ML20154Q353
| ML20154Q353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1986 |
| From: | Harpster T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Harrington W BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8603210136 | |
| Download: ML20154Q353 (2) | |
Text
r-C' tgR 1 B Docket No. 50-293 Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear ATTN: Mr. William D. Harrington .
Senior Vice President, Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Gentlemen:
Subject:
FEMA Reports on the September 5,1985 Pilgrim Emergency Exercise and the October 29, 1985 Remedial Exercise This letter transmits the Federal Emergency Management Agency report of the September 5, 1985 Pilgrim emergency exercise, and the subsequent remedial exercise of October 29, 1985, which was conducted to resolve Category A defi-
~
ciencies identified during the September exercise.
Four Category A deficiencies were observed at the September 5,1985, exercise.
Three deficiencies were observed at the Carver Emergency Operating Center (E0C) and one was observed the Taunton reception center. The three deficiencies at the Carver E0C were: (1) the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities premptly was not demonstrated; (2) the E0C management did not participate in the exercise, make decisions or coordinate emergency activities; and, (3) the E0C staff did not adequately demonstrate their ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ. The fourth deficiency concerned the Taunton reception center. The radiological monitoring capability for evacuees and vehicles was not demonstrated. As a result of the October 29, 1985 remedial exercise, the four deficiencies observed during the September 5,1985, exercise have been adequately resolved.
If you have any questions concerning this matter please contact W. Lazarus of my staff at (215) 337-5207.
Sincerely, 6D?[,hih! L0 */s Terry L. Harpster, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Attachments: As Stated I N g
\ /
hD F
K 5 0 93 PDR 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY gh
i-Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear 2 cc w/ encl:
A. V. Morisi, Manager, Nuclear Management Services Department C. J. Mathis, Station Manager Joanne Shotwell, Assistant Attorney General Paul Levy, Chairman, Department of Public Utilities W. F. Nolan, Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen Plymouth Civil Defence Director Senator Edward P. Kirby Public Document Room (PDR) local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2)
Mr. E. Thomas, FEMA RI bcc w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
DRP Section Ch.ief W. Raymond, SRI, Vermont Yankee T. Shedlosky, SRI, Millstone 182 H. Eichenholz, SRI, Yankee P. Leech, LPM, NRR W. Thomas, EPS
/
fl 5 Cazarus H ter 3/I~l/86 3/ t 786 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
e m
4p fb5'*, Federal Emergency Management Agency i / Washington, D.C. 20472 FEB I 91966 MENORANDUM EUR: Edward L. Jordan Director, Division of Dnergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Of fice of Inspection and Enforconent U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Commission FM: * * "
Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs SUBJECr: Exercise Report of the Septenber 5, 1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Dnergency Preparedness Plans for the Pilgrim Nuclear Ibwer Station, and a Report on the October 29, 1985, Remedial Exercise.
Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report of the Septenber 5,1985, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth, obssachusetts. he joint exercise a was full participation for the Coninonwealth of Massachusetts and the five localities located within the Dnergency Planning Zone (EPZ). We report, dated December 5,1985, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region I. Also attached is a report on the October 29, 1985, Remedial Exercise for four Category A deficiencies observed at the joint exercise.
Four category A deficiencies were observed at the September 5,1985, exercise:
three were observed at the Carver Dnergency Operating Center (EOC) and one was observed at the Taunton reception center. We three deficiencies at the Carver EOC were that: (1) it did not demonstrate the ability to nobilize staff and activate facilities pronptly; (2) the EOC management did not participate in the exercise, nuke decisions or coordinate emergency activities; and, (3) the EOC staff did not adequately danonstrate their ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ. he fourth deficiency was concerned with the Taunton reception center because the radiological monitoring capability for evacuees and vehicles was not demonstrated.
As a result of the October 29, 1985 renedial exercise the four deficiencies observed during the September 5, 1985, exercise have been corrected.
n , y ,, e a d + o "
4 -wTY*~'" 3{h[h
7 In the Septenber 5,1985, exercise, there were other inadequacies identified requiring corrective actions. The CoTmonwealth of Massachusetts has received a draf t copy of the exercise report and will be preparing schedules of corrective actions. When they are received and analyzed, we will send you copies.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Ibbert S. Wilkerson, 01ief, Technological liazards Division, at 646-2861.
Attachments As Stated
)
1 1
1
, .. .._..m.. . _ . . . .
a
[
~
- iM
f Region I J.W. McCormack Post Office and Court House
. . Boston, Massachusetts 02109 December 16, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel W. Speck Associate Director State & Local Progams & S pport FROM: Henry G. Vickers Regional DirectQ j't/ .- ,
, /M i
/
/v
SUBJECT:
Pil grim Nucl ear Power] Station R em ed i al Exercise Cor*rective - -
Actions Report f
4 We have attached two copies of our Corrective Action Report regarding the Pilgrim exercise held October 29, 1985. This report is an addendum to the 1985 Pilgrim Exercise Rport and describes the corrective actions taken to remedy the four deficiencies found during the subject exercise.
Attachments
)
e l
i i
REPORT ON THE REMEDIAL EXERCISE FOR THE l l
P ILGR IM NUCLEAR P0WER STAT 1 0N '
l 0CT0BER 29, 1985 l
l M ( #
Q O O FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY R EG I0N I John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse Building Boston, Massachusetts 02109 kbf$$h! ~b Jf l
1 l
l
. O e
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
SUMMARY
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
- 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A. Category A Deficiencies. . . . . . . . . . . . 2 B. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 C. Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 with Attachment II. Exercise Eval uations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 A. Carver EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5 B. Taunton Reception Center . . . . . . . . . . . 4 III . Concl usions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6 i
l l
l l
i
q_. .__ _ ._ . . _ _ . _ ._ ._ _ _ .
i .
O
SUMMARY
On October 29, 1985 a remedial exercise was held to l correct the four deficiencies (1isted in the next section) identified in the draf t report for the September 5 Pilgrim Exercise. A three hour drill was hel d , involving the Carver l ocal E0C, and the grounds of the Taunton Reception i
Center. Tested at this remedial exercise were: the mobil-ization of staff and activation of f acilities at the Carver _ E0C, the demonstration of decisionmaking and ability to coordinate emergency activities at the Carver E0C, the ability to al ert the public within the Carver portion of the 10-mil e EPZ, and the demonstration of radiol ogical mon- '
itoring capability for evacuees at the Taunton Reception Center. The remedial exercise corrected the four deficien-cies, and most of the Areas Requiring Corrective Actions in the Town of Carver, which were observed at the September 5,
! 1985, exercise.
L' I
1- ,
I
I. INTRODUCTION A. Deficiencies of September 5, 1985 Exercise The four deficiencies observed at the September 5, 1985 exercise were as follows:
CARVER EOC
- 1.
Description:
The Carver E0C did not demonstrate the ability to mobilize staf f and activate facilities promptly.
The E0C staf f notified on the call-up list did not report to the E0C and carry out their assignments.
(NUREG-0654, II. E.2, A.2.1)
Recommendation:
Designated staff should report to the E0C to repre-1 sent the organizations designated in the plan. They should carry out specified assignments promptly. Pro-cedures should be in place for activation of alternate staff to fill vacancies in first shift E0C-appointments
- 2.
Description:
EOC management, as specified in the plan, did not par-ticipate in the exercise. There was no demonstration of the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. (NUREG-0654, II, A.1.d, A.1.b, A.2.a)
Recommendation:
An accurate E0C management structure should be developed and specified in the town-plan. Al ternate sta f f shoul d be designated, trained, and procedures put in place for their activation
- 3.
Description:
E0C staff did not adquately demonstrate their ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ. There was no coordinated effort among the participating stafff for simulating sounding of sirens, disseminating in-structional messages, or route alerting. (NUREG-0654, II, E.6) 3 Recommendation:
E0C staf f should demonstrate the ability to alert the public in the af fected portions of their com-munity and disseminate the initial instructional messages.
TAUNTON RECEPTION CENTER
- 4.
Description:
The objective to demonstrate the radiological monitoring capability for evacuees and vehicles was not demonstrated because there were no trained personnel present at the Taunton Reception Center to conduct radiological monitoring. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev 1, II, K.5.a; o.4.c: J.12).
Recommendation:
Staff must be identified and trained to provide radiological monitoring of evacuees and vehicles.
B. Objectives for the Remedial Exercise The objectives for the exercise held on October 29, 1985 to show correction of the deficiencies were as follows:
CARVER EOC
- 1) Demonstrated ability to alert, mobil ize sta f f, and activate f acilities at the Carver EOC.
- 2) Demonstrate ability to make decisions and coor-dinate emergency activities.
- 3) Demonstrate ability to alert the af fected public within the 10-mile EPZ.
- 4) Demonstrate the organizational, operational, and physical capabilities of the Carver E0C through its f ull-scale activation. This is to address as many of the areas requiring corrective action as could be demonstrated.
TAUNTON RECEPTION CENTER
- 1) Demonstrate the radiological monitoring capabil-t ities of Taunton city personnel to receive evacuees at the Taunton Reception Center.
8 C. Scenario for the Remedial Exercise See attached scenario.
II. EXERCISE EVALUATIONS The remedial drill of October 29, 1985 to demonstrate correction of the deficiencies observed during the September 5,1985 f ull-scale exercise of the Pil grim Nuclear Power Plant included activation of the Carver E0C and the radiological contamination monitoring station of the Taunton Reception Center located on the grounds of the Taunton State Hospital. Reports of observations in both locations follow.
A. Taunton Reception Center Taunton City personnel adequately demonstrated their cap-ability to provide radiol ogical contamination monitoring-for evacuees f rom the Pil grim EPZ. Present for the exer-cise were 2 contamination monitors from the fire department and personnel manning a pumper truck for washing down con-taminated vehicles. The fire department has a total of 8 trained monitors. There was a city policeman present for security and traffic direction. From the Taunton Civil De fense Agency, there were two trained monitors, plus the Civil Defense Director and Deputy Civil Defense Director.
The Civil Defense Agency has the capability of fielding 20 trained people.
The Civil Defense Director brought with him seven CDV-777 kits. Each kit contains 1 CDV 700 geiger counter, 2 CDV-715 monitors, and an assorted supply of CDV-138's 742's, and 730's. The Deputy Civil Defense Director required each participating emergency worker (all who were present) to register by filling out a personnel record form and log of all dosimetry issued. Each emergency worker received a zeroed CDV-138 and CDV-742. TLD's were not actually issued. They would normally be provided through the Area II State Civil Defense Office.
For the purpose of the exercise, three vehicles were monitored in a segregated portion of parking area at the entrance to the reception area. The four monitors method-ically checked all surfaces, including wheel well s, of all the vehicles. One truck was simulated as being contam-inated. Written procedures were available, and followed.
4 -
l The deficiency observed at this location during the September 5 exercise was corrected.
B. Town of Carver EOC The Carver E0C, located in the Police Station was notified via the Minitor Alert System by the State Police of an Unusual Event at 1:30 p.m. Key E0C staff (Civil Defense Director and Fire Chief) were notified of such by beeper.
Al l further communications to Carver originated from the Area II office for this exercise. At 1:51 p.m. Area II, notified Carver of an Alert. At 2:11 p.m., a Site Area Emergency was declared by Area II. Between 2:14 p.m. and 2:25 p.m., all E0C staff were called and reported for duty.
EOC staff present were; the Civil De fense Director, a town Selectman, Police Chie f, Fire Chief, School Superintendent, and the Department of Public Wel f are and local Health agency heads. By 2:34 p.m., the E0C was fully activated. At 2:46 p.m., Area 11 notified the dispatcher at Carver that
! a General Emergency was declared at 2:35 p.m.
At 2:47 p.m., Area 11 relayed a protective action recom-mendation for sheltering in-place f rom 2-5 mile s , appl ic-able to Plymouth only. At this point, E0C staff began discussing in detail among themsel ves the range of pre-
- paratory steps they should be taking to prepare for a protective action response in Carver. There was good com-mand and control exhibited by the Civil Defense Director, and excellent input from all EOC staff regarding activities to be accomplished in Carver, should the need arise.
At 3:09 p.m., Area II advised Carver that a sheltering in-place protective action recommendation for Carver East of Rte 58 would become ef fective at 3:15 p.m. The Civil Defense Director felt that the recommendation should have incl uded the whole town. At 3:15 p.m., the activation of the public notification system (7 sirens) was simulated.
EBS messages were inserted by an exercise controller to coincide with messages to be released to the public by the State.
At 3:25 p.m., it was simulated that the telephone system was not working. The communications officer adequately compensated by using RACES. Evacuation was simulated at 3:45 p.m. The local EOC staff knew their responsibilities regarding school s, special f acilities, and were able to deal with a simulated traffic accident bl ocking an < vac-uation route and a simulated heart attack victim requiring medical attention.
-5 -
1 The Carver E0C is now located in an operations room of the police station. It was adequate. Displ ays, maps , and status boards were used and kept current.
The three deficiencies noted at this location during the September 5 exercise have been corrected.
III. CONCLUSIONS The one deficiency observed in the September 5 exercise of the plans and preparedness for the Pil grim Nuclear Power Plant in Taunton, and the three observed in Carver, have been addressed and corrected. In addition, all six Areas Requiring Corrective Action and the one Area Recommended for Improvement in Carver were also addressed and corrected.
In concl usion, there is reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off-site in the event of a radiological emergency to adequately protect the public health and safety.
l
} "'4 4*
e1 a '< !
H g
y, =
/
O O FINAL EXERCISE ASSESSMENT JOINT STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE FOR TiiE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION PLYMOUTil, M ASSACIIUSETTS SEPTEMBER 5,1985 l
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION I
- John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse Boston, Massachusetts 02109
(($12S iCC H%f .
l l
.i .
i PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION i
1 LICENSEE: Boston Edison Company i :
- LOCATION: Plymouth, Messachusetts !
l DATE OF REPORT: December' 5,1985 i
i DATE OF EXERCISE: September 5,1985 ,
i PARTICIPANTS:
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Plymouth, Mass.
Duxbury, Mass.
Carver, Mass.
7 Kingston, Mass.
Marshfield, Mass.
NONPARTICIPANTS: None 1,
a 1
7 4
4 i
i i
2 1
l 4
J
' 11 l
i
_ _ . . _ . . - - . , . . . . _ _ , . _ , . _ _ . . _ _ . _ , - . _ _ . - _ _ , . . . . , . - . . . - _ . _ , _ m ,r . , _ , _ . , ,
CONTENTS Vi LIST O F A B B R E VI ATIO N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SUMMARY
................................................................viii I
1 I NT R O D U C TI O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 E x e rc is e Ba c k g ro u n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I 2
1.2 Fe de ral O bs e rv e rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 1.3 Ex e rc i s e O bj e c t i v e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 1.4 Ex e rc is e Sc e n a r i o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 1.5 E va lua t io n C ri te ri a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 2 E X E R C IS E EV A L U ATIO N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Massachuse tts State Ope rations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9
2.1.1 E m erge nc y Opera tions Ce n ter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14 2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18 2.1.3 AreaIIEOC..................................................
2.1.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams and Radiological Health Laboratory ................................................... 21 2.1.5 Taunton EOC and Reception Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 E m erge ncy M e dic al Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.1.6 2.1.7 Middleborough -- State Police Warning Point and Access Control...................................................... 30 2.1.8 M e di a C e n t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.2 Massachusetts Local Emergency Operations Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 .
2.2.1 Plymouth.................................................... 36 2.2.2 Duxbury ..................................................... 40 2.2.3 Carver....................................................... 42 2.2.4 Kingston..................................................... 46 2.2.5 M a rs h f i e l d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING C O R R ECTI V E A CTIO N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 TABLES 1 Selec ted Events and Observed Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station -
Se p t e m b e r 5, 19 8 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 3 Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions - Tracking Table -
Pilgrim Nuclear Po we r Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6tt 4 Status of Objectives - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 i
e
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ARC American Red Cross DECO Boston Edison Company ,
CAP Civil Air Patrol CD Civil Defense CEP Civil Emergency Preparedness DPH Department of Public Health DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EAL emergency action level EBS Emergency Broadcast System EOC emergency operations center EOF emergency operations facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency G-M Geiger-Mueller K! potassium iodide MCDA Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency MDPH Massachusetts Department of Public Health NAWAS National Warning System NIAT Nuclear Incident Advisory Team NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NU REG-0654/ " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency FEM A-R EP-1 Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" PAG protective action guide PIO public information officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RADEF radiological defense REP radiological emergency preparedness SOP standard operating procedure TCP traffic control point TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture ei
9 I
SUMMARY
4 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, communities within the Pilgrim emergency planning zone, and the Boston Edison Company conducted an exercise of the plans and preparedness for off-site radiological emergency response for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) in Plymouth, Massachusetts, on September 5,1985.
Following the exercise, preliminary observations were indicated by the 22-member federal observer team, and briefings for exercise participants and the general public were held on September 6, 1985 at Memorial Hall in Plymouth. The evaluation, deficiencies, areas requiring corrective actions, areas recommended for improvement,
! and recommendations are included in this document.
Each deficiency or area requiring corrective action and a corresponding recom-mended corrective action is described by jurisdiction in Section 2 of this report. Areas recommended for improvement, which do not require corrective actions, are also
! similarly described.
l Section 3 provides a summary listing of: (a) deficiencies which would lead to a i negative finding, and (b) areas requiring corrective actions. It also provides a suggested
- format for the state to use in responding to these items.
]
FEMA has recently adopted some changes in terminology to describe exercise inadequacies. The revised terminology is reflected in this report. The different classes of exercise inadequacies are defined in Section 1.5 of this report. Deficiencies are l exercise inadequacies which were previously identified as " Category A Deficiencies,"
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions are those previously identified as " Category B Deficiencies," and Areas Recommended for Improvement are those previously identified as " Areas for Improvement."
j COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS OPERATIONS i
I The Commonwealth of Massachusetts operations for this exercise included the i
state emergency operations center (EOC), the emergency operations facility (EOF), the Area II EOC, two radiological field monitoring teams, the Taunton reception center,
, ambulance and hospital emergency medical services, the state police warning point, and i the media center. The performance of the Commonwealth' of Massachusetts was i characterized by improved performance over past exercises and the correction of many
! earlier inadequacies.
1
! The state EOC is an outstanding facility ideally suited for extended emergency
! operations. The EOC was promptly activated, but staffing of the EOC was not fully demonstrated due to prepositioning of most key staff members. Emergency operations management at the state EOC was good. The State Civil Defense Director provided i
excellent leadership and involved key staff members in decision making. The EOC staff was competent and well trained. Communications at the state EOC were very good.
! However. very little technical information regarding accident assessment was provided to the EOC by the EOF staff. Because of their lack of data, the EOC staff did not have viii w-,_.-_ %, ... - - - - - - -
, - - - , _ - , _ . . . . . . _ _ .-. . ym..- - . . , , -r . - . , - - .
a good technical basis for the actions they took. Public alerting, notification and instruction were adequately coordinated from the state EOC. Although there was not sufficient time at the end of the exercise for a full demonstration of recovery and re-entry operations, the Director and his staff demonstrated that they were knowledgable of the process and potential problems and were prepared to cope with the situation.
The on-site EOF is housed in three trailers which tended to become crowded, hot and noisy. A new EOF is presently under construction. Activation and staffing of the EOF was prompt, although players were prepositioned in the area of the plant. Com-munications systems were excellent at the EOF. Accident assessment and determination of off-site consequences to the public health was satisfactory at the EOF, and protective actions recommended were carefully considered. The technical aspects of dose and dose rate projections were primarily carried out by the utility staff. More time should have been spent by the state personnel at the EOF in critically reviewing the dose assessments and protective action recommendations made by the utility. The flow of technical information from the EOF to the state EOC also needs improvement.
The facilities at the Area II EOC were adequate. EOC activation and staff mobilization were adequate, although some players were prepositioned. Command and control of the emergency operations were very well demonstrated. Leadership by the Director, and staff teamwork were evident. Message flow within the Area II EOC was very good. The coordination of information with the state and local EOCs was also adequately demonstrated. Communications systems functioned effectively.
Both radiological field monitoring teams mobilized for this exercise had all appropriate equipment. The technical operations of the NIAT-3 team were excellent, however, a, problem with determining monitoring point locations by the NIAT-7 team was observed. Communications between the field teams and the EOF were adequate with the exception of temporary loss of contact with the EOF by both teams on several occasions.
Radiological exposure control equipment and procedures used by the field teams were adequate. Because of scenario limitations, however, there was not sufficient time to fully test the capabilities of the field monitoring teams.
The Taunton reception center was activated for this exercise. Much space is available but is ordinarily not maintained in usable condition. Although a fire truck and three men were'present to wash down cars, there were no trained people on site to perform radiological monitoring. The ability to perform radiological monitoring at the reception center was, therefore, not demonstrated. There is also some question as to whether the existing local agreement to have the Red Cross do the registration at the reception center is compatible with the overall State / Red Cross agreement.
l The emergency medical services of the Metro Ambulance Service and the Jordan Hospital were evaluated for this exercise. The ambulance crew did an excellent job and i demonstrated themselves to be very patient and professional under difficult conditions. l However, there is a need for better communications on the ambulance. The hospital l
! staff at Jordan Hospital did a creditable job of handling the contaminated patient; ;
however, the communications capabilities could be improved. j i
I ix
.- -- , ~ . _ _ - - .-. . _ _ _ --. . - _ _ .
! The State Police warning point at Middleborough had good facilities, and emergency operation management was effective. Coordination between staff members was good. However, the possibility exists that the radio dispatcher could not handle both l
routine and radiological emergency calls in a timely manner in a real emergency. Some communications problems also continue to exist in the notification and verification of
, messages between the State Police warning point and the local EOCs. Adequate ,
l '
t resources and equipment are available to handle possible traffic control requirements.
, Staff demonstrated that they are aware of potential traffic problems, manpower requirements, evacuation routes, relocation / decontamination center locations, and
. dosimetry requirements.
The Media Center had adequate facilities. Activation and staffing of the media l
center was good, although actual notification and mobilization of PIOS was not demonstrated. The communications systems were generally good, although some
! improvements could be made. The public information functions at the media center were l
generally performed in an excellent manner. Media briefings were generally thorough, 1 accurate and clear. Coordination and information exchange between PIOS was excellent.
A i
LOC AL OPERATIONS Each of the five communities within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) participated in the radiological emergency exercise. Operating facilities and resources l were adequate at all local EOCs except for Carver. However, many of the EOCs lacked adequate population distribution information on local residents and seasonal transients.
Key EOC staff received initial notification through their local police and/or fire dispatcher. Pagers and telephones were utilized to notify EOC staff. EOCs were
! completely activated at the Site Area Emergency although key officials and some staff l were present in their respective EOC facilities prior to this notification. Staffing was.
I efficiently completed in all EOCs. However, at Carver the EOC director and his staff 2
did not respond and the EOC was not formally activated.
1 l Communication equipment functioned effectively at each EOC. The primary j system was the telephone and backup was provided by the RACES radio system.
4 Fixed sirens and route alerting teams were dispatched by the local EOCs (except Carver) to notify the public. Evacuation was simulated. The local civil defense directors l discussed evacuation procedures and the logistics required for traffic and access control.
All EOCs had an adequate supply of radiological exposure control equipment.
Except for Carver, EOC staff dem'onstrated that acceptable procedures are in place to distribute dosimetry, maintain records, and control individual dose and decontamination.
! Recovery and reentry procedures were not performed although these procedures were i available in all municipal plans and were discussed at some EOCs.
l The scenario was generally adequate to test the emergency response capabilities l of participating EOCs. The scenario provided a sufficient opportunity to correct j inadequacies reported from the previous exercises, l
i l
)
} x .
1 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Planning include:
e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of state and local government emergency plans for adequacy.
e Determining whether the plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises conducted by emergency-response jurisdictions.
e Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved federal agencies:
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
- American Red Cross (ARC)
Formal submission of emergency plans to the regional assistance committee (RAC) by the state and relevant local jurisdictions was followed by the first joint radio-logical emergency response exercises on March 3,1982. Additional exercises were conducted on June 29, 1983 and September 5,1985. This report presents findings for the September 5,1985 exercise. The purpose of these exercises was to assess the capability of the state and local emergency preparedness organizations to protect the public in the event of an accident at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
An observer team consisting of FEMA Region I personnel, regional assistance committee members, and supporting personnel from federal and state agencies evaluated the September 5, 1985 exercise. A total of 22 observers trained in radiological emergency response were assigned to evaluate state, local, and field activities.
Following the exercise, a closed critique of the exercise for the participating state officials was held at 1:00 p.m. on Friday, September 6,1985, at Memorial Hall in Plymouth Mass. This critique was followed at 2:00 p.m. with an open meeting for the public and local participants.
2 The findings presented in this report are the results of a review of the federal observers' evaluations and were reviewed by the RAC chairman for FEMA Region I.
Since the FEMA Region I director is -responsible for certifying to the FEMA associate director of State and Local Programs and Support that any significant deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action observed during the exercise have been corrected, and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans as appropriate, FEMA suggests that the State complete the schedule for corrections of the significant deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions included as Section 3 of this report.
1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Twenty-two federal observers participated in evaluating this exercise. These individuals, their agencies, and their observation location (s) are given below.
Observer Agency Location Edward A. Thomas, RAC Chairman FEMAa General Observations Lawrence Robertson, Team Leader FEMA State EOC Jack Dolan FEMA State EOC David Rohrer NRC D State EOC (Radiological Health)
Robert Rospenda ANLc State EOC Thomas Baldwin, Team Leader ANL Area II EOC Bruce Swiren, Team Leader FEMA EOF Frederick Oleson FEMA EOF Warren Church FDA d EOF Neil Gaeta, Team Leader FDA Field Monitoring Teams and Radio-logical Health Laboratory Michael Leal FDA Field Monitoring James Roester BNL* Field Monitoring Kenneth Horak, Team Leader FEMA Media Center (Plymouth Memorial Hall)
I William Gasper, Team Leader ANL State Warning Point (Middleborough)
Sue Ann Curtis, Team Leader ANL Plymouth EOC Michael Goetz FEMA Carver EOC Deirdre Donahue FEMA Carver EOC Dorothy Nevitt USDA I Duxbury EOC Elizabeth Dionne FEMA Marshfield EOC Gary Kaszynski ANL Kingston EOC John Stepp Emergency Medical Services ( A m bu- *
!ance and Jordan Hospital)
Donald Connors ARCE Taunton Reception Center aFEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency b
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission C
A NL: Argonne National Laboratory d
FDA: U.S. Food and Drug Administration
?BNL: Brookhaven National Laboratory I
USDA: U.S. Decartment of Agriculture TARC: American Red Cross l
3 1..! EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The overall objectives of the state and local communities were to demonstrate
.that their emergency-response plans, operations, and capability for mobilizing and coor-dinating necessary resources are adequate to cope with an emergency at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS).
The objectives for the September 5,1985 exercise were as follows:
- 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly. (State EOC, Area II EOC, EOF, Media Center, EOCs for the five towns within the plume exposure EPZ and one
[Taunton] reception center will be activated.)
- 2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. (Staffing backup will be indicated by roster backup. Actual shift changes will not be undertaken.)
- 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. (These objectives will be exercised at state and local EOCs.)
- 4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. (Facilities and displays will be exercised at all locations activated [see objective 1].)
- 5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. (Communications among all emergency facilities and for field teams will be exer-cised.)
- 6. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion. (Two field monitoring teams will be exercised.)
- 7. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for deter-mining ambient radiation levels. (Both field teams will be appro-priately equipped.)
- 8. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measure-ment of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10-I uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases. (Field teams will be exercised in this regard; no laboratory work is planned. Radlabs have been satisfactorily exercised in past events.)
- 9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection and transport of samples' of" soil, vegetation, snow, water, and milk. (Field teams will be exercised against this objective:
daboratories will not.)
7 i 4
- 11. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appro-i priate protective measures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.
(This capability will be demonstrated by State staff at the EOF.)
- 14. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, initial instructional message, . within and disseminate an
- 15 minutes. (Alerting will be exercised up to and including EBS
- testing. No siren activation is planned during the exercise, i however.)
}
- 15. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion. (Instructions to the public will be demonstrated at the state EOC.)
- 16. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to j
manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
(Ability to organize and implement an evacuation will be demon-strated. No physical movement of evacuees is planned.)
j 17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to i deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or j < traffic obstructions. (Abilities consistent with the types of l impediments expected in September will be exercised [i.e., no winter impediments are foreseenl.)
l 21. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control .emer-
, e gency worker exposure. (This capability will be exercised from j the EOF and from local EOCs. Also by field teams.)
i
- 22. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on pre-
- determined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers i and/or the general population. (EOF personnel will demonstrate this capability. Massachusetts plans do not call for KI for the public.)
i 25. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner. (This capability will be exercised at the media center. If press appear, a briefing will be provided at the state
, EOC as well.)
i
- 26. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of infor-mation released. (Coordination at media center and with state
- 27. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion. (Rumor control capability among media '
l center. state EOC and EOF will be exercised.)
i
5
- 28. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radio-logical monitoring of evacuees. (This ~ objective will be exercised at a single reception center.)
- 31. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals. (Use of ambulance in trans-porting injured and contaminated worker from Pilgrim plant to Jordan Hospital will be demonstrated.)
- 32. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals. (Facilities and procedures at Jordan Hospital will be exercised.)
- 35. Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure. (This capability will be tested at the EOF.)
- 36. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry. (This capability will be tested at the state and Area II EOCs.)
1.4 EXERCISE SCENARIO An operator was conducting a routine operability surveillance . at about 8:00 a.m. During this surveillance, the operator was sprayed and burned by steam and hot water escaping from the gland seal condenser due to a blown gasket. The failure of the exhaust line also resulted in a direct path from the torus to the torus room atmosphere, although this was not yet known by the plant operators. At about 8:05 a.m.,
the injured and contaminated operator stumbled away from the accident location. When he was discovered, an Unusual Event was declared since this was a contaminated injury requiring off-site medical treatment.
The drywell floor sump was routinely pumped down at about 8:30 a.m. The drywell floor sump high level alarm annunciated in the radwaste control room at about 8:45 a.m. and was reported to the operating supervisor by the radwaste operator. Since it had been only 20 minutes since the last pumpdown of the sump, the alarm indicated reactor coolant system leakage in excess of 50 gallons per minute for this period which, therefore, triggered an Alert declaration a short time after.
At about 8:53 a.m., the RBCCW head tank water level fell and the volume of the RBCCW loop B was reduced to the point where adequate cooling for the drywell coolers could not be provided. This caused the drywell to overheat. /,s a result of this, and in accordance with procedures, the operator scramed the reactor at about 8:54 a.m.
Reactor relief valves were manually operated to control reactor pressure after the scram and isolation. However, unknown to the operator, the use of the relief valves allowed primary steam to pass into the torus and out through an exhaust line into the torus room and then to the reactor building atmosphere. At about 9:15 a.m. increasing airborne radiation levels, from leakage through the broken exhaust line, were indicated by the air i 1
l
b 6 .
particulate monitor at the drywell entrance. The main stack normal range monitor also indicated increasing effluent radiation levels.
Due to airborne radiation levels, the reactor building was evacuated at about 9:30 a.m. based on a recommendation from Health Physics personnel. The reactor building crane operator evacuated from the refuel floor leaving the DOT shipping cask supported by the reactor building overhead crane. The cask was abandoned over an area ,
of the refuel floor near the edge of the spent fuel pool which is not capable of with-standing a heavy object drop. At about 10:30 a.m. a very loud, resounding, heavy noise was heard throughout the reactor and administration buildings. This was the result of the DOT cask falling on the edge of the fuel pool when the supporting cables failed.
Unknown to the Watch Engineer, the cuk severely damaged the fuel pool structural concrete and liner and some of the recently irradiated fuel. At about 10:31 a.m. four refuel floor vent exhaust monitors went into alarm indicating high releases from the refuel floor ventilation system. This triggered declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
When the DOT cask fell on the north edge of the fuel pool, shrapnel and the concussion damaged the cladding of some of the freshly irradiation fuel in the pool, releasing a fraction of the contained gap activity to the fuel pool water and subsequently to the refuel floor atmosphere. Unknown to the ' operator, the impact of the cask also caused
, substantial damage to the fuel pool structural concrete. The liner was severely torn at a weld seam and buckled into the pool. There was still sufficient intact concrete to prevent leakage.
At about 11:30 a.m. the fuel pool water level began to drop at the rate of several feet per minute. Latent structural damage to the fuel pool resulted in a large crack in the concre'te in the side of the fuel pool which suddenly propagated and opened a hole,
, and the fuel pool liner failed catastrophically, resulting in a large amount of water leakage. The upper two feet of fuel became uncovered at about 11:35 a.m. before the leakage abated. Direct radiation levels on the refueling floor and near the hole were lethal due to the exposed fuel. The location of the hole was such that only the uppermost two feet of the active fuel bundles were uncovered. The uncovered sections of the fuel were heating up and would begin to perforate and melt in about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> if supplemental cooling was not provided. A General Emergency was declared based on projected off-site dose consequences.
At about 12:45 p.m. time was compressed during the exercise so that fuel melting began sooner than the laws of physics would allow. High radiation levels existed throughout the reactor building and were indicated on the main stack effluent monitors.
A General Emergency was declared based on off-site projected whole body doses and main stack high range effluent monitor reading. Significant airborne releases to the refuel floor atmosphere, standby gas treatment system, and the environment occurred.
Radiation levels on the refuel floor and near the hole in the fuel pool were lethal due to the uncovered fuel. Scatter of gamma radiation from the walls of the pool caused the entire refuel floor to be inaccessible.
At about 2:30 p.m. the fuel perforated and partially melted down to the residual water level in the fuel pool. Damage ceased, releases were decreasing rapidly, airborne levels in the reactor building were decreasing to the point where reentry was possible.
The General Emergency ended.
I 1.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Section 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654, FEM A-REP-1,
. Rev.1 (Nov.1980). Following the overview narrative for each jurisdiction or activity, deficiencies, areas requiring corrective actions, and areas recommended for improvement are presented with accompanying recommendations.
Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or other actions. Deficiencies are inadequacies that lead to a negative finding. A negative finding must be based on at least one deficiency. Four (4) deficiencies were observed in the September 5,1985 exercise.
i Areas requiring corrective actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies n of state and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
Areas recommended for improvement also are listed as appropriate for each
~ jurisaiction or activity. These are problem areas observed during the exercise that are
' not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.
It should be noted that the above definitions reflect recently adopted changes in
- terminology by FEMA. Deficiencies were previously identified as " Category A Deficiencies," Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were *previously identified as
" Category B Deficiencies," and Areas Recommended for Improvement were previously identified as " Areas for Improvement."
.I
o 8
e . .
- C 3 S. S. S.
S. S. S. S.
.ee e e e e e e & eb c I 4 e 3 e em O N 4 0 @ 6 9 e 4 e.
. 4 O e art 4e e
st go en @ e @ N e O.
- O.
. . . . . . e . . . . .
g
=* 9 8 S. S. E. S. S. E. S. S. S. S.
.e e e e e e & & e & eb ab &
e A O .= O O N e - e O O 9 em m
e a
e O n m e e O e c
- e. c.e. =.=
e e @ *e em O N N O m 4. e.e e
te
& .e .
. . . . . e . e e e . . .
S 5 S. S. S. S. E. S. S. S. S. E. S. 3e e .oa e e e e e ab e e & Ab & & Eb ey e e eC ce ce O .e @ @ N O e.u.,. m e.)* e O e e.e.@
. c.e. c.e. Q 4 a 4 e.r.b Bde.C and eB @ O..
O ce me es
= O e 4 t e.e c.*e eo
. e . . o . . .
S S. S. S. S.
- s. A. E. E. e-e e e e e Eb em Sb ab e e M se
- 4. N O $ 1 e 0 $ 4 9 e m 4
e O m -4 =.e. a.r.e u c.e. ce e @ O c't e
.e ==.
m v.=e a.
. e e . . . . e e e e e 8 9 S. S. S. S. S.. S. S. S. S. E.
h E.
to e e e e E && e G & & & &
a e e e ON e O C N s, u N
4 O < e <
4 e 8 l O EL @ S O- O == C e e ce se .e r.e ce me r.e.
. . . . . . . . . e e e .
B 8 8 8 8 8 E 8 8 en 8e G. Ee S. e E.
Og e e e e G & e e & & . & &
W e h e C @ e - O O O 3 O O O e O e e 4 O m M
.s'n c.e. O.. O.. e.
m e es ce a= e #
O.e
== O r.e. -.* .== . c.*e e . . .
S. S.. S. S. S.
te C .* e e e e ab
.O e ==C.
C O @ q t e g .e e l C g g g e, m e m.. 4 4 qn e e. c.e. em. . .
- s e e O - e y y
e e . . . . e e . . ee S. e m E. E. S. E. S. S. S. E. S. e en e e e e e & G & e & 44
-e e.
N eE et e. 6 B e I e'= 0 8 0 N ert ce ce e ee m O e m 8"4 gg er.*
. en.=.=.
. a.r.* =.=. 4.a e @ O O m - es .* ee
.e .e .e .a e
9 M . . . . . . . . . . . . . e Q S D
.e G. W. G. Se E. E. E. S. S. S. e S. S. m.
E e.e g e e e e ab e e eh eb e- Ab ab e
> ~ e8
@w e re O 8 e
e O
O.
a ~ e e
e O e
O O a o
C e. e.s 8.. c.e. .e e.t. e.o. c.e.
4 e. @ e e ee
=== 0
- e .e N N .e I
D C- se . .e .e @
2> e 6 e
. e . . . . . . ee e. e. e. 3 G ee 8 S. S. S. S. e. A. S. S. S. S.
e e e e e e & Ab e e Eb & e ab as O. C)
M e
m
.=
O..
0 art r.e.
4 e.s.t I am M
e.m.
e O 4 m
9 MOO
.e.
. 4 e.s.
e e.e u E
e Q em @ @ O = e n't se
- e ce O s.e ==
.e. e C -
g 5
= . . . . - . . . . . . E 8
j e.e A. E. S. S. . S. . O. S. . S. . S. e o e e e e e e e e & & G & & & & &
t's e es
@ es 8 O e O e e @ e=e O O
.e na og e
O..
8 e i
m.e e, m O. 4O 8 e.
e M e @ @ @
.O .=.
. O.e e m O.e c.e. c.e ce ce e
e
. e . . .
- =8 *J S. @
ey S. S. S. S. e S. a
.ee e e g & & & Q 9
.U.se g e e g g ee 9 O e C e e e e O e.m I te A s.e. a.r.t e.r. c.e. .e. g v e e O s e m e e4 e.o - e e
. m e u g h ee e e a h w n. int e w g e e. - E m.e s .8 as e e =. e s
- e'.e g n. g e ge 4 ee 7 e 3 e
me E
es e
e g
e me C
.s e.'=
7 4 C e e.t e
e es
.es C e
e e.
e C e
1 e
e e
e e > e me 3 e. S N e es N.n S C D tea e e S a e .O. e e O e.Pt da w. e.
m e ee= e. .e. =5 ee me e .E* .m
- O h 3 .* e e e na e to f's e W & e e S 9 se E ee a e e 3 as 4 Q C .S= e. e +4 mis e 2 3 9 e e
e e e c .es v e 4 e
e h
-e 9 -
- e. .=o
'A
- e. 3 2d e..e. -e.
'e
'e =
1*
e e" e
3 4 W e e Q e t= W et W e
- +
9 Emergency Oparations Cancer 2 EXERCISE EVALUATIONS ,
I 2.1 MASSACHUSETTS STATE OPERATIONS 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts EOC is located at the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency and Office of Emergency Preparedness underground facility in Framingham, Massachusetts. This is an outstanding facility and is ideally suited for conducting emergency operations for an extended period. Although much supplemental space is available throughout the EOC building, most emergency operations are centralized in the operations room. The operations room is a large room with a tiered arrangement which provides good working space and excellent visibility of displays for all key staff members. Telephone communications are available for all staff members in this operations room.
The EOC is ideally suited for extended operations if they become necessary and has been used in the past for actual emergencies. The EOC has eating and sleeping facilities as well as sufficient lavatories and showers. Backup generating capability is present although it was not demonstrated for the exercise.
The operations room contained all required maps, displays, and status boards. All were prominently posted with the exception of population data by evacuation area.
However, population data were available in the plan if needed for reference. Emergency action levels and meteorological data were posted. Several of the supplemental status boards did not have the first sheltering protective action recommendation posted until late in the exercise, however. Overall, the exercise objective on the adequacy of facilities and displays was effectively demonstrated.
According to the plan, the EOC is activated and staffed at the Alert emergency action level (EAL). However, most key staff members were prepositioned during the Unusual Event and the EOC was observed to be operational and staffed with key t personnel by 9:10 a.m., almost immediately after the call notifying the civil defense (CD) director of the escalation to Alert which was received at 9:06 a.m. from the state police. Because of this prepositioning, the exercise objective on staff mobilization was not considered fully demonstrated. However, it should be noted that staff participation at the state EOC was excellent and all required personnel were present and all agencies were represented. The ability to maintain staffing around the clock was demonstrated by presentation of a roster showing staffing changes for three shifts, thereby satisfying an exercise objective.
The EOC activat on procedure is put in motion by a call from the Pilgrim pint to the state police warning point. The state police then call the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (MCDA) and the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. These agencies then notify other individuals and agencies using a call out list.
10 Emargency Operations Center Emergency operations management at the state EOC was good. The state civil defense director was clearly in charge, conducting frequent informative briefings for the EOC staff. He also consulted with staff members in formulating protective actions and involved them in the decision-making process as necessary. The staff appeared to be competent and well trained. They were able to operate independently, paid close attention to detail in implementing decisions, and planned for contingencies. Message handling at the EOC was efficient. Message logs were maintained by staff members and copies of messages were distributed to key staff members. Verification of key messages at the EOC was demonstrated by requiring the receipt of hard-copy messages on the
- facsimile machine before acting on the content of a message. This verification process corrects a previous area requiring corrective action (#11). Since the transmission of hard-copy messages was standard operating procedure and was done quickly, this procedure was demonstrated to be workable and effective.
Overall, the communications at the state EOC were very good. The exercise objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations was met and the previous area requiring corrective action #9 is considered corrected.
Commercial telephone lines were used for most of the routine communications at the EOC. Each key agency had its own telephone available in the operations room. Although ithese telephones generally worked well, occasional problems were observed when minor delays occurred in placing a call or when staff members had difficulty with clear voice communications over the telephones. No major delays were observed, however. An extensive radio and teletype communication system was also available at the EOC if
.needed. These systems are located in a communications area outside of the operations room, and consist of numerous radio nets and hard-copy teletypes including statewide civil defense, NAWAS and RACES. These provide ample backup if needed. No major
. delays were observed in communicating with any location or individual due to equipment problems. Telefax was used for hard-copy transmission between the EOC and the r
emergency operations facility (EOF). This key link operated quickly and efficiently.
Telefax was also used for hard-copy transmissions to and from the media center and also worked effectively.
Accident assessment and determination of protective action recommendations were performed at the EOF and transmitted to the state EOC by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) personnel at the EOF. The personnel at the state EOC did a commendable job with the very limited technical data available to them.
Because of this lack of data, the EOC staff did not have a good technical basis for the actions they took. Although the information flow between the state EOC, EOF and Area l
II EOC was timely and improved over past exercises, there was very limited technical information coming to the EOC from the EOF regarding plant conditions and the reasons for emergency action levels. Therefore, a previous area requiring corrective action (#14) remains uncorrected. However, meteorological information was transmitted from the EOF to the EOC in a timely manner using the new form developed by MDPH and the licensee. This corrects a previous area requiring corrective action (#47). The EOC staff also assumed incorrectly that the basic technical work was being done by the DPH staff at the EOF. However, as described in the EOF section of this report, the DPH staff depended entirely on dose assessments and p:rotective action recommendations developed
! bv the licensee. The lack of technical information and the basis for decisions can be i
I l
4 e
11 Emergency Operations Canter A
corrected by a more formalized process of gathering and transmitting the necessary data from the EOF to the EOC. In addition, there was no technical representative from the licensee in the EOC who could have provided the necessary briefings to EOC personnel on plant canditions and the safety significance of these actual or projected conditions. This
'can be easily remedied by the dispatch of such a person to the EOC by the licensee
^
during a radiological emergency.
Public alerting, notification and instruction were adequate. Public instructional messages were prepared and transmitted over the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS)
! - (simulated). Prescripted EBS messages were used to supply specific information on sheltering and evacuation, including how to do it and where to go. The simulated EBS messages were broadcast after sirens were sounded, allowing a brief interval between siren sounding and message broadcast, so that citizens could turn on radios . or televisions. This corrects a previous area requiring corrective action (#15). EBS evacuation messages were sent directly to the EBS stations from the state EOC.
Operational evacuation instructions were transmitted promptly from the state EOC to
' -the Area 11 EOC and then to the local EOCs using established command and control communications systems. New emergency planning zone EPZ maps were used at each
{~
' EOC and there was no difficulty reported irs translating EPZ sector information into local
< landmark information. These observations correct a previous area requiring corrective action (#48). Discussions were held at the EOC concerning the use of loud speakers and f
emergency vehicles to give instructions to the transient population, especially along the ebeaches. The beach populations were considered in the development of protective i t actions. EBS messages were prepared for use when the er.nergency classifications were schanged and when changes in the emergency situation resulted in a need to provide the '
public with additional information. The rumor control telephone number was activated i during the exercise, meeting one of the exercise objectives.
EOC personnel demonstrated that they were knowledgeable of the implications of protective evacuation and the inherent problems, such as traffic control and control of access to the evacuated areas. A special Civil Air Patrol (CAP) flyover of the area to be j, evacuated was performed to identify any potential traffic congestion points based on actua traffic conditions on the day of the exercise. Videotape of evacuation routes was made during this flyover and was shown to the EOC staff after completion of the flyover.
As part of the evacuation process, consideration was also given by the EOC staff to institutionalized persons, ships and boats in the area. At the exercise the U.S.
Coast Guard operated in accordance with its new memorandum of understanding with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and was not required to send helicopters or boats into the plume area 'to alert the boating public. The establishment of this memorandum of understanding corrects a previous area requiring corrective action (#49). Schools were also considere.d during the evacuation process. At 11:16 a.m. schools were directed to implement the prerelease program. Overall there was good preplanning and distribution -
of resources to support any needed evacuation. There were also adequate messages over EBS to inform and direct the population in the affected areas.
Although sufficient time was not.available at the end of the exercise for a full d '
demonstration of recovery and reentry activities, the civil defense director met with key 1
i
12 Emargency Operations Center staff members near the end of the exercise to discuss recovery and reentry. He dis-cussed the recovery and reentry situation in general and asked the staff members what specific actions their agencies would bc involved with and what specific problems would
'have to be addressed. Even though the scenario did not allow a full demonstration of recovery and reentry and for a verification that previous areas requiring corrective action (#3, #21) had been corrected, the civil defense director and his staff demonstrated that they were knowledgeable of the process and potential problems and were prepared to cope with the situation.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions
- 1.
Description:
There was very limited technical information coming to the State EOC from the EOF regarding plant conditions and the reasons for emergency action levels, which also limited infor-mation flow to the Area Il and local EOC's (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.10, F.1.d).
Recommendation: Coordination between the state EOC and EOF should be improved to ensure that sufficient data are gathered at the EOF and transmitted to the State EOC to form a basis for sound decision making, and subsequently transmitted to the Area 11 and local EOC's.
- 2.
Description:
Because of scenario limitations, a full demonstration of recovery and reentry activities was not conducted (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, M.1, M.3, M.4).
Recommendation: Recovery and reentry should be fully tested in a future exercise.
13 Emergency Oparations Ctnter Areas Recommended for improvement
- 1.
Description:
The supplemental status boards in the state EOC operations room did not have the first sheltering protective action recommendation posted until late in the exercise.
Recommendation: All status boards on display should be updated with the current protective action recommendation in a timely manner in order to prevent misinterpretation by staff members in the EOC.
- 2.
Description:
Most key staff members were prepositioned at the state EOC prior to the Alert EAL when the EOC is planned to be activated and staffed.
Recommendation: In order to fully demonstrate activation and staffing procedures, players should either not be prepositioned or should not participate in EOC activities for a reasonable period of time in order to simulate travel time to the EOC.
- 3.
Description:
Occasional problems were observed with the telephone equipment in the state EOC operations room, resulting in minor delays.
Recommendation: Telephone equipment and systems should be periodically checked and repaired or replaced as needed in order to prevent communications delays during an emergency situation.
- 4.
Description:
There was no technical representative from the licensee in the EOC who could have provided briefings to EOC personnel on plant conditions and the safety significance of these actual or projected conditions.
Recommendation: During a radiological emergency the licensee should dispatch a technical representative to the state EOC.
i l
l 14 Emergency Operations Facility ,
2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF facilities are unchanged from the last exercise. The on-site EOF is housed in three trailers which tended to become crowded, hot and noisy. In spite of the less than ideal conditions, the EOF facility was able to adequately support the emergency
- operations, and the cooperation between utility and state representatives was excellent.
The utility has started the construction of a more adequate EOF several miles from the reactor site. The displays at the EOF were all adequate to support EOF informational functions. However, many maps were not oriented to true north, although they were labeled to indicate this. The development of new maps, oriented vertical north, was not complete, continuing part of an earlier area requiring corrective action (450).
A full complement of staff was present at the EOF. Staffing was accomplished quickly although some of the players were prepositioned in the area of the plant. The EOF was staffed by three representatives from the MCDA, two from the MDPH, and field monitoring teams from MDPH, assisted by two individuals from FDA. The capability for 24-hour staffing of the EOF was demonstrated by presentation of a roster and by a simulated shif t change.
Communications systems were excellent at the EOF. Numerous telephone lines were available as the primary means of communication. Backup communications systems were also available and were adequate for reliably reaching all sites. There was a dedicated telephone line to both NRC Region I and to the Plymouth EOC. There were
. also Massachusetts Civil Defense radios, state police radios, local Plymouth police radio, marine band radio for reaching the Coast Guard, and RACES radio. This radio equipment
- was staffed by the utility simultaneously in the communications trailer which was used
. by state personnel, and the assessment trailer which was used by the utility staff. A j
_ previous area requiring corrective action (#9), which noted some communications
. problems among the state EOC, the EOF, and the Area II EOC and which recommended a dedicated telephone line between the state EOC and EOF, remains uncorrected.
! Although there were no communications problems observed at this year's exercise, a
! dedicated telephone line has not been installed. The procedure in use consists of dialing up the state EOC on a commercial line and then keeping the line open by continuously
- staffing the line.
i Internal communications at the EOF were handled adequatelf by frequent oral
- briefings. The internal communications were sometimes hindered, however, by the crowded and noisy conditions at the EOF.
Although the media center is the primary location for information exchange, i there was a public information function staffed by the utility in the communications trailer in the EOF. The role played by the utility public information officer (P!O) at the EOF was to coordinate the accuracy of state and utility information flowing from the EOF to the media center, and circulating hard copy of all news releases to state and utility EOF personnel for review before being released by the media center.
In spite of the crowded and ndisy conditions in the EOF, the assessment of off-site consequences to the public health was satisfactory and the protective actions recommended were carefully considered. Both sheltering and evacuation were advised by i-1
15 Emergsney Oparations Facility l the EOF players for state and local implementation. Sheltering during the early phase of the exercise was precautionary and selective; perphaps overly conservative in terms of
, the protective action guides (PAGs). Later, when predictable fuel damage would allow up to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> advance notice for evacuation, this was advised out to a full 5 miles with sheltering out to a full 10 miles.
I The technical aspects of dose and dose rate projections were primarily carried j out by the utility staff. The state DPH staff were prepared and qualified to do nomo- i i graphic estimates for populated areas but the unusual nature of the scenario required
- engineering skills as well as health physics consideration.
Remarkable cooperation was shown by the utility's technical staff in briefing the l '
state DPH staff on the reasons for the utility's recommended protective actions off-site. However, no attempt was made to preempt the state DPH and Civil Defense staff in making the final decisions for either sheltering or evacuation. In the early stages of this exercise minor releases resulted in sheltering recommendations for limited distances. Preparation of the messages describing plant conditions requiring these recommendations were somewhat delayed by the crowded' conditions at the assessment trailer and by procedural problems.
In general, the state personnel at the EOF did not inquire as to the assumptions that were used by the utility for the dose projections and protective action recom-
' mendations. More time should have been spent by the state in critically reviewing the dose assessments and protective action recommendations made by the utility. Infor-
' mation flow from the EOF to the state EOC requires improvement. Although state ~DPH
' staff at the EOF were included in detailed briefings by the utility as to plant status and the radiological significance of the plant status, the DPH staff at the EOF did not pass on this detailed information to the EOC. Because of this, the EOC staff had very limited
' technical information to use as a basis for decision making. Additional training in the
! ' assessment of nuclear power plant accidents is recommended for state staff located at the EOF. Another aspect of information flow from the EOF requiring improvement is the use of proper forms. The Nuclear Power Plant Accident Communication Form which was extensively used is not appropriate for all plant information to be conveyed to the state EOC. In addition, much information was transmitted from the EOF to the state
! EOC over the telephone from handwritten notes. Because of these observations, two previous areas requiring corrective action (#14 and #50) remain uncorrected. However, the transmission of meteorological information was observed to be timely and improved 1
from the previous exercise, thereby correcting an earlier area requiring corrective action
(# 47).
The exercise scenario was not very realistic and was at times a source of con-
} fusion for the players. One of the problems was the lack of a definitive weather fore-1 cast. Another problem was that the scenario time during which the plume activity was i significant was too short to adequately exercise the state field monitoring tean.s. During i the early phase of the exercise the minor releases were insufficient for the deployment l of the off-site monitoring teams. However, it did provide for the team members and DPH to assemble and check out their instrumentation and procedures. FEMA observers considered these teams to be well equipped and trained. However, due to the unique nature of the scenario which delayed significant releases until late in the play. only one team nad a opportunity to deteet any radiation with their instrumentation.
i
{.
16 Emergsncy Oparations Facility The scenario was designed to create an anticipated release of large quantities of fission products because of spent fuel damage within the time frame of the exercise.
Not all of the control data were adjusted accordingly nor was the persistence of wind direction (exercise control) in accordance with last-minute changes in the weather forecasts.
Deficiencies
~
None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions
- 1.
Description:
Dose projections and protective action recommendations were done by the utility at the EOF. The state personnel at the EOF did not perform independent analysis and did not inquire as to the assumptions that were used by the utility in their analysis (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.10).
Recommendation: State personnel at the EOF should either conduct independent analysis or should spend more time in critically reviewing the dose assessments and protective action recommendations made by the utility.
2.,
Description:
Although the state DPH staff at the EOF were included in detailed briefings by the utility as to plant status and the radiological significance of the plant status, the DPH staff did not pass on this detailed information to the state EOC. Because of this, the EOC staff had very limited technical information to use as a basis for decision making (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.10).
Recommendation: Additional training in the assessment of nuclear power plant accidents is recommended for state staff located at the EOF. Responsibility should be assigned to DPH or utility staff at the EOF for preparing plant status updates and meteorological data on standard forms as well as written recommendations and reasons for protective actions.
Areas Recommended for improvement
- 1.
Description:
Some of the map displays in the EOF are not oriented vertical north. Although this is noted on the maps, it can still potentially cause misunderstandings on geographic sectors.
Recommendation: New maps should be developed which are oriented vertical north.
l l
~w -- ,m- ~ -,--e ,- .-n ~ . , . . . _ , , , _ _ _ , , _ . . , , _ _ _ , , _, _
- 17 Emergtney Optretions Fr,cility
- 2.
Description:
EOF players were prepositioned in the area of the plant prior to the start of'the exercise.
Recommendation: In order to fully demonstrate EOF activation and staffing in a future exercise, personnel should not be pre-positioned.
- 3.
Description:
Internal communications at the EOF were sometimes hindered by the crowded and noisy conditions at the EOF.
Recommendation: The ability to control noise at the EOF should be demonstrated in a future exercise.
4.
Description:
Information flow procedures from the EOF to the state EOC can be improved. In some cases information was passed on over the telephone from handwritten notes. In other cases, although the Nuclear Power Plant Accident Communication Form was used, this form is not appropriate for all plant information to be conveyed to the state EOC.
Recommendation: All communications between the EOF and the state EOC should be properly logged and documented, and the appropriate documentation forms should be used. Redesign of the existing forms is recommended.
5.
Description:
The exercise scenario was not very realistic and did not provide the opportunity to adequately exercise all of the state field monitoring teams.
Recommendation: Future scenarios should be designed to allow the full demonstration of field monitoring teams' capabilities.
t
3 18 Area II EOC .
2.1.3 Area II EOC The Area If EOC is located in the basement of the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (MCDA) Area !! office building on the grounds of the state prison in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. As demonstrated in previous exercises, the facilities at this EOC were adequate to carry out the Area Il responsibilities for communication with local EOCs and the provision of state assistance as requested by local authorities. Extended 24-hour operations could be sustained at the EOC. Backup emergency power for communications was available and demonstrated. Status boards showing emergency classification levels with times each level was declared, activated reception centers, school closings and activated traffic control points were maintained througbaut the exercise. Maps showing the 10-mile EPZ, evacuation routes, access / traffic control points and population by sector were posted and utilized by staff as needed. A detailed map showing the locations of dairy farms, food processing plants and water supply sources was available for use in the alternate EOF which is located in the Area 11 building.
The objective to mobilize staff and promptly activate facilities was adequately demonstrated. Since the exercise took place during normal working hours, MCDA staff normally assigned to the Area II office reported to work as usual. Other agency repre-sentatives (i.e., American Red Cross, state department of public works, state police, Civil Air Patrol and RACES) were notified as provided in the Area Il procedures. All agency representatives were in place at the EOC during the Alert ECL. It was observed, however, that some responders from other areas of the state who would have to travel some distance to the Area 11 EOC were prepositione'd. While it is recognized that this prepositioning is necessary due to the compressed time frame of an exercise, pre-positioned players should simulate their travel time by not actively participating for a reasonable period at the beginning of an exercise. Twenty-four hour staffing was adequately demonstrated by presentation of a roster which designated backup personnel for each emergency response position at the Area II EOC.
Command and control of emergency activities was very well demonstrated at the Area II EOC. The Area !! director demonstrated very effective leadership and the training, knowledge and teamwork of the staff were evident throughout the exercise.
This leadership and team work were especially evident when it became necessary for the director to request clarification of evolving protective action recommendations that were received from the state EOC. Periodic briefings were held to apprise the staff of the situation. Appropriate staff were involved in the timely . implementation of communications to the local EOCs. Messages from the state EOC were developed, typed, logged and communicated to the local EOCs in a timely manner via telephone and RACES radio as a backup. The area for improvement in the receipt and logging of messages, Identified at the previous exercise, has been corrected. Message flow within the Area II EOC was very good. All incoming and outgoing messages were logged and a journal of events was maintained throughout the exercise.
The coordination of information with the state and local EOCs was adequately demonstrated. A brief malfunction of the microwave telephone line to the state EOC was quickly compensated for with land line telephone until use of the microwave line was restored. Verification of notification of changes in the emergency classification through the "Menitor" notification system and protective actions recommended by officials at the
,y - . - - - - . , - . , - - -
r-..
, 19 Area II EOC state EOC were communicated to the local EOCs by three telephone operators and two RACES operators. The NUREG-0654 system of emergency classification was used in all
. communications with the local EOCs (rather than the Massachusetts number system),
.thereby correcting a previous area requiring corrective action (#13). All of the necessary equipment and procedures to carry cut these communications functioned effectively. The communications staff was well trained in message logging proc.edures.
. Complete logs of all communications wi th the state and local EOCs were available.
The Area II EOC does not have media responsibilities. All press inquiries would i be referred to the media center. However, an area for media representatives could be set up in another part of the MCDA Area 11 building should it become necessary to shift the media center from its primary location at Memorial Hall in Plymouth, Massachusetts.
The Area II EOC had very limited involvement in the implementation of protective actions recommended by the state. Area II's primary responsibility is to communicate these recommendations to the local EOCs for implementa ion at the local 1 level. Verification of the action to shelter population within five miles of the plant was received from the state EOC at approximately 12:08 p.m. and as requested, simulated sounding of the sirens by directors at the local EOCs was cocedinated for 12:20 p.m.
< ~ Verification of notification of the action to evacuate the town of Plymouth and shelter all other communities within the 10-mile EPZ at 2:20 p.m. was completed at l
'approximately 2:38 p.m. Area II MCDA has developed a computerized data base of resources that are available to assist the local implementation of protective actions if requested. Use of this data base was demonstrated when an inquiry regarding possible assistance with ambulance resources was received from the town of Duxbury.
The radiological defense (RADEF) officer described in detail the radiological exposure control responsibilities at the Area !! EOC. Direct-reading dosimeters were available in sufficient number and ranges (60 0-200 mR instruments and 100 0-20 R instruments). Chargers were available and emergency worker dosimetry instructions were available for distribution to workers who may be deployed to field assignments.
! Sixty thermo luminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were available and, according to the RADEF officer, procedures are in place for a utility representative to take these badges to a laboratory for analysis at the end of each day if necessary.
The ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled recevery and reentry was adequately demonstrated through a briefing by the Area 11 direc*or and
- discussion with the EOC staff.
i
) Deficiencies I
None.
i Areas Recommended for Improvement .
- 1.
Description:
Some responders from other areas of the state who would nave to travel some distance to the Area !! EOC were
- - - -- --.v r- - - . ~ - - - - - - - - - - . - -.-,,--.g - .
w.n .-,-n ,- >e-- -
c.,-- ..-- - -m.,----,n.n--yv,,, w--n- , , , --. w
20 Area II EOC prepositioned for the Sept. 5,1985, exercise (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
1, !!, E.2).
Recommendation: While the prepositioning of some state responders assigned to the Area !! EOC is necessary due to the compressed time frame for an exercise, prepositioned players should simulate their travel time by not actively participating for a reasonable period of time at the beginning of an exercise.
e S
" " ~ ^ ^^' ' '
- - - , --e , __ _ _ _ .
o 22 Radiological Field Monitoring Tecms and Radiological Health Laboratory training in respirator usage would be an asset in the radiological exposure control program for field monitoring team members.
The scenario was not sufficient to fully test the capabilities of the field monitoring teams. The activity involving the field monitoring teams was too compressed near the end of the exercise so that there was insufficient time to perform soil, vegetation, milk, and water sampling, thereby not meeting one of the exercise q
objectives. The opportunity for field team activity provided by the scenario was so short that the NIAT -7 team missed its only opportunity to take an air sample because of delays caused by a dead vehicle battery.
Radiological Health Laboratory. The demonstration of capabilities of the Radiological Health Laboratory was not included in the exercise objectives. However, an arrangement was made to discuss the capabilities and procedures of the Massachusetts Radiological Health Laboratory in Boston with the laboratory supervisor the day before the exercise. Because this was not a formal evaluation, the comments presented are for information only and no Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Actions, or Areas Recommended for Improvement are cited.
Equipment at the laboratory could be improved. The multichannel analyzer, while adequate for providing qualitative and quantitative measurements during an emergency, is not state-of-the-art (over 10 years old) and is difficult to maintain. It was not functioning on the day of the visit and reportedly had been inoperative for about the past 3 weeks. The state laboratory has basic counting equipment needed to support an emergency, but no backups are available except as part of agreements with laboratory facilities at Lowell University and MIT. (These facilities should be evaluated at future exercises.) The communication system available at the laboratory consists of commercial telephone.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions
- 1.
Description:
Difficulty with determining some of the monitoring point locations was observed. The controller's map conflicted with l a commercial atlas in regards to the designations of several roads I (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!,1.7, I.8,1.11). ,
l Recommendation: The road locations on the MDPH maps should be checked to ensure that the maps are up-to-date and that the state used maps agree with those used by the utility.
i i
21 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams 1
and Radiological Health Lauratory l
2.1.4 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams and Radiological Health Laboratory i Monitoring Teams. Two state field monitoring teams (NIAT-3 and NIAT-7) were I mobilized and observed for the exercise. Mobilization of the field monitoring teams was I not fully tested since the teams were predispatched from Boston, knowing that the
! exercise was scheduled. The teams were en route to Plymouth from Boston when they .
j were notified by radio to report to the EOF. The field teams arrived at the EOF at 10:10 l a.m. and were quickly given duty assignments.
! Both field monitoring teams had all appropriate equipment including that for i radiation monitoring, air sampling, soll and vegetation sampling, and water and milk sampling. In addition, the NIAT-3 team used a portable tape recorder to record all activities for future reference. This team also had a state-owned HP-41 CDX computer
! Overall, the equipment of the NIAT-7 team was adequate and that of the NIAT-3 team was excellent, thereby satisfying general exercise objectives. The equipment was cali-brated in August 1985 as indicated on calibration stickers. It is suggested that the next
, scheduled calibration date also be indicated on the stickers. The only observed problem
) relative to equipment is that the teams' vehicles are not suitable for unfavorable terrain f and weather conditions. The use of four-wheel drive vehicles for the field monitoring
- teams should be considered.
I i The technical operations of the NIAT-3 team were excellent with the exception
} that sources should be available for the operational check-out of both the Geiger-Mueller j (G-M) and ion chamber equipment. The demonstrated adequacy of training corrects an 1 area requiring corrective action (#51) from a previous exercise. Both teams took frequent readings en route. A problem with determining monitoring point locations by j the NIAT-7 team was observed, although this was subsequently resolved by communi-
} cations from the EOF. The controller's map conflicted with a commercial atlas as to the l designation of several roads. The road locations on the MDPH maps should be checked to j ensure that the maps are up-to-date and that the state-used maps agree with those used l by the utility.
j .
Communications between the field teams and the EOF were adequately demon-i strated, thereby meeting an exercise objective. Minor communications problems were -
{ observed when NIAT teams 3 and 7 temporarily lost contact with the EOF for periods of j 1 minute and 3 minutes respectively. In addition, no backup radio communications are
- available to either team, and the vehicle battery of NIAT -7 team went dead when the-
} ignition switch was left on the "On" position when the engine was shut off in order to
{ maintain the radio communications. ;
! Radiological exposure control equipment and procedures used by the field j monitoring teams were adequately demonstrated, thus _ meeting one of the exercise j objectives. The teams had self-reading dosimeters, permanent-record dosimeters, j dosimeter chargers, and record-keeping cards. Team members were familiar with~ the
! dosimeters and periodically took readings. Team members do not carry potassium
{ Iodide (KI). The authorization for use of K! and its distribution would be handled from the
! EOF. The teams had all protective equipment (anticontamination suits, boots, gloves and tongs) with the exception of respirators. The addition of respirators along with proper I
i l -
l-
_ _ . _ _ . . _ . . - _ _ _ . _ . _ . ~ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _
23 Radiological Field Monitoring Teems and Rzdiological Hsalth Laboratory
- 2.
Description:
Field monitoring teams do not have any backup communications capabilities (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.d).
Recommendation: Field monitoring teams should be provided with backup communications equipment to ensure communications with the EOF if the primary system fails.
Areas Recommended for Improvement
- 1.
Description:
A full demonstration of field monitoring team mobilization was not performed since the teams were pre-dispatched from Boston, prior to the formal mobilization request.
Recommendation: A full demonstration of the notification of personnel and mobilization of the field monitoring teams should be conducted in a future exercise.
- 2.
Description:
Although instrument calibration stickers indicated the date of the last calibration, no date for the next scheduled calibration was indicated.
Recommendation: The next scheduled calibration date should be clearly posted on calibration stickers.
- 3.
Description:
The field monitoring teams' vehicles are not suitable for unfavorable terrain or weather conditions.
Recornmendation: The use of four-wheel drive vehicles for the field monitoring teams should be considered.
- 4.
Description:
Sources were not used for the operational checkout of both the G-M and ion chamber equipment.
Recommendation: Sources should be available and used in the operational checkout of the G-M and ion chamber equipment.
- 5.
Description:
Field monitoring teams were not equipped with protective respirators.
Recommendation: Field monitoring teams should be supplied with respirators.
- 6.
Description:
The opportunity for field team activity provided by the scenario was so short that there was insufficient time for environmental sampling.
N
3 . . . .-. _- . _ - . - .~. .
24 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams and Radiological Health Laboratory 5
Recommendation: Future exercise scenarios should be structured
! to provide sufficient opportunity for activity by the field monitoring teams.
.i l
i l
T I
I i
l 1
l.
O 1
'1 l
i 4
f f.
1 i
i 1
l 3 .
e e
- . - _ _ _ - - . ___._ _ -._..----. - . . _ _ _ _ _ - , _ . , _ , . . ~ . _ _ _ . - . . . . - - - - . _ _ _ , , - . . _ . _ - . . - . - - - . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . , . - . .
25 Teunton EOC &nd Reception Center 2.1.5 Taunton EOC and Reception Center The Taunton EOC is located in the basement of the Taunton Town Hall. The primary function of this EOC is to coordinate the establishment of reception and mass care facilities for evacuees from a potential radiological emergency at the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station. The EOC had all appropriate maps and displays either posted or available for reference. The EOC is somewhat small and a larger area would be desirable. The acting director was in charge of the EOC operations during the exercise. Additional personnel at the EOC consisted of civil defense staff, police, and public works personnel. Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. Communications at the EOC consisted of commercial telephones and amateur radios. The proper emergency classification system was used at the EOC, thereby correcting a previous area requiring corrective action (#13). Dosimetry at the EOC consisted of 10 low-range,10 mid-range and six high-range direct read dosimeters. Six dosimeter chargers were also on hand as well as 6 record-keeping cards. There were also 46 CDV 777-A kits on hand, but training is needed by the EOC staff in the proper use of dosimetry.
- The Taunton Reception is located at the Taunton State Hospital. For this exercise the adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees was to be demonstrated, but not the mass care of evacuees. The objective to demonstrate the ability to perform radiological monitoring at the reception center was not met. Although a fire truck and three men were present to wash down cars, there were no trained people on site to perform the radiological monitoring. Staff at the EOC indicated that the local civil defense person who was to be responsible for this function was unable to obtain the proper training because the radiological course which he had intended to take was cancelled.
The reception center area is normally vacant and would be opened specifically for reception activities in an emergency. Much space is available but is not ordinarily maintained in usable condition. The existing local agreement is that the Red Cross would be in charge of registration at the reception center and would use Red Cross forms.
However, there is some question as to whether this is compatible with the overall State / Red Cross agreement, since Red Cross staff normally concentrate on mass-care operations. During the exercise a Red Cross representative did report to the reception center with forms. A Red Cross radio was set up outside the building and a table and chair were present inside the building to demonstrate the location for registration.
Furniture and food resources were available to the reception center if needed.
Deficiencies
- 1.
Description:
The objective to demonstrate the radiological monitoring capability for evacuees and vehicles was not demonstrated because there were no trained personnel present at the Taunton Reception Center to conduct radiological monitoring. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev 1,11, K.S.a; o.4.c: J.12).
(E 26 Taunton EOC and Reception Canter Recommendation: Staff must be identified and trained to provide radiological monitoring of evacuees and vehicles.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions
- 1.
Description:
Taunton EOC staff were not knowledgeable in the proper use of dosimetry (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a K.3.b).
9 Recom mendation: EOC staff should receive training in the use of personnel dosimetry.
- 2.
Description:
There are some questions as to whether the existing local agreement to have the Red Cross do the registration at the Taunton Reception Center is compatible with the overall state /
Red Cross agreement. The Red Cross normally concentrates its staff on the mass care functions (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1,11, A.1, A.3, J.12).
Recommendation: The local plans for the Taunton Reception Center should be reviewed with appropriate organizations to determine if the plans are consistent and compatible with other agreements. This must be done to ensure that the needs of evacuees will be met in a radiological emergency.
9
1 . .
27 Emmegancy Madical Services i
e
{
2.1.6 Emergency Medical Services Exercising of ambulance and hospital emergency medical services were objectives of the exercise. Metro Ambulance Service and Jordan Hospital were i evaluated for the exercise.
The ambulance crew did an excellent job and demonstrated themselves to be very 1 patient and professional under difficult conditions. The initial call to the ambulance I service came at 8:19 a.m. and indicated that the Pilgrim station had a burn patient with j simulated exposure from steam pipes. The ambulance arrived at the Pilgrim station main
- gate at 8
- 22 a.m. The ambulance waited at the gate until instructed to make its
] presence known. At 8:40 a.m. the ambulance entered the facility and arrived at the
{ patient at 8:42 a.m. There is a need for better communications on the ambulance.
I Although the ambulance can communicate with traffic control personnel, it does not I have two-way radio communications with the hospital, EOF, or local EOC.
I j The ambulance crew had a radiation survey meter, one radiation protection suit, j and dosimeters, but their use was not observed and low-level dosimetry was not j availatple. The crew demonstrated procedures for decontamination of the patient, but i not for preventing contamination of the ambulance and crew. However, both the
, ambulance and crew were checked for contamination after the patient was removed from
{ the ambulance. ,
1 I The hospital staff at Jordan Hospital did a creditable job of handling the
! contaminated patient. A health physicist was available to advise the hospital staff. The
! hospital had the necessary equipment for determining whether and how a patient was contaminated and for decontaminating a patient. The staff was well protected and had l adequate equipment but had to use a room that is an existing examining room. The use 1 of a separate small decontamination room with a shower and plastic covered floors would
! be better to prevent the spread of contamination. The patient could then be moved to
]
the examining room after he is clean of radiation. At the hospital no one was observed closing air ducts or shutting down the air conditioning to prevent the spread of
- contamination. .
i The communications capabilities at the Jordan Hospital could be improved. The hospital had no special emergency communications links with the local EOCs, the EOF, j other hospitals or radiological laboratories.
} Deficiencies None.
t i
j l Areas Requiring Corrective Actions l
l 1.
Description:
The ambulance had inadequate communications to l
the hospital, EOF or local EOC (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.2).
l t
f
28 Emergtney Mrdical Services i .
4 Recommendation: The ambulance should have two-way radio communications capabilities with the hospital. EOF and local .
EOCs. -
- 2.
Description:
The Jordan Hospital had no special emergency communications links with radiological laboratories, other hospitals, the EOF or local EOCs (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.2).
Recommendation: Communications capabilities at the Jordan Hospital should be improved to ensure the ability to communicate with radiological laboratories, other hospitals, the EOF or local EOCs in a timely manner in a radiological emergency.
- 3.
Description:
The ambulance had only one radiation protection suit (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1,11, L.1, L.4).
Recommendation: The ambulance should be equipped with protective clothing for each member of the crew.
l 4.
Description:
The ambulance crew did not have low-level 1 dosimeters and was not familiar with the operation of radiation j monitoring equipment (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, L.1, L.4, K.3.a).
l Recommendation: The ambulance crew should be equipped with low-level dosimeters and should be trained in the use of radiation monitoring equipment.
1
- 5.
Description:
An existing examination room was used at the Jordan Hospital for the initial evaluation of the contaminated victim rather than a small decontamination room, presenting the problem of decontamina. ting a large area and possibly spreading radioactive particles throughout the hospital and beyond (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
l 1, II, L.1).
Recommendation: The use of a separate small decontamination room would be better than an existing examination room for the
- initial evaluation of contaminated victims to prevent the spread of contamination.
Areas Recommended for Improvement
- 1.
Description:
The ambulance waited at the main gate of the Pilgrim station for 10 minutes before receiving additional
- instructions on where to report (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1,11, F.2).
Recommendation: Either the ambulance dispatcher should more specifically describe the location to which the ambulance is to
. , . , , , , - - - ..c , ,_ . . - ~ - - - - - . . - . -- , , . - - ..~...y _.
l 29 Emergency Mzdical Services report, or the guard at the gate should direct the medical team to the injured person (s) promptly.
4 6
30 Middleborough - State Police Wsrning Point and Access Control -
2.1.7 Middleborough - State Police Warning Point and Access Control The state warn *ng point is located in the State Police Troop D barracks in Middleborough. The facility is adequately equipped with all supplies and amenities to sustain around-the-clock emergency operation response. Emergency classification levels were posted and a status board was maintained throughout the exercise. Noise was adequately controlled and entry into the operation area was restricted. Backup emergency power is available and routinely tested (it was not demonstrated). There was only one map posted in the dispatch center. That map identified the traffic control points, which are the responsibility of the state police. Evacuation routes, relocation centers and population distribution (traffic volume) maps should be available but were not.
Activation of the responsibilities of the state police in Middleborough occurs upon the receipt of the Unusual Event notification from the Pilgrim plant. The dispatch center and headquarter office are already 24-hour operational and therefore are available to receive notification at any time. The message is received at the police headquarter office and then transmitted to the dispatch in the communication room. The notification messages were received over commercial telephone lines from the plant.
Radio is also available for the transmittal of these messages. Verification of the notification messages is over commercial telephone lines to the utility. The warning; point is also responsible for notifying the MCDA and MDPH. This occurred at any change in classification or protective action recommendation. (There were no protective action
. recommendations transmitted through the state police warning point.)
Emergency operation management was effective. The individual in charge (duty
_ officer) w'as the one designated in the plan. Coordination between the staff was good.
- Messages were logged and distributed as appropriate. Copies of the plan, written
, checklists and standard operating procedures were available and utilized throughout the exercise. The staff was knowledgeable and dedicated in their duties nd responsibilities.
i However, some additional training of the dispatcher in the communications room is l needed. A deficiency was noted in the last exercise dealing with the dual duties assumed I by the radio di.spatcher. Specifically, he is responsible for day-to-day police business as well as exercise communications. This was somewhat remedied by having an assistant (clerical) present in the communication room, but the possibility still exists that the
- dispatcher could not handle both routine and radiological emergency calls in a timely manner in a real emergency. The previous area requiring corrective action (#8) remains uncorrected.
l The primary function of the state police warning point in Middleborough is a l communication relay point. Notification messages are received from the plant by radio (primary) and commercial telephone lines (secondary). During the exercise, the primary system was not utilized and commercial telephones were used for message transmissions and follow-up message verification. The messages from the plant are received in the police headquarter office, verified there, and relayed to the communications dispatch room. The dispatch then attempts to notify the eight communities responding. The communications system activates two county police radio nets (Plymouth / Bristol). From there the local EOCs are notified. During the exercise the seven locals within the Plymouth County NET were able to receive the messages transmitted but all could not
31 Middleborough - State Police Warning Point and Access Control
- verify messages over radio. The one local within the Bristol NET (Taunton) could only i . receive two messages over the radio during the entire exercise and was unable to verify over radio. When verification was not* received by the dispatcher at the warning point, notification would occur by commercial telephone. Several times during the exercise, j the communications dispatcher called the local EOCs to determine if a transmission had been received. When he found out that it had not, he neglected to relay that message '
- during the call. Therefore, the message was never passed on to the local. This happened
) to Taunton at both the Alert and Site Area Classification. The communications problems 1
- described above continue a previous area requiring corrective action (#52).
i The entire notification procedure at the warning point occurred in under 15 j minutes (time message received until all communities verified). In addition to the j transmission of messages to the local EOC, the warning point is also responsible for i notifying the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (MCDA) and the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH). This function was executed by the officer who received the messages from the plant. All procedures demonstrated at the state police
- warning point during the exercise were in accordance with the plan. Field personnel under the direction of the state police are contacted via police radio.
The state police are responsible for assisting in traffic control in the affected i Pareas. Police vehicles and personnel are staged and dispatched from the Troop D j ' headquarters in Middleborough. During the exercise various requests were received from t the Area 11 EOC office to activate access control points. Adequate resources and i ' equipment are available to handle the possible requirements. Although the police provide
,an implementation function only in traffic control, with decision making done elsewhere, discussions were held concerning traffic control duties (traffic volumes expected, j ~ impediments to traffic flow, weather-related problems, staffing requirements, etc.).
One traffic control team was dispatched to the field to activate a control point l
j 'on Route 44. Numerous teams simulated dispatch while others were held on standby.
l ' Teams are aware of evacuation routes and relocation / decontamination center locations.
Dosimeters were issued to teams.
There is an adequate supply of dosimetry equipment available at the state police '
j building. Low-range and mid-range dosimeters and TLDs are distributed to all j emergency workers dispatched into the field. Dosimeters are charged and issued to the j staff along with record cards and instructions. A master record card and issue card are j maintained at the police building for each emergency worker -- this is in addition to the individual record cards issued. Dosimeters are to be read on the half hour. In the event of a high accumulated dose the staff has been informed to call the dispatcher and alert ;
j the police controller. Decontamination of the police officers dispatched into the field i j would occur at the station in Middleborough. Facilities include a wash-down area for j vehicles and personnel. The police officers have recently received training in !
j decontamination and dosimetry theory and procedures. This action corrects previously j j identified area requiring corrective action (#2 and #53).
i' a s .
] Defielencies
! None.
1
32 Middleborcugh - State Police Warning Point and Access Control ,
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions 1.
Description:
Although a clerical assistant has been provided for the radio dispatcher at the state police warning point, the potential still exists for the radio dispatcher not being able to handle both routine calls and radiological emergency calls simultaneously (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, F.1.a. F.1.d).
Recommendation: A second radio operator should be made available, at least on a standby basis, to assist with the large number of calls and radio transmissions anticipated during a radiological emergency.
- 2.
Description:
Some communications problems continue to exist in the notification and verification of messages between the state police warning point and the local EOCs. This was also noted in previous exercises (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, F.1.a, F.1.d).
Recommendation: The reliability of the primary radio communications system should either be improved, or alternate systems established.
Areas Recommended for Improvement
- 1.
Description:
Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers and population distribution were not available at the state police warning point in Middleborough.
The indicated maps should be obtained and Recom mendation:
made available for reference.
J .
e
- 33 Media Center 2.1.8 Media Center The media center was located in Memorial Hall in Plymouth. The facilities for the PIOS were generally very good. There was enough space, equipment and materials for the PIOS to function properly. Similarly, there was adequate space and furniture for media representatives, but no equipment or supplies provided for their use.
The organizations represented at the Media Center by PIOS included the utility (Boston Edison Company--BECO), Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, Massachusetts Department of Public Health, and Plymouth Civil Defense. The activation and staffing of the media center appear to be more than adequate to meet the most rigorous public information demands. Competent sufficient staff for each organization are able to be activated on a 24-hour basis. However, since actual notification and mobilization of the PIOS was not demonstrated, future exercises should test the ability of the media center to be activated with a minimum of prepositioning.
The communications system in place at the media center was generally very good. Multiple telephone lines, two facsimile machines, and a radio scanner were available and used constantly to maintain timely communications with the EOF and state EOC.
There was, however, only one pay telephone available for reporters. While the BECO spokesman indicated that more would be available in a real emergency, this capability should be demonstrated.
Also, the facsimile machine should have been used to receive copies of EBS messages issued from the state EOC for distribution at the media center.
The public information functions at the media center were generally performed in an excellent manner. Media kits were available and contained the most recent emergency public information brochure which corrects an area requiring corrective action (#16) from an earlier exercise. There were six media briefings held at critical times during the exercise. These were generally thorough, accurate and clear. However, the technical expert, who was present at most briefings, was not present at the critical fifth briefing leading to confusion about the plant status. A technical expert should be present at all major media briefings.
Maps and displays were used to good effect. Before each briefing, and throughout the exercise, there was excellent coordination and information exchange among the various PIOS. The critical importance of this coordination was dramatically demonstrated when the MCDA PIO held up the distribution of a proposed utility media release on a utility-recommended shelter order to 20 miles from the plant until the state had the time to appropriately consider the recommendation. The final state shelter order was for 10 miles. The state P!O was, therefore, responsible for preventing the distribution of conflicting and confusing public instructions. Of special significance was the fact that utility staff regularly called local media with updates during the exercise, indienting a capability for media outreach. The good coordination and control of media releases demonstrated during the exercise and the transmission of hard copies corrects an area requiring corrective action from a previous exercise (#17).
i .
34 Media Center -
The media center played no role in the formulation or distribution of EBS messages. This function was performed at the state EOC. Likewise, the rumor control i
telephone number was established at the state EOC.
When recoinmended protective actions included evacuation of the area within five miles of the Pilgrim plant, contingency plans were discussed to move the media center to the alternate site at the MCDA Area !! headquarters in Bridgewater. The discussion included bringing in dosimetry from the utility if necessary. The decision was made not to evacuate the media center simultaneously with the town based on the availability of ample lead time before the projected release. Future effort should focus on the logistics of a possible evacuation of the media center. Dosimetry should be on hand for use in such an eventuality.
l The scenario was generally effective in generating sustained and meaningful activity at the media center. Special mention should be made of the role-playing reporters provided by the utility. These " reporters" in addition to the several real reporters present, performed a necessary service in posing persistent and challenging questions to the PIOS. At times the role-playing reporters challenged and successfully violated the security arrangements provided for the P!Os by the utility. Future scenarios should test the ability of the media center to be activated on as close to a real-time basis as possible.
Deficiencies None.
i Areas Requiring Corrective Actions None.
Areas R~ecommended for Improvement
- 1.
Description:
No equipment or supplies were provided for media representatives at the media center, and there was only one pay telephone available for their use.
Recommendation: Equipment, supplies, and additional telephones should be provided for media representatives.
- 2.
Description:
Actual notification and mobilization of the PIOS to the media center was not demonstrated.
I Recommendation: Future exercises should test the ability of the media center to be activated with a minimum of prepositioning.
1 l*
a e
35 Mtdia Canter
- 3.
Description:
The facsimile machines at the media center were not used to receive copies of EBS messages issued from the state EOC for distribution at the media center.
Recommendation: The telefax machine should be used to receive state-generated EBS messages so they can be distributed at the media center.
- 4.
Description:
The technical expert who was present for most media briefings at the media center was not present for the critical fif th briefing, leading to some confusion about the plant status.
Recommendation: A technical expert should be present at all major media briefings.
- 5.
Description:
The decision was made not to relocate the media center during the protective action recommendation of evacuation.
Recommendation: Future effort should address the logistics of a possible evacuation of the media center and the need for dosimetry.
- 6.
Description:
Role-playing reporters at the media center challenged and successfully violated the security arrangements provided by the utility.
Recommendation: Security arrangements at the media center should be reviewed and upgraded, if necessary.
i
I .
36 Plymouth l 2.2 MASSACHUSETTS LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS i -
2.2.1 Plymouth The Plymouth EOC is located in the basement of the Memorial Hall municipal building. The alternate EOC, which was not activated for this scenario, is located at the Plymouth Airport.
(
The primary EOC facilities were adequate as to furniture, lighting, telephones, extended support and backup power. The limited space was efficiently utilized. An air
! filter had been installed to improve ventilation and correct a problem that had been
! observed during the last exercise. A status and event board were posted and a large EPZ l
map was available showing sectors, evacuation routes and stren positions. Compass points had been superimposed on a second EPZ map to correct an area for improvement.
i information on reception centers and access control was available in the plan. However,
{ current population distribution data on residents and transients was neither posted nor
! available in the plan for designated evacuation areas. The absence of this information could limit the effectiveness of this community's emergency response planning and I requires corrective action.
] The primary EOC was partially activated following no'.ification of an unusual.
4 event at 8:25 a.m. The civil defense director and selectu.:n had been notified by town <
l police dispatch using pagers and telephones. At the Alert notification at 9:07, all EOC staff were contacted by telephone and put on standby. Following the Site Area notifi-cation at 10:39 a.m. the EOC was activated and staffing was completed by 11:10 a.m.
} The notification procedure has 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> capabilities and the calllist was up to date.
Nine municipal offices were represented and 12 individuals participated. A
! ' roster was presented to demonstrate round-the-clock staffing capabilities. The
- participating staff demonstrated a good understanding of their roles and their j assignments were promptly carried out.
j The civil defense director, as specified in the plan, capably managed the EOC 3
operations. The deputy director, who was well informed on the escalating emergency I situation, provided management support. Periodic briefings were held and the j appropriate staff members were included in the decision making. The new town plan had j been received several days before the exercise. This plan, as well as checklists, was ;
i frequently referenced throughout the exercise. Message logs were maintained by the ,
{ communications officer and the more important information posted on the event board.
Message logs were also maintained by participating staff although the recording procedures and format were not standardized. Systematic documentation for all j departments would be helpful to the second shif t. Access control was maintained by the l Civil Air Patrol in combination with utility security staff.
1 i ; The communications capabilities at the EOC were very good. The primary j communications system was the telephone which interlinked the EOCs, Area II and loca!
- institutions. The R ACES and high-band CB radios served as backup. In addition, police, fire, town network and MCDA radios were available. All communications were confined i
i i
1
{ _ _.____. _ ._.__.___ _ _,-
. _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _..._ _ _ _ _ _
- f. .
37 Ply .ath to the communications room to reduce noise in the operational area. Procedures were in place to transmit written messages to EOC staff or verbally brief the staff which corrects a previously reported area requiring corrective action (#30). A radio and television for monitoring EBS messages were present although the EBS stStlons were not monitored and radio was not operational throughout most of the exercise. Messages concerning the emergency action levels were often received from the medla center liaison before they were transmitted over the existing communications systems.
The Plymouth EOC simulated a comprehensive program for alerting the public and carrying out both sheltering (12:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m.) and evacuation activities at 2:18 p.m., 2:30 p.m. and 2:39 p.m. when the entire community was evacuated. Each protective action included simulated siren and voice notification over the fixed speakers, and simulated deployment of route alerting teams with sirens and public address systems. A computer was utilized to identify the streets to be included in the route to be assigned to the route alerting teams. However, staff were ancertain about actual route completion times. The coastal areas were notified by the harbor master as 'a simulated boat with speakers patrolled the area. The Plymouth airpoat simulated stopping all air traffic. Schools and other public and institutional facilities were contacted by the EOC staff and notified of the emergency situation. Prescribed messages were given to the public using radius information rather than familiar landmarks. This could be confusing, particularly to the many transients who are present during the summer tourist season. Moreover, EOC staff expressed a concern that anticipated route alerting times may be excessive.
Protective actions were demonstrated by the simulated establishment of traffic and access control points, closure of municipal water intake points and provision of transportation vehicles for mobility impaired in nursing homes and hospitals. Staff and
, equipment were reported to be adequate to keep evacuation routes open and cover access and traffic control simultaneously. A new utility pamphlet that included a survey forra for mobility impaired and other instructions to the public has been recently mailed. The EOC staff report that these pamphlets are now being received in their community and that they contain appropriate information. If this information reflects the procedures provided in the new town plan, a previous area requiring corrective action has been corrected (# 16).
Radiological exposure control equipment was dispensed to EOC staff when the EOC was activated. Kits contained low- and medium-range dosimeters and TLDs.
Chargers and record-keeping cards were also available. The supply of equipment was adequate. Police and fire staff maintained their own equipment which included the dosimeters and simulated TLDs. The Department of Public Works did not have dosime"ry kits and there was some confusion on the procedures to be followed to promptly acquire dosimetry for their field personnel.
EOC and field staff were requested to simulate reading dos: meters every M minutes and report any readings to the RADEF office. This corrects a previously reported area requiring corrective action (#55), however, these instructions do not correspond with those reported as a' proposed action to be developed by the state (6/25/85).
---w - - - - c--.., - - - ,
38 Plymouth Members of the press would not be given access to the EOC once activation takes place. Security will direct the media to the Media Center. This corrects an area requiring corrective action from a previous exercise (#43).
Recovery and reentry were not demonstrated and an area requiring corrective action outstanding from 1982 could not be corrected (#46). The EOC was closed following notification of downgrade in classification. This was done in order to avoid overtime costs in the municipality. Although recovery and reentry procedures have been incorporated in the new town plan, in response to an area requiring corrective action from an earlier exercise (#54), FEMA has not received a revised version of the Plymouth plan and this issue remains incomplete.
The design of the scenario was adequate to test the emergency response capabilities of the Plymouth EOC.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions
- 1.
Description:
Current population distribution data on residents and transients was neither posted nor available in the plan for designated evacuation areas. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, J.10.b)
Recommendation: Current population distribution data should be provided for residents and transients including the expected seasonal variations.
- 2.
Description:
Protective action instructions for sheltering and evacuating the public were not given in terms of familiar boundaries and landmarks. Sufficient information was not provided to transients. This information is important in an area with a large transient population. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.6, E.7)
Recommendation: Protective action instructions should be developed to reflect familiar boundaries and landmarks and to provide information to transients.
- 3.
Description:
EBS stations were not monitored in the EOC and the available radio was not operating during part of the exercise.
(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, E.5)
Recommendation: EBS stations should be routinely monitored in the EOC and the equipment should be maintained.
e
b 39 Plymouth Areas Recommended for improvement
- 1.
Description:
EOC departmental staff did not have a standardized procedure in place for message documentation. This would improve the overall operations and transition to the second shif t.
(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.1.b, A.2.a)
Recommendation: EOC staff should develop a standardized message recording procedure and format for logging departmental messages.
- 2.
Description:
Route alerting teams have not participated in a full demonstration and uncertainties exist in expected route completion times. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.6)
Recommendation: Route alerting should be demonstrated and field tested in a future exercise.
- 3.
Description:
A procedure was not in place to promptly provide Department of Public Works field staff with appropriate dosimetry. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, K.3.a)
Recommendation: A procedure should be established to promptly provide appropriate dosimetry to all Public Works field staff.
I l
I
- - e , e , m +
40 Duxbury i
2.2.2 Duxbury
)
The Duxbury EOC is located in the basement of the fire department. The facility was adequate as to space, furniture, lighting, extended operation and backup power. An additional telephone line has been added since the last exercise to correct an j area requiring corrective action (#56). A status board and appropriate display were posted. However, information on the current population distribution for residents and transients was not available.
- The EOC was activated following the notification of a Site Area Emergency at l 10
- 43 a.m. and staffing was completed by 11:02 a.m. The emergency notification was transmitted from the town police to the fire department duty officer who was responsible for contacting the EOC civil defense director and EOC staff. This system had 24-hour capabilities.
!- Eleven municipal agencies participated in the exercise and their representatives demonstrated adequate training and knowledge in carrying out their assignments. Due to I other demands, some staff could not be continually present in the EOC, although they i were able and did participate in making the more important decisions. Round-the-clock j staffing capabilities were available and a second shift was posted on the roster.
a 1 The EOC was managed by the civil defense director as specified in the plan. He
! discharged his duties efficiently and provided continuous briefings to his staff. Excellent decision making resulted from the staff coordination. Copies of the new town plan were l
available for staff use as well as their respective checklists. Access control to the EOC was simulated.
l The communications systems included the telephone and RACES rsdio. All i communications were promptly received and the quality of the transmission was good.
Public alerting actions were carried out by the Duxb;.:ry EOC including simulatcd sounding of sirens and. voice broadcasts over fixed speakers and deployment of route alerting teams with vehicles equipped with publie address systems. When the General Emergency was declared at 11:44 a.m., the civil defense director made the decision to I deploy the route alerting teams to pre-warn transients on the beaches and harbor to take shelter. When Area Il recommended an evacuation of beach and harbor areas at 2:42 p.m., the EOC harbor master and beach officer made a second check to assure transients i had left the area. During the exercise, the sirens and route alerting activations were simulated for a shelter order at 12:40 p.m. and at 2:42 p.m. Schools were also notified of this recommendation. Instructions transmitted over the fixed and mobile alerting systems were not prescribed.
i There was a simuhted demoristration of access control by the highway.
department, for examole, the police department simulated positioning heavy-duty wreckers at key intersections to demonstrate the ability. to keep evacuation routes clear. The Harbor master indicated that he would clear all water traffic within his jurisdiction. The EOC school department coordinator would have notified sche es to release students and return them to their homes when a sheltering action was requred.
I t
v w , , - , - . ,
-.._m _. _ , --....---.---.-% r - ,.,y.---_-- ,---u ._.-.sg-.-,..---.--w - r -,w,- -r-- w.,--y 7,
41 Duxbury EOC staff reported that emergency information had been mailed to the public by the utility which corrects an area requiring corrective action from an earlier exercise
(# 41). The information is current although the exact cont [nt was not cross-compared with the plan. If this information is accurate, an area requiring corrective action has been corrected (# 16).
Exposure control was demonstrated for the EOC staff. Dosimetry equipment included low- and medium-range dosimeters. TLDs, record-keeping cards and chargers.
There were 60 dosimeters and TLDs available for emergency workers, which was more than the number of participants. The RADEF officer demonstrated issuing dosimetry to 16 emergency workers. The availability and issuance of the low-range dosimeters corrects an area requiring corrective action from an earlier exercise (#58).
Media relations are not carried out by the Duxbury EOC staff.
Recovery and reentry were not fully demonstrated as part of this scenario. This community was requested to shelter and no evacuation of the resident population was required. Although recovery and reentry procedures are available and included in the local plan in response to an earlier area requiring corrective action (#57), FEMA has not received a revised copy of the Duxbury plan, and this issue remains incomplete. EOC staff did discuss the recovery actions that they would initiate under the shelter order.
This demonstration partially corrects an area requiring corrective action (#46).
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 1.
Description:
Current population distribution data on residents and transients was neither posted nor available in the plan for evacuation areas. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.b)
Recommendation: Current population distribution data should be provided for residents and transients including the expected seasonal variations.
Areas Recommended for improvement
- 1.
Description:
Access control to the Duxbury EOC was simulated.
Recommendation: EOC operations should include an actual demonstration of EOC access control in a future exercise.
l 1
42 Carver 2.2.3 Carver According to the applicable spetion of state / local plans, the Carver EOC is
. located within the town hall. However, during the exercise, there was confusion among the participating staff on the specific location of the operational area. The location that finally was selected and utilized was a small basement office. The size of the office is inadequate and the ventilatien is poor. Since the EOC radio communications are also located in the same room, the noise could adversely affect EOC operations.
Appropriate maps and status boards were posted in another room. Posted information did not include population distribution data and this information was not available in the town plan. However, small-scale copies of the available displays were present in the office area. They were not highly usable or easy to read. Throughout the exercise the status boards were not utilized and the emergency classification levels were not posted.
The EOC activation procedure was initiated by the police / fire dispatcher in the municipal communication room. After the notification and verification of an emergency message from the state police, the dispatcher contacted the EOC staff. Contact was made using a combination of pagers and telephones and an up-to-date call out list. This
< activation procedure was according to the local plan. However, the EOC director and his staff did not respond, consequently, the EOC was not formally activated. Staffing was never completed leaving the EOC only partially operational.
r EOC staff that participated throughout the exercise included the on-duty s dispatcher and an off-duty dispatcher who was not il sted on the EOC call-up list. Other municipal staff visited the EOC but did not actively participate in the operational activities. Round-the-clock staffing capabilities were not demonstrated.
The EOC was not managed by the individual designated in the plan or by an alternate. There was no leadership observed to coordinate emergency activities, conduct
. briefings, and demonstrate decision making. Access to th'e E0C was not controlled. A
[
, copy of the revised plan was available for reference but the participants did not use written procedures or checklists.
The communications systems available to the EOC consisted of the telephone and RACES radio. Police, fire, and department of public works radios were also available in
! the municipal communications center. The communications center and EOC were in separate buildings. Eventually it is planned to connect these buildings by an intercom.
Exchange of messages between the EOC operations area and communications center created confusion and some time ~ delays. The dispatcher became overly busy with his
! regular duties and the management of emergency telephone traffic. A concern was i expressed that the telephone line into the communication center would be overloaded in an actual emergency. The commercial telephone is the primary communication system.
The backup system is the RACES radio. Initially this radio was not operational because a microphone could not be located. Once operational, both communications systems operated well during the exercise. .The RACES operator displayed enthusiasm and carried out his assignments in a professional manner.
l
.n.. , . , - - - . ,
1 l
43 Carver !
. I l
l Limited public alerting activities were carried out by the participating staff. On l his own initiative, the dispatcher regularly telephoned the local schools, and other.
municipal agencies to keep them updated on the emergency situation. The dispatcher did not receive an order to simulate siren activation, therefore, no actions were ever taken to alert the general public. Part of Carver was within the area covered by the shelter recommendation. In addition, the staff believes that some of the fixed sirens may be inoperable. Available staff were uncertain about procedure for deploying route alerting teams for primary or supplemental notification.
Even though portions of Carver were in the area covered by the shelter recommendation, access control points were not established for inbound traffic. Traffic control points were not activated along the evacuation route under their jurisdiction.
Staff were not available during the exercise to coordinate protective actions such as these. However, staff believed that sufficient municipal personnel and equipment could be made available for traffic and access control we well as keeping the evacuation routes open.
Pamphlets that contain information on protective actions have been updated and distributed to the public which corrects part of an earlier area requiring corrective action (#16). However, participating staff noted that the telephone number published for the town hall is incorrect and this continues part of the earlier area requiring corrective action (# 16).
Exposure control equipment was available in the Carver EOC and included low-and medium-range dosimeters, TLDs, chargers, and record-keeping cards. The supply was adequate for the number of participants identified in the town plan. This corrects an
- outstanding area requiring corrective action (#44). Radiation detection kits are also
' reported to be available. A staff member was familiar with the dosimetry distribution and decontamination procedures.
Recovery and reentry were not demonstrated. Carver was not located within the '
area being evacuated under the exercise scenario, therefore, an area requiring corrective action in this area could not be corrected (#63). Although recovery and reentry procedures are available in the revised plan in response to an area requiring corrective action from a previous exercise (#59), FEMA has not received a copy of the revised plan for review, and this issue remains incomplete.
Deficiencies
- 1.
Description:
The Carver EOC did not demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly. The EOC staff notified on the call-up list did not report to the EOC and carry out their assignments. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II. E.2, A.2.a)
Recommendation: Designated staff should report to the EOC to represent the organizations designated in the plan. They should carry out specified assignments promptly. Procedures should be in place for activation of alternate staff to fill vacancies in first-shift EOC appointments.
i I
l l
\
I 44 Carver
- 2.
Description:
EOC management, as specified in the plan, did not participate in the exercise. There was no demonstration of the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1 II, A.I.d, A.1.b A.2.a)
Recommendation: An accurate EOC management structure should be developed and specified in the town plan. Alternate staff should be designated, trained and procedures put in place for their activation.
- 3.
Description:
EOC staff did not adequately demonstrate their ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ. There was no coordinated effort among the participating staff for simulating sounding of sirens, disseminating instructional messages, or route alerting. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 II, E.6)
Recommendation: EOC staff should demonstrate the ability to alert the public in the affected portions of their community and disseminate the initial instructional messages.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions
- 1.
Description:
There was confusion among the participating Carver EOC staff on the location of the operations area. (FE M A-R E P-1, Rev.1, II, H.3)
Recommendation: The Carver EOC operations area should be clearly identified and the location should be provided in the town plan.
- 2.
Description:
The EOC operations area utilized for this exercise was inadequate to support emergency operations. The displays and status boards that were located in the operations area were too small and were not visibly posted. The status board was not utilized and the emergency classification levels were not posted.
(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3)
Recommendation: The EOC facilities should be improved and adequate displays should be usable and easy to read. The status boards should be utilized and the emergency classification levels posted.
- 3.
Description:
Round-the-clock staffing capabilities were not demonstrated. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, A.4)
Recommendation: Demonstrate the ability to staff the EOC cound-the-clock.
V 45 Carver
- 4.
Description:
The available telephone !!. es in the municipal dispatch center could become overloaded during an actual emergency. In addition, the dispatcher was overly busy with handling routine work as well as emergency telephone messages.
(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3, F.1.e, F.1.b)
Recommendatiom Separate telephone lines and communications staff should be assigned to municipal emergency operations. All equipment should be located near the operations area or provisions should be made for prompt message transmittal between separate areas.
- 5.
Description:
Access to the EOC was not controlled. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, D.3)
Recommendation: Access to the EOC should be controlled.
- 6.
Description:
Access and traffic control points were not activated or simulated by the Carver EOC staff. Consequently, access was not restricted to the area under their jurisdiction which was being sheltered. Traffic control points were not available to provide assistance along the evacuation route. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.k, J.10.g, and J.10.j)
Recommendation: The EOC staff should demonstrate their
- organizational ability and the resources necessary to manage traffic and access control within their jurisdiction.
Areas Recommended for Improvement
- 1.
Description:
EOC staff did not utilize written procedures and checklists for reference in carrying out emergency operations within the EOC.
Recommendation: EOC staff should utilize written procedures and checklists in carrying out the emergency operations of the EOC.
46 Kingston 2.2.4 Kingston The Kingston EOC is located in the Kingston fire station. Ov.erall, this. facility has sufficient amenities to carry out emergency response activities. B'ackup power was available and emergency action levels were posted. A status board was used to record and update major events which satisfies a previous recommendation. The facility also included a radio for monitoring EBS broadcasts and this reflects a response to an earlier recommendation. All necessary maps were available and posted except for population distribution information. Population numbers for residents and transients were not available for evacuation areas.
Key EOC staff were placed on stand-by following notification of an Unusual Event at 8:18 a.m. Notification to staff was made by pager. The EOC was activated at the Alert notification at 9:22 a.m. and was operational by 10:00 a.m. The EOC staff primarily comprised volunteers who demonstrated knowledge of their assigned duties and implemented procedures effectively. However, there was some confusion among the staff regarding the definition and purpcse of the state of emergency declaration by the governor.
Participants represented municipal police and fire departments, civil defense, board of selectmen, the local school district, board of health, RACES, and a citizens band radio group.
The EOC operations were efficiently managed by the civil defense director. The director informed his staff on the changing emergency situation, guided staff discussion regarding emergency response actions and utilized the town plan and appropriate checklists. The civil defense director aggressively pursued information from the Area II office needed for quick response actions and demonstrated a correction of a previously reported problem. Another previous area requiring corrective action was corrected by
' establishing a security point staffed by the Kingston auxiliary police (#25). A single log was maintained for internal messages in response to a recommendation from a previous exercise.
The communications systems in the Kingston EOC consisted of a dedicated line to the Area II office in Bridgewater, a telephone line to the Kingston police, citizens band internal civil defense radio network, RACES, and a municipal radio. All of these systems functioned well and messages were promptly transmitted. A previous deficiency was corrected by having the RACES and citizens band operators use earphones to reduce the noise level within the EOC (#32).
The Kingston EOC did not play a role in carrying out protective actions. The initial message to activate sirens and EBS at 12:38 p.m. did not apply to sectors within municipal boundaries. Nevertheless, simulated procedures were in place for siren activation had it been required. Route alerting by police and fire departments was also discussed. According to the EOC director, Kingston has a sufficient number of vehicles with public address systems to implement route alerting procedures. This capability corrects an earlier area requiring corrective action (#39).
i 47 Kingston Following receipt of shelter and evacuation recommendations for other communities, EOC staff discussed the adequacy of the personnel and resources available for protective actions in Kingston. According to the EOC director, resources and personnel would be adequate to control access and keep evacuation routes clear. Mutual aid could be obtained from other areas should the need arise. The staff reviewed the i location of the designated traffic control points and noted that some maps need to be changed to reflect requirements in the field. However, the EOC staff did not have school prerelease plans available fcr review. A message at 11:31 a.m. indicated that a prerelease of schoolchildren should be ordered. Moreover, some confusion existed among the staff on the areas outside Kingston that were being affected by the protective action recommendations for sheltering. The ability for local residents to respond to protective actions would, in part, depend on the information they received in pamphlets distributed to them. These pamphlets were not present in the EOC and two areas requiring corrective action from an earlier exercise concerning the content of these pamphlets could not be evaluated.
Radiological exposure control was effectively implemented. An adequate number of low- and medium-range dosimeters, TLDs, chargers and record-keeping cards were available. The deputy civil defense officer demonstrated good knowledge of exposure control procedures. Excellent instructions were issued to each emergency worker and an information sheet was filled out. The availability of dosimetry satisfies part of a recommendation for an area of improvement from a previous exercise.
However, dosimeters were not read on a regular basis and this continues part of an area for improvement reported at the 1983 exercise.
Media relations were not demonstrated at the Kingston EOC.
Recovery and reentry activities were not demonstrated. Kingston was not evacuated and these procedures could not be tested to eliminate an area requiring corrective action (#46). Although procedures for recovery and reentry are now present in the local town plan in response to an earlier area requiring corrective action (#61),
FEM A has not received a copy of the revised plan for review, and this issue rema!ns incomplete.
The scenario provided a good opportunity to test the capabilities of the Kingston emergency response pers )nnel. The staff displayed outstanding initiative in developing creative free-play mess >At to stimulate activities.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions
- 1.
Description:
There was some confusion among EOC staff on the definition and purpose of the State of Emergency declaration by the governor. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II. A.2.a)
48 Kingston Recommendation: The local plan should include a description of the State of Emergency Declaration and clearly distinguish it from the General Emergency. Additional training should be provided to all local emergency response personnel.
Areas Recommended for Improvement 1.
Description:
Based on discussions with the civil defense director and review of the local plans for traffic and access control points, redesignation of some points may be necessary. (FE M A-R EP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.k, J.10.g)
Recommendation: The local plan should be modified to reflect local needs and optimize management of traffic and access control in an emergency situation.
2.
Description:
EOC staff did not have procedures for prerelease of school children in place and available for review. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g, E.6)
Recommendation: Procedures for a prerelease program for school-children should be available in the EOC for review by EOC staff.
Staff should be familiar with these procedures for a rapid response in an emergency situation.
- 3.
Description:
Some confusion existed among the staff on the areas outside Kingston that were being affected by the protective action recommendation for sheltering. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. II, J.10.j, A.2.a)
Recommendation: Provide training to EOC personnel on inter-preting protective action recommendations and understanding how sectors are identified on the EPZ map.
. 4.
Description:
Dosimetry was not read at regular intervals. This continues part of an area for improvement reported from an earlier exercise. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.b)
Recommendation: Require dosimeter readings at appropriate periodic intervals. and review exposure record forms to facilitate recording the information.
l
s 49 Marshfield 2.2.5 Marshfield The EOC is located in the basement of the Marshfield police station. The facility was well lighted and has sufficient furniture and adequate telephones and a source of backup power. Improvements in these facilities correct an area requiring corrective action from a previous exercise (#62). Telephones and other communications equipment are presently located in the same location within the EOC, eliminating confusion in operations. This corrects another area requiring corrective action (#29).
Extended use could be accommodated at a nearby fire department facility which is totally self-sufficient.
Maps and required displays were available and posted in the EOC. A previous area requiring corrective action (#22) has been corrected by the improved quality of some displays. A large blackboard was available for a status board and the emergency classification levels and maps were easy to see and read.
The Marshfield EOC was activated at 10:35 a.m. following notification of a Site Area Emergency. The EOC was operational immediately since the EOC staff were pre-positioned. Notification to EOC staff was made by the police department using pagers and telephones. This system has 24-hour capabilities. During the exercise the eight offices were represented in the EOC by actual or simulated staff. The participating I staff displayed a thorough knowledge of the local REP plan and excellent training in carrying out emergency procedures. This demonstration corrects an area requiring
, corrective action from a previous exercise (# 31). Around-the-clock staffing was available and an up-to-date roster for a second shif t was presented.
Ernergency operations were effectively managed by the civil defense director.
Periodic briefings were held to update staff on the emergency situation and staff, where appropriate, were involved in decision making. A recently updated plan was readily available and written procedures and checklists were referenced. Message handling was effective as messages were verified, logged and distributed. Security procedures had been established and entrance to the EOC was controlled throughout the exercise. This eliminated another area requiring corrective action (#26).
Communications worked very well and EOC capabilities have been expanded since the last exercise. Currently the available systems include a direct telephone line, RACES radio, citizens band radio and a police scanner. Messages received over the police scanner and radios were of excellent quality and messages from Area Il flowed smoothly.
The Marshfield EOC was minimally involved in public alerting activities although public instructions were not developed. This community is situated on the edge of the EPZ. EOC staff discussed simulating the sounding of sirens in response to the sheltering recommendations that would affect a small portion of the municipality.
Protective actions were not demonstrated. The staff discussed the procedures that were in place for establishing traffic control points, keeping evacuation routes clear, assisting the mobility impaired, and transporting schoolchildren including children with special needs. However, under the scenario, an evacuation route and other highways l
! +
0 50 Marshfield I
that gave access into an area under a shelter order are located within Marshfield's jurisdiction. Traffic and access control points were neither established nor simulated.
EOC staf' reported that local residents had received new emergency information pamphlets. The information contained in the pamphlets had not been cross-compared with the plan. The outstanding area requiring corrective action from a previous exercise could not be completely evaluated (#16).
Exposure control equipment included low- and medium-range dosimeters, TLDs, chargers, and record-keeping cards. The equipment supply was more than adequate for the number of participating emergency workers. The civil defense director was aware of decontamination procedures.
Media relations were not carried out.
This community did not evacuate during the exercise, consequently, recovery and reentry procedures were not demonstrated. Nevertheless, staff did conduct a discussion of the various actions that would be taken should an evacuation be required in their community. This discussion of recovery and reentry eliminated an area requiring corrective action from an earlier exercise (#46). Although recovery and reentry procedures have been included in the revised town plan, in response to an earlier area requiring corrective action (#63), FEM A has not received a copy of the revised plan for
. review, and this issue remains inccmplete.
The design of the scenario was adequate. Marshfield provided an acceptable demonstration of its emergency response capabilities.
Deficiencies None.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 1.
Description:
Access control was neither ordered nor simulated by the Marshfield EOC. This community contained areas included in the shelter order as well as roadways leading into the area potentially affected under the exercise scenario. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.K, J.10.g)
Recommendation: Access control points should be established on roadways leading into an area covered by a protective action.
Areas Recommended for Improvement
- 1.
Description:
The Marshfield EOC staff were prepositioned.
1 Activation and staffing procedures were not fully demonstrated.
. (F E M A- R E P-1, Rev.1,11. E.2) l
_ _, ., . _ , _ ._,. _. . , - _ ,__ v_ _ - . - _ . , , , ., , . . _,
3 51 Harshfield Recommendation: In a future exercise the Marshfield EOC should fully test its activation and staffing capabilities.
i 9
-, "~A_ -- -' -,, '~,m .
ua , ' ~ - . , , ' ' N~
e 52 1
t l
t i
l
'h t
e
i 53 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions with recommendations noted by the federal evaluators of this exercise. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (November,1980), exercise objectives, and the evaluation criteria provided in Sec.1.5 of this report.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plan.
FEMA requests that the state and local jurisdictions submit the measures they have taken or intend to take to correct deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including projected and actual dates of completion for implementing corrective actions, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately.
FEMA has recently adopted changes in terminology regarding exercise inadequacies. The revised terminology is reflected in this report. The definitions of the exercise inadequacies are as follows:
Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or other actions.
Areas Requiring Corrective Actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
Four (4) deficiencies were identified in this exercise. Both deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions identified in this exercise are summarized in Table 2.
Table 3 is a compilation of the current status of deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions identified in the March 3,1982, June 29,1983, and September 5,1985 exercises. Table 4 lists the status of each of the 35 FEMA Core Objectives for each state and local jurisdiction by exercise year.
i i
-~.
V O
54 e
e s
o i
I 1
l I
J i
1 -v TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Sept ember 5,1985)
Page 1 of 14 1
Ikliciencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, ,
Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recomunendation Rev. I, State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date i
St at e EOC
- l. De sc ri pt ion: There was very limited 1.10, technical information coming to the F.I.d State EOC from the EOF regarding plant w u
f conditions and the reasons for emergency action l evel s , which al so limited information flow to the Area II and local EOCs. i Hecommendation: Coordination between the state EOC and EOF should be im-proved to ensure that sufficient data are gathered at the EOF and trans-mitted to the State EOC to form a basis for sound decision making, and 4 subsequently transmitted to the Area 11 and local EOCs.
. ' . De sc ri pt ion: Similar to the previous J.9.c caercise, the U.S. Coast Cuard did not simulate the dispatch of helicopters
) into the EP2 area since radiation
' would trigger a f alse alarm on stress sensors on the aircraft which use a radioactive source.
Hecomunenda t i on t if alternate arrange-ments have been est abli shed, the plan should be revised to reflect the fact that Coast Cuard helicopters will not be mobiliacd intu a potentially
. radioactive area during an emergency. 7 i
a
_. _. . ~ . . . -_ -. __. - . . _ _ . _ . _ . . - . . . - .- . - . .-. .. . - . . - . . - . .- - .
i 2
1
.l .
i m
i TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (September 5,1985)
Page 2 of 14 1
FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recomunendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date ,
for Corrective Action Element .5 i
- 3. Description Because of scenario M.I .
l limitations, a full demonstration of M.3, recovery and reentry activities was M.4 not conducted. u Heconomenda t ion s Recovery and reent ry e should be fully tested in a future cuercise.
hiiergenc y Otierat ions Fac ilit y (F0F)
- 1. De sc r i pt inn: Dose projections and 1.10 protective action recoasnendations were
- done by the utility at the EOF. The state personnel at the EOF did not i i perform independent analysis and did not inquire as to the assumptions that i
were used by the utility in their e analysis. !
i Recoasiendation: State personnel at the EOF should either conduct inde- t pendent analysis or should spend more time in critically reviewing the dose assessments and protective action reconenendations'.made by the ut ilit y.
l l
i e
O
- e
o TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (September 5,1985)
Page 3 of 14 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-l.
Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Reconenendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L)
Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and 1.ocal Response Date for Corrective Action
- 2. De sc ri pt ion t Although the state D PH 1.10 staff at the EOF were included in detailed briefings by the utility as to plant status and the radiological g significance of the plant status, the u DPH staff did not pass on this detailed information to the state EOC.
Because of this, the EOC staff had very limited technical information to use as a basis for decision making.
Re conumendat i on Additional training in the assessment of nuclear power plant accidents is reconsnended for St at e staff located at the EOF.
Responsibility should be assigned to DPH or utility staff at the EOF for preparing plant status updates and meteorological data on standard forms as well as written recommendations and reasons for protective actions.
Field Monitoring De sc ri pt ion: Difficulty with deter- 1.7, 1.
mining some of the monitoring point 1.8, The con- I.11 locations was observed.
troller's map conflicted with a conencr c i al atlas in regards to . the designations of several roads.
Reconsnendat ion: The road locations on the MDPH maps should be checked tn ensure that the maps are up-to-date and that the state-used ma ps agree with those used by the utility.
(
TABt.E 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (September 5,1985)
Page 4 of 14 Deftetencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-l. Proposed Actual Rev. I, State (S) and Local (1,) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation Date Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions State and Local Response
- 2.
Description:
Field monitoring teams F.I.d do not have any backup communications capabilities.
Recommendation: Field monitoring ta teams should he provided with backup #
communications equipment to ensure consnunications with the EOF if the primary system fails.
Taunton EOC/ Reception Center
- l. Desertption: The objective to demon- K.$.a.
strate the. radiological monitoring 0.4.c, capability for evacuees and vehteles J.12 was not demonstrated because there were no trained personnel present at the Taunton Reception Center to conduct radiological monitoring.
Recommendation: Staff must be identtited and trained to provide radiological monitoring of evacuees and vehicles.
I.
Description:
Taunton EOC staff were K.1.a.
not knowledgeable in the proper use of K.1.b dostmetry.
Recommendation: EOC staff should receive training in the use of personnel dostmetry.
- Deftetency. ~
- _ _ . . _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _m _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . . .,-..._. . . _ _ _ . . . _ _ . . .. . . . _ . . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _
. e b
-f 1
t
- I i
i l
TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (September 5,1985) Page 5 of 14 Proposed Actual FEMA-REP-l, FEMA Evaluation of Completion Deticiencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective Stat e (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion Rev. 1, State and Local Response Date Actions and RAC Reconumendation Proposed Corrective Actions Date Element a f or Corrective Action i A.1, i 2. De sc ri pt ion s There are some questions as to whether the esisting local A.3, J.12 agreement to have the Red Cross do the registration at the Taunton Reception vi i
Center is compatible with the overall @ t j The Red
' State / Red Cross Agreement.
i Cross normally.iconcentrates its staff on the mass care functions.
Re comunenda t i on s The l oc al plans for the Taunton Reception Center should be i
reviewed with appropriate organita-tions to determine if the pl an s are consistent and compatible with other l' agreements. This must be done to ensure that the needs of evacuees will i
be met in a radiological emergency.
tu..rgency Medical Services lie sc ri pt ion s The ambulance had inade- F.2 l 1.
quate communications to the hospital,
Necomunenda t i on s The ambulance should have two-way radio c onsnun ic at ions capabilities with the haspital. EOF and local EOCs. i i
d 5
1 4
, . . . - - - , , , , _ . . . . . _ . . . _ . . . _ _ _ - . . ~ ~ . _ . . , . . . . . , . _ , . . . . , . , _ . _ , _ - ..._ _ . . _ . _ . , . . . .. ,m,- - . _ , _ . . . - , _ . . -,
4 5
k TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (September 5,1985)
Page 6 of 14 lieliciencies/ Areas Requiring Correr.sve FEMA-rep-1, ,
Proposed Actual Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recomendatio o for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date
- 2. th sc ription The Jorda'n Hospital had F.2 no special emergency comun ic a t i ons links with radiological laboratories, other hos pi t al s , the EOF or l oc al ,
EOCs. o Recomendat ion s Comunic at ions ca pabili ties at the Jordan Hospital should be improved to ensure the ability to communicate with radio-logical laboratories, other hospitals, the EOF or local EOCs in a timely manner in a radiological emergency.
- l. De sc r i pt ion: The ambulance had only L 1, one radiation protection suit. L.4 Hecumenda t i on : The ambulance should be equipped with protective clothing tur each member of the crew.
- 4. lk sc ri pt ian t The ambulance crew did L.1, not have low-level dosimeters and was L.4, not familiar with the operation of K.3.a radiation monitoring equipment.
Recomenda t i on The ambulance crew should be equ i p ped with l ow-l evel dusimeters and should be trained in the use of radiation munitoring equipnent.
- . . - - . - . . _ - , - . . - . . -. - . . ._- . . . . . _ . . - - . - - _ _ - - ~ . _ -_. -- - - - .. - -
b TABLE 2 Demedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Sept ember 5,1985)
Page 7 of 14 Ikticiencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual l Ac t ions and RAC Reconenendation Rev. 1, St at e (S) and Local (L) Compl et i on FEMA Evaluation of Completion i
for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date
- 5. De sc r i pt ion! An esisting esamination L.!
room was used at the Jordan Hospital r for 'the initial evaluation of the l cont amin at ed victim rather than a small decontamination room, presenting e
~
the problem of decontaminating a large l area and possibly spreading radio-l active particles throughout the hospital and beyond.
i Hec onenenda t i on The use of a separate smal1 decontaminstion room woutd be better than an esisting esamination i room for the initial evaluation of
- contaminated victims to prevent the l
spread of contaminat ion.
I p .st e Wrning Point
- i. lk sc r i pt ion! Although a clerical F.1.a.
assistant has been provided for the F.1.d l radio dispatcher at the state police l warning point, the potential still
! esists for the radio dispatcher not twing able to handle both routine calls and radiological emergency calls simultaneously.
Reconenenda t i on! A second radio operator should be made available, at least on a standby basis, to assist with the large number of calls and
! radio t ransmissions anticipated during a radiological emergency.
b1 TABLE 2 temedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Pouer Station (September 5,1985)
Page 8 of 14
-FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deticiencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective ,
FEHA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Reconumendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion Element Proposed Coerective Actions Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action
- 2. De sc r i pt ion Some consnunic at i ons F.1.a.
problems continue. to 'esist in the F.1.d notification and ve r i f ic at i.on of messages between the state ' police ,
. warning point and the local EOCs. N This was also noted in previous exercises.
Recomumendation The reliability of the primary radio consnunic at ions s/ stem should either be improved, or alternate systems established.
Pl ymout h EOC
- 1. De sc r i pt ion t Current population J.10.b di st ribut ion data on residents and transients was neither posted nur avai labl e in the plan for designated evacuation areas.
Recoasnendat i on s Current population distribution data shoul d be provided for residents and transients including the espect ed sea sonal va riat ions.
e
- - _ . - - - . . ~ _ _ .. . - . . _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . .- . _ _ . . _ -- - --. . .
b TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station i
(September 5,1985) rage 9 of 14 l IA?ficiencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1 Proposed Actual
' Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Act ions and RAC Recoasnendation Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response
- 2. lk sc r i pt ion 8 Protective action E.6, 1 instructions for sheltering and E.7
) evacuating the public were not given 4 in terms of familiar boundaries and a landmarks. Sufficient information was W
' not provided to transients. This information is important in an area with a large transient population.
Stec onenenda t i on : Protective action inst ruct ions should be developed to reflect familiar boundaries and
. landmarks and to provide information to transients.
I. De sc r i pt i on: EBS stations were not E.5 munitored in the EOC and the available r.ediu vas not operating during part of the esercise.
Hecuanaendation EBS st at ions should
- lie routinely monitored in the EOC and the equipment should be maintained.
Ikenteury EOC
- l. 14 sc ri pt i on: Current po pul a t i on J.10.t distribution data on residents and transients was neither po st ed nor available in the plan for evacuation 4
areas.
l Nec onenenda t ion! Current po pul a t i on distribution data should be provided for residents and transients including ahe espected seasonal variations.
- _ _ _ _ ._ ______m - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ __ -. _ .. ._ -.
h I
o TABLE 2 Remedial Act ions f or Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (September 5,1985)
Page 10 of 14 Proposed Actuel th:liciencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion Rev. I, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recommendation Date State and Local Response Date El ement Proposed Corrective Actions
' for Corrective Action 4
! Carver EOC
- l. Descriptions The Carver EOC did not E.2, demonstrate the ability to mobilise A.2.4 ,
activate facilities *-
staff and
- j promptly. The EOC staf f notified on the call up list did not re por t to
,J. the EOC, and carry os. . .their assignments.
' lt ec ommendat ion t Designated staff '
should report to the EOC to represent l
the organisations designated in the plan. They should carry out s peci f ied assignments promptfy.
Procedures should be in' plate for activation of at;ernate staf f to fill vacancies in first shift EOC 4
a ppoi nt me nt s .
Description! EOC management, as A.I.d.
, 32. A.I.b, specified in the plan, did not participate in the exercise. There A.2.a was no demonstration of the al.ility to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
Recommendetion! An accurate EOC management structure should be developed and specified in the town 3 plan. Al te rnat e staff should be
' designated, trained, and procedures put in place tor their activation.
l t
Meliciency.
~- _ - . _ = . - . -. _ _ _ _ - . - _ _ . . ._ _. - _ .
, ,~
l t
w TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station .'
! (September 5,1985)
Page 11 of 14 l
f Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, l Rev. 1 State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recomunendation Date Date l
for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions State and Local Response
[
i
- 3. Descriptions EOC staff did not E.6 adequately demonstrate their ability to alert the public within the 10 mile EPZ. There was no coordinated ,
effort among the participating staff u for simulating sounding of sirens, disseminating instructional messages, or route alerting.
Recommendationt EOC staff shou'd demonstrate the ability to alert t *,e public in the affected portions of their community and disseminate initial instructional messages.
- 1. Descriptions There was confusien it .1 anong the participating Carver EOC staff on the location of the operations area.
Recommendations The Carver EOC ope ra t i on s area should be clearly identified and the location should be provided in the town plan.
i h
l ADeliciency.
I f
I i
l l
l
1 t
i
'I TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
' (September 5,1985)
Page 12 of 14 FEMA-NEP-1, Proposed Actual y
.lAliciencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion '
Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) '
Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action El .?me n t l 2. Descriptions The EOC operations area it . 3 utilized for this esercise was inade-quate to support emergency operations.
The d i s play s and st at us boards that ,
' were located in the operations ares &
were too s.nal l and were not visably posted. The status board was not utilized and the emergency classifica-tiun levels were not posted.
Rec onenenda t i on : The EOC facilities should be improvedi adequate displays should be usable and easy to read.
.The status boards should be utilized ,
and the classification levels posted.
- 1. De sc ri pt ion s Round-the-clock staffing ' , . A.4 i
capabilities were not demonstrated. i Recomunenda t i on t Demonst rate the abil-It y to staf f the EOC round-the-clock.
tw sc ri pt ions The available telephone II . 3, d
4.
lines in the municipal dispatch center F.I.e.
could become overloaded during an F.1.b actual emergency. In addition, the dispatcher . was overly busy with handlina routine _ work as well as emergency telephone messages.
Met onenenda t i on : Separate telephone II..e s and c onununi ca t i on s staf f should be assigned to municipal emergency operations. All equipment should be located near to the operations area or provisions should ta. made tar prompt mess-age t ransmi tt al between separate
.ir e,i s .
=
- __ _ . _ . _ _ _ __ _m __ __ _ _. . _ - ._
. e l
l h
TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (September 5,1985)
Page 13 of 14 FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual tkticiencies/ Areas Requiring Cortective Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recomunendation Rev. 1, State (S) and 1.ocal (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action Element
- 5. tkscriptiont Access to the EOC was 0.3 not controlled.
Recommendation: Access to the EOC should be controlled. @
Y
- 6. tw sc ri pt ion: Access and traffic J.10.k.
cont rol points were not activated or J.10.g.
simulated by the Carver EOC staff. J.10.j Consequently, access was not restricted into the area under their jurisdiction which was being shel-tered. Traffic control points were nnt available to provide assistance along the evacuation route.
Re comunenda t ion : The EOC staf f should demonstrate their organizational ability and the resources necessary to manage traffic and access control within their jurisdiction.
Kingston EOC
- 1. tkscription: There was some confusion A.2.a among EOC staff on the definition and purpose of the State of Emergency Ikclaration by the Covernor.
Hecuaunenda t i on : The socal plan should include a description of the State of Emergency Declaration and clearly di st ingui sh it from the Ceneral Emergency. Additional training should tw provided to all local emergency response personnel.
t TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (September 5,1985)
Page 14 of 14 Proposed Actual INficiencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1 Completion FEMA Evaluation of completion Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action Element Marshfield EOC
- 1. De sc ri pt ion s Access control was J.10.j neither ordered nor simulated by the Marshfield EOC. This community h$
contained areas included in the shelter order as well as roadways leading into the area potential aflected under the esercise scenario.
Recommendations Access cont rol point s should be e st abli shed on roadways leading into an area covered by a protective action.
8 9
- e TA38.E I th f t c i enc l eg .end Are.sa Requi r ing Cor rec t lee Act ions - Pt lgr am %W l war Power 'ildt ten Page i of 32 Objecttwe Subse-gesent ly Corrective NilR FC-nbi4 h*=a-tested Actton previously Ft:MA-RFP-l Current Faercise Rev. 1 (Fueretse Vertiled Eseresse Identified FEMA Action Taken Date) (i.e.. Resulte) Status te...e pencriptian Date Issue objective objective Reference Jurtedtetten Tee Communicettone equip- C flew between 3/3/82 N/A 3 I .f.9.In a. Massa-(6/29/83) meet and its demon-
- 1. Infoteatlan in.m chusette the state and Area it Ence stratten were excel-
-was infrequent, and was tent. (FR 8981; pg.
somet ime s erroneous, which 80).
resulted in atelnformation and contweton at the Area 11 nic. (4.1.1)
State police have received and Yes State pottee have been C 3/3/82 N/A 20 10 K.1.s Massa-
- 2. State ratice have respone-K.1.b chusetts are contfautng to receive (6/29/83) provided with appro-j thetity for access control. training in doetmeter use. priate dostmetry. and
' M.I.c but are not equipped with (PF.A 6/29/81) trained in i t s use in 0.4 not trained in the use of 1983 t984 and 1985.
desteeters. There were no (6/20/85 letter from provietons for deteretning Mass.) @
i dose rates, maintenance of dose records, or decontent- Yes At the 1985 esercise natten of personnet and (9/5/s5) the state pottee den-equtement. Appropriate onstrated adequate training should be provided knowledge of desteetry t o the St at e Police. and radiological empo-(4.1.2) sure control proced-utes.
Recovery and reentry functions Tee t N/A 35 23 N.1 Massa-
- 1. The scenarte allowed only 3/3/82 were tested successfutty in (6/29/83) ,
l chusetts is stantes for recovery and (6/20/85 letter from 1984 reentry operettene. Thte Mass.) Yes At the 1985 exercise to not suffletent time for (9/5/85) suffletent time was meantanful evaluation. not avattable et the Early tereinations of the end of the eneretse
, eneretse prevented any for a full demonstra-
' s hwtantial mettetty in tion of recovery and this area. (4.l.1) reentry activttles.
i 4
0 s
4 4
4
TOOT.F 1 th f t etencies anet Areas Requi ring Cor rect ive Actione -- Pt igr tin Nor tear Power Stat lan Page 2 of 32 objective subae-Nt11t ff-tI654 quentty Correcttwo C Frevinusly F t.MA- R t P-l Tested Actton Fuercise identified FEMA Enerrtee lle v . 4 (feercise Vertised Current Date leeue objective objective Refercore .f ur t eillct ion Actinn Taken Date) (i.e., neoutts) Statuo l uue pescription 1/3/82 N/A t) 5 E.6 Dunbury The State did not plan to Yes Alerting the public C
- 6. In thoultury, the strens were tooperetive, and mohtte activate strens on 3/3/82. (6/29/81) was simulated by Douhury did not attempt to sounding the atrene notifIr.itIan procedures activate the synten. All and dispatching route were not used. The State untre were' checked out during alerting teams and alu.a l J wor k with the atti- Ma r c h-M a y . 1982. and a test of vehicles. (FR. 1981, It y and local government to the system was successfully pg. 21).
correct Llw problem, randucted in lune 1962.
(4.2.3) (h/2ta/sl5 letter from Mase.)
1/1/82 N/A 13 ) 1.6 Marshfletd The State did not plan to Yes Evidently training has C
- 4. In *Isr htteld, the strene (6/29/81) been given to all were in p t. ace and were activate the strene on March
- 3. 1982. All Fire Department firemen and some operational prior to the policemen e=errise. but there were no 4teratchere were trained in in stren t ratned personnel available stren activation procedures fallowing the 1982 eueretee.
activation procedures.
(TR 198); pg. )))
h t .. activate the system.
(4.2.2)
(6/20/85 letter from Mase.)
In M4rshiteld, doetmeters 3/3/82 N/A 20 in K.3.a Marshfield Tee New equipment and C 6
did not work properly. K.1.h (6/29/01) training classes were given to the EOC staff F a.e l t y eqqtpoent makes the esposure and other personnet by c4pahlitty for the Seaton Edison contret queettonable.
Company. (FR. 89813 Training in operation and maintvanace of monitoring pg. 15-36) e.talpment to advtsed for leprave.1 capabtIity.
(4.2.1)
- 7. At the EnF the communica- 1/3/82 N/A 5 16 F Massa- Ves some communicot ton 1 t ions area and the assees- chusetts (6/29/83) probleme still estet
, ment area are separated, due to the separatton w),t c h resulted in same of the various work r oawwn t r at ion difficuttles. areas et the EOF.
(FR. 1981; pg. 14)
A reevaluattan of communt-c a t t o.e equipment locations
- t. recommended. (5.l.3) Yee At the 1985 esercise (9/S/85) the layout was still the same. Construc-tton of a new EOF to in progrees.
e e A
.- ~ . . - . . . . ~ . . . . . . - . . . . . . - - . . ~ . . = -. - . . . - - , ~ . + . . ._ .-. - . ~ . - n ._ - -- -
I TA Bl.F. 1 Deftelentles and Areae Requirfnet (*ntrerttwe Arttonn == pt(grie Nucle.1r Power Statteen Page 1 of 12 objective suhee-NtlN M-84$4 q.eent l y Corrective Previously DNA-RI.P-t Tested Actton Exercine Identified FEMA Faercise Rev. t (Emercise Vertfled Current le nc pesertption fla t e lesue 8thj ec t ive objective Reference .fartsdirtlan Action Taken Dat e) (i.e.. Resulte) Statue
- 8. The dispatcher at the 3/3/82 N/A ) 1.14 F.l.a Masta- Tee Comennication ves t State Police Headquartere F.t.f thosetts (b/89/8)) elllt a probles dur-in MlJJlehoru had to hen- Ing the June 29 198) ,
4 .l l e all routine calle se eueretse. (see
. well as the cammunicatione 82.1.7.8) i ec*sittag tron the power s e ..I t on veergency. These Tee Although a clerical i'
J ste* .tu.n l .l be sepe- 49/5/83) assistant was avall-
- raw t, ..n.t an additional able during the 198)
J t spat e her use.t in case of esercise, the poten-a reat i nc t. gent at the tial still estate for power station. (1.1.4) the radio dispatcher not being able to handle routine calle N
- and radiologicel W i emergency calle ste-l uttaneously.
9 There were some coassun t- 1/1/82 N/A S 4 F.! Maeg4* Te8 A defletency was noted C catlan probleme among the chusette (6/29/83) during the June 29 st ate DMC. the t'0F . and .
198) esercise. (see j the Area It EtC. 4 dedt- #2.1.2.1)
- cated telephone Itne be-tv cn the state F.0C and T'8 10 0 dedicated telephone
, the FnF to recommendet. (9/5/85) Ilne was present et
( 4.1.4 ) the 1985 esercise.
, newever. no communt-i catione problems were observed due to tack of a dedicated Itne.
t 1
l l
1 i
i 4
- .~ . . . - - . . . _ - . ~ . . - . . - . . _ ~ . . _ . _ - . _ . . . _ - - - . _ -- . _ ,~ -. ..____c _ - - - - - ... ~.. - - - - . ~ . .
i,
- i i
1 1
1 >
4 i
1 i
TQQl.E l pr e t c t eni l es and Areas iteqa t ring Car s ec t i ve Act l..n* -- rtigtle Noel.*,or Pe.wcr Mt.ettaet 1
Page 4 of 12 l
Ob'*ctive S &se-Ntllt tE-tW.54 quent1y Correcg{ve ,
F EMA-It rP-l Tested Action Previously
! New. I (Faercise vertfled Current Fuercise Identified FEMA Fueretse Act ion Taken list e) (i.e., nesulte) St atie s ;
9 l es..e th sc ri pt lon Date Isave Objective Chlcretve iteference .lur i sd ir t lon Yes A deficiency was noted C News.. gen from the state 1/3/82 N/A ) i .3 Mange lu.
chosetts (6/29/83) during the June 29, b< ta the Area II enc 1983 exercise. (See j l ac ke.t technical infor-82.l.2.1)
- natta on which to base
> c. prehenalve decisions at Yes At the l985 esercise.
i the 4rea level. In one (9/5/85) the state EOC passed
?- c ue .en error was made in techalcal information i sec t .it selectione at. the to the Area It EOC A s e.e Il 6.nt' . The EPE maps I aiot the sector diagree from the EOF. tiow-j wk.mit t he made compatible, ever, elace the Area and runststent momencle- 11 Enc does not need tor, n.ed. ( %. t .6 ) techalcal details for q thalt decision making. PJ the original eserclee
- j. Inadequacy is conald-
' ered closed. EFZ and sector diagram maps were effectively used during the esercise. i i
I F.I Massa- Yes C ll. Prore.tieres for verfil- )/1/82 N/A 5 (6/29/81) t cation of messages at all cimen t s levels need leprovement. Yes Vertfleation of eess-(5.l.7) .(9/5(85) ases at the 1985 euer-clse was effectively I,
demonstrated at the +
state FAC by watting for the receipt of j hard-copy messages before neting on ver-5 bal messages.
1 M44 4 4- Tee I
- 12. thee t 4 - f ault y redto 1/3/82 N/A % 9 F.l.
en. u.ie r t h.it h44 jaest been- F.) cimenet t e (6/29/01) o i nst a t icJ i=.t not tested, Tee not observed at 1985 the Taantan Enc staff did
! .ot respond to the inttlat (9/5/8$) emerrise. .
t
, siot i f t r4t t..w. This and +
4 Ib4g kMp eq64t f ment $b.hgkd be t enteil reveelar ly. (4.l.8)
( l 1
i f
! 6 i
, . e n ,
. o 2
1 J
T4ntA i Deftricutem .end Areas Respit r i ng for rec t i ve Act i ons -- Pi lg r t e Nisc lea r l'ower St .st l an Page 5 of 32 objective Subse-NUM rE-06 % quent17 Corrective Previously FEMA-REP-L Tested Action Eueretse IdentifteJ FEM 4 F.nercise Rev. 1 (Emercise Vertfled Current
- 1. sue Desertption Date tenue Objective Objective Reference .lur t sdi ct ion Action Taken Date) (i.e.. Results) Status U.) Massa- Yes C
- 13. The Taontoit E0C, the llan- 3/3/82 N/A 3 i rhssetts (6/29/83) uver E6 < . and the Red Cross at the Area 11 EDC si e.1 the Massachusetts Yes The NUREC-0654 classi-innher svstem for emerg- (9/5/05) fication system was 9
in-used at the 1985 emer-rucy c l.ima t f tcat ion, cise, stead of the Nt REC-0654 s 4.swe t t i c a t t sm system.
(S.t.60)
Informitton flow among the 1/3/82 N/A 3 ? 1.9 *I.e a s.e- Yes Defletency during June 1 14 E.t chusetts (6/29/81) 29 1983 esercise (see Mir. the state EOC and the 82.t.t.1)
A r c.e it t << needs taprove- N ecot to avotJ problems Yes Based on observations W such as incorrect selec-(9/5/85) at the 1985 esercise.
ttoa of evacuation areas.
leformation flow still A st .soJ.o rd reporting fur- needs improvement.
mit should be understood Very little technical by att. (5.1.11) teformation was trans-eitted from the EOF to tte state EOC. The
- huclear Power Plant Acetdent Communicatton F c.r e* was not used ccinsist ent ly by the E(T and is not appro-patate for all trans-sitted information.
The Area II EDC di-rector had to request a clartiteation of evetving protective action recommenda-ttons.
5
TABIA 4 IAtis-lencies mod A reas Requi ring Correct ive Actions -- Pi t t r ies Noc irar P..wc r S t .e t t et Page 6 of 12 Objective Suhee-Nt m EG-lih 54 quent 3 y CurrectIwe Prev [ously F t.M A- R OP- l Tested Acttun Esercise Identified FEMA Faercise in ev . 4 ( Fue rri se Vertited Current i s.oc nevertption Date issue Ohjecitve Objective Itef erence ,lurtedtetton Action Tahen Date) (i.e.. Results) Status Hassa- Yes Deficiency during . lune C
- 15. Fierther refinements in the 3/3/62 N/A 14 6 E.i
.ootcot of t59 messages chusetts (6/29/81) 29 1983 eseretse.
n o.t in the prw edures for (See 82.1.1.2)
+ t t v e t i ng the system are Yes 4t the 1985 esercise, u c.te.f . losofficleat time
- w. .e l l owe d for the Els (9/%/85) pr e s.:r ipted E85 me s-c- ,si io tw tesosattted saite s were used and I I
contained att appro-he t ..r e the strens were Prie:e information.
viunded. The 055 message EBS messages were ste-11J not supply spectile i ,.t .a ra st t on on the meaning ulated to be broadcast after a brief interval of st.e l t e r i ng ur evacua-after sounding of )
Iao, how ta Jo it. or strets. !
where to st o. The use of
. ,, o..e .t nessages should be 1 m et l ec it e.l. (5.l.12) 3/1/82 N/A 8 t;. l . Massa- Yes I 14 Inform 4ttan pamphlets dis- 2%
t r i but *.t to the pubite G2 chusetts (6/29/83)
, appeare,t tu be outJated Yes Upda:ed (September a..J in s,voe cases contra-
[
dlctory to local plans. (9/3/65) 1985) pamphlets were slauuld take di s t ri be r ed to the The stare puhtte and were ob-necess.erf corrective serv.sd during the 1985
- a. t t ..n . (5.1.13) eser:tse at the media center. Marshfield.
Dunbury, and Plymouth.
Not observed JC King-ston. At Career the phon.e number listed in the pamphlet is incor-rect.
- e
. e TA51F l Ivglclencies and Areas Requittud Corsective Actions -- Pilgrim Serle.er Pwer MLatlan Page 7 of 32 Objective subse-j NU M tI;-06 % quently Correct 1ve Previousty F t.MA- N EP- 1 Tested Actton Faercise Identified FtMA F.ne r c i se Rev. t (Emercise vertfled Current issue objective objective Reference .lur t ed t et t on Action Tiken Date) (i.e., Results) Status t *=w Desc r ipt ion Date N/4 8 C.4.c M 4 s t.t- Yes Hard copy of press re- C 17 There were sume prublems 3/3/82 24 chosetts (6/29/83) leases could not be alth t wrdinat ion of media transmitted to the r e t e.a Se e , and inforeatton State FJC. Media
" ti the press w.es not al- briefings were thor-
' The rapid
. rs atacly. ough and accurate. (FR
-.enerto Jewetapeents did 1983; pg. 22)
..t 418 % the preparatton
..t news re t e.ese s to keep Yes At the l93l5 esercise, up wit h the plant develop- (9/5/85) media releases were neots. Coordination be- adequately coordinated 1
t wee.. the ordia center anJ and timely, and hard-I the et ste DiC was hampered copy transalaston of l 5y the i mipe rah t i t t y of the releases was pos- N the h4rd copy message sthle.
U tr4.inetssion system and by heev telephone !!nes.
Tretning in the use of the h.ord-copy system is re-co.mee n. led . along with the i n* t a l l a t ion of a dedt-cated telephone line be-l twee.t the state enc and the avata center. Per-todie upd4tes by the media center should also he pro-v i .ted to media personnel i n t he state DC. (S.I.14)
Massa- Yes Air sampling equipment C la. FielJ monitoring teams had 3/3/82 N/A 7 17 1 Insofftetent eqelpment for chusetta (6/29/83) and techniques were adequate. (Flt 1983; air s.ampling. Each team pg. (8) j should have a SAM 11 or
- c. gut ealent instrument to enable them to determine r e t i nu t i ve to. fine concen-tr tt. ins in the field.
Tte .etr-a mpling techatque n.-c<t
- to be moJtfted be-
. in <e a In-minute sampling time nav cause worker
- e s p.e *u r e to he ton long.
c pectelly in a h i g h-i
,1
Tsal E 1 Ik f let ene tes and Areas Itequiring correct ive Ac t ionn -- l't igr te hoc tear Power St at ion Page 8 of 32 Objective Subse-NLf k FE-06 54 quent1y Corrective Prevtously F OtA-It t'.P - 1 Tested Actton Eserclse litent t f led FEMA Eneretno Rev. I ( Exe r c i se Vertfled Current
!* sue Desertption D4te Issue objective Uhlective lieference .lurt* diction Action Taken Date) (i.e., Resisits) Status
.ac t i v i t y sara. Comment-s ett., t.e t wee.a t he EDF and the fletd t e.e.s was weak.
The t i e l .1 te435 should r eti.i r t measurements when they 4re t .sk e n anit not wait mentil they are re-quested. The collection
.e a.t transets*lon of radio-logic =t Jit a from the EOF
.i nd Focs w is not aufft-c tent ly timely to pe r mi t FoC he,e l t h ptysics per-sonnel to vertfy the acct-dent assessment anJ recog-mended protective actions.
(%.I.1%)
19 The f o rda.i Hospital lacke 1/1/82 N/A 38 11 K ,t.,o M s s a- A fully equipped de- C de c not ae t na t i on factll- chusetts contamination factlity ties, and used a regular entsts at the Jordan enemination room for de- Hospital. This fa-cont . net nat ion. A separate cility was built with tact 11ty is recommended. utility assistance, Amhulance personnel do not and is eueretsed at h.e v e low-level dostmeters, least annually.
a n.1 it to not clear (6/20/85 letter from whether they have bee n Mass.)
trained in using them.
Persinnel monitoring equtpeent and training in its n+e should be pro-vide t. Personnel at the Arth swater EoC were con-
. e r <se.1 4hout the lack of t r a i n i n.g g l.c v received in
.l ..witamtnettan. Equip-
.ec i s t .n.I traintag should he e v4 t o.et d and truvided
,i s osee *4rv. (i.l.14) e e
_ _ _ _. _ ._. - __ _ _. . _ . . _ - ._m. - - _ _ __ . . - _ _ . . -.
'4 e e s
+ TARIE 1 N f ic teac les amt Are.is Requi ring Correct ive Aet taan -- Pilgria Nuc lear Power St at ion Page 9 of 32 Objecttve Subse-NUM EC-Ofd4 quent17 Corrective Previounty FEMA-REP-l Tested Actton Faercise Identtfled FFMA Farrelse Rev. 1 ( Eme r e t se Vertfled Current I..ne pescription Date lesue Objective Objesttve Reference .luttadiction Action Taken Date) (i.e., Results) Status 20 The RrtJgewater receptton 3/3/82 N/A 27 12 D.) Massa- No I center nee ts adJtttonal chusette (6/29/81) egotenent and trained per .nnet for proper j w r eenl y of evacuees.
, ti.l.li)
The twk of recovery a n.t 1/3/82 N/A )$ 2) N.l.a. Massa- llecovery and reentry functione Yes !
23.
reentry operations was a N.I.h chouetts at the State Enc were tested (6/29/83) shortcoming of this eser- successfully in 1984 (6/20/85 else and should be letter from Mass.) Yes At the 1985 exercise a
adJ ressed in future euer- (9/5/85) suffletent time was I
The not available at the clee Preparations. 'J end of the exercise scenerta also did not test for a full demonstra-1.sho r at or y analysts. de-contamination, and inges-tion of recovery and I
reentry activities.
tion pathway monitoring which ..is not an eneretse ohjeettve. The exercise provided f or only a token ev4cuation. ( S. I .18 )
1/3/82 N/A 3 1 1.to.a Marshfield Yes Displays still need C
- 22. ptsplays at Marshfield contJ he teproveJ so that J.10.R (6/29/83) taprovemente. (FR they are more eas!!y read 1983, pg. 34 )
and less confusing.
Yes The displays observed (St atus Board) (5.2.1)
(9/S/85) at the 1985 exercise were much improved and are considered ade-quate.
21, 4t Carver, the use of a 1/3/82 N/A 3 1 D.t Carver Yes Statue board was at ti- C st stas board to recom- (6/29/83) taed. (FR 1983, pg.
mended. (4.2.5) 29)
.{
A.2.4 Carver Yes Access to the EDC was C 24 At C4rver. 4 security 1/1/82 N/A 3 3 pe r %..o
- Mail .t be stationeJ 0.4.d (6/29/83) controlled by a guard and a tog was main-4r the entrance of the enc tained. (FR 1981, pp.
l to se*trict entrance and to m<sl at a t a a tog. ( %.2.1) 10 )
l T
e
TARIT I tv f ic icoc hes an.t Areas Requi r ing Corre(t t ve Act t ms -- Fliptr te Niec le-er P .wcr St at t on Page 10 of 32 Objecttwe Subse-MINEI;-Oh54 qtsent I y Correttive P re v L.ma t y FtMA-Rfr-t Tested Actinn Faerctae tJentified FFMA Facrrine New. 1 (Emeretse Vertfled Current f
- mie tw4cription il4t e la9ue Dhlective tab}ect ive Reference _furtsJ&caton Ace ton Taken D4te) (t.e., Results) Status 23 % ..rlte p roc edure s need 3/3/62 N/A 3 3 A.2.a Wingston Yes Security procedures C to be estahttshed at o.4.J (6/29/83) were not established.
gg,g,too. (FR 1983. PC. 3 t)
Yes At the 1965 esercise, (9/5/65) a police officer was stationed at the en-trance to the Enc.
26 wcurtty procedures need 3/3/92 N/A 3 3 A.2.4 Marshiteld Yes Entrance to the enc C t., tv estahtished at o.4.J (6/29/83) was not controlled.
Marshflel4. (FR. 1983, pg. 35)
N Yes Security procedures CD (9/5/85) were in place at the 1985 esercise. Access into the Enc was con-trolled.
27 t at ernal communication 3/3/82 N/A 5 A F.I Locals Yes Internet communica- C neeJa taprovement at all (6/29/83) tions at the local five local DH*s. (5.2.4) EOCs were taproved.
(FR L983) 29 The locettona of radio and 3/3/02 N/A 5 3,4 F.I Carver Yes An intercos has been C t e l e pheme communication (6/29/83) instatted. (FR 1983, esatraent la separate pg. 30) rouas at Carver led to cenfustan in operations.
(%.2.4) 29 The tocations of radte and 1/3/82 N/A 5 3,4 F.! Marshiteld Yes C
- I e rh.mc communicatton (6/29/03) et. t pee nt to separate room > .i t 94rshiteld teJ to Yes At the 1985 esercise i m r a i t in in operettone. (9/5/85) the rsJto and tele-(%.2,,) pho.se communicationa equipment were located in the snee area at the enc.
i
e o TAntr. i pet ic ienc le, and Ate 4a Requiring N rrective A. t l one -- Pi lge l e Ew lea r P swe r St at t.m Page it of 32 Ohjecttve subse-NUNkE-fmS4 quentty Correcttve PrevLougly F t.MA- R F.P- 1 Tested Actton fueretse identified FFMA Euercise Rev. 1 (F.sercise Vertfted Current I n u.c Dcucription Date Issue Objective Objective Reference lu r l *J 1c t ion Action Taken' Date) (i.e., penults) Status 30 The locat t.ma of radio and 3/3/82 N/4 $ 3.4 F.I Plymoutts Yes C t e l epAme cummunication (6/29/83)
- e. .. t p.,c o t in separate t o .m. at Pl ye.mt h led to Yes Communications equip-
.o f o. t .m to operattons. (9/S/85) ment was located in a
($.2 s) separate room at the 1985 esercise to re-doce noise. Communt-cations were observed to function well.
It. At no.burv. oral messages 3/3/82 N/A 3 3 If. t Duubory Yes Messages were logged. C betog reevived and trans- (6/29/83) (FR 1983, pg. 27) attted should be docu- N mented. ($.2.4) @
- 32. I nt e r n el communication at 3/3/82 N/A 3 3 F.! Kingston Yes C Kingston can be teproved (6/29/83) by re.t u c t i on in the noise level. The Kingston EOC Yes Earphones were used at uset amatest radio for (9/5/85) the l985 exercise to primary communications and effectively sintatze commeretal telephones for the effect of noise on bukup. (%.2.4) co*nnuit cat tons.
- 53. Some adittional training 3/3/82 N/A 3 3 N.0 1.nca l s Yes Emergency operations C woolt taprove emergency (6/29/83) management was in-operations man 4gement at proved at the local etw loca l toCs. (4.2.5) EOC s . (FR 1983) 14 in rarver. Jepartment 3/3/82 N/A 3 3 N,n Carver Yes The entire staff was C herts toutJ use additional (6/29/83) knowledgable of their oa-t he-)..h training. Jobs. (Fa 1983 pg.
(5.2.5) 30) li. Che.httste should bc used 3/3/82 N/A 3 3 N.0 Dumbury Yes Checklists were used. C in pu = Na r y ; Jepartment (6/29/R3) (FR 1983. pg. 27) be+1
- du.u l d he tralmed in ru as o.st linq .e n.1 notiftea-ttwo prm edores. ($.2.5)
TAatE 6 aef t cleucles anJ Areas Reqiet ring Cor rect ive Actione -- Filgrie Nucle 4r Powe r St et t aei Page 12 cf 32 objective subse-NtIN FI;-ph % quentty Currective Previously F f.MA -R t r- 1 TesteJ Act1on Eneretse IJentificJ FFMA Fue r e t se Rev. t ( f.ne re s se Vertfled Current issue De sc r i p t i on Date issue objective phlective Reference .lortsJtction Actina Taken Date) (i.e., Results) Status h, in king *t.m. aJJitional 3/)/82 N/A 3 3 N.0 Kingston Yes Briefings were held. C oral briefings are recom- (6/29/83) (FR 1981, pg. 32) w.wic J . (4.2.i) 17 On-t he- job t r aini ng in 1/3/82 N/A 1 1 N,n Marshflaid Yes C M.orshiteld to recoemenJcJ (6/29/81) to improve the capahtt-teles for involvteg spec- Yes Stu swehers of the afic response negentaa- (9/5/85) staff have received tions. the use of the training. At the 1985 veergency c las si f ic ation e se rcise the - staff system, and the knowleJge members were observed of the local RERP. (5.2.5) to be aware of the co emergency classifica- O tion system, use of dosteetry, and were knowledgeable of the local RERP.
IM. streou were not activated 1/3/82 N/A !) 5 E.6 Duubury The State did not plan to Yes At Duxbury, alerting C in l>u. bury anJ Marshfield. Marshtteld activate the stren on March 1 (6/29/83) the public was simu-(g,2,n) 1982. Dusbury did not attempt lated by sounding the to activate the system. All strens and dispatching units were checked out during route alerting teams M4rch-May, 1982, and a test of and vehicles. (FIL the system successfully con- 1983, pg. 27) At ducted in June 1982. (6/20/85 Marshtteld, evidently letter froe Mass.) training has been given to all firemen and some potteenen in stren activation pro-cedures. (FR 1981, pg. 35)
M. E t n.:s t on hetteves that 1/3/82 ' N/A 11 5 F.h Ringston Yes toute alerting was not C they ns cJ a mahtte rubite (6/29/81) performed. (FR 1981, aJlress systee in adJttlon pg. 31) to the strens, but the vehicive regatreJ for thte Yes Kingston has mobile ac t t..n m ey not be avail- (9/5/85) public address systems 4hte in reat emergency. on 12 fire and police A far.ber evaloattna of department vehicles this need and Ito require- and one Civti Defense ment. Should he conducted. vehicle.
ti.2.b)
J
. e
.. .-. - ._- . _ _ - - __ -- - -~ _ - - . - , - . + -- -_ ,. . _ . ,
e o Tatu t i r%-f t et enetee aaJ Areas acq.st ring correct t ve Actton. -- Fl igr ie New l.%s r Power st at i on Page 43 of 32 Objecetve Subse-NtiktU Oh% quently Corrective previously frMA-REP-l Tested Action Emeresse Identlfted FtMA fuercine Ncv. 1 (Emerclue Vertfled Current t .uc ne.crtetton Date tesue Objectlee rthj ect t ve ketere.we .f u r l ed i c t ion Action Taken Date) (i.e.. Itesults) Status 40 The rn was not activated 1/3/82 N/A Il % E.S MArthfleld Yes EBS activation was C i in the Mirs%fteld area (6/29/83) sim41ated. (FR 198) h= t e.. e the station (96 Pd. 33)
P at) .t i d not receive the
. . , . *. .r y loformation from t tie tre4 It. (5.2.1)
- 41. to bosburv. Mcna emergency 3/3/82 N/A 2% B C.I. Dunhury Tes C public informatton was C.2 (6/29/83) avettable at the fire lu se and town offices. Yes At the 1985 exercise, ht it sho.a td have been (9/S/85) it was established
=.elled to the residents. that emergency pubite IN sh r y should work with information brochures m.
the state to resolve dif- have been dist ribut ed ferentes. (4.2.8) by the utility to the residents of Douhury.
i 42. Faergency response pro- 3/3/82 N/A 23 8 C.I. Kingston Yes I s cedures spectfled in the C.2 (6/29/83)
- pamphlet distributed to t he Kingston residente Not observed at the cont r ad i c t those in the 1985 exercise.
loe41 plan regarding ac-tions after stren activa-i than, ($.2.4) 41 rte.f l a personnel were 3/3/82 N/A 4 3 c.).a Plymouth Yes C
.all wcJ in the Plymouth (6/29/83)
ET which aJded to the overtrowdtng of the small Yes At the 1985 exercise sp4ce. In the f es tie re. (9/5/85) tt was estabitshed
- n. ws media briefings that a procedure is in sheetJ he held at the place to prevent the nenrhe media center. media free entering
(%2.97 the EOC. Alt med t .
hrtetIngs would be held in the nearby
- media center.
T4n;E 1 1%ftcicnetee and Areme Requiring Corrvettve Actt. nom -- rt ige le % c lear P..wcr St.et t an Page 14 of 12 Objective Subse-Na t u rc-06 % quently Corrective Prevtously FEMA-KlP-l fested Actton F.se r c i se identified F F *t4 F.ne r c i se Rev. 6 ( Eme r c i se Vertfled Current l oue Description Date tesue objective Ob)cctive Reference f or t sell c t ion Action TAken Date) (1,e., ResuIts) $tatyg 1/3/82 N/A 20 10 H.? Carver Yes Supplies of dosteeters C Se anty t... desteeters were 4v t idae at Carver. M.) (6/29/83) setti inadequate. (FR 1983, pg. 11)
( s. '. 4 0 )
Yes At the 1995 exercise (9/3/85) 60 each of low and medlue range dost-meters and TLDs were available.
ne of the three 1/3/82 M/A 20 10 H.7 Marshiteld Yes New dosteetry ' equip- C si. u.i t ,
Jasleeters available at H.3 (6/29/83) ment was available at the EC. (FR 1983, Marshfield worked proper-tv. ( 5. 2.10 ) PE. 35) N teeretse of recovery and 1/3/82 N/A 1% 21 M. Locals Yes I eh.
rien nt r y ove r st t <*ns were N.B.4 (6/29/83)
N.I.h obertives. m=e v e r . the Yes Due to scenario lla-cuercise te ret nat ed bef ore thre mo ld be eueretsed. (9/5/85) ttations, there was not sufficient time (4.2.ll) available at the end of the 1983 exercise for a full demonstra-tion of recovery and reentry activities.
However, a good know-ledge of required act iv t t les was evident by staff discussions at Marshftold and Dumbury.
- e e
s =
l T4st E 1 n.ficiencies and Are.is Restotring Correettve Actinos -- Fi lgr tis Nor t.*a r Power St at ion Page !$ of 32 Ohjucttve Subse-NttN tr-06 54 quently Currecttwe Previously FEMA-REP-1 Tested Actinn Esercise Identific.I FEMA Fueretse kev. t (Emercise vertfled Current t oue tiencription Date lasue objective Dhjective eteference .lur t sJ t et t on Act ion Taken Date) (i.e. Results) Status A/29/83 5.1.11 5 14,27.10 E.4.g, Massa- Timely and accurate meteo- Yes Meteorological infor- C 47 Metcaroloftcal data re-cetwcJ by the state EOC (#14) E.h chusette rological data should be (9/5/85) motion was received at fro.n the FoF were not re-t ransmi t t eil from the EOF to the state EOC from the until almost an the State EuC from the onset EDF in a timely manner retved h .r siger the SITE l AREA] of the nest exercise. Addt- during the 1985 euer-tional training shou 1J be else. Errors in sec-I Mt u.:t scY was declaret.
tur designations were these data were provided for all emergency-4 A t 4 i. by t r onamit tcJ by telephone response utganisations, t s.- eliminated indt-cluding the EOF. In accurate cating both the direc-4t often tilegtbly re-c o r.t. d ty the recipient, transmission and understanding tion from which the j
of meteorological information. wind was blowing and This 4J.lest to confusion an incorrect EPZ especially wi nd direction, the direction to which when sec t or was recommended by Typed hard-copy meteorological it was blowing. CO data transmissions, to prevent LJ the EDF for evacuation, The error apparently was the potential for mistater-d.w tu a map reading error pretation of t!!egible hand-written messages. are adviseJ.
at the EOF. This error in Maps ergen t g at ions at all mertur identtftcation was not corrected watti 15 should be consistent with et not es later. ( 2. t . l . 8 ) unt f orm orient ation of North.
MCnA/OEP Nesponse A new protective action recom-i mendation form was developed by MDPH and SECo. Hard copies of this form will be trans-
)
mitted to MCI)A via telecepter.
The form includes an EPZ I. diagram with compass headtags.
and space for a verbal de*
scription of the protective action recommendetton.
(cantinued) i i
1
T4st v i % ciencies en.t Areas Reautring Corrective Ace to m -- Pilgrim N cli u Power Station Palte 16 of 32 ob.}ec t i ve Subse-NU N H;-OM4 quent1y Correcttwe Previously FEMA-NFP-1 Tested Action Favreine Identtfled FFMA F.ne rc i se Rev. I (Esercise Vertfled Current I .,ue tv se r t pr ion Date issue objective Uhjective Reference .furisdtetton Action Taken Date) (i.e., Results) Status gy, (cong'd) Further, Esecutive Order 144 training sessions, attended by representatives of all State agencies which participate in caergency esercises and opera-tions, now include a dis-cueston of accurate trans-mission of meteoretogical data. New EPZ maps which have been developed will be equtpped with pinwheels to aid in appropriate affected area identification. 16/20/85 letter from Mass.)
CD EnA/ ore Itesponse Yes At the 1985 e xe r cist, C D
4n. Ev4.netton messages for 6/29/83 5.l.12 5.11,t5 18.20 E.6, Massa-the puhtte sent over E8s (#tS) E.7 chusetts (9/5/85) the ESS messages were and to local LDCs vta the Geographic descriptions of transattted promptly.
Area !! ht < were delayed sectors based upon commonly New EPZ maps were used for 40 additional 30 min- recognized landmarks are being and there was no diff-utes (beyond the 35 min- developed by MCDA and will be tculty in translating the avallatte in written form at EPZ sector information uses deserthed in the State EOC by August I, into local landestk previous item) because the st4te toc had difficulty 1985. (6/20/85 letter from information.
t r4ns t.st i ng EPZ sector Mass.)
Information into local landmark information to f4ctiltate evacuation.
(2.6.1.2) 49 The Co t e t Guard elected 6/29/83 11.14 14.21 .f.9.c Maana- MrDA/0FP Response Yes At the 1985 exercise C not to svad heltcopters or chosetts (9/5/85) the U.S. Coast Guard h<.4 t s to the plume. Nott- A new memorandum of under" operated in accordance tt<* tion of tbv twaat i ng a t anJ t ig was c onc t isded with with its new nemoran-the 11 . 5 Coast Gua rit in dum of understanding 34.blir abould be coordt-This agreement limits with the C,3mmonwealth n it e.1 he t ween the Coast 19814 a e r,t a +1 the state. Coast Guard participetton to of Massachusetts and
( 2.1. t .1) the transport of Boston Edison was not required to personnet, specifically the send helicopters or Green Environment al Mont toring boats into the plume Team, area to alert the hosting puhtte.
e e
Tani t i t.et t i t ene tes anit Are is Reipat ti ng Cor rnt ive %-ttant -- Pttrete Nucl.ar Power Statinas Page 17 of 32 Objecttve Subae-Nuutn-ob%4 quently Correcttve l'revtously trMA-tFP-t Tested Actton Envecise 1.teut t i t ed FEMA Faerctae Rev. ! (Euercise Vertfled Current issue Description Date Issue objective Ohjective Reference furtsdiction Action Taken Date) (i.e.. Results) Status og.d) Nottitcation of the Roating puhtte will be achieved by
- 4) U.S. Coast Guard emergency information broadcast notice warnings to mariners via CHl6 and CH22 VHF FMt B) Boston Edison Stren Nottitcation; C) 1Acal Harbormaster Craft.
(6/20/85 letter from Mass.)
Sa. Nam.on t e st i on of signtit- 6/29/81 5.1.3 14 11,21 F.t.d Massa- McDA/nEP Response Yes At the 1985 exercise I c a..t information, includ- (#9) A.2.a chusetts (9/5/85) much information was ing the sect or to be evac- (EOF) The recommended form was transmitted from the aateJ, abould be trana- developed jointly by the EOF to the state EOC mittcJ accurately. uttitty and MDPil . and tested over the telephone (2.1.2.1) during a 1984 drt!!. New base f rom handwritten notes maps. with a ve rt ica l north rather than using the designation, have been devel- available form. Also, oped and will be in place for most maps are staply the 1985 esercise. (A proto- labeled "not vertical t ype f orm, and clearer " north
- rierth* Instead of designations on maps were put being reformatted.
In place following the issu-ance of the 1983 FEMA report.)
(6/20/85 letter from Mass.)
St. It appeare.t that one MDFH 6/29/8) 7 5 0.4.c Massa- MCD4/0EP Response Yes At the 1985 esercise C m..o l t ur t ag team needed 1.8 chaiset t e (9/5/85) both monttoring teams m.. r e training in certain Regular training for all N147 were observed to be a ve c t . of oft-stta m.m t- staff DPH ta ongoing. Annual suffletently trained, toring. A.me of the N!AT tratntng for f teld mont toting and were feet 11er wtth t el t were not aufficlent- has been augmented by BECn. equipment and proce-ly traineJ to perform ( A/20/85 f etter f rom Mass.) deres.
fielJ nonttoring duties.
(2.1.4.I1 a
P i TAntt ) ev f i c l et- en w.t Are4s Re.intring Carreettve Aceton -- Pt t r r t e Noc 4.r ir tw er St.tt..n Page 18 of 32 Objecttve Subse-NIM H;-l H>$4 quent1y Corrective Previously FEMA-REP-1 Tested Actton Fseretse IdenttiteJ FFMA Eseretse Rev. t (Esercise Vertfled Current 14 3..e nesertetton Date Is*oe Objective Objective Reference .luranJictl.n Ac t i on Tak en Date) (i.e.. Results) Status HC11A/ol'P Response Yes Nottf tcation was still L' The primary system for 6/29/8) S.I.4 5 87 .115 F.l.a Massa- I noi t t y t nit local commun- (#3) 20 chosette (9/$/85) a problem at the 1985 (State Poltre) The system in question con- exercise. The new t t t .. . of emer a tency levels e n.t protective actton was sists of a tone encoder on the raJto system has not I .ic t s ec t t we. Al t Nmgh Plymouth Count y Radio Net , and been Instatted. In t e leph.a.e kickup was u sed mont tur tone-act ivated receiv- some cases the loca!
plan, the erg an this net. Boston EHCs had difficulty in
.. r .i t ait L .>
w es slow a n.t EJtson has angtgned two fleto receiving the trans-p r. c.t.a r e
.w . w . , scre otten late. service techotetans to a field misstnns and in vert-service, bene.1 in Kingston, to fication of the trans-( 2. 4. 7. 8 )
maint ain this and other compo- missions by radio, nents of the Prompt Alert Telephone was used as System on a fatt-time hasts. a backup. m CB None t he le s s , the system la less than ident because it involves two steps (nottftca-tion from the plant to State Police using a tone alert raJto on a utility f requency, followed by notification to local wars.tng points on a second tone-elert system).
Theref ore MCUA has designed a high hand FM system which will perett stAtteneous nottitca-tion to att varatag potete directly from the plant estng a State Police frequency. The etttity is in the process of procuring this system for 1985 Installation. (6/20/85 letter from Mass.)
e e TAM > l niet e c t enc ies aisd Area. Itequi ring Cor recc t ve Ae t t .m s -- Pt tg f j a Nor te .t r Powe r St at ton Page 19 of 32 Ohjective Suhee-Nat W W-06% quently Correcttwe Prevtously FEMA-REP-t Tested Actton Faercise IJentified FEMA Faeretse Rev. 1 ( Ese r ci se Vertfled Current t wae sweertption Date lesue ohjective Objective Referance Juttsdiction Act ion Taken Date) (i.e.. Results) $ Latus S t. The atete police have had. 6/29/8) 4.1.2 20 5.34 K.i.b. Massa- MCliA/nt P Response Yes At the 1985 exercise C mt are continuing to (#2) K.l.a. chusetts (9/5/85) it was estabitshed reutve, training in the K.1.h (State Police). State Police have access to that training in de-use of norvey meters and
- M.nss DPit showers and change of clothes contamination proce-dost.seter.. but the force at Troop D Headquarters in dures and locations of
.t oe . not sces to be sur- M i d<t l e bo r o. These factittles decontamination con-taitently aware of the will be the primary decon- ters has been made tamination factittles avall- available to the en-stere to be taken for ahte for use by State Police State Police iv.iting itself of decon- tire t etaatton seretces. Personnel. Should these Troop D force. Police g2,i,7,2) factittles be activated State officers vers observed police will request on-site to be knowledgeable in supervision of decontamination the use of dostmetry g activities by a N!AT menher. and in decontamination y The avallahtlity of the decon- procedures. However, tamination capability and the the Troop D procedures Avattability of NIAT staff to have not yet been op-supervise personnel decentam- dated.
Instion will he noted in Troop D procedures currently under review. The new p r oc edu re s will be in place by August l.
1985. (6/20/85 letter from Mass.)
%. Nes a very awJ reentry plans 6/29/8) 35 10 M.1 Plymouth. + According to MCDA 12/10/84 FEMA is still watting i and pr.wedures are not Mass DPil letter. town revised plan to for a copy of the t os ..r po r a t ed in the local include recovery and reentry. revised plan, p l .s a. (2.2.1.1)
MCDA/0FP Respons* Yes At the 1985 esercise (9/3/85) it was observed that New recovery and reentry the recovery and re-procedures have been developed entry procedures are by the Radiation Control now provided in the Program of the De pa r t men t of Pl an ( ll e '. S. M81 Puhlte llea l t h. These proce- 1985 Annes J). Ilow-dures have been incloded in ever. f t.MA has not the Plymouth Town RFRP. received a revised (h/20/M5 letter from Mass.) version of the Plymouth plan.
T4ni t i ne(Ect m lew and Are44 Re. pet ring C.*f te(t t ve Ac t bau -- Pilptrtg N.ec t ..,o r Piewe r St at tim Page 20 of 32 oblective Subse-NONEG-ohs 4 quent1y Currecttwe Previouely FFMA-RFF-1 Tested Actinn Fuercise IJennifted HMA E.ercise Rev. 1 (Esercise Verifted Current towne lh mi e t yt t.in Date t
- sine Ohicettve Dhject i ve Referense .turisdiction Action Taken Date) (i.e., Results) Status W thatneter readings were - 6/29/81 15 to K.l.h Plymouth. + Dostmeter issue corrected by 8/t3/84 C
. tv re4t and recordeJ Mass DFil proper demonstration during drlti
.iu n Janteeters were 1944 drtit. Dostectry kits were t . .. a .t when returned. Yes observed at she 1985
- MCD4/0EP Response (9/5/85) esercise. Procedure (2 ,1,2) in use was to read Improved dostmetry capabitt- dostmeters every 15 ties are currently being etnotes and report any Jeveloped. Anticipated in- increase in reading, provements call for providing each emergency worker with a dostmetry kit. The hit con-sists of a CDv-139. a CDv-7 30 a TLD and a set of instruc- N tions in a rip-lock bag. The instructions include guidance for charging and wearing the dostmetry. Instructions also include recommendations to check self-reading dosteeters several times per hour. Emer-gency workers are informed to report back to their ItADEF officers as predetermined esposures are reached. Re-porting begins with attainment of the 175 mR level. Training in the u se s and reporting intervals to included in ongoing refreshee training for lacal emergency response personnel. (6/20/85 letter for M.tse.)
Tm r 1 wi t. l. ic t es 4+t Area. we9ntring corrutive Ac t e me. -- ri t gr t e w i ..r P..wc r st ar t..o Page II of 12 Objecttwe Subse-NU N H;-Oh 54 quently Currecttwe Previously F EMA -R tr P- 1 Tested Actton Faercise Identified FFM4 Faercise Rev. 1 (Fueretse Vertfled Cur re.:t t=,.e Descgtetton Date Issue Objective Objective Reference fortsdiction Act ion Taken Date) (i.e., Results) Status
%. The single telephone In 6/29/8) $ 18 II. ) huuhiery Two inrosing telephone lines Yes At the 1985 exercise C t he m: is not suffletent have been added. (9/S/83) there were two tete-phone lines. One was w he n there is substantial MCD4/0FP Response for use by EOC staff evem.en i r.*t t ons activity.
(2.2.?.!)
and the other was for A new telephone line will be u se of the Civil e established at the Dunbury Defense Director.
D K* . (6/20/85 letter from Mass.)
$7 it e werv an.1 reentry plans e/29/3) 15 10 M.1 Duxbury. e Recovery and reentry pro- Yes At the 1983 exercise I an.1 proceJures are not Mass Drlt cedures have been tecorporated (9/S/85) it was observed that covere t in the local plan. Into the plan (11/41/84 letter recovery and reentry from Dumbury). procedures are now 00 (2 . 2.2) #
covered in the local McD4/0FP Response plan (Annen L of May 1983 reviston).
New recovery and reentry However, FEMA has not procedures have been developed received a revised by the Radiation Control copy of the plan.
Progree of the Department of Public Health. These pro-cedures have been incorporated into the Duxbury Town Plan.
(6/20/85 letter from Mass.)
59, t .w-r aue Josteeters (0- 6/29/83 20 5 K.1.a. numbury. + A steolated method of Yes Both low and mid-tange C 2 rut mR) were not tesued, K.1.h Mass Dril distributton and follow up (9/5/85) dostmeters were avait-nur is it apparent that procedures were available at able and issued to the 8/15/84 drill (11/21/34 emergency workers at ther.e is any intent to t u..e them in accordance letter from Dunhary) the 1983 exerctae.
utth their local plan.
MCD4/oFP Response (2.2.2.1) leproved dostmetry capabill-ties are currently being Jewetoped. Ant t elpated in-prieveme n t s call for prowtJing each eine r genc y worker with a d..s t ee t r y ktt. The kit con-sists of a CDV-LIM. a CUV-730
Tani r i pitIct-**tes -. n.t Areas uemitetag Carresttve Action -- Pi ld e t
- N or t.*
- r Pi.wc r 'it a t t o.i Page 22 of 12 Ohjective
%s b e e-ND u tG-Uh % quently Currective Pr'evtoasty Fl.MA-REP-1 Tested Acttoi Faeretse I. tent i f i ed FFMA Fsercise Re v i (Eserctae Vertited Current I . .c De m. r t p t i on Date Issut Ghjective Objective Meterence .fortettction Act ion Taken Date) (i.e., Results) Status
$3, g c3m . 4) a TI.D and a set of instruc-tions in a a l p-l ock bag. The instructions inc t orte guidance for charging and wearing, the dostmetry. Instructions also include recommendettone to check self-reading dostmeters several times per hour.
Emergency workers are informed to report back to thelr RADEF ufficers as predetermined cuposures are r e a c heit . Re-porting begins with attainment of the !?5 mR level. Training C in the uses and reporting O intervals is included in nngoing refresher training for local emergency response personnel. (6/20/85 letter from Mass.)
- 9. W .,ve r y a. J reentry pro- 6/29/85 3) 10 M.! Carver + McnAlorP Res2**** Yes At the 1985 exercise I cJor . re not incl.Jed M.e s s tWil (9/5/85) It was observed that to t he Carver local New recovery and reentry pro- recovery and reentry 5, : ... (2.2.1.1) cedures have been developed by procedures are avail-the Radiation Control Program able in the local of the Department of Pubite plan. Itowever, FEMA Health. These procedures will has not received a he incorporated into the copy of the revised Carver Town RERP. (6/20/85 plan for review of the letter from Mass.) odequacy of these procedores.
9 t
a e rani t i swfactenetes and Are4s Requtring C.strective Actie. -- Ptagrte Nucle.or Power S t .e t i on .
Page 23 of 32 Objecttve Subse-Nt!NU: 3654 quently Currecttwe Previously Ft.MA-M #-l Tested Actton Emeretse Identtfled FtMA Eueretse Fev. 1 (Fuercise Vertfled Current is,u, nescription Date Isene Ohjective Objective Reference .lartedtetton Action Taken Date) (i.e. Results) Status 60 The elvil Jefense director h/29/83 5.1 84.19 A.I.d Kingston MCn4/nEP Restw>nse Yes Drill demonstrated C
,t t .t n.o t acquire needed 8/15/84 good emergency opera-i nf or.ut t on in a timely The Kingston Civil Defense drill tio4e management. No p4rticularly dur- director noted the time lapses problema encountered.
4.aoer.
tog t l.c CtM RAL FMEKctmCy es suggested by the FEMA ubservers. and being made Yes At the 1985 euercise c t s ..n level. (2.2.4.1) aware of t he pruhlen at ruve t o (9/5/ el5) the Civil Defense improve the infurnation y,a t h- tit rac t or acquired erlag proc e.ture during the needed information 1984 esercise. Immediately when needed. The new com-MCUA and Kingston offtClaI9 munications system believe marked improvement has directly to the Area been made since 19%) (see 11 EOC functioned August 15 1984 FEMA exercise well.
report stating that the Etagston staff and director provided gomt emergency opera-tions management). (6/20/85 letter f rom Mass.)
- 41. Recow re anJ reentry pro- 6/29/81 35 10 H.I Kingston. + Recovery and reentry pro- Yes At the 1985 esercise I ceJ.e ee are .aot covered la M.ess Drli cedures have been incorpurated (9/5/85) it was observed that the .acal plan. ( 2.2.4.2 ) into the town plan. (11/9/84 recovery and reentry letter from Kingston) procedures are now included in the local MCDA/0EP Response plan (Annes 1). How-ever. FEMA has not New recovery and reentry pro" received a copy of the redures have been developed by revised plan for the Radiation Control Program re view of the adequacy of the De pa r t men t of Pubite of these procedures.
He.elth. These procedures will be incorporated in to the Kingston Town RERP. (6/20/05 letter from Mass.)
T4al.t i twt ti t encies 44J Arean R.a.t. a r t og Correct ive Act ions -- l'l l et t e Noc t e e r Powe r %t ar i an Page 24 of )2 Objecttwe Subse-N141I-On ,4 quent1y Corrective F rev iousl y Ft.M A- R F P - 1 Tested Action Envretse IJentified FfMA F ae r c lase Rev. t (Emercise Vertfled Current Date issue Objective Objective Refe.ence Jurt* diction Act ion Taken Datc) (i.e., Resu rs) Status 14 5..e IVscription
% r *hf le t.t one desk has been added and Yes Additional furniture C
- 62. .utrictent f urnic are such e/29/85 5 18 F.l.b Jesks, and adtittnnal communicattan (9/5/85) has been oF*ained for t bles. eq*e l pment is being negotiated. the EOC and was ob-t e i e, hme s for emergency et st f was n et available in (41/14/84 letter from Marsh- served to be adequate fleid) at the 1985 euercise.
t i.e t C. nor was backup
- p. .we r f .e c..mnan t c a t i on .
,s.g) MC11 A/0 EP lic egom 42 Mril4 is attempting to locate furniture to su ppleme nt re-saurces at the Town of Ma r s>r fle1J's Ewrgency Operettens Center. Backup power for tt e Marshfield local EOC wi t! he @
N provtJed by MCDA on an emer-gency request basis. Tele-pho 1 !!nes will be estab-itshed at the Marshfleid FDC. (6/20/85 letter from Mass.)
iM Marshfield, Recovery anJ reentry pro- Yes At the 1985 esercise t bl. Res.ive r y and reentry pro- 6/29/93 10 *f. 3
+ Mass l* Pet ccJores have been added to the (9/5/85) it was observed that s e .tu rve are not included plan. accor*tng tu town offt- recovery and reentry 3 ,* the Incal plan, procedures have been clats. (ll/14/84 letter from
( 2. 2. i . 2 ) to the
%rshf teld) added local plan (Annen 1 May MCDA/0FP flearnee, 1985). However, FEMA has not recetved a New recovery and reentry pra- copy of the revised celures have beca developed by plan f or review of the the Radiation Control Program adequacy of these of the Department of Fuhlte procedures, he.a l t h. These proced stes have been i nc lueted in the Mar sil e fielJ Town It F RP . Th/20/ft) let' r from Mu s.)
- e
a e TJ.ht.E 3 Det telencies and Areae Requiring corrective Art tone -- Pt trete m tear Power Naattan Page 26 of 32 Objective Suhee-NU t tr:-06 S4 q.sently Corrective PreviouSty FEMA-tFP-t Te s t ed Action fueretoe Identitled Ff'MA Faercise Rev. I (Fuercise Vertfled Current issue Desctlption Date Issue objective Objective Reference Jurisdiction Action Taken Date) (i.e.. Resulto) States 6A. Ottitrutty with deter- 9/S/85 4.6 4,6 3.7 Mages- g etnina some of the sont- I.4 thusette tortna point locations was I.tt observed. The contro' ter's map confittted with a commercial atlas in regards to the deglana-tlone of several roads.
(2.t.4.1) 69 Field monitortna teams do 9/5/93 $ 5 F.I.d Masse- g not have any backup com- chusetts munications capaht11-ties. (2.l.4.2)
- 70. The objective to demon- 9/S/45 27 23 m.i.a, Massa- g strate the radiological n.4.c. chusette tenitoring capability for J.12 evacuees and vehicles was not demonstrated because there were no trained pere 3nnel present at the T&unton Reception Center to conduct adiological monitoring. (2.t.S.t-D). DEFICtFNCT.
- 71. Taunton EOC staf f were not 9/5/85 21 28 K.1.a. Massa- I knowledgeable in the pro- K.1.h cNemetts per use of dostmetry.
(2.t.S.1)
- 72. Thste are some questions 9/S/85 27 2R 4.1 Ma**a- I se to whether the entsting A.1 chusetts local agreement to have J.12 the Red Cross do the reg-tstretton at the Taunton Raception Center to com-patible with the overall State / Red Cross Agree-eent. The Red Cross nor-sally concentrates its stsif on the mass care funettons. (2.1.5.2)
VDBLE 1 Deftetenetee and Areas Requiring Corrective Ac t t ana -- Pt igri e he tear Pawcr st 4t t an Page 25 of 32 DhjectIve Subse-Nt!RFC4%%4 quent1y Correettwe Previously FEMA-RrP-t Tested Action Encretse identified FFMA Faercise Rev. t (Fueretse Vertfled Current totue fiescription Date tenue nhjective Dhjective Reference .furtedtettan Action Taken Date) (i.e. Results) Status 1.10 Mangs- g
- 66. There was very limited 9/5/85 5.1.11 %.10 5.11 techntcal information (FR 9/R2) chosette coming to the State EOC (#14) from the EOF regarding plant conditions and the reasone for emergency action levels, which also tietted information flow to the Aree II and local PC s . (2.t.1.1) g h5. Recause of scenario list- 9/5/R5 4.1.1 h 36 M.t. Masg4-tations, a fuit demonstra- (FR 9/R2) M.1 chusetts of recovery and (83) M.4 tinn c reentry settettles was not tos conducted at the state Enc. (2.1.1.2)
Q4 Dome projectione and pre- 9/5/85 10 18 1.10 Maese- t tective action recommenda- chusette tions were done by the utittty at the EOF. The state pergonnet at the EOF did not perfore indepen-dent analysts and did not inquire as to the as suer tions that were used by the utility in their anal-ysts. (2.1.2.1) 67 Although the state DPM 9/5/85 3.5,10 3.5.11 1.10 Massa-staff at the EnF were chusetts included in detatted hrtefings by the utility as to plant status and the radiological significance of the plant statug. the DPR staff did not pass on this detatted information tc t he s t at e F,nc. Because of thig. the enc staff had very lletted techntest information to use as a hosts for dectSton making.
(2.1.2.2)
. e
e m T4BI F ) lie f i c l eete l e n an.t Areas Ite.gol fl eng Cor reet t ve Act ions -- pligt le %scle a st Piews r St 4 t t.oet Page 27 of 32 Objecttve Suhee-Nt!W F1:-E M S4 equen t 1 y CorreCttWe FtMA-urP-t TesteJ Actton Previoualy New. 1 (Fuercise Vertfled Current Enerrise Identified FEMA F.se r r t se Act lan Taken Dat e) (i.e., Res.stts) Status Date t e sui' Ohlective Objective Reference for t sJ t et ton
- .
- se Ib ertption g
The iishu t soce had in4de- 9/S/tl$ 5.M 4,1t F.2 Ma s* i-76 thovette
.io 4t e i.w intrations to the h-apital. EOF or local rnC . ( 2. t .6. t )
g The lor.lan thispt t al had no 9/$/85 $,){ 5.12 F.2 M e ne s-74 slogetts synlal eiwrgency communt-
. .e t I ..o n I t eik s w1th raJ10-t .ig i c.e l lahoratories, ether hoopttals. the E07
..r t u a l ra:s . ( 2. t .6.2 )
g 75 The imholance had only one 9/S/85 20.10 21,11 L.I. Ma. a-r 4J 14t t an protstion suit. l. 4 ihonetts (2.l.h.))
g Mais s a-7%. fl.e .iehotence crew did not 9/5/85 20.10 21.11 L.I.
L.4 chiesette have low-levet dostaeters K.1.a and was not fastliar with the operation of radiation monttoring equipesent.
( 2.1.6.4 )
1 Maa s e-77 An estettag essetnation 9/5/6) 31 32 L.t thusette rison was used at the J o t .la n llospi t a l for the i ni t I 41 ev4luation of the root aalaated viet te rather c lo.o 4 small decontaetna-tion room, presenting the prohtem of decontaminating
.i l it ge area and possibly spre.e,t t ng r4Jtoacttve pirtteles thr.sughout the hospitet and beyonJ.
(2.1.h.$1
i T4Mt.E ) Ine (1c t encies and Areas Requiring C orrect t ve Act ions - I'ligr te Nur t.. tr Power St.st l=*n Page 28 of 32 (4)ecttve Subse-NU R tE-OM4 qieent t y Corrective Previousty F t.MA - R t:P- t Tested Actton fueretse I.lentificJ F t.MA F.sc r c i se Rev. 1 (Fuercine vertiged Current invie Description Date i s .e objective Objective Reference .lur t sJ t et t on Act ion Taken flat e ) ( t .e. , Resiel t s ) Status 7M. A l t h....gh a clerical assts- 9[$/8% $.t.4 2,5 2,% F l.4, Mases t- g t ant has twen provided for (FR 9/82) F . I . .! chosetts the r .J t o Jispatchet at (88) (State Pollev) the . tate police warning 3.o t n t . the potent Iat et t t1 est.t* f .> r the radio Jiu-p et si .r a..t being able to h.. ...t l e both roottne catto i+t r adiological emergency
. alls 4tmuttaneously.
( .'. . t . 7 . t )
79 % >.s= .o m..ntcations prob- 9/5/85 2.1.7.8 % % F.I.a. Mas
- s- g (FR 9/6)) F.1.J shosette c 1.r u continis to estet in @
the nuttitcation and vert- (f52) .
f i c a t i .m of raessages be-t.cen the state police waening point and the local tN o . This was also noted in preetous e ue r-cines. (2.1.F.2) 80 Corrent popul at ion J t e t ri- 9/5/85 4.1% 4,16 .1.10. t. P l yn.m t in I butta. J.e t a on residents
>en l t ransients was neither p.mted nor available in the plan for designated evacuart m areas.
( ?. 2. t . t ) ,
nl. P r..t e r t i ve action i n s t riec- 9/S/85 14 t) E.6, Ptyevoth I t i .u.s for sheltering and F.?
e v 4cu et in, g lio public were i nt ::t ven in terms of f amt iI er houndaries and tandmarks. Sufftelent luf rregt ton was not pro-
- t 1. J L .a tr4astents. Tbte l o f ..r mit ion in leportant t re ,i i area witi t a large tran*Icnt populattoo.
(2.2.t.21 s a
. _ _ ___m _ _ .
e TAMI.E I ik t telenclee and Areae Req.et ring Corte. t Ive 4. t inne -- Pt (grle Nort a.or Power Stat ton Page 29 of 32 Objecttwe Subse-Nt1N tE-0M4 quentty Corrective Tetted Actton Previnuely F t.MA-R EP- L
( Eme r c ise Verified Corrent Exercise identtfted FEMA Favrcise Rev. I
,Iu r t eet t e t Inn Action Taben Dat e) (i.e.,Resntgs) Status tes.ie nencription Date lesue Ohjective Objective Reference g
not 9/5/85 5 ll S,14 E.% Plymo it h
- 82. En:6 Stattons were monitore.1 in the Ulc and the av.a t lable raJto was not operating during part of the exercise.
(2.2.1.1) g 4,16 .l .181. b then har y a t. Current population Jtstri- 9/S/65 4.1%
botton d.st a on residents f
and t r.instent s was neither posted not available in the plan for evacuation
~
are4s. (2.2.2.1) c g
N I I E.2, Carver e6 The C.s t ve r Eoc did not 9/5/8%
demonstr.ite the ability to A.2.4 i mohltlee staff and actt-vate factittles Proept-ly. The EOC staff nott-fled on the call-up list did not report to the Enc, an.1 carry out their assignments. (2.2.1.1-0) nrrtCtENCY.
i 1.1 Carver ni. Enc management, as spect- 9/S/6) 1.1 A.l.d.
fled in the plan, did not A.I.b.
a participate in the ener-A.2.s clee. There was no demon-
- trattun of the ability to make dectelons and to c+er d i na t e emergency ae-ttvities. (2.2.1.2-0) gFtCfLNCT.
i l
s
T4al.E 3 14f t e tencies and Areas lle. tut rinet Corrective Actlan. -- Pt a ,t r i e Nuc lear P.. c r st at t.m Page 30 of 32 Objertive Subse-W N t G-t M4 quent!y Curretttve Prcvioosly F t.tl A-It EP- I Tested Acttoe Fneretse identified F t.MA Fuerstse It ev . 1 (Esercise Vertfled Current 1 *ne Dv=cription Date I s t .se tihjec t i ve l>b j ect i ve meterence furtsJtetton Act ion Taken Date) (i.e.. Results) Status t4 h . b< si of f did not ade- 9 / *;/5) ti 14 E.h Carver 3
.pt st e l y deemst r at e their sht i L t y L .e alert the pub-li. within t tte 10 mile F P/. There was no coor-
.t i n.s t est etturt 4+enet the p ar t l e i pat t ny, staff for
.6+il itng sounding of s t es .u , disseetnating in-s t r iac t i neu l messages, or r ..u t e .s l e t t i ng . (2.2.3.3-n). Lit:f I C i t NCV .
Carver @
87 There was confusion among 9/5/85 1.3.4 1.3.4 H.i i CO the participating Carver tnC statf on the location of the oper4ttons area.
(2.J.l.8)
M8 The Efic ope ret t ons are4 9/5/85 5.2.5 4 4 It. 3 carver utiltted for this esercise (Fit 9/82) was inaJequate to support ( # 34) emergency operations. The
.Itsplays and status boards t hat wirre located in the operations area were too
.n e l t and were not visibly postel. Tlie status board w ,s not utilized and the enesgency classiftestion levels were not posted.
( 2. 2.1.2 )
g 49 No..nJ-t he-c lock staffinA 9/5/85 2 2 A.4 Carver p-shi t t e tes were not
.tes.W 4 L F a t ed. (I.2.3.3) e ,
e T TABI F. I the t ic leoclee .eved Are.sa Requi ring Cor evet t ve Ac t inns -- l'a lg r im N ec li+.o r Pe>we r St.st i on Page 11 of 32 tejective subse-w u tt-DM4 quently Corrective Ft.MA-NFP-1 Tested Actton Previoom(y Vertfled Current FFMA Eserctae Mcv. I ( Ese r c i se rsercise Ident i f icif ahjective objective Reference .luri sd i c t ir.n Action TAken Date) (i.e., Results) $tatus l*=oc Description Nte l e ssee g
9/5/55 2.) 2,% 11 . 1 Carver 90 flic ot t alite telephone F.l.e, L l o..is la the municipal could F.f.b
.ll eg*.st ch center he cocie overloA*ted during *
.i n wtnal emergency. In
. JJ i t i on . the dispatcher w as overly busy with han-dit og roint S ne work as well 44 emergency telephone me. . ..ge s . (2.2.1.4) g acce
- to the Eoc was not 9/5/85 5.2.3 4 4 n.) Carver 9t.
controlled. (2.2.1.5) (FR 9/82) c
(#24) @
Carver I
- 92. Access a.i.l traffic control 9/5/85 17 16,17 J.lo.k.
f.10.g.
gootate mere not activated or simiitated by the Carver 1.10.]
D aC staff. Consequently, ec 6'eu s w.i s not restricted into the area under their jortsJtetton which was being sheltereJ. Traffic ca.dt rol points were not
.sv.all Ah le (G Provide essist4nce along the evac-u.etton raute. (2.2.3.6) 3 9/5/85 2.2.4.1 1 3 A.2.a Rtagston 9 t. There was some confusion as ng Eoc staff on the (FR 9/83) definttlao and purpose of (f60) the St .it e of Emerge ncy th c l .o r 4t t.m by the
(;o v e r no r . ( 2.2.4.1 )
TAat y. 1 Dericiencies and Areas Requi ring Cor rect i ve Act t.wis -- Pi lstr lm Niscle,er Power St at ion Page 32 of 12
. ~ . . . . . . - . . .
Objective Subse NU N IT.-Ofd 4 ,
q sent ly Correcttye Previously FtMA-RTP-t Tested Actton Esercise IJentified PEMA Faercise Rev. 1 (Esercise Vertfled Current t usue tweer tption Date Issue Objective Objective Reference .f u r i sd i c t ioeg Action Taken Dat e) (i.e., Results) Status g
94 Access cont rast ses netther 9/5/85 3 3 1.10.) Marshfleid urJered nor simulated by t iie Ma r shf ic t d FoC. This cocoonn i t y contained areas t ac t o.ted in the shelter
..s de r .a s w.a l l au ro4Jways le.a6a*e Into the stem p.it ent i a l l y af f ect*d under the esercise scenarlo.
( 2. 2.5. l )
O Issi.e
Description:
All t enues described are Areas Requiring Corrective Act ion, escept for those specifically identified as Deftetencies, g NOTtM : lesue Identification Code Numbergs identification numbe r which appears in parentheses after the issue description and, where appropriate, in the coluen for previously identtfled issues, The first two or three digits refer to the report section number in which the issue is presented. The last digit aefers to the specifte number of the tesue as listed to the report section.
P r e v t.uas t y IJentified lesuet Ref erences the issue (Jentification number, and the number of the issue Je listed in this table.
F: *tA sih j ec t i ve s From the itst of FEMA's st andard M (ore objectives.
>=ercise objective: From the It sting of state's exercise objectives as present.aJ in eAch pf the post eserCise assessment reports.
Ac t i or T.ekeit The action taken by the state and local jurtsdictions in response to the proposed actions..
Objecttw+ %absequently Tested; Indicates whether or not the assor t at ed chjert ives have been tested at a subsequent esercise. Also provides the esercise date.
Corrective Action VertfieJs De s e r t be s t he results of the corrective actions as observet during the esercise.
Corrent st st os: C - Complete
. = Incomplete Other Abbreut.itt. ens N/A = Not applicable FR = Final Report Pf.A = Post Eseretse Assessment
- 1
- 101 o
TABLE A States of Objectives - Filgria Nuclear Power Statfoe Sheet 1 of 5 U E E
%3 . .: A U ;U % 0 $ IE II o E Uo IE c SE !o e 3
. 23 *
-* 2 ** a > 8 1 2s if g = =
- z= 1; g el * , g =
Tear of Objective Overall s g jl Je 3 z; ; 3 z; g , y .
g
(
FEMA Core Objectives Esercise Met fot Site j S $2 g
- j ;O j j f g ;
A A A A A A A A A A A A A
- 1. Demonstrate ability 1982 A A - - A A A A A A A A A to mobilise staff and 1981 A A A A A A A A 1 A A A A activate facilities 1985 promptly.
A A A A A A A A A A 1982 A A A
- 2. Demonstrate ability A A A - A A N N N N N 1983 A A to fully staff A A A A A A A A A I A 1 1 f acilities and main- 1985 tala staf fing around the clock.
1 A 1 A A A A A I I I I L
- 3. Demonstrate ability 1982 A A A A A A A - A A A A I to make decisions and 1983 A 1 A A A -
A A I A A A A to coordinate 1995 emergency activities.
A A A A A A A A A A A A 1 4 Demonstrate adequacy 1982 A A 4 A A A A A - A A A A of fact 11 ties and 1983
! A A A A I displays to support 1985 I I A A - A !
emergency operations.
I I A A A I A I 1 ! ! I
- 5. Demonstrate ability 1982 I A A A A - I A A A I 18 4 to connunicate with 1943 1
! A A A A A all appropriate loca- 1995 ! I A A A ! I tions, organizations, and field personnel.
Demonstrate ability 1982 A - -
A -
- 6. - - - - - - - -
A - A -
to mobilize and de-1983 - - - * -
- - -' A - - - -
ploy field monitor- 1985 ing teams in a timely fashion.
7 Demonstrate appropri- 1982 A I - 1 ate equipment and - -
1993 3 A - . - -
procedures for deter- 1995 mining a1bient radia-tion levels.
1952 A -
- 6. Demonstrate approprt-ate equipoent and 1983 - - -
A procedures for meas- 1985 - - -
A -
urement of airborne radiotodine concen- ,7 tretiogs as low as 10 uC1/cm in the pre-sence of noble gases.
102 0
TABLE & Statue of Objectives -- Pilgrie Nuclear Power Station (Cont'd)
. Sheet 2 of 5 0 : :
. : 1* ." A
- T: .: : 3 OE ?.: :
G3 F2 e 22 27 2 t- 2 ** 3 2 Year objective 18
- " -: ;;;; .*1 33 3 e % *a
, t j.
m i of Overa11 Met for Site j 6
8 a2
. J$
4 G 2* ;l E I IO I J d s 7
j ~k' FEMA Core Objectives Emercise
- 9. Demonstrate appropri- 1982 - - - - - - -
- - - A ate equipment and 1993
- - N procedures for col- 1985 1ection, transport and analysis of samples of soil, veEetation, snow, water and milk.
10 Demonstrate ability 1982 A A to project dosage to 1983 A - - -
the public via plume 1985 I 1 exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protec-tive measures, based on PA0s, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and ,
all other appropri-ate factors.
- 11. Demonstrate ability 1982 N - -
to project dosage to 1983 A - -
the public via in- 1985 N gestion pathway ex-posure, based on field data, and to deterstne appropri-ate protective measures, based on P AOs and other relevant factors.
- 12. Demonstrate ability 1962 N to 19plement pro- 1983 A -
tective actions for 1985 N ingestion pathway hazards.
Demonstrate ability 1982 A A A - - - - -
A I I 1 4 13.
A - - - - - A A A A A to alert the public 1943 I I A A - - - - -
1 A A A A within the 10-311e 1995 A EP2, and dissezi-nate an initial instructional oes-sage, within 15 minutes.
2 103 O
TABLE 4 States af Objectives - Filgria Nuclear Power Station (Cont'd) Sheet 3 of 5 x . .
. 3 -
- m1 " . * *
% .$ % 'ee o c$ oZ g 5 o U. .m**oE v.e e 7 m e8 ." e S .$
o J . m o y
8 Year Objective gM
= = *
- je g l; g, o } q* qe z
, g g
} p .
(
of Overall ,
g
$ gg g j j j[ * { [' f g; y FEMA Core Objectives Exercise Met for Site {
- - - - - - A A A A A A 14 Desonstrate ability 19A2 1 I I - - - - - - 5 N N N N to formulate and 1963 A A 4 I A - - - - - - A I distribute appropri- 1985 ate instructions to the public, in a tirely fashion.
N N N N N N M N N N N 1982 N N
- 15. Demonstrate the or- - - - - - - -
A A A A A 19M3 1 genizational ability - - - - - - - - - - -
I 1985 A and resources neces- ,,
sary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EP2.
- - - - N N N T N 1982 N - N -
16 Deconstrate the or- - - - - - N N N % N 1983 N -
N genizational ability - - - -
N N N N N 1995 N - .- -
and resources neces-sary to deal with lipediments to evacu-acion. as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
N N N N N N N N N N 1982 N N N 17 Denonstrate the or- - - - - - - N N N N N ganizational ability 1983 A -
= - - - - - -
! A A A A and resources neces- 1985 A siry to control access to an evacu-ated area.
N N N N N N N N N N N N N 14 Demonstrate the or- 1962
- - - - - - N N N N N gn11 rational ability 1993 A -
- - - - - - - N N N N N and resources neces- 1995 N sary to effect an orderly evacuation of sodility-impaired in-dividuals within the plume EPZ.
N - - - - - - -
N N. N N N 19 Desonst rate the or- 1962
- - - - - - N N N N N ganizational ability 1993 A -
- - - - - - - N N N N N and resources neces- 1965 N sary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plune EPZ.
]
l l
I l
1 l
l l
1 104 L o
TABLE 4 Statue of Dbjectives -- F11 grim Nuclear fewer Station (Coet'd) sheet u or 5 0 : :
. : 1* I .: e ':
- % ::: .:
- O 0: ?.: :
Go Ei e 23 %E
- 18 . %3
- t- 2 ** a - .: 2
.g ** g ; 7 gw == g q q; g Tear of Objective Overall
- g g ,* j e g g ;e z g _ p {
FEMA Core Objectives Exe rcise Met for $1te j $ Jg g g j g3 j j g ; e g A A 18 A 1 A A 1 A Demonstrate ability 1992 1* A A A
- 20. - - - A - N I - A I A A A to continuously 1983 A A A A A 1985 A A A I 1 - -
sonit.3r and control emergency worker exposure.
N N N N N N N N N N N N N
- 21. Demonstrate the 1992 N N N N N N N N N N N N N shility to make the 1963 - - - - - N N N N N N A A decision. based on 1995 predetermined cri-teria whether to issue KI to emerg-ency workers and/or the general popula-tion.
N N N N N N N N N N N N N
- 22. Demonstrate the 1982 N N N N N N N N - N N N ability to supply and 1993 N N N N N N N N N N N N N 'N administer KI. once 1965 the decision has been made to do so.
N N N N N N N 1992 N N N N N N
- 23. Demonstrate ability N N N N N N N N N N N N to effect an orderly 1983 N N N N N N N N N 1995 N
- N N N evacuation of on-site personnel.
- - - - - I 26 Demonstrate ability 1982 N N
- - - - - - - A N N N to brief the media in 1933 A - - - - -
a clear, accurate and 1995 timely manner.
- - - - - - A A I i A A Demonstrate ability 1992 1
- 25. - - - - - - - A N N N N N to provide advance 1983 A - - - - -
A -
coordination of in- 1995 farnation released.
N N N N N N N N 1982 N N N N N
- 26. Demonst rate ahtlity N N N N N N N - N N N N N to establish and 1993 operate rumor control 1985 A in a coordinated fashian.
1982
- - - - A -
27 Demonstrate adequacy N N N N N N N N N N N N of procedures for 1983 N
- - - - 1 - - - - - - - ~
registration and 1965 radiological moni-toring of evacuees.
~
! WD MR 26 @ 7590-01
[
COLKETEF
'fi$iRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO b
[ Docket Nos. 50-3 52-4MWt (Check Valve) HAP 20 P7 :49
~
& 5 0-3 52-ehA -G (Containment Isolation)]
o'^/o u + Yd M '. 1 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY (LIHERICK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1)
Assignment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Notice is hereby given that, in accordance with the authority conferred by 10 CFR 82.787(a), the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel has assigned the following panel members to serve as the Atomic Safetir -
and Licensing Appeal Board for this operating license amendment proceeding:
Thomas S. Moore, Chairman Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy Howard A. Wilber cmhAJ C.QJean Shoemaker Secretary to the Appeal Board Dated: March 19, 1986 h
8603210144 860319 ~
{DR ADOCK 05000352 PDR l
.n. , - - , . - . ~ . -- n .- -,v
- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of I I
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY : Docket No.(s) 50-352-OLA/0LA-2 (Limerick Generating Station, Unit i) !
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing FRN Assignment of ASLAB have been served upon the following persons in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR section 2.712.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Administrative Judge Board Ivan W. Smith, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Richard F. Cole Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Joseph Rutberg, Esq. Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal Director Conner & Wetterhahn, P.C.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20006 Edward G. Bauer, Jr., Esq. Frank R. Romano Vice President and General Counsel Chairman Philadelphia Electric Company Air and Water Pollution Patrol 2301 Market Street 61 Forest Avenue Philadelphia, PA 19101 Ambler, PA 19002 David Wersan, Esq. Barry M. Hartman, Esq.'
Assistant Consumer Advocate Deputy General Counsel Office of Consumer Advocate Governor's Energy Council 1425 Strawberry Square 300 North Second Street, 11th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120 Harrisburg, PA 17101
Docket No.(s) 90-332-OLA/0LA-2 o Thomas M. Gerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection Robert L. Anthony l Department of Environmental Resources Box 186 Third and Locust Streets, 5th Floor Moylan, PA 19065 Harrisburg, PA 17120 James T. Wiggins Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
, P.O. Box 47 l Sanatoga, PA 19464 l
l W Dated at Washington, D.C. this -
20 day of March 1986 Office of t Secretary of the Commission
)
. 1 l
T/lEFth1()Pilf lf'/LPil(IIII I l
NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION
. RD 5. Box 169, Ferry Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301 ,,pty yo Sqf ENGINEERING OFFICE 1671 WORCESTER ROAD
+
FRAMINGHAM. M ASSACHUSETTS 01701
- TEL EPHONE 617-872-8100 March 14, 1986 FVY 86/21 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wo.hir.;ter, nc 20555 Attention: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. Vern Rooney, Senior Project Manager BWR Project Directorate No. 2 Division of BWR Licensing
References:
(a) License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)
(b) Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, dated June 3, 1977 (c) Letter, YAEC to USNRC, WYR 80-83, dated July 24, 1980 (d) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 84-46, dated May 15, 1984 (e) Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, FVY 84-129, dated November 2, 1984
Subject:
Degraded Grid Protective System - Clarification of Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 122
Dear Sir:
The purpose of this letter is to respond to the NRC staff's recent request for clarification concerning the subject Proposed Change, submitted November 2, 1984 (Reference (e)). Specifically, clarification was requested for Note 10 to Table 4.2.7 (Page 61).
The proposed Note 10 to Table 4.2.7 reads, " Functional tests are iJt required for this instrumentation. The calibration performed once per operating cycle will adequately demonstrate proper equipment operation." The intent of this note is not to indicate that functional testing will not be performed; but rather to state that no separate functional test of the instrumentation is required. Vermont Yankee will functionally test the instrumentation via the relay calibration surveillance and the integrated ECCS tests which are performed each outage. We believe this clarification adequately addresses the staff's concern; however, in order to prevent any future confusion, attached pleese find a revised Page 61 which clarifies the intent of Note 10 to Table 4.2.7.
9603210151 860314 \\
I
)
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 14, 1986 Attention: Mr. Vern Rooney Page 2 Should you have further questions or require additional information regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLE R POWER CORPORATION T&L :
R. W. Ca stick Licensing Engineer RWC/no Attachment ec: Mr. Carl Woodard, USNRC, Region 1 l
i-
A t
VYNPS TABLE 4.2 NOTES
- 1. Initially once per month; thereafter, a longer inte' eval as determined by test results on this type of inetrumentation
- 2. During each refueling outage, simulat'ed automatic actuation which opens all pilot valves shall be performed such that each trip system logic can be verified independent of its redundant counterpart.
- 3. Trip system logic calibration shall include only time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip system.
- 4. This intrumentation is excepted from functional test definition. The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channel.
- 5. Check control rod position indication while performing the surveillance requirement of Section 3.3.
- 6. Functional tests, calibrations and instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not to be operable or tripped. Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to exceed once per week. Calibration shall be performed prior to or during each startup or controlled shutdown with a required frequency not to , exceed once per week. Instrument checks shall be performed at least once per day during those periods when instruments are required to be operable.
- 7. This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definitions and shall be calibrated using simulated electrical signals once every three months.
- 8. Functional tests and calibrations are not required when systems are not required to te operable.
- 9. The thermocouples associated with safety / relief valves and safety valve position, that may be used for backup position indication, shall be verified to be operable every operating cycle.
- 10. Separate functional tests are not required for this instrumentation. The calibration and integrated ECCS testu which are performed once per operating cycle will adequately demonstrate proper equipment operation.
Amendment No. 63 61
i
!M miD W PA NH6
[
00LKETED usulW March 19,1986 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *86 MAR 20 m0 :20 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Of f n.:
BEFORE TIIE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENbbhbdnD In the Matter of )
)
i; ERR-MCGEE CHEMICAL ) Docket No. 40-2061-ML CORPORATION ) ASLBP No. 83-495-01-ML
)
(West Chicago Rare Earths )
Facility) )
) Docket No. 4 0-2 061-S C (Kress Creek Decontamination) ) Source Material License
) No. STA 683
) ASLBP No. 84-502-01-SC
)
MOTION FOR ESTABLISIIMENT OF DATE FOR NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO KERR-MCGEE MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS On March 4, 1986, Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation filed a " Motion to Compel Production of Documents Relating to the NRC Staff involvement In the State of Illinois' Effort to Become an ' Agreement State'". The cer-tificate of service states that Staff counsel was served by hand on that date. IIowever, as indicated by the certificate, service was by delivery to the N R C 's offices at 1717 11 Street, N.W. , Washin gton , D.C. on March 4th. Stcff counsel has discussed this matter with counsel for Kerr-McGee and indicated that because of delay in receipt of the motion the Staff would require until March 24, 1986 to respond to the motion.
Kerr-McGee has no objection to the Staff responding by that date.
Since there may be ambiguity as to the due date for the Staff's re-sponse, the Staff respectfully requests the Atomic Safety and Licensing 8603210137 860319 PDR ADOCK 0400 1 }Q Q r,, , p
A Board to designate March 24, 1986 as the date for the Staff's response to the motion to compel.
Respectfully suhnit ted, N M t N
.t en II. Lewis '
Deputy Assistant Chief Ilearing Counsel Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 19th day of March, 1986 CR 4i[!50 i
ed , =d -
3 lk b.-
g,.7,;;; utst!Va hdM t
i l
e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of I KERR-MCGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION t Docket No.(s) 40-2061-SC 1
(Kress Creek Decontamination) l l
j l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE d I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing LB grant of motion to est date have been served upon the following persons in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR section 2.712.
Administrative Judge John H. Frye, III. Administrative Judge
] Chairman Jerry R. Kline l Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge Stephen H. Lewis, Esq.
James H. Carpenter Office of the Executive Legal Director Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 6'ashington, DC 20555 John C. Berghoff, Jr., Esq. Richard A. Meserve, Esq.
Chadwell & Kayser, Ltd. Covington & Burling 8500 Sears Tower P.O. Box 7566 Chicago, IL 60606 Washington, DC 20044 Neil T. Proto, Esq. Michael Lublinski, Esq.
Kelley, Drye & Warren Kelley, Drye & Warren One Landmark Square One Landmark Square Stamford, CT 06901 Stamford, CT 06901 Mead Hedglon, Esq. Stephen W. Seiple, Esq.
Kerr-McGee Corporation Department of Nuclear Safety Kerr-McGee Center 1035 Outer Park Drive Oklahoma City, OK 73125 Springfield, IL 62704 9
. . - , - ,, .- a, . . - - , - , . - - - - - -
. . - - - ,. - . - - - . , - ~ , . -
i Docket No.(s) 40-2061-SC Anne Rapkin, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 160 North LaSalle Street Chicago, IL 60601 Dated at Washington, D.C. this '
20 day of March 1986 e ].
8771;; ai t i;c;;;;;;siic;E;;;r;; tan l
l l
r I
l I
. A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of I KERR-MCGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION : Docket No.(s) 40-2061-ML i
(West Chicago Rare Earths Facility) 1 I
i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing LB grant of motion to est date have been served upon the iallowing persons in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR section 2.712.
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge John H. Frye, III, Chairman Peter A. Morris Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge James H. Carpenter Office of the Executive Legal Director Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 John C. Berghoff, Jr., Esq. Richard A. Meserve, Esq.
Chadwell & Kayser, Ltd. Covington & Burling 8500 Sears Tower P.O. Box 7566 Chicago, IL 60606 Washington, DC 20044 Mead Hedglen, Esq. Stephen W. Seiple, Esq.
Kerr-McGee Corporation Department of Nuclear Safety Kerr-McGee Center 1035 Outer Park Drive Oklahoma City, OK 73125 Springfield, IL 62704 Anne Rapkin, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General l
160 North LaSalle Street Chicago, IL 60601 ;
I Dated at Washington, D.C. this Q
20 day of March 1986 i' b ,(7[f} b s
I Office of th Secretary of the Commission
i 'l MAR 171986 Docket No. 030-11139 License No. 07-16499-01 Allied Chemical Corporation ATTN: Mr. Herbert G. Albrecht
Subject:
Inspection No. 030-11139/86-01 This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Ms. Marlene J. Taylor of this office on February 13, 1986 of activities authorized by NRC License No. 07-16499-01 and to the discussions of our findings held by Ms. Taylor with yourself at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to radiation safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules 1 and regulations and the conditions of your license. The inspection consisted t of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.
Within the scope of this inspection, no violations were observed.
1 In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the Public Document Room.
No reply to this letter is required. Your cooperation with us in this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely, Origina1 Signed By:
Francis M. Costello John D. Kinneman, Chief j Nuclear Materials Safety Section A, Division of Radiation Safety j and Safeguards cc w/ encl:
Public Document Room (PDR) i Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
- State of Delaware i
! 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY DL ALLIED CHEM CORP - 0001.0.0 I
e603210171 860317 RETURN ORIGINAL Tb REG 1 LIC30 T' AN ' BEGIONI 07-16499-01 PDR g. Ult 0
1 Allied Chemical Corporation 2 lAAR 171986 bcc w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (w/ concurrences)
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o enc 1) p P/^
RI:f7 DRSS RI:DRSS
\
Taylor /fi Kinneman 02//o/86 @/ (1/86 J 1
\
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DL ALLIED CHEM CORP - 0002.0.0 02/25/86 ,
1