remaining dose, and a dose rate setpoint also based on the worker's remaining dose. Upon exiting the work area, the EDRD is rezerced recording the individual's dose in the computer.

No violations or deviations were identifie.

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Internal Exposure Control (83750)

10 CFR 20.103(b) requires the licensee to use process or other engineering controls to the extent practical, to limit concentration of radioactive material in air to levels below that specified in 10 CFR Part 20, (

Appendix B, Table 1. Column 1.

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10 CFR 20.103(b) also requires that when it is impracticable to apply

process or other engineering controls to limit concentrations of radioactive material, other precautionary procedures shall be used.

These precautionary procedures include respiratory protective equipment.

The use of process controls and engineering controls to limit airborne radioactivity in the plant was discussed with licensee representatives.

The licensee has 25 portable high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter units.

Eight portable HEPA units were rated at 2,000 ft3/ min while 17 units were rated at 1,000 f t3/ min.

The inspector also verified that

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National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) certified respirators were being used by the licensee.

After reviewing records of individuals who had been exposed to concentrations of radioactive material during the first quarter of 1990 and discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector determined that no individual had been exposed to concentrations nf radioactive material greater than 40 MPC-hours.

The inspector only noted two cases in which individuals had uptakes of Co-58 (202 nanocuries (nC1) and 112 nC1). 'The licensee evaluated the cases and made the following corresponding MPC-hr determinations:

4.1 MPC-hrs and 2.25 MPC-hrs.

10 CFR 20.103(a) requires the licensee to perform appropriate bioassays and assess intakes of radioactivity.

The inspector reviewed the whole body counting (WBC) equipment operation and discussed counting and calibration methods with equipment operators.

The licensee's WBC

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i equipment consisted of a Canberra Stand-up Fast Scan System.

The

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1kensee's stand-up unit provided rapid screening capabilities and also the capability to qualify the body burden of radioactive material, but it only provided crude activity localization capabilities. The licensee also had a Nuclear Data chair unit which at the time of this inspection was not

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in service.

The licensee plans to place this system in service to perform bioassay work.

The inspector reviewed the annual calibration and associated records which was performed on September 25, 1989.

Additionally, the inspector reviewed the daily quality control (QC) checks

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for March 1990 and noted that check source (Co-60/Cs-137) activities were plotted and tracked daily. There were no obvious problems associated with the data.

The QC and calibration records were well organized and maintained.

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Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination. Surveys, and Monitoring (83750)

The licensee was required by 10 CFR 20.201(b) and 20.401 to perform surveys and to maintain records of such surveys necessary to show compliance with regulatory limits.

During plant tours, the inspector examined postings of radiation levels and contamination levels for various areas in Unit 1 Containment and the Auxiliary Building.

Tours were also performed by accompanying HP Techr.icians on routine daily surveys.

Within the areas examined, all posting and labeling requirements were met. The inspector noted that the survey practices were adequate and that the technicians demonstrated an adequate awareness of the limitations of the survey instruments.

Survey data and information on plant conditions for use in work planning and dose control were disseminated in a timely manner and posted outside of each surveyed area room or cubicle.

The inspector also examined the licensee's radiation detection instrumentation and verified that (1) the portable instruments were in calibration; (2) there was an adequate supply; (3) the instruments were properly maintained; and (4) the performance checks of survey and monitoring equipment were performed daily.

While touring the instrument calibration facility, the inspector observed that area lighting was inoperable in the source calibrator room.

It was noted that this situation was immediately corrected before the end of the inspection.

During plant tours, the inspector observed that area D-78 of the Auxiliary Building was being used as a staging area or temporary storage area for high radiation outage-related waste.

The maximum contact dose rates were on the order of 600-700 mR/hr and the ' :neral area dose rate was approximately 200 mR/hr.

The area was properly posted as an unlocked

"High Radiation Area." Typically, waste from the Unit 1 containment would be transported from level 1 in a service. elevator to Level D of the Auxiliary Building and through a tortuous pathway to Room 0-78.

The licensee agreed that in order to minimize handling of the waste and to reduce the potential for lack of HP coverage on each level which is serviced by the elevator as the waste is transported down several levels, a better location to stage or temporarily store outage waste would be considered.

The inspector also reviewed records of personnel contaminations for 1989 and the U1R2 outage.

During 1989, the licensee only experienced 72 personnel contaminations, it should be noted; however, that the licensee only experienced 20 forced outage days in 1989, namely the U1 pressurizer outage (January 1989), U1 chemical volume control system outage (September 1989), and the U2 snubber outage (October 1989). As of March 28, 1990, the licensee had 48 skin and 15 clothing contaminations.

The U1R2 outage goal was 90 personnel contaminations.

The outage work was approximately 90 percent complete.

The 1990 station goal was 250 personnel contaminations. The licensee had a good system for tracking

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personnel contamination events (PCEs) by root cause, department, and body or clothing location.

The inspector observed that approximately 43 percent of the PCEs were due to poor work practices,13 percent due to improper use or removal of PCs,13 percent due to changing condition exceeding the capability of the PCs, and 10 percent due to failure of the PCs or other equipment.

Approximately 50 percent of the contaminations occurred on the head, neck, and face; 11 percent on the shoes and socks; and 10 percent on the hands / wrists, pants, and legs.

The licensee's contractors accounted for 46 percent of the PCEs while the following groups accounted for the balance:

operations (18 percent), waste and decon (13 percent), maintenance (11 percent), HP (3 percent), and Quality

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Assurance (QA)(3 percent).

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Maintaining Occupational Exposure ALARA (83750)

Paragraph 20.1(c) of 10 CFR 20 requires that licensees should make every

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reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures as far below the limits specified in Part 20 as is reasonably achievable.

Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10 provide information relevant to attaining goals and objectives i

for planning and operating light-water reactors and provide e general i

operating philosophy acceptable to the NRC as a necessary basis for a program of maintaining occupational exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

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Rodiatiun Source and Field Control

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's efforts in utilizing proven industry-developed methods of controlling out-of-core radiation sources and fields.

Since the licensee's facility is relatively new and there has been no significant fuel integrity problems, unusual efforts to reduce source term have not been necessary. However, the licensee was planning to remove the resistance thermocouple detector (RTD) bypass mainfolds in the Unit 1 Reactor Building during the third (next) refueling outage and in Unit 2 during refueling outage number 2.

During the last two Unit 1 outages, at shutdown, the licensee added

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hydrogen peroxide to the primary system to induce crud bursts for subsequent removal of radioactive cobalt which had become soluble during the peroxide addition. Both times the licensee added hydrogen peroxoide to the primary coolant af ter draining the system to the reactor vessel nozzle center lines (mid-plane method)..

The solubilized " crud" was then removed by the purification system ion exchangers.

During the UIR2 outage the chemical volume control

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system (CVCS) demineralizers were placed out of service on four occasions during critical periods after shutdown for a total of 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br />.

The CVCS demineralizers were out of service due to the scheduling of various emergency system tests and design changes..

After the hydrogen peroxide induced crud bursts were initiated,

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insufficient ion exchange was utilized to remove the soluble radioactive cobalt.

This resulted in increased dose rates in the reactor coolant system.

This scheduling problem was discussed during an ALARA Committee meeting on March 21, 1990.

The ALARA Congnittee decided to evaluate the rescheduling of various tests and work activities during the hydrogen peroxide addition.

The irdpector and licensee representatives discussed the addition of hydrogen peroxide to the primary coolant system with the system completely full.

This method would allow cleanup to occur throughout the primary system, whereas the mid-plane induced crud burst method removes crud from the reactor core surfaces only.

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Licensee Awareness and Involvement The inspector also discussed with licensee representatives wcrkers awareness and involvement in the ALARA program.

The inspector observed that the licensee had an ALARA suggestion program established, however, there has been no formal participation in the program.

Currently, there was no ALARA suggestion incentive program and only one ALARA suggestion receptacle.

The licensee agreed that this asptct of the ALARA Program could be improved by placing

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additional receptacles around the facility and evaluating the need for tr. incentive program.

The licensee's ALARA Committee consisted of the Committee Chairman (General Manager) the ALARA Coordinator, and a manager and/or superintendent from tne following groups:

Mechanical Maintenance; Electrical Maintenance, 18C Maintenance; Engineering; Operations; QC/QA; Technic 61 Support; and HP/ Chemistry.

The committee met at least once per quarter or as needed to discuss collective dose goals, objectives, personnel contaminations, ALARA concerns, and additional work scope, c.

ALARA Goals and Objectives The inspector discussed with licensee representatives the 1990 station collective dose goal, the U1R2 outage goal and the U2R1 outage goal and how the licensee was tracking its goals.

The collective dose goals for the station, normal operations U1R2 and U2R1 were the following:

310 person-rem; 31 person-rem; 145 person-rem; and 134 person-rem, respectively.

As of March 26, 1990, the actual U1R2 collective dose was 185 person-rem.

The licensee provided the following reasons for the collective dose being much higher than expected:

Increased outage scope

Design CMnge packages were issued late to the field (ie, man-hour estimates were not available at the time the original estimates were made)

Radiation dose rates were higher than expected

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RCS cleanup after shutdown was inadequate (See Paragraph 8.a)

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Poor work practices and field coordination With regard to the increased outage scope the following was

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identified:

59 snubber retests; RHR pump work and check valve work; problems with the fuel handling equipment, miscellaneous discovery

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and corrective maintenance projects, reactor head conoseal gasket i=

leak, reactor. head / stud and conoseal decon, and decontamination of contaminated system spills in containment and the Auxiliary Building.

In addition four tubes were required to be plugged in Steam Generator (S/G) No. 2.

The licensee also observed higher than expected dose rates throughout F

the Unit 1 Containment Building.

The licensee compared the average

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dose rates in containment for U1R.1 and U1R2 refueling outages.

The

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dose rates were approximately 100 percent higher on the average during U1R2 than during U1RI.

For example, the dose rates around the filled reactor cavity were 27.5 mR/hr during this outage compared to

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0.2 mr/hr during the U1R1 outage, it was also observed that the

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average dose per entry into containment for U1R2 was 3.9 mR/ entry

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compared to 1.7 mR/ entry for VIR1.

The average time per entry also increased from 115 minutes for U1R1 to 133 minutes for U1R2.

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total number of entries significantly(as of March-decreased from the first refueling outage from 76,563 to 49,076 28,1990),

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ALARA Results The inspector discussed with licensee representatives successes in meeting ALARA goals.

As discussed above, the licensee did not meet its U1R2 goal of 145 person-rem. The actual collective dose for U1R2 as of March 28, 1990 was approximately 185 person-rem.

Considering the outage work scope for U2R1 scheduled for this Fall, it would appear that the licensee would have difficulty in meeting the 1990 station goal of 310 person-rem. The inspector noted that the station collective dose goal was established by the Vogtle Project Vice-President who reviews the collective dose goal request submitted by the Radiation Protection group through the Station Manager.

It was not clear to the inspector on how the station cc11ective-dose goal was established at 310 person-rem when the original outage work scope for U1R2, U2R1, and power operations was estimated to be 420 person-rem.

The inspector and licensee representatives discussed

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the importance of establishing realistic dcse goals.

The following was discussed:

(1) dose goals that are too ambitious may not be achievable; (2) successes in meeting ALARA goals and objectives provide measures of ALARA program effectiveness; (3) not meeting unrealistic ALARA goals could cause unnecessary concerns among plant staff that the ALARA procram is ineffective; and (4) continual failure to meet ALARA goafs and objectives could cause disinterest among plant staff.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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9.

FollowuponAllegations(99014)

t concern:

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The alleger stated that the licensee was washing protective clothes (PCs)

in a public laundry facility in Waynesboro, Georgia regularly since february 23, 1990.

D,iscussion:

On March 22, 1990, the inspector contacted the licensee regarding this practice and made an onsite visit to discuss this concern with licensee representatives.

The inspector determined that the licensee was not sending PC garments to the laundry facility referred to above; however, the licensee was washing yellow colored multipack dosimetry vests and

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multipack dosimetry skull caps at the offsite laundry facility.

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vests and skull caps were worn underneath the PC in the same manner as modesty garments were worn.

The licensee had been practicing this method

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of washing these garments since the first Unit I refueling outage.

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estimated that 418 dosinietry vests had been washed for Unit I refueling outage No. 2.

The licensee used a total of three administrative clerks (two contract clerks, one licensee clerk) to perform the laundry duties.

The vests had been worn by a variety of personnel, including HP Technicians, S/G jumpers, and various maintenance personnel.

All individuals exiting a contaminated area, including individuals wearing the dosimetry vests, were required to step in both a gamma portal monitor and a gas-flow proportional portal monitor.

The gamma portal monitors (SPM-904) contained plastic scintillator detectors and were used as the first level of contamination detection, especially in detecting " hot particles."

The gas-flow proportional portal monitors (IPM-7) were used as the second level of contamination detection and control and were designed to detect contamination due to alpha or beta radiation.

The monitors were calibrated in a manner such that an individual would cause an alarm if the contamination level was greater than or equal to 5,000 dpm/100 cm.

The inspector reviewed the calibration data for the r

SPM-904s and IPM-7s located outside of the manway exit of Unit 1 Containment Building and a sampling of the daily source checks.

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The calibrations were performed once per six months as required by procedure and there were no problems observed with the daily source check data.

For the IPM-7, the licensee used a Tc-99 button source and periodically used a plant smear sample of approximately 5,000 dpm/100 cme containing Mn-54, Co-57, and Os-137 for the source check.

A 1.1 uCi Cs-137 button tource was used for the daily source check on the SPM-904's.

Although the IPM-7 and the SPM-904 were set to alarm at 5,000 dpm/100 cm,

r the monitors actually alarmed at a lower level since the surface area of the detectors was approximately 400 cm,r

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The inspector, accompanied with two licensee representatives, met with the owner of the laundry facility in Waynesboro, GA on March 23, 1990.

The inspector discussed with the owner any radiological safety concerns she may have had.

The owner indicated that she had no immediate concerns and stated that one of her employees had made the allegation.

An upper management licensee representative provided the owner with a letter from the Georgio Power Company's Plant Vogtle signed by W. F. Kitchens for G. Bockhold, Jr. indicating that the multiple dosimetry clothing sent to the laundry facility was released from Plant Vogtle as non-radioactive material.

The letter provided a point of _ contact and phone number at Plant Vogtle should any further questions'arise. As further assurance to the owner of the laundry facility that the dosimetry vests were not contaminated, the licensee perJormed an area radiation survey and a contamination survey of the laundry f acility.

The contamination survey included smear samples taken inside each washer and dryer, table top surf aces, and cashier counter.

All smear results were less than 100 dpm/100 cm.

The background dose rate in the building was 10 micro r

R/hr.

A representative sample of the smears was analyzed by a gamma spectrometer and the results indicated no nuclides present.

The inspector and licensee representatives discussed the practice of washing dosimetry vests at offsite laundry facilities.

The licensee indicated that in order to preclude an apparent public misconception, plans had been initiated to purchase washing and drying equipment for plant Vogtle.

This equipment would be strictly used for washing

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non-contaminated clothing.

The licensee indicated that this equipment should be available for the Unit 2 refueling outage in September 1990.

Findinos:

The inspector determined that the licensee was washing bright yellow-colored muitiple dosimetry clothing in a laundry facility in Waynesboro, Georgia.

This practit.e had been continuing regularly since February 23, 1990.

The licensee had also washed dosimetry vests at offsite laundry facilities during the first Unit I refueling outage. The clothing was worn like an undergarment and used for containing multiple radiation monitoring devices for radiation workers.

The licensee was not washing PCs at the Waynesboro laundry facility.

Conclusion:

This allegation was not substantiated in that the licensee was not washing PCs at the laundry facility in Waynesboro, Georgia, 10. NRCInformationNotices(92701)

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The inspector determined that the following Information Notice (IN) had been received by the licensee, reviewed for applicability, distributed to appropriate personnel, and that action, as appmpriate, was taken or scheduled:

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89-13 Alternate Waste Management Procedures in Case of Denial of Access to Low-Level Waste Disposal Sites The following ins had been received by the licensee; however, reviews had not been completed:

89-47 Potential Problems with Worn or Distorted Hose Clamps on Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (the licensee had only received this IN from the Corporate Office on March 27, 1990)

90-08 Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel 11. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on March 23 and 30,1990.

The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the. inspection.

The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

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