IR 05000424/1997011

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Repts 50-424/97-11 & 50-425/97-11 on 971102-1213. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations & Maint
ML20198M686
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 01/12/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198M315 List:
References
50-424-97-11, 50-425-97-11, NUDOCS 9801200087
Download: ML20198M686 (18)


Text

33.

}l+

[ w, _

'

' ~

...-

,

'

.

,.

_

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY-COMMISSIO,N'(NRC).-

'

"

4:

-

. REGION ll-~

i

,

-y--

l

-

Docket Nosi:50-424:and.50-425:

-

'

7 License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF.-81:

I

~ Report No:--

- 50-424/97-11,;50-425/97-11 Licensee:

' Southern Nuclear rating. Company. Inc.

-

Facility:-

Vogtlel Electric Generating :lant (VEGP) Units 1 and 2 Location;.

7821 River Road

-

Waynesboro.;GA 30830

,

Dates:

November 2 through December 13. 1997--

Inspectors:

'M. Widmann. Acting Senior Resident Inspector K. 0'Donohue. Resident'. Inspector l Approved by:

P. - Skinner. - Chief

' ' '

Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

.

>

>

t j

khc T.

ly..

-

-

Enclosure 3

.

~

9901200087 990112 PDR ADOCK 0S000424

PDR g

.

<

.

-%.,

,

,-

-l-g

--

.--

.. _ _.,

s e-

-

.

.

,

..

-

.

.

.

.

- -

-.

..

.

.-

,

e-

-

EXECUTIVE' SUMMARY U

-

.

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant: Units 1 and 2 L-NRC-Inspection Report 50-424/97-11, 50-425/97-11

'

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations engineering.. maintenance, and plant suoport. The report-covers a 6-week.

>

period of resident: Inspection.

,

,

Ooerations-In general, the conduct of operations was professional and

  • -

-safety-conscious-(Section 01.1)..

'

The inspectors determined that technical specification (TS) minimum

>

.

-

requirements'for staffing were met, and that the licensee was adequately staffed to respond to an event.

In addition, the inspectors concluded '~

. that the safety significt,nce of a-failure to aroperly implement standing order (50) 2-97-04 " Residual Heat Removal (RiR) Train A Pump Room Drain -

2-1218-U4-101," which required an operator to be assigned non-conflicting job functions, was minimal-. Although the licensee assigned.

multiple duties to one individual, that conflict did not impede the licensee *s ability to. effectively respond to an accident (Section 01.2).

~

  • '

' A non-cited violation was identified due to the assignment of multiple

-

'

< duties to operations personnel in conflict with 50 2-97-04 (Section 01.2)-.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee has the capability to close

dual function valves remotely with a safety injection (SI) signal present (Section 01.3).

Clearances were performed (i.e., installed and removed) in accordance

established procedure guidance (Section 03.1).

The-freeze protection and heat tracing equipment was capable of

performing its intended function.

The improved equipment conditions were the result of the license 2's effort to closecut previously identified items (Section 03.2).

The inspectors concluded that the reactor systems for Units 1 and 2 were

operated and aligned in accordance with applicable plant procedures, s

However, the inspectors identified a malfunctioning reactor power chart recorder that went: undetected and uncorrected for approximately 32 days.

This was considered an example of. inattention to detail on.the part of the control room reactor operators (Section 04.1).

.

Enclosure 3

,

l x

.

v

,,,--e.

,,

,

r

-

t

'

.

.

.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program for operator

.

requalification, specifically the implementation of segment examinations. met the established program and procedure requirements.

Procedure 00715-C adequately addressed the various aspects of segment examinctions to effectively administer exams and implement remedial training as deemed appropriate (Section 05.1).

Maintenance Observed maintenance and surveillance activities were thoroughly

+

m ipleted and professionally performed (Secticas M1.1 and M1.2).

A violation was identified for the licensee's failure to properly test

ti.? reactor tri) and bypass breakers in accordance with TS Surveillance Requirements (Sls).

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's surveillance procedures 14420-1/2 and 14421-1/2 were inadequate. In that, the procedures did not test all required contacts for the reactor trip and bypass breakers on a 31-day staggered Dasis consistent with the trip actuation devite operability test (TAD 0T) requirements of TS SR 3.3.1.4.

In addition, the inspectors also concluded that procedures 14752-1/2 were also inadequate. in that the procedures did not test the P-4 signal generated by the bypass breaker to the electrohydraulic control (EHC) system consistent with the TADOT requirement of TS SR 3.3.2.9 (Section M8.1).

A deviation was identified for the licensee's failure to perform

required testing of reactor coolant pump (RCP) circuit breakers per Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 13.8.1. Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection devices, at least once per 18 months since initial startup of both units (Section M8.2).

Enclosure 3 I

- __ _

.

.

.

.

.

,

s

.

.

' '

-

.

.

,,

l

,

,

'Recort Detailst ll

,

'

Summary of Plant Status fUnit1

~

-The' unit operated ati full power-throughout the inspection period.

>

Lunit: 21

'

(The unit operated at full power throughout the inspection period.

I.

Ooerations

Conduct of _ Operations

'

01.1_ General Comments (71707)-

.

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations.

In general, the reviews indicated that the conduct of operations was

,

professional and safety-conscious.

01.2' Shift Mannina-

- a '.

Insoection Scoce (71707)

The inspectors reviewed' operations department shift staffing to.

determine 'if the licensee has maintained requirements in accordance with

-

,

Procedure 00012-C, ' Shift Manning Requirements," Revision-(Rev.) 10 and c

the staffing recuirements of Technical Specifications (TS).

Section 5.2.2. lnit Staff.. ThEinspectors reviewed control room logs:

'

the Emergency Plan. and applicable portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).- As 3 art of this inspection effort. th inspectors reviewed Standing Grder (S0) 2-97-04. " Residual Heat Removal

-

TRHi) Train A Pump Room Drain 2-1218 U4-101." The S0 was issued to

'2-1218-U4-101.perator to ensure that Unit 2 RHR drain valve-

. designate an o be closed in an emergency situation. The drain valve,

.normally closed, was throttled open to allow continuous drainage of a

+

packing. leak on RHR train A suction valve 2-HV-8812A, The opened drain valve, provided a potential pathway of radioactive material out of the-auxiliary building following an Emergency-Core Cooling System (ECCS)

' injection and swap over to ECCS recirculation per Emergency Operating

'

-

- Procedure (EOP) 19013-C 'ES --1.3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation '

"

manning: requirements :The inspectors also d', potential impact on shift Rev.zl8.- 50-2-97-04 was reviewed due to the V: _

~

scussed shift manning

-. issues _with cognizant operations personnel.

-

}bt : Observations and Findinas

Procedure 00012-C establishes-the minimum staffing. requirements for safe Loperation of the plant as _ required by TSs.

Data Sheet 1. " Minimum-Shift

'

Enclosure'3

.

,

-

.,

-,

,.

.

.-

-.-.

-.

..

.

-.

. _ _. _ _

. _. _. _.. _ _ _,

_ _ _,,

_. _. _ _ _ _.

.

"

!

.

t

i

.

~

"E rovides the licensee with a method to document the names of-Hanning,l which fulfill the required TS and emergency response.

p personne positions.

The inspectors reviewed data' sheets from September through

~

- November 1997, ~ Based on this review, the licensee met the minimum--

staffing ~ requirements of TSs.

_;

'

During this review, the inspectors identified!that on several occasions.

a-non-licensed operator was assigned multiple duties. Specifically, on two occasions. October 8 and 18, 1997, an operator was assigned as a

- member of the field monitoring team while also being designated to close

~

the RHR drain valve. The designation of an operator to multiple duties was in conflict with the guidance of 50 2-97-04.

Theinspectors also

'noted during the review that an operator was assigned to the fire brigade team on three different occasions while also being designated to-close the RHR drain valve.

In addition. the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to properly document in control room logs on -

.

numerous occasions the operator who was designated to close the RHR valve.

Following review of Procedure-10002-C, ' Plant 0)erating Orders,"

Rev.12. E0P 19013-C and TS-5.4, Procedures, tie inspectors concluded

.that the 50 represented a procedure.

As such it required the review and controls specified by TS 5.4.

Based on the review performed of the control room shift supervisor logs and shift manning data sheets-

,

contained in Procedure 00012-C. the inspectors determined that the measures of SO 2-97-04 were not properly implemented.

However, the safety significance of this issue was minimized, in part,

'

due to available personnel on site to respond to an event. A review of records indicated that the licensee could have adequately staffed all emergency response Jositions, as well as, designated an operator to close the Unit 2 RH1 valve.

L c,

Conclusions The inspectors determined that the licensee met the TS minimum requirements for staffing. The inspectors concluded that the licensee

,

-has been adequately staffed to respond.to an event. The safety

significance of the failure.to properly implement 50 2-97-04 was

minimal.

Although the-licensee assigned multiple duties to one F

individual contrary to 50 2-97-04, that conflict would not have impeded l-the licensee's ability-to effectively respond to an accident.

However, ithe assignment-of multiple duties to operations personnel was in-conflict with-the S0. This failure constitutes a violation of minor-significance and is treated as a Non; Cited Violation (NCV), consistent E

with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is identified as i

NCV-50-425/97-11-01. Failure to Properly-Implement Unit 2 Procedure l

Promulgated As Standing Order.2-97-v4.

L l0

_

_

Enclosure 3 L

l r

L#

,

--

.

_

_

__

_

_

. - =

-

..

-

...

..

..

-

.

.. - -

--

.

-

--

-

.

,

i g

i

'

3.

01.3: Dual-Function Valves ca.

Insoection Scoce (TI 2515/136)

The-inspectors reviewed various dual function valves per guidance in Temporary Instruction 2515/136, " Operation of vual-Function Containment-Isolation Valves.1to determine if a design-deficiency concerning the -

ability of dual function valves to perform a-containment isolation.

. function existeu.. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's ability to remotely close' Containment isolation Valves (CIVs) with a safety injection (SI) signal-present.

A dual function CIV is defined as a valve that receives both an open signal for its safety function. as

>

u ll es a containment isolation signal.

For dual function valves. the system safety function takes priority over the containment isolation signal. Caring the ins)ection, the inspectors also reviewed the CIV design and function wit 1 the system engineer, b

Observations and Findinos The1nspectors reviewed the containment isolation valves identified in-the UFSAR and compared the list to the system piping and instrumentation diagrams to verify all containment isolation valves were identified.

The UFSAR table of containment isolation valves appeared inclusive, and, indicated which CIV had dual functions. The inspectors also reviewed the control logic diagrams associated with dual function valves. The inspectors ' determined that the engineering safety features actuation-system (ESFAS) logic allows the SI signal to be reset with the initiating condition still present..

Therefore, if there is a SI signal present, the actuation signal can be re:,et, and effectively blocked, to allow remote closure of the appropriate containment isolation valves using its handswitch.

The reset of the SI signal. is addressed in the licensee's emergency o)erating procedures. Operations personnel are frequently trained on t1e emergency procedures and are expected to be familiar with the reset process.

c._ Conclusions The -inspectors concluded that the licensee has the capability to close dual function valves. remotely with a SI signal present, o

i-Enclosure 3

.

.

-

_

.

.

-_

.

,

.

-03 Operations Procedures and Documentation 03.1 Walkdown of Clearances (71707)-

During the inspection period, the inspectors walked down the following clearances:

-19700776 Nuclear service cooling water pump 5 discharge valve 1-HV-11605 29700307 Control room filter unit train A 29700417 Component cooling water pump I train A; rework outboard bearing-b.

Observations and Findinas The inspectors did not identify any problems or concerns during these walkdownr.

Clearances were performed (i.e.. installed and removed) in

'

accordar.ce with established procedural guidance.

03.2 Cold Weather Preoarations a.

Scone (7171.4_1 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's cold weather program.

The review included inspection of insulation and heat tracing on safety reiated systems: freeze protection panels: verification of completed work orders and review of open maintenance work orders (MWO): preventive maintenance (PM) checklists. SCL01749. " Freeze Protection." and SCL00424. " Heat Tracing." The inspectors also interviewed the responsible system engineer, b. Observations and Findinos On November 24. 1997, the inspectors performed a walkdown of Unit 1 and Unit 2 heat tracing and freeze protection equipment.

The inspectors noted a general improvement in the equipment condition from arevious inspections although additional work remains outstanding.

T1e inspectors determined that the equipment was adequately maintained to ensure performance of its intended safety functions.

Several concerns including missed preventive maintenance, work orders that were several years old, and poor condition of field equipment, were previously identified in Inspection Report 50-424, 425/96-12.

As part of this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the status of the work orders on heat tracing and freeze protection equipment. Work was completed during the summer and fall of 1997 on heat trace and freeze protection systems which resulted in the improved general condition of equipment and control panels.

Enclosure 3

.-

.

.

Two MW0s. initiated in 1996. remained open due to plant conditions not-allowing for the work' activity;'however, the remaining open MW0s were initiated in 1997.

The inspectors also verified that preventive

. maintenance was prioritized, scheduled, and performed appropriately.

-

The inspectors performed.a walkdown with the system engineer of the majority of the freeze protection control panels specifically to inspect Discrepancies identifie, trol panels were The con for cleanliness conditions and general repair.

d during the found to be in good condition.

walkdown were documented and are being tracked by the licensee.

Insulation observed during walkdown was also noted to be in acceptable condition.

that operator aids were taped to most of the ninels.pectors observed During the freeze protection panel walkdown, the ins The cperator aids were not controlled per administrative Procedure 10009-C. " Operator Aids." Rev. 9.

The system engineer confirmed that information on the operator aids was correr.t. therefore the inspectors' observation were administrative in nature. The inspectors forwarded the minor issues identified, such as the uncontrolled operator aids and inconsistent spare circuit breaker positions in the freeze protection panels-. to licensee management.

c.

Conclusion The inspectors concluded that the freeze protection and heat tracing equipment was capable of performing its intended function. The improved system conditions were the result of the licensee's effort to closecut previously identified items.

Operator Knowledge and Performance 04 1 Walkdown of Control Room Instrumentation a.

Insoection Scoce 01707)

As part of routine plant observations the inspectors walked down the Unit I and Unit 2 control room instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed a)plicable procedures and drawings to verify proper system alignments.

.Tle inspectors also discussed plant system parameters and associated indications with control room licensed operators.

b Observations and Findinos During the walk downs, the inspectors noted that systems were aligned per procedureLrequirements. Plant parameters were within ex)ected ranges.

No significant discrepancies were observed during tie walk downs. However, the inspectors did identify one instrument not properly responding to plant operation. The inspectors observed that Unit 2

,

reactor power chart recorder (NR-45) operatior, was slightly erratic.

Enclosure 3

.

_

__

_

.

-.

.~

__

_ _-...__ _

__

__

T

-

.

.

6-

"

The recorder indicated reactor power at approximately 101 to 102%..

?

Investigation by the on-duty reactor operator determineo that the chart i

recorder was not-functioning properly due to a bent spring. MWO l

J29702956 was-generated-to address this issue. l Further review by the

-

inspectors of NR-45 recorder perfermance 1dentified that the recorder.

had not been operating properly forlapproximately 32 days. On

December 3, 1997, the licensee performed the MWO to restore the recorder-

to normal operation.

~

>

v c.

Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the reactor systems for Units 1 and 2 were

-

'

operated and aligned in accordance with applicable plant procedures.

^:

However.-the inspectors' identification of a malfunctioning reactor

_ power chart recorder, which existed for approximately 32 days, was an

.

example of inattention to detail on the part of the control room reactor operators.

"

4 05 Operator Training and Qualification

-05,1 Review of Seament Examination Proaram'

,

a.

Insoection Scone (71707)

The inspectors reviewed a portion of the licensee's requalification-program,-specifically, segment examinations. and the application of the program requirements per Procedure 00715-C. " Licensed Operator Requalification Program." Rev.15.

In addition, the inspectors discussed the training requirements and implementation of the program-with cognizant trairing personnel.

b.

Observations and Findqqs A review of the training records for the previous four segment

>

examinations indicated that the majority of the operators tested met or-exceeded the minimum acceptance criteria established in Procedure 00715-C.

In the cases where operators either failed a specific-segment examination (< 70%). or their rolling four segment examination average fell below the 80% criteria, the appropriate actions-were taken by the licensee.

In accordance with Procedure 00715-C.

remedial training was provided and a second exam administered, Remedial

-

training provided was properly documented. The: inspectors noted during review of Procedure 00715-C that it did-not_ address the status of an

- operator's license due to failure of a segmentJexam or whose four-

l segment' examination average drops below the 80% criteria.

Based on discussions with training personnel, the licensee indicated that no

-

restrictions are ) laced on an operator's license due to a single segment-

exam failure or wio's average score falls below the minimum as the-result of'one exam. The inspectors noted that a number of operators performed licensed duties in the control room after failure of a segment i

Enclosure 3

-

._

w hre ]'

-

s

-

w c

g-

,

.. - -

.

- -

.

- -.-.. -- -. - -.

- -

--.--_

.

,

-

p

.-

,

'

7:

-

t

-

.

.

.

o exame.Per Procedure 00715 C. operators who received remedial training-have until the. end of the subsequent training _ segment-to successfully i

pass the. failed segment.

In all cases-reviewed, operators who initially..

failed.a segment exam or fell below the minimum rolling' average!

acceptance criteria were retested and satisfactorily met the program requirements.

,

-Procedure 00715 C states that an operator wh6-fails to meet the-

.

!

acceptance criteria established for a retest shall require the immediate

removal of that operator from licensed duties.

However, based on

.

records and the time period reviewed, no accelerated training was required for any operator. Accordingly operators who assumed licensed duties in the control room met the requirements of 00715-C.

.c.

Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program for operator

--

requalification, specifically the implementation of segment examinations, met the established program and procedure requirements.

Based on this review. Procedure 00715-C adequately addressed the various

~

aspects of segment examinations to effectively administer exams and

'

implement remedial training as deemed appropriate.

Miscellaneous Operaticns Issues (92901)

08.1 (Closed ) Violation (VIO) 50-424/97-07-01: Failure to Document Entry Into Proper Action Condition Following Airlock Maintenance a.

IDipectionScoce(92901)

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions associated with the

+

. licensee's failure to enter the appropr16te Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action condition during the performance of a maintenance activity on the Unit 1 airlock shaft seal.

.

b.

Observations and Findinas The licensee's corrective actions were: identified in correspondence

,

dated September 25, 1997. The licensee )rovided operations personnel additional training and guidance as to t1e proper action condition entry for Technical S)ecification LC0 3.6.2 " Containment Air Locks."

_#

specifically, w1en maintenance is being performed on the air lock bulkhead versus.the air -lock. door.

c.

Conclusions-Based on.a review of the licensee's corrective actions, this violation-

..is closed.

'

!

-

Enclosure 3

'

=

,

^r i

r

-

%

we-T w

h*T*

'--t-

-Tevt--==-+1'-

r'

-+

-'it9

W

~Bt-

-'

'W4-

.

.

08.2 (Closed) VIO 50-425/97-05-Q2: TS LCO Entry Not Documented Properly a.

Inspection Scope (92901)

This violation dealt with the licensee's failure to properly document entry into all applicable TS LCOs for a containment sump level transmitter that was inoperable.

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions identified in the licensee's response to this violation in correspondence dated July 18, 1997, b.

Observations and Findinos The 'nvolved operations personnel were counseled as to the importance of LC0 entry / exits, the need to reference all applicable TSs. and to list applicable actions on the LC0 tracking sheets, i

c.

Conclusions Based on a review of the licensee's corrective actions, this violation is closed.

II.

Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 tiaintenance Work Order Observations

_

a.

Inspection Scone (62707)

The inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities involving the following work orders:

19703485 Investigate ground on isolation device panel OIP2 train B 19703544 Auxiliary relay room emergency safety feature fan switch

,

A-HS-12823A re)lacement 19703547 Fuel handling auilding unit relay change out 19703598 Main steam isolation valve 1-HV-3016B loop 2 train B hydraulic pump cycling 29700055 Investigate annunciator ALB15D01 on 2-HV-30368 main steam isolation valv NR-45reactorh'owerrecordernotoperatingproperly 29702956 29703112 Spent fuel pool purification filter rep 4c? ment b.

Observations and Findinas The observed maintenance activities were thoroughly completed and professionally performed.

Enclosure 3 H

.7

-

-

..... - - -

...,-

--..

...~

-

.

~ -.

-.

- -....

'

-

.

. -

,

_

-Hl.'21.-Jyf.veillance Observation'

-a..105.)ectionScone(61726)

' Thifinspectors observed the performance or reviewed the following; strveillar.ces:and plant-procedures:l

44490-1-Containment cooling system operability and-response time-test. Rev. 8 -

l14604 2 Solid. State Protection System (SSPS) slave relay K617 t,ain A test safety injection, Rev. 2

14608 2

=SSPS slave relay K601 train A test safety injection Rev. 7 14802 2

~ Nuclear service cooling water pumps 1, 3 and 5 and check valve inservice test and response time test. Rev. 13-14905 2-Reactor cooling system leakage calculation. Rev.16

~

14980-2 Diesel-generator operability test, Rev. 46 T ENG 97-30 Component cooling water pump performance test, Rev. 0 b.

Observations and Findinas The observed surveillance activities were thoroughly completed and professionally performed, M8-Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)

HO.1 -(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-424. 425/97-04-04: Interlock Testing of Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers

,

a.

1DID stion Scone (37551) (61726) (92902) (973Q1),

'This URI documented inspector questions concerning the adequacy of

- surveillance testing of reactor trip bypass breakers.

Specifically, the inspectors identified a concern that the licensee did not test the P-4 interlock feature of the bypass breaker prior to placing them in service. Additionally. the inssectors were concerned that the P-4 signal generated by the by) ass areakers and supplied to the turbine

,-

Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) system was not verified in the licensee's

'

surveillances.

The inspectors reviewed the following procedures that-were used to test the reactor trip and bypass breaker circuits:

,

Procedure 14420-1.

" Solid State Protection System and Reactor Trip Breaker Train A Operability Test." Rev. 27:.

Procedure 14420-2,.

" Solid State Protection System and Reactor Trip Breaker Train A Operability Test." Rev. 19:

Procedure 14421-1.

" Solid State Protection System and Reactor Trip Breaker Train B Operability Test." Rev. 8:

.

R Enclosure 3:

<

V

-

-_

-

..

- -.

.

.. -.

_

.

.

~'

.

,

.

e

Procedure 14421-2.

" Solid State Protection System and Reactor Trip Breaker Train B Operability Test.' Rev. 6:

Procedure 14752-1.

" Reactor Trip Systen P-4 Interlock Test "

Rev. 4:

Procedure 14752-2.

" Reactor Trip System P-4 Interlock Test "

Rev. 4.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed the Technical Specification (TS)

surveillance requirements (SR): 18-month preventive maintenance Procedures 27765-C. * Westinghouse Type DS 416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance." Rev. 25. and 27767 C.

Reactor Trip Switchgear Check Out and Maintenance." Rev. 5: and test circuit breaker drawings.

The inspectors also reviewed this issue with cognizant licensee personnel, b.

Observations and Findinas The P-4 signal is developed by a combination of cell switches (33b contacts) and auxiliary contacts (52b contacts) actuated by the reactor trip breaker and bypass breakers.

Once generated, the P-4 signal is provided to the SSPS to enable the feedwater isolation feature. and to the turbine EHC system to actuate a turbine trip.

Different sets of 33b and 52b contacts on the reactor trip and bypass breakers are used to develop these two functions.

TS SR 3.3.1.4. Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, required the licensee to perform a Trip Actuation Device Operability Test (TADOT) on the bypass breakers prior to placing them in service on a 31-day staggered test basis.

A TAD 0T consisted of operating the trip actuating device and verifying the operability of required alarm. interlock, and trip functions.

The TADOT included adjustment, as necessary, of the tri) actuating device so that it actuated at the required setpoint witlin the required accuracy.

Therefore, to satisfy the TAD 0f requirements the licensee's test required a 31-day operability verification of the reactor trip breaker and bypass breaker auxiliary and cell switch contacts, used as P-4 interlock, to provide the initiation signal to SSPS and EHC systems, Based on the inspectors'

review, the licensee verified half of the total number of contacts used in the P-4 interlock on a monthly basis.

TS SR 3.3.2.9. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, required an 18-month TADOT to be performed to verify that the P-4 signal was generated for both the SSPS and EHC systems.

This test verified that the P-4 signal was generated from both the reactor trip and bypass breakers.

The TADOT verified the function of the brcaker circuit, not just contact position. A review of the licensee's surveillance procedures indicated that the P-4 signal to SSPS was tested for both the reactor trip and bypass breakers.

However.-the inspectors identified that the licensee surveillance procedares did not Enclosure 3

.. -

,_

-. _

_. _ _..

.

. _.

._

_. _..

,

K

-

..,.

,

.

.

r

~

11.

j

,

-contain a provision to test the P-4 signal-to the EHC system from the

reactor trip bypass breaker; A' review of:the plant: design, indicated '

-

, '-.'

that a test circuit did not exist'.to test the P-4 signal to the EHC

-

system from the bypass breaker,

__

i

+

-c.

Con 61usions

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's surveillance procedures 14420-1/2 and 14424-1/2 were inadequate, in that, the procedures did not test all 33b and 52b contacts for.the reactor trip and bypass breakers.

on a 31-day staggered basis consistent with the TAD 0T requirements of TS-SR 3.3.1.4.

The inspectors also concluded that licensee procedures-

-

o 14752-1/2 were inadequate, in that, the procedures did not test the P-4

'

signal generated by the bypass breaker supplied to the EHC system:

consistent with the TADOT req)uirement of TS SR 3.3.2.9.

-

This-is

'

identified as Violation (VIO 50-424, 425/97-11-02. Inadequate Surveillance Testing of P-4 Interlock for Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers, w

Based on documenting this issue as a violation, this URI is closed.

M8.2 -(Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50 424. 425/97-007-00: Containment o-Penetration Electrical Overcurrent Protection Not Tested a.

Insoection Scone (61726) (92902) (92903) (92700)

This LER documented a missed Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)

surveillance for Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 125 volt direct current

.

control power circuit breakers. The inspectors reviewed the LER and subsequent corrective actions, a Unit 2 temporary modification to address the issue, and the deficiency cards generated.

The inspectors also interviewed cognizant engineering personnel.

b.

Observations and Findinas On September 12,- 1997.during an engineering review, the licensee determined that thcre were circuit breakers that provided control power through containment penetrations to.RCP-lift oil pump pressure switches.

The licensee identified that those breakers were not tested in accordance with.either the current TRM or former TS surveillance requirements from the original plant startup for both units.

At the itime of discovery, the Unit 1 breakers were deenergized due to an

'

'

ongoing refueling outage, subsequently, no immediate action was-necessary.

The licensee installed temporary-fuses in the Unit 2 -

for testing.the circuit breakers.pping capability, obviating the need.-

circuits to provide redundant tri The breakers wre successfully. tested on Unit 1 prior to restart from the refueling outage.

.

h The licensee determined that the Vidated Final Safety Analysis Report-(UFSAR)! Table 16.3-5 Containment penetration' Conductor Overcurrent

~ Protection Devices and: Isolation Devices for Class IE to Non-Class 1E Feeds, did not list a circuit breaker number for one of the two breakers

-

,

,

Enclosure 3

.

-4+9e:s

,.-,.

f

- - - -, -

7 pp,-

-r.y.-,-

,,. -

,,

p.

4,.

.y,

,,c'.

cv.,.

.

.

-

-.

-

.

.

.

'

installed in the RCP lift oil pump penetratica.

This oversight resulted in only one of the two breakers being included in the surveillance procedure, and consequently, not all breakers were tested in accordance with the TRM.

As part of the licensee's planned corrective action, the licensee initiated a Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) to quantify the potential affects of a circuit failure on these penetrations in order to justify possible deletion of the dual overcurrent protection requirement.

Pending completion of the REA. the Unit I and Unit 2 breakers will be tested or permanent fuses will be installed.

c.

Conclusions Based on their review, the inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to oerform required testing of RCP circuit breakers per TRM 13.8.1.

Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection devices, at least once per 18 months since initial startup of both units.

This is identified as Deviation (DEV) 50-424, 425/97-11 03. Failure to Perform Containment Penetration Circuit Breaker Surveillances.

Based on this review, this LER is closed.

M8.3 (Closed ) VIO 50-425/97-01-01:

Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System Surveillance Not Conducted _As Required by TS a.

Insoection Scoce (61726) (92903)

This violation documented a missed surveillance as the result of NRC identification that six valves in the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater recirculation flow path were not verified in the correct position within the surveillance time frame of 31 days.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions identified in the licensee correspondence d'ted May 9, 1997.

b.

Observations and Findinas The licensee revised both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 " Safety Related Locked Valve Verification Checklists." (Procedures 11867 1 Rev. 28. and 11867-2. Rev. 21).

In addition, the licensee incorporated this violation example into the lessons learned program.

Saecific training emphasizing component positioning and verification tec1niques and expectations was also provided to operations personnel, c,

Conclusions l

Based on the review of the licensee's corrective actions, this violation l

1s closed.

L Enclosure 3 l

L

..

.

.

.

M8.4 (Closed) LER 50 425/97-001-00:

Surveillances Not Performed For Unlocked Valves This issue was documented in Inspection Re) ort 50 424, 425/97-01 (Section M3.1).. The inspectors reviewed tie corrective actions identified in the LER and concluded that they are sufficient.

No new issues wre identified in the LER.

This LER is closed.

IV.

Pl.antSupport F8 Hiscellaneous Fire Protection Issues F8.1 (Closed ) Violation (VIO) 50 424. 425/97-05-07:

Fire Extinguisher and Hose Station Missed Surveillance a.

Insoection Scooe (71707)

This violation documented a missed surveillance as the result of Nucit.r Regulatory Commission (NRC) identification of six fire ho'e stations in the Unit 2 nuclear service cooling water tower tunnels and five fire extinguishers located in the fire pump house with expired inspection stickers.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions documented in correspondence dated July 18. 1997, b.

Qblervations and Findinas The licensee revised Procedures 29100-C. " Portable Fire Extinguisher and Fire Hose Station Visual Inspection." Rev. 9 and 29134-C. " Portable Fire Extinguisher Annual Surveillance." Rev. 5. to provide better coordination for the performance of monthly and annual surveillances.

c.

Conclusions Based on the review of the licensee's corrective actions, this violation is closed.

Er. closure 3

.

l l

l l

.

-

..

.. -

_ _. _

_._.

.

_. _ _ _ _. -

,

'

e P

-

-14

_

'

_

V.

Manaoement Meetinas and Other~ Areas

X Review of Updated _ Final Safety. Analysis Report'(UFSAR)

>

A recent ' discovery of a licensee o>erating its facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need :for a special!

l focused review that corr ares plant practices, procedures and/or

-

'

parameters to the UFSAR descriptions.

While performing the inspections discussed in this resort, the inspectors reviewed the applicable

portions of.the UFSAR that related to the areas-inspected. The-inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the i

observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters except where

noted in this report.

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

,.

The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee management at t1e conclusf on of the inspection on December 16. 1997.

Tine licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered-proprietary.

No proprietary-information was identified.

PARTIAL-LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Beasley. Nuclear Plant General Manager

.

J. Gasser. Plant Operations Assistant General Manager S. Chestnut. Manager Operations K. Holmes. Manager Maintenance B. Burmeister. Manager Engineering Support M. Sheibani.. Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor

C? Tippins. Jr., imclear Specialist I INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726

Surveillance Observation IP 62707:

Maintenance Observation IP.71707:-

- Plant Operations IP 71714:

Cold Weather Preparations IP 92700:

- Onsite Notification of Written Reports of Non-routine Events

<

At Power Reactor Facilities

+

.-

.

IP 92901:

Followup - Operations IP 92902:

Followup - Maintenance

.IP 92003:

.

- Followup _ - Engineering f

TI 2515/136L

- Operation of Dual Function Containment Valves Enclosure 3

'

,

.

i

~ - - -.

- -.

,

e

-+

_

,

,.,

.,,m_g,,e,,

,

,,

,. -

,

m..,

-

,.wr_,

.

'

.

_

.-

,

.

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

-

i Doened

.

50-425/97-11-01 NCV Failure to Properly Implement Unit 2 Procedure Promulgated As Standing Order 2-97-04 (Section 01.2).

50-424. 425/97-11-02 VIO Inadequate Surveillance Testirq of P-4 Interlock for Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers (Section M8.1)

'

50 424, 425/97-11-03 DEV Failure to Perform Containment Penetration Circuit Breaker Surve111ances (Section M8.2)

0101ee 50-424/97-07-01 VIO Failure to Document Entry Into Proper Action Condition Following Airlock Maintenance (Section 08.1)

50- 425/97-05 02 VIO TS LC0 Entry Not Documented Properly (Section 08.2)

50-424, 425/97-04-04 URI Interlock Testing of Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers (Section M8.1)

'

50-424, 425/97-007-00 LER Containment Penetration Electrical Overcurrent Protection Not Tested (Section M8.2)

50-425/97-01-01-VIO AFW System Surveillance Not Conducted As Required by TS (Section M8.3)

50-425/97-001-00 LER Surveillances Not Performed For Unlocked Valves (Section M3.4)

50-424. 425/97-05-07 VIO-Fire Extinguisher and Hose Station Missed Surveillance (Section F8.1)

Enclosure 3

..