IR 05000424/1993013
| ML20045H960 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1993 |
| From: | Balmain P, Brian Bonser, Skinner P, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045H950 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-93-13, 50-425-93-13, NUDOCS 9307220176 | |
| Download: ML20045H960 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARtETTA STREET N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 o
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Report Nos.:
50-424/93-13 and 50-425/93-13
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Licensee:
Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295
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Birmingham, AL 35201 Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: May 2, 1993 - May 29, 1993
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Inspector:
I4 ar /5, //S B.
Bonse K Senior Resident Inspector
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Date Signed
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su /5' /YV3 c
fR Starkey, Resident Inspector
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Date' Signed
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P. A. Balmain, Resident Inspector
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Date' Signed
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6 / I' b Approved by:
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P'. Skinner, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 3B Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, inspection entailed inspection in the following j
areas: plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, Emergency
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Safety Features (ESF) system walkdown, fire protection, and follow-up of open items.
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Results:
One non-cited violation (NCV) was identified.
The NCV involved a failure to incorporate a fire protection surveillance procedure revision into the surveillance tracking i
program and resulted in missing _an annual inspection of approximately 300 portable fire extinguishers (paragraph 6a).
A weakness was identified in maintaining the reliability of the Unit I electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system. Numerous problems with the system resulted in a challenge to Unit I safety systems and led to a reactor trip (paragraph 2e).
9307220176 930616 PDR ADOCK 05000424 G
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A continuing concern was identified with personnel operating the wrong components. Two errors of this type,. including one wrong unit error, occurred duri.ng the inspection period.
Licensee management continues to stress the importance of self verification (paragraphs 3b and 4b).
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- J. Beasley, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations S. Bradley, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
- W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support S. Chesnut, Manager Engineering Technical Support C. Christiansen, SAER Supervisor C. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent R. Dorman, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness
- C. Eckert, Technical Specialist G. Frederick, Manager Maintenance
- W. Gabbard, Nuclear Specialist, Technical Support M. Griffis, Manager Plant Modifications
- M. Hobbs, I&C Superintendent
- K. Holmes, Manager Operations
- D. Huyck, Nuclear Security Manager W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
- I. Kochery, Health Physics Superintendent R. LeGrand, Manager Health Physics and Chemistry G. McCarley, ISEG Supervisor R. Moye, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety an,d Compliance Supervisor
- W. Shipman, General Manager Nuclear Plant
- C. Stinespring, Manager Administration
- J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning C. Tynan, Nuclear Procedures Supervisor J. Williams, Supervisor Work Planning and Controls Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors, engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors, and office personnel.
Oglethorpe Power Company Representative T. Mozingo
NRC Resident Inspectors
- B. Bonser D. Starkey
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- P. Balmain
- Attended Exit Interview An alphabetical list of abbreviations is located in the last paragraph of the inspection report.
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2.
Plant Operations - (71707)
a.
General The inspection staff reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications, and administrative controls. Control logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift relief records, LC0 status logs, night orders, standing orders, and
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clearance logs were routinely reviewed. Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, engineering support and technical support personnel.
Daily plant status meetings were routinely attended.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts.
and shift changes. Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's procedures *. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by TS.
Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation, and recorder traces important to safety.
Operating parameters were verified to be within TS limits. The inspectors also reviewed DCs to determine whether the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing corrective actions.
Plant tours were taken during the reporting period on a routine basis. They included, but were not limited to the turbine building, the auxiliary building, electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, NSCW towers, DG buildings, AFW buildings, and the low voltage switchyard.
During plant tours, housekeeping, security, equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies / procedures were followed. This included observation of HP practices and review of area surveys, radiation work permits, postings, and instrument calibration.
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The inspectors verified that the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions.
Inspectors observed that persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the PA; vehicles were properly authorized, searched, and escorted within the PA; persons within the'PA displayed photo identification badges; and personnel in vital areas were authorized.
b.
Unit 1 Summary The unit began the period operating at 94% power. On May 3, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a main turbine trip caused by an EHC system malfunction. The unit remained in Mode 3 until
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commencing a reactor start-up on May 4.
The unit reached 100%
power on May 8 and operated at full power through the end of the report period.
c.
Unit 2 Summary The unit began the period operating at 100% of 3411 MWt. On May 17 the unit began increasing power to the recently authorized core thermal power limit of 3565 MWt.
Power was increased to 98.9% of 3565 MWt when the main turbine control valves reached the full open position. This corresponds to the maximum heat removal capability of the secondary plant. The unit remained at this power level through the end of the inspection period.
d.
Plant Management Changes On May 21, 1993, the licensee announced that W. B. Shipman, General Manager of Plant Vogtle, would return to his previous position at corporate headquarters in Birmingham, Alabama as General Manager of Nuclear Support, Vogtle.
J. B. Beasley, currently the Assistant General Manager of Plant Operations, was promoted to the General Manager position. These management changes were effective June 1,.1993.
e.
Unit 1 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to EHC System Malfunctions On May 3, with Unit 1 operating at 98.5% power an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a main turbine trip caused by an EHC system malfunction. The. licensee determined during EHC troubleshooting that sticking or binding of internal components in the A EHC pump pressure compensator caused the EHC system pressure to drop and ultimately reach the main turbine low EHC pressure
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trip setpoint of 1100 psig. When the licensee disassembled the A EHC pump and its pressure compensator,'an oil and water mixture was found in the pump.
It was then determined that approximately 25 gallons of water were inadvertently added'to the EHC fluid reservoir on May 2.
During the Unit 1 outage the EHC system was drained for maintenance activities and the EHC fluid was stored in 55 gallon drums in the turbine building near the EHC pump skid. The drum which was used to fill the EHC system on May 2 was apparently moved at some point during the outage and used to collect water from a TPCCW system leak. The drum evidently was then later returned to the EHC pump skid area where the other EHC fluid drums were stored. This drum was then used to fill the EHC fluid reservoir. The licensee concluded that the water and particulates added to the EHC reservoir from the drum was the most probable cause of the A EHC pump pressure compensator failure.
EHC pressure decreased to a pressure that caused the B EHC (standby puno) pump start'ed. The main turbine tripped before EHC
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system pressure could recover. The licensee's investigation determined that the EHC low pressure alarm and the standby pump automatic start pressure switches were out of calibration and the calibration PMs had not been performed since initial start-up testing.
The standby pump automatic start setpoint, normally 1300 psig, had drifted to about 1200 psig. The normal alarm setpoint of 1300 psig had drifted to 800 psig. Although the standby start setpoint was verified to be above the turbine trip setpoint, the licensee concluded that the hydraulic conditions of the B EHC pump, a positive displacement pump, and the_ subsequent vibration caused by the pressure transient after the start may have generated the turbine trip.
The licensee identified that the calibration frequency for these switches was prescribed to be a 600 month interval. This was changed to a 36 month interval prior to the trip. The inspector reviewed annunciator response procedures and PM checklists and identified another example of an excessive PM calibration interval specified for two pressure switches for the 1A MFPT thrust bearing wear detector (IPS-5322 and IPS-5340). These switches were on a 600 month calibration interval and were last calibrated in 1987.
The automatic action from the switches can result in a HFPT trip and plant transient. The inspector informed the licensee and the calibration intervals were revised to 36 months for the both units.
The licensee also identified and corrected a wiring error which resulted in the coincidence logic for the low EHC pressure turbine trip pressure switches to be reduced from 2 out of 3 logic to a 1 out of 2 logic.
In addition to these problems the inspector noted from the licensee's review that the tolerance for the acceptable range of EHC operating pressure in the turbine building operator logs was 1400 psig to 2000 psig. The normal operating pressure of the EHC system is approximately 1600 psig. When the pressure was recorded at 1450 psig on operator rounds prior to the trip, it was not recognized as an abnormal or degraded condition because the operator logs indicated that the EHC pressure was acceptable.
Based on the inspector's review of this event and a review of the licensee's investigation,' the inspector identified a weakness in maintaining the reliability of the Unit 1 EHC system. The numerous problems with the system, which included a failure to adequately control EHC fluid drums, excessive calibration intervals, wiring errors and operator rounds logs referencing an excessive tolerance, resulted in a challenge to Unit I safety systems. The inspector will review the licensee's corrective actions to this event as part of the LER follow-up.
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Unit 1 CCP B Damaged Due to Loss of Suction Flow Path On April 3, Unit I was in a defueled condition.
CCP B was in operation charging to the RCS at a flow rate of 100 gpm with a corresponding 100 gpm letdown to the RHR system.
Suction for CCP
B was being taken from both the VCT and RWST. During the shift, operators had periodically cycled the VCT outlet isolation valves shut and then open in order to maintain VCT level above ~30%.
Toward the end of the day shift, with the VCT outlet valve closed,
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ERF computer data indicated that the RWST outlet valve went closed which isolated all suction to CCP B. The pump ran in this configuration for approximately 30 minutes before it was manually
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stopped by the R0 when it was no longer needed to' support the current plant evolution. On April 5, with the reactor still defueled, CCP B was started again to support plant activities.-
Approximately eight seconds after the pump start, the pump motor supply breaker tripped. Subsequent investigation by the licensee and pump vendor revealed that the pump had experienced damage to the inboard seal and impeller assembly.
During this investigation
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the licensee identified that the pump was damaged on April'3, when the pump suction had been isolated for 30 minutes. The pump was
repaired and returned to service after a satisfactory functional.
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test was performed.
The licensee's event critique team could not identify a' reason for the pump suction being isolated. After reviewing the event, the inspector determined it had no safety significance since the.
reactor was defueled' at the time. However, it is significant to r'
note that the procedure being used during VCT level. control, procedure 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System, gave no
guidance for operating the charging _ system to control RCS level
during Modes 5 and 6. ' The control room staff was controlling this
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evolution based on their knowledge of system operation with.no specific procedural guidance for cycling VCT or RWST outlet valves.
Procedure 13006-1 has been subsequently ~ revised to include steps, notes, and cautions for adjusting RCS-level in
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Modes 5 and 6.
The inspector concluded.that additional procedural
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guidance could have provided an additional barrier to this type of u
event. The inspector considered this event to be caused by a lack
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of CVCS configuration control by control room supervision during i
refueling activities; however, it was an isolated occurrence ~ and i
had no safety significance due to the defueled reactor conditions.
g.
Observation of Emergency Drill On May 26 the licensee conducte'd a practice emergency drill in preparation for the full-scale annual emergency exercise. -
The inspectors observed the drill from the TSC, OSC, EOF and backup E0F in Waynesboro, Georgia. The drill included a medical-emergency and an evacuation of the E0F to the backup E0F.
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Overall, the drill was satisfactory.
Personnel accountability was conducted with minimal problems. The medical drill was handled routinely with no observed problems. The TSC functioned in an orderly manner and the various emergency classifications were declared within the appropriate time restrictions. The inspector did note that the " Plant Parameter" status board and the
" Radiation Monitor" status boards in the TSC were not frequently updated.
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The inspector observed that turnover of the Emergency Director in the simulator was good. The inspector also observed the setup and activation of the backup E0F in Waynesboro and considered the relocation evolution to be satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
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General Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for necessary test prerequisites, instructions,
acceptance criteria, technical content, data collection, independent verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected to determine that approved procedures were available, equipment was calibrated, prerequisites were met, tests were conducted according to procedure, test results were acceptable and systems restoration was completed.
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SURVEILLANCE NO.
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14425-2 Power Range Quarterly ACOT 24809-1 RWST Level IL-993 ACOT 24586-1 Containment Pressure Protection
Channel I IP-937 ACOT
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14030-1 Power Range Calorimetric Channel Calibration
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14980-1 DG IB Operability Test 14611-2 SSPS Slave Relay K602 Train B Test SI 14613-2 SSPS Slave Relay K603 Train B Test SI
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b.
Source Check Performed On Wrong Unit Radiation Monitor On May 13, a Chemistry technician received permission from the control room operator to perform a source check on Unit 2 Containment Area low Range Radiation Monitor 2 RE-003.
He obtained the appropriate procedure and then went to the B level of the control building to place the DPM for 2RE-003 in " block."
Instead of going to the Unit 2 DPM he went to the Unit I radiation monitor 1RE-003 DPM and placed it in " block." The control room identified the error and quickly informed the technician of the mistake.
Radiation monitor, IRE-003, was returned to service.
This event did not result in a violation of TS, since the remaining two containment area low range monitors, IRE-002 and IRE-2565, were operable.
The licensee reviewed this event and determined that the technician had gone to the wrong unit and that there were no extenuating circumstances. The inspector also walked down the area where the DPMs for monitors IRE-003 and 2RE-003 are located.
The DPMs are correctly labeled and are not physically located near each other.
The inspector concluded that this wrong unit error was caused by the technician's inattention. This error is an example of a continuing concern with wrong unit / wrong train errors i
previously identified (see NRC IR 424,425/93-03).
c.
Review of AMSAC System During the inspection period the inspector reviewed AMSAC Surveillance' Testing and the AMSAC System design to determine if it was susceptible to the' introduction of software errors due to maintenance activities.
Errors have been introduced in the AMSAC systems at other plants due to improper software changes.
The AMSAC system at Vogtle was supplied by Westinghouse and is a microprocessor-based instrumentation system. The inspector determined through a review of the AMSAC Technical Manual and discussions with the system engineer that the software that provides setpoints and actuation logic for AMSAC is stored on EPROM chips. Any changes to this software are required to be processed through administrative design controls and requires physical replacement of the chips with EPROMs supplied by the vendor. The inspector has witnessed Unit 1 AMSAC Surveillance testing under procedure 54804-1, ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry Surveillance, and verified that the system logic performs as required. The ' licensee performs AMSAC surveillances on a quarterly and 18-month frequency.
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Based on this review the inspector determined that the AMSAC system can perform reliably, and design controls to maintain the integrity of its software are adequate.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
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Maintenance Observation (62703)
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General The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed
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personnel, and reviewed records _to verify that work was conducted -
in accordance with approved procedures, TSs,_ and applicable
industry codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that
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redundant components were operable, administrative controls were
followed, clearances were adequate, personnel were qualified,
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correct replacement parts were used, radiological: controls were.
proper, fire protection was adequate, adequate post-maintenance testing was performed, and independent verification requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to service.
k Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that'the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance activities.
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance activities:
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WORK DESCRIPTION
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29202253 Perform PM on CBCR filter Unit N7001 Temperature Loop-29202357 Replace Existing Contactors.in ESF Heaters with Nutherm Contactors Having Date Code
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of February 1992 19301540 Install Pressure Switches on ARV 3010
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29301666 NSCW Pump 3 Discharge Valve Did Not Close -
on Pump Stop
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19302151 Inspect TDAFW Mechanical Overspeed Linkage 19302225, 19302226 A Train Battery-Cell 46 and B Train Battery Cell 15 are not equalizing properly with other cells and need single cell charging.
b.
Incorrect Breaker Operated During Maintenance On May 4, an electrician went to MCC 2ABB _to troubleshoot the'
failure of 2HV-11606, NSCW Pump 3 discharge valve, to close.when the pump was stopped. NSCW Pump 3 had been declared inoperable and troubleshooting was being done under MWO 29301665.
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electrician went to breaker 22 on 2ABB rather than breaker 36, the correct breaker. As a result, the electrician tripped NSCW
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pump 1, which, along with pump 5, was one of the two remaining operable NSCW pumps in train A.
The error was quickly caught by the electrician and control room operator and pump I was returned to service in approximately 1 minute.
During that one minute period Unit 2 entered the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LC0 action statement of TS 3.7.4, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
The inspector reviewed the work package associated with MWO M301666 and determined that the information in the package was jequate and correctly identified the breaker cubicle to be entered. The inspector also verified that the breaker cubicles fan MCC 2ABB were correctly labeled and identified. The inspector concluded that this event was the result of inattention to detail by the electrician involved.
This is the second example of this type error (see paragraph 3b) and has been noted as a concern.
c.
TDAFW Mechanical Overspeed Trip Linkage Binding On May 16, while performing procedure 14810-1, TDAFW Pump and Check Valve IST Response Time Test, the TDAFW pump did not trip when the mechanical overspeed trip lever was manually depressed as directed by the procedure. Operator assistance was required to move the trip linkage in order to manually actuate the pump trip.
The pump was declared inoperable and MWO 19302151 initiated to investigate the failure.
Maintenance personnel discovered that the trip linkage was not properly aligned resulting in binding on that portion of the linkage going to the electrical trip solenoid. The mechanical overspeed linkage and the electrical overspeed linkage are interconnected but function independently.
Adjustments were made to align the linkage.
It.was then lubricated and functionally tested and the TDAFW was declared operable later in the day on May 16.
The inspector reviewed the TDAFW maintenance work history and did not find any other examples of this type failure. Also reviewed was the Terry Steam Turbine vendor manual to determine what maintenance, if any is recommended on the trip linkage. The vendor manual does not give detailed instructions but does recommend that on a quarterly basis all linkages be cleaned, j
lubricated, and checked for freedom of movement. The licensee has j
a PM checklist, SCL00140, which is used to perform these j
inspections. The inspector identified that the PM checklist also does not give detailed instructions to verify freedom of linkage movement. The licensee is in the process of revising the PM to provide specific guidance on inspecting the trip linkage.
The inspector was satisfied that this was an isolated failure and that detailed vendor preventive maintenance guidance was not available which could have precluded this failure.
In addition, the inspector determined that the binding would not have disabled I
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the electrical overspeed trip. The inspector was also satisfied
that the PM checklist will be revised to reflect specific steps to be taken when inspecting the trip linkage.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
During this inspection period, the inspectors conducted a detailed walk down of major portions of the Unit 1, Train A, NSCW system. The purpose of the walk down was to independently verify the status of the system.
The NSCW system alignment procedure and system P& ids were used to verify correct system alignment. All valves were found in their correct position.
Several general observations were noted by the inspectors.
numerous valves were missing plastic identification tags; the written description on several valve identification tags did not match the description in the alignment procedure; and, in three cases, the insulation around the valve casing was in poor condition. These observations were brought to the attention of Operations supervision.
The inspectors determined, through interviews with the licensee, that the licensee had embarked on a retagging program for Unit 1.
The new tags, which were already received by the licensee, were metal backed for durability, had large clear print, and had individual bar-codes (for possible future use).
The new tags' descriptions were developed using the system alignment procedure.
Plant management's goal for having the new tags in place is projected for March 30, 1994.
In addition to the walk down, the inspectors reviewed the following NSCW surveillances and determined that the licensee performed them at the required frequencies:
Procedure No. 14552-1: NSCW Flow Path Verification Procedure No. 14801-1: NSCW Transfer Pump Inservice Test Procedure No. 14430-1: NSCW Cooling Tower Fans Monthly Test This walk down and review did not identify any problems that could affect the operability of the system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Fire Protection Program (64704)
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Portable Fire Extinguisher Annual Surveillance Past Due (64704)
On May 17, during the routine monthly visual inspection of portable fire extinguishers, the licensee identified that
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approximately 300 extinguishers had not received their annual inspection within the maximum allowable time interval as required by procedure 29134-C, Portable Fire Extinguishers Annual Surveillance. These 300 extinguishers were last inspected in early February 1992.
Further investigation revealed that procedure 29134-C was revised in July 1992, and at that time the
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number of checklists contained within the procedure was expanded
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from three to seven to simplify extinguisher inspection. Due to an administrative oversight, a Surveillance Task Verification Sheet was not initiated for each of the four additional procedure checklists.
Therefore, when procedure 29134-C was performed in February 1993, Work Planning only generated checklists.1, 2, and 3 because it was unaware of the additional four checklists.
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This failure to implement a procedure is a violation of TS 6.7.1.h, which requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the Fire Protection Program Implementation. The licensee took prompt action to inspect the remaining extinguishers and initiated the appropriate surveillance task verification sheets. This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because of its minor safety significance and the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy. This non-cited violation is identified as NCV 50-424,425/93-13-01; Failure to Perform Annual Portable Fire Extinguisher Surveillance.
b.
Observation of Announced Fire Drill On May 21, the inspector witnessed an announced fire drill which simulated a fire in the FHB Normal HVAC charcoal filter. The inspectors observed that fire brigade dress out, response to the simulated fire and command and control at the simulated fire scene were adequate.
Participation by health physics, maintenance and security was also evident.
One non-cited violation was idehtified.
7.
Follow-up of open items (90712) (92700) (92701) (92702)
The Licensee Event Reports and follow-up items listed below were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of TS compliance and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and relative safety significance of each event.
a.
(Closed) LER 50 425/92-005, " Communication Problems Result In Missed Technical Specification Surveillance."
Cognitive personnel errors and poor communication were identified as being responsible for causing this event. Control room
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personnel were subsequently instructed in the proper communication to be used for implementing TS action statements involving other i
departments.
The chemistry foreman was counseled regarding the necessity of compliance with procedures and making adequate shift turnovers. Operations and Chemistry personnel were trained on the capabilities of the auxiliary sampling equipment. This event was
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13 also discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-424,425/92-11 and was identified as NCV 50-425/92-11-01.
Based on this review of the licensee's corrective action this item is closed.
b.
(Closed) VIO 50-425/92-19-01, Failure of Licensed Operator to Remain in the "At the Controls" Area, and V10 50-425/92-19-02, Failure to Obtain Permission For Short Term Relief.
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The licensee responded to the violations in correspondence dated October 8, 1992. The violations involved a failure by a licensed operator to remain in the "at the controls" area of Unit 2 and to obtain permission from the Unit Shift Supervisor for short term relief prior to leaving the area. The licensee disciplined the operator and shift briefings were conducted to inform all shifts of this event and to reinforce the "at the controls" requirement.
Additional discussions were held by the Unit Superintendent with each R0 and B0P operator to emphasize the safety significance of the event and procedural requirements regarding "at the controls" responsibilities. The licensee has also directed operators to log in by signing the unit control log when they assume "at the controls" responsibility. The licensee has also revised the requirements of procedure 10003-C, Manning The Shift, to clarify the changeover of responsibility for "at the controls" operators.
Based on this review of the licensee's corrective actions, these item are closed.
c.
(Closed) IFI 50-424,425/92-07-03, Evaluation of ECCS Flow Balancing Data and Test Procedure Revision This IFI involved a concern regarding the setup of ECCS branch line throttle valves in the charging and SI systems. ECCS branch line flows may have been set too low in the past and may not have been consistent with the existing accident analysis. The acceptance criteria in procedures 14721-1 and 14721-2, ECCS Subsystem Flow Balance and Check Valve Refueling Inservice Test, had met the criteria specified in TS but had not supported all the criteria in the Vogtle accident analysis.
In response to this issue Westinghouse reviewed the assumptions in the ECCS analysis and provided the licensee with an evaluation of the CCP and SIP subsystems flow balancing criteria. This evaluation provided suggestions on criteria and methodology that could be used to revise procedures 14721-1 and 14721-2. The licensee also reviewed flow balancing data from past outages.
The licensee completed the review of previous ECCS flow balancing test results and found all results to be acceptable. This review included evaluations of cases where the test results did not fall within the acceptable ranges. The licensee also revised the ECCS flow balancing procedures prior to 1R4 using the Westinghouse recommendation.
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Based on this review of the licensee's corrective actions this item is closed.
d.
(Closed) LER 50-425/92-007, " Partial Feedwater Isolation due to Instrument Malfunctions."
The drain valve for 2LT-553 was closed, the drain plug tightened, and no further instrument spiking was experienced.
Instrument tubing for the other SGs was inspected and any leaks were corrected.
Prior to IR4, procedures 23701/2, Plant Instrumentation Valve Line-up, were revised to. include sign-off
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steps for positioning of SG instrument drain valves before their return to service at the end of refueling outages.
Based on this review, this item is considered closed, e.
(Closed) LER 50-425/92-003, "RHR Valve Interlocks Out of Calibration Due To Procedure Inadequacy" A TCP was initiated for the four procedures on each unit which used the RHR suction isolation valve interlock calibrations.
The eight procedures were again revised when the permissive setpoint value was later changed from 377 psig to 365 psig. These setpoint changes were completed for Unit I during the recent IR4 outage and had previously been completed for Unit 2 during 2R2 in 1992.
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review was made of TS surveillance procedures to identify similar misapplications of setpoint tolerances and no further discrepancies of this type were identified.
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Based on this review, this item is considered closed.
f.
(Closed) URI 50-424,425/93-07-02, Licensing Basis Reviewed to Determine 10CFR50.59 Applicability.
The inspector held discussions with an NRR 10CFR50.59 expert and reviewed the scope of sequencer Temporary Modifications 1-92-08
and 2-92-016 to disable the ATI feature and the licensing basis for the ATI feature documented in SER section 8.4.8, Load Sequencing Design.
Based on these discussions it was determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not required to be prepared i
because the ATI feature was not explicitly described in the FSAR, and the licensee determined during the preparation of the Temporary Modifications that removal of the ATI would not result in an inoperable condition for the sequencers or the diesel
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generators, or any alteration of the function of these components.
The inspector also determined during this review the SER is not required to be reviewed for screening 50.59 applicability.
Based on this review this item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
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8.
Exit Meeting The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 1,1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
Item No.
Description and Reference NCV 424,425/93-13-01 Failure to Perform Annual Portable Fire Extinguisher Surveillance 9.
Abbreviations ACOT
- Analog Channel Operational Test AFW
- Auxiliary Feedwater System AMSAC
- ATWS Mitigation Actuation Circuitry ARV
- Atmospheric Relief Valve ATI
- Automatic Test Insertion feature ATWS
- Anticipated Transient Without Scram BOP
- Balance of Plant Operator CBCR
- Control Building-Control Room CCP
- Centrifugal Charging Pump CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations CVCS
- Chemical and Volume Control System DC
- Deficiency Card DG
- Diesel Generator DPM
- Data Processing Module ECCS
- Emergency Core Cooling Systems EHC
- Electro-Hydraulic Control System E0F
- Emergency Operations facility EPROM
- Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory ERF
- Emergency Response Facilities ESF
- Engineered Safety Feature FHB
- Fuel Handling Building FSAR
- Final Safety Analysis Report gpm
- gallons per minute HP
- Health Physics HVAC
- Heating Ventilatipn and Air Conditioning I&C
- Instrumentation and Controls i
IFI
- Inspector Followup Item IR
- Inspection Report
ISEG
- Independent Safety Engineering Group IST
- In-Service Test LC0
- Limiting Condition for Operation LER
- Licensee Event Report MCC
- Motor Control Center MFPT
- Main Feedwater Pump Turbine MWO
- Maintenance Work Order MWt
- Megawatts thermal
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- Non-Cited Violation NPF.
- Nuclear Power Facility NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR
- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSCW
- Nuclear Service Cooling Water System OSC
- Operations Support Center PA
- Protected Area P&ID
- Piping and Instrumentation Drawing PM
- Preventive Maintenance
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psig
- Pounds per Square Inch RCS
- Residual Heat Removal System R0
- Reactor Operator RWST
- Refueling Water Storage Tank SAER
- Safety Audit And Engineering Review SER
- Safety Evaluation Report SI
- Safety Injection SIP
- Safety Injection Pump SG
- Steam Generator SSPS
- Solid State Protection System TCP
- Temporary Change to Procedure TDAFW
- Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System TSC
- Technical Support Center TPCCW
- Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water System TS
- Technical Specifications URI
- Unresolved Item VCT
- Volume Control Tank VIO
- Violation IR4
- Unit 1 - Fourth Refueling Outage 2R2
- Unit 2 - Second Refueling Outage
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