IR 05000424/1990028
| ML20024F852 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1990 |
| From: | Brian Bonser, Brockman K, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024F847 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-90-28, 50-425-90-28, NUDOCS 9012270047 | |
| Download: ML20024F852 (10) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -.
[go me og#
UNIT E D ST AT E S
NUCLE An nECULATOnY COMMISSION g ',
/,(
RE GION 11 t,fa [ '
O 101 M ARIE T T A ST R E LT, N W,
- '
AT L AN1 A. GLORGI A 30373 g s., j
.....
Report lios.:
50-424/90-28 ano 50-425/90-28 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.:
NPF-68 and NPF-81 Facility Name:
Vogtle Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
October 27 - November 23, 1990 Inspectors:
C*
P k^
l b/?"
B. R. Bonser, Senio6 Resid t Isspector Date Signed bc k. b /.o fg^
lL
$
a R.D.Starkey,Residen{ Inspectok>
Date Signed Accompanied By:
P. A. Balmain, Resident Inspector Approved By: $
eXi'l J
JS/ 3 h K. E. Brocknian, Sec%on Chief f)at4 Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection entailed resident inspection in the following areas: plant operations, maintenance observation, surveillance observation, plant startup from refueling, and followup of events.
Results:
One violation was identified involving two examples of a failure to follow procedures both of which resulted in ESF actuations.
(Paragraphs 3a and 3b)
A weakness was identified in the area of procedural compliance.
(Paragraph 3b)
!
9012270047 901213 PDR ADOCK 05000424 O
.. _ _.
.
. = -
-
- - - - - - -
- -
.. _ - -
_-
_-
--
,
.
W
!
,
DETAILS
'
1.
Persons Contacted
>
Licensee Employees
l
- S. Chesnut, Manager-Technical Support
- C. Christiansen, Safety Audit and Engineering Group Supervisor
'
- T. Greene, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
'H. Handiinger, Manager Maintenance l
),
- K. Holmes, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness
- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations
- R. LeGrand, Manager Health Physics and Chemistry
- G. McCarley, Independent Safety Engineering Group Supervisor
- R. Odom, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor
- W. Shipman, Acting General Manager Nuclear Plant
- J. Swartzwelder, Manager Operations Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors, engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors, and office personnel.
- Attended Exit Interview An alphabetical list of acronyms and initialisms is located in the last paragraph of the inspection report.
2.
PlantOperations-(71707)
The inspection staff reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period-to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical-
.
Specifications, and administrative controls.
Control logs, shift supervisors' logs, shif t relief records, LC0 status logs, night orders and standing orders, lif ted wires and jumper logs, and clearance. logs were routinely reviewed.
Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, engineering support and technical support personnel.
Daily plant status meetings were routinely attended.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and shif t changes. Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's procedures. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications.
Direct-observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety. Operating parameters were observed to verify they were within Technical Specification limits. The inspectors also reviewed Deficiency Cards to determine whether the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
.
,-.____ _ _ _ ___ _ _.- _ _. _,__ __,___ _ _ _
.
.
..
.
'
.
Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine basis.
They included, but were not limitsd to, the turbine building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, NSCW towers, diesel buildings, AFW buildings and the low voltage switchyard.
During plant tours, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies / procedures were followed.
This included observation of HP practices and review of area sura.ys, radiation work permits, postings, and instrument calibration.
The inspectors verified that the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the PA; vehicles were properly authorized, searched, and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; and personnel in vital areas were authorized.
,
On October 30, 1990, at 5:10 a.m. (CST), as documented in DC 2-90-292, a hold clearance intended for Unit 1 NSCW Pump 4 was incorrectly placed on the Unit 2 NSCW Pump 4.
The Unit 1 control room handswitch had been properly placed in " pull-to-lock" and tagged.
However, the Unit 2 pump breaker had been racked out and a hold tag was placed on the Unit 2 'B'
shutdown panel transfer switch.
At 0830 CST, the Unit 2 Reactor Operator noticed the loss of power indication to NSCW Pump 4 Subsequent investigation led to the discovery of the clearance having been placed on the wrong unit. Although an independent verification (1.V.) had been performed by the responsible PE0s when the clearance was hung, neither PE0 realized that he was on the wrong unit.
The responsible PEOs were counseled.
The subject of proper I.V. will be addressed in future requalification training classes, it should be noted that during the time that Unit 2 NSCW Pump 4 was out of service, both of the other 2 pumps in Train 'B' were operable and running, i
a.
Unit 1 Suninary L
Unit 1 operated in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at full power throughout
,
the reporting aeriod. During this period an increase in the RCS identified leacage rate was detected. The leakage into the RCDT
'
l increased to approximately 3.5 gpm and then stabilized at that level.
(TS permits a maximum of 10 gpm identified leakage). The licensee determined that two potential sources of the leakage are the RTO bypass lines and the RHR suction valves. The licensee plans to shut down the unit for repairs if the leakage rate increases further.
l l.
!'
,
-
.
. - - -
-
- - -. - -- -..
- -
-
-.. - -
- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
____
-___
_
_ ____.
-
'
.
,
.
'
b.
Unit 2 Summary i
Unit 2 began this inspection period in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown)
awaiting the completion of maintenance act1vities before commencing a startup following 2R1. The unit achieved criticality on November 9, at 7:05 p.m. (EST), entered Mode 1 on November 12, tied to the grid on November 14, at 8:25 a.m. (EST), and reached 100%
!
power on November 19.
The inspection period ended with Unit 2 at 100% power, c.
Steam Generator Level Tap Modification During 2R1, the licensee made a modification, as described in DCp 90-V2N00/2, to the SG narrow range level indication system. The modification relocated the level of the SG lower tap from 438 inches elevation to 333 inches, as measured from the top of the SG tubesheet, increasing the level span from 128 inches to 233 inches.
Relocation of the level tap resulted in an increased band of
indication, which allowed adjustment of the low-low steam generator level reactor trip setpoint and provided additional operating margin.
This additional margin to the ' rip setpoint will enable Vogtle to withstand a feed pump trip frna 100% power without a resultant reactor trip and will minimize the effect of SG level shrink / swell phenomena due to feedwater flow rate changes at low power.
During the reactor startup following 2R1, a noticeable improvement in SG level stability was observed as a result of this modification.
This modification necessitated a change to the TS which the licensee submitted in an application dated May 29, 1990.
The amendments were approved and became effective on August 30, 1990. The amendments revised TS Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-3 by adding a second set of values for SG low-low and high-high instrumentation.
Unit I will be similarly modified during its next refueling outage.
3.
SurveillanceObservation(61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy.
The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work.
The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were cenducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.
-
-
-
.. -
- -, -.
.
. - - -
-
. -.,,..
-
_ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _.
.
j
.
Listed below are surveillances which were either reviewed or witnessed:
Surveillance No.
Title 13502-2, Rev 6 Control Rod Drive And Position Indication System 14701-1, Rev. 9 Reactor Trip Breakers UV And Shunt Trip Test 14748-2, Rev. 1 AFW Check Valve Cold Shutdown Inservice Test 14801-2, Rev. 3 NSCW Transfer Pump Inservice Test 14980-1, Rev. 22 Diesel Generator Operability Test 88006-C, Rev. 1 Rod Drop Time Measurement With Drop Cart a.-
Actuation of Containment Isolation Valves On October 26, 1990, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 and the reactor coolant loops filled, a partial ESF actuation occurred while restoring train
B of the Solid State Protection System.
This actuation was briefly discussed in Inspection Report 50-424,425/90-25 and is discussed in more detail here.
On October 26, an 1&C crew was assigned to restore train B of the SSPS in accordance with Procedure 24831-2, Reactor Trip and ESF Logic Response Time Test Section 4.12. Restore To Service. After SSPS Train B was taken to " Test", as requested, the I&C crews divided up the restoration tables of procedure 24831-2 and began the restoration process.
Approximately 30 minutes after the repositioning of card jumpe*s and removal of jumpers began, the Unit 2 Balance of Plant Operator obsarved a Train B containment isolation valve in the reactor coolant normal letdown line, 2HV-8152, showing dual indication followed by fully closed indication. Over a short period, several other Train B containment isolation valves and several Train 8 containment ventilation isolation valves were noted to close. At this time, it was realized by Operations that the SSPS restoration was causing plant equipment to operate and the restoration was.
discontinued until the cause could be determined.
,
The cause of the event was a failure to follow the step sequence requirements, as delineated in the procedure.
Prior to the removal of these jumpers, the procedure required the I&C technicians to request the R0 to restore blocks and reset the ESF actuation signals, as necessary.
I&C technicians failed to request the R0 to perform this step, since they did not refer back to the body of the
...
..
...
.
...
--
_
..
_ _ _ _ -,
.-
.
.
.
..
.
-. --. - - - - - - - - - - -. - -. - - -. -. - - -. - -
- -
'
i
.
.
i procedure in performing the restoration, but relied on only the restoration tables for guidance.
Since the slave relays were still actuated as a result of performing the ESF logic response time test, the removal of the jumpers allowed the ESF signals to be sent to the associated plant components.
A contributing cause of this event was the misunderstanding that the I&C technicians and the operators had concerning the effects of the SSPS test switch on the slave relays in the output section of SSPS.
This led to the mistaken belief that
,
'
putting the switch in the test position would preyr '. any equipment
operation.
The licensee's investigation into the event identified 52 jumpers that had been removed from the SSPS slave relay output contacts.- A review of the jumpers removed versus the components that operated determined that all ESF components that should have operated under the existing plant conditions did operate.
As a result of this event no unsafe plant configuration resulted.
This event is the first of two examples of a failure to follow procedure constituting Violation 50-424,425/90-28-01. The licensee issubmittinganLER(50-425/90-15) on this event, b.
Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation On November 8, 1990, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 (Hot Standby), the TDAFW pump was inadvertently started while preparing to perform response time testing on the pump. The response time testing was required to be performed following compis tion of repacking the TDAFW pump, in preparation for the respcase time testing, technicians connected a recorder in the auxiliary relay panel in accordance with procedure 54844-2, Train C TDAFW Pump Response Time Test and 2HS5106A TAD 0T. - Connection of the recorder created an electrical flow path which opened the TDAFW pump steam admission valve, HV-5106, starting the pump. The valve was immediately closed.
Pump speed was reduced and the pump continued to run on mini-flow while the cause of the valve opening was investigated.
The direct cause of this event was a failure to follow procedure by the Duty Engineer.
The Duty Engineer did not ensure that the procedure was performed in order. This resulted in completing the steps for the recorder hook-up before completing the prerequisites.
Had the procedure been followed, the recorder connection would not have caused the steam admission valve to open.
Contributing to this event was a lack of awareness by the shift supervisor, who permitted the hook-up of the recorder without performing an adequate review of the method or the consequences.
This event is the second of two examples of a failure to follow procedures constituting violation 424,425/90-28-01. The licensee is submitting an LER on this event.
_ _ _ _
____ _ _., _ _. _ _ _
_.
.
-
. -. -.-
- _. -.
._.-
_
_--
_.
_- - - _.-...- _.- - -..
J
It should be noted that licensee management has identified the issue
.
of procedural compliance as a major concern.
Several of the
problems which occurred during 2R1 can be traced to procedural non-compliance. These failures to comply with procedures cannot be attributed to one cause; however, the causes appear to stem more from a lack of attention to detail and awareness of plant status rather than a disregard for procedural compliance.
On November 21, 1990, the Assistant General Manager Operations met with managers and supervisors to discuss procedural compliance.
He noted several examples of failure to adhere to procedures during recently completed 2R1 and stated that this was the single most negative trend of the outage.
He directed those in attendance to fully endorse procedural compliance, talk with their personnel, and make timely procedure revisions. He stated that plant management will monitor progress through management observations, the DC program, and LERs.
One violation was identified.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
'The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures. Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards.
The inspectors also verified that: redundant components were operable; administrative controls were followed; clearances were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was
adequate; qualitj control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-moi"tenance testing was performed; and independent verification requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure.that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance activities:
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance activities:
MWO No.
Work Description 19003664 Repair CCW Pump Motor 19004250 Replace Calcon Vibration Switch On IB DG 19004232 Install MDD #90-V1M194 P-3 Logic Orifice Sizing Change On 1B DG 28906371 Replace Packing On TDAFW pump Seals 29003348 Perform Functional Testing Requirements For 2HV-3016A No violations or deviations were identified.
, _
,
..
,
.. _ - - _. - _
-
.. -
__
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
5.
Plent Startup From Refueling (71711)
The inspectors witnessed portions of the tests and evolutions listed below to verify that ttartup activities, heatup, the approach to criticality, and core physics testing conducted following 2R1 were accomplished in a controlled manner and in compliance with approved procedures.
12002-C, Rev. 19, Unit Heatup To Normal Operations Temperature And Pressure 54015-2, Rev. 2, Reactor Coolant System RTD Cross-Calibration 88006-C, Rev. 1, Rod Drop Time Measurement With Rod Drop Test Cart 12003-C, Rev. 12, Reactor Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2)
88002-C, Rev. 1, Reload Low Power Physics Testing During the performance of rod drop time measurements on November 8, 1990, the licensee experienced indication problems with the rod control system.
When shutdown bank withdrawal was initiated, rod step counters indicated motion on both SDA and CBA, however, DRPI indications indicated position only on CBA. Licensee I&C personnel determined that a failure of a " Rod Bank Overlap" card caused the indication problem and they replaced the card.
On November 9, 1990, a similar problem occurred. When control bank withdrawal was initiated an "RPI URGENT ALARM' was received.
The step counter indication showed motion on CBA, CBC, and CBD; DRPI indication showed motion on CBA and CBD. The licensee determined that L !s failure was also due to a fault on the " Rod Bank Overlap" card, but in a different portion than the earlier failure.
The faulty card was replaced and no significar.t problems occurred for the remainder of control rod withdrawal.
7.
Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702)
As a followup to the March 20, 1990 Site Area Emergency, during the Unit 2 refueling outage the resident inspectors monitored the licensee's implementation of vehicular controls in the low voltage switchyard and staging of portable equipment. The inspectors were satisfied that the licensee had effectively implemented the controls.
- - - - - -
_ - -.
_ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
... - _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _.. _. _ _. _. _. _. _.. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _. _.. - _.,
'
.
,
8
8.
Exit Meeting i
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 26, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
'
Item Number
. Description and Reference VIO 424.425/90-25-01 Violation of TS 6.7.1 - Failure to Follow Procedures with two examples (Paragraphs 3.a and 3.b)
,
9.
Acronyms And Initialisms
'
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System CBA Control Bank A CBC Control Bank C CBD Control Bank D CCW Component Cooling Water System CST Central Standard Time DC Deficiency Cards DCP Design Change Package DG Diesel Generator DRPI Digital Rod Position Indication System-ESF Engineered. Safety Features
'
EST Eastern Standard Time HP Health Physics I&C Instrumentation and Controls-IV Independent Verification LC0 Limiting Conditions for Operations LER Licensee Event Reports MDD Minor Departure from Design MWO Maintenance Work Order NPF Nuclear Power Facility NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSCW Nuclear Service Cooling Water System PA Protected Area PE0 Plant Equipment Operator RCS Reactor _ Coolant System Rev Revision RHR Residual Heat Removal System RCDT Reactor Coolant Drain Tank R0 Reactor Operator RTD Resistance Temperature Detector SDA Shutdown Bank A SG Steam Generator
_ _ _ - _ _, _,.. _. _. _ _, _, _. _ _ _
.
. -
.. -.
. - -.
. _. _ _... _ _.. _. _ _ _ _. _. _. _
_. _ _. -
_ _ _ -.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _...
- >
.
.
'
1'
!.
'
>
t i
SSPS Solid State Protection System
)
{
TAD 0T Trip Actuation Device Operability Test
,
i TDAFW Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
!
TS Technical Specifications
,
UV Vnder Voltage i
VIO Violation
'
2R1 Unit 2 - 1st Refueling Outage
!
.
!
!
,
i
3
!
>
l I
l r
<
ww---
.. - -. - e mm m. -.,-..
--r.,,
ew-... -
-e.+--e
%-v a
%,-,..
-,.ww.,e....--w.e_.
rw -
ww+
m--,-.<e--
,u-,..--ne--.rewee,-,wiwe.,
, 4
,r--+-
- ,