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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217N8911999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for Period of 970422-990621,IAW 10CFR50.59(b).List of Changes Effecting Fsar,Encl ML20217D3951999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990806 Submittal on USI A-46, Implementation Methodology Used at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Per GL 87-02 ML20217E1581999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-05 on 990726-0905.Three Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.Violations Include Failure to Assure That Design Bases Correctly Translated Into Specifications ML20217C3151999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Scenario Package for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Scheduled for 991207.Without Encl ML20217D5591999-10-0505 October 1999 Documents Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Five Yr Survey of Main Breakwater.Survey Has Determined That Pilgrim Main Breakwater Is Intact & Remains Adequately Constructed to Perform Designed Safety Function ML20217C8051999-10-0505 October 1999 Forwards Proprietary Results of Audiologic Evaluations for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Attachment Clearly Shows Requirements for Operator Hearing Ability Are Met. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML20212J8301999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.Staff Conducts Reviews for All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months ML20216J9961999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Resume of Person Identified as Acting RPM in Licensee to NRC Re Notification That Person Named in License Condition 11 of 20-07626-02,is No Longer Employed at Pilgrim Station.Resume Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20212F7871999-09-24024 September 1999 Advises That Util 990121 Application for Amend Being Treated as Withdrawn.Proposed Changes Would Have Modified Facility UFSAR Pertaining to Values for post-accident Containment Pressure Credited in Pilgrim Net Positive Head Analyses ML20212H1381999-09-23023 September 1999 Submits Info in Support of Request Filed on 990730 to Grant one-time Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Authorizing Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise to Be Conducted in 2002 Instead of 2001 ML20212H1441999-09-23023 September 1999 Withdraws 990121 Request for License Change Re Emergency Core Cooling Sys Net Positive Suction Head,Due to Incorrect Datum Preparation ML20212C2861999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards SER Accepting Licensee 981123 Request for Relief RR-E1,RR-E5,RR-E6 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & Request for Relief RR-E2,RR-E3 & RR-E4 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20216F3451999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Summary Rept Providing Results of ISI Conducted at PNPS on-line & Refueling Outage (RFO 12) ML20216E7111999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards License Renewal Application Including Form NRC-398 & Form NRC-396 for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Without Encls ML20216E5891999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Copy of Pilgrim Station Organization Structure. Encl Refelcts Changes in Upper Mgt Level Structure.Changes Were Effective 990901 ML20211M4501999-09-0303 September 1999 Informs That Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Plans to Conduct Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise with Commonwealth of Ma on 991207,IAW 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.2 ML20211M9161999-08-31031 August 1999 Submits Review & Correction of Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid),Version 2,re Pilgrim Station ML20211J8391999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Provisional Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Plant,Changing Portions of Agreement to Permit Up to Two Distributions & Clarify Formula for Distribution ML20211H5701999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-04 on 990610-0725.Two Violations Identified Being Treated as non-cited Violations ML20211C3381999-08-19019 August 1999 Provides semi-annual LTP Update,Including Schedule, Commitment Descriptions,Progress Since Last Update & Summary of Changes.Rev Bars Indicate Changes in Status Since Last Submittal ML20210U7521999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opossing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems ML20210U6691999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opposing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems ML20210U5761999-08-18018 August 1999 Responds to Opposing Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Informs That for Sale,Nrc Responsible for Only Ensuring That Entergy Technically & Financially Qualified to Operate NPP ML20210U5151999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Approval of Indirect Transfer of FOL for Pilgrim in Response to .Approval No Longer Needed Since Beco Sold Interest in Pilgrim to EOI on 990713 ML20211B3841999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR power-operated Gate Valves ML20210U4831999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data Sheets for Period of 990101-0630,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML20210S0891999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Amend 11 to Indemnity Agreement B-48 Signed by Boston Edison Co & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20210R6251999-08-0606 August 1999 Provides Supplementary Info on USI A-46 Implementation Methodology at Pilgrim Station,To Enable NRC to Perform Evaluation & Issuance of Plant Specific SER for Plant ML20210M9411999-08-0202 August 1999 Requests That NRC Treat Pending Actions Requested by Beco Prior to 990713,as Requests Made by Entergy.Ltr Requests That Minor Administrative Changes to License Amend 182 & Associated Ser, ,reflect 990713 Transfer ML20210H8761999-07-30030 July 1999 Requests That NRC Grant Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section IV F,Which Would Authorize Rescheduling of 2001 Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Pilgrim Station to 2002 ML20210H8661999-07-29029 July 1999 Provides Revised Response to GL 96-06 & Addresses NRC Insp Concern for Containment Penetration X-12.Info Submitted to Facilitate NRC Review & Closeout of Subject GL for Plant ML20216E2321999-07-26026 July 1999 Discusses GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. NRC Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing as Rvid Version 2 ML20216D4131999-07-22022 July 1999 Informs That J Conlon,License OP-11040-1,terminated Employment with Beco on 990703,per 10CFR50.74.Individual Will Not Participate in Util Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program ML20210E2231999-07-20020 July 1999 Discusses Arrangements Made by Dennis & M Santiago During 990615 Telephone Conversation for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Pilgrim During Wk of 991004 ML20210C4151999-07-19019 July 1999 Informs That Util Intends to Submit Approx Eight Licensing Actions in FY00 & Eight in FY01,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02.Actions Are Not Expected to Generate Complex Reviews ML20210A9441999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to Re Changes to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Physical Security Plan Identified as Issue 2,rev 14, Addendum 1,respectively.No NRC Approval Is Required IAW 10CFR54(p) ML20210F3711999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs NRC That Effective 990713,listed Pilgrim Station Security Plans Have Been Transferred from Boston Edison to Entergy & Are Still in Effect ML20209G2251999-07-0909 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-03 on 990419-0609.Five Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C. Several Individual Tagging Errors Occurred ML20209C4661999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Addendum on Proposed Change in Corporate Ownership Structure Involving Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20209C3851999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Redacted Draft of Decommissioning Trust Agreement Re Transfer of PNPS & NRC Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generating Co ML20209C7761999-07-0606 July 1999 Submits Annual Summary Rept of Changes Made to QAP Description as Described in QA Manual,Vol Ii.Rept Covers Period of Jul 1998 Through June 1999.No Changes Made During Period ML20196J7251999-07-0101 July 1999 Informs of Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20209B9411999-06-30030 June 1999 Discusses Deferral of IGSCC Welds to RFO 13.Deferral of Welds to Refueling Outage 13 Does Not Impact Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) Since Plant in Compliance W/Exam Percentage Requirements ML20209B9431999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Formal Notification That Closing Date for Sale & Transfer of Pilgrim Station Scheduled to Occur on 990713. a Wang Will Be Verbally Notified of Time of Sale Closing ML20196H2381999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards SER Denying Licensee 980820 Request for Alternative Under PRR-13,rev 2 for Use of Code Case N-522 During Pressure Testing of Containment Penetration Piping ML20209B9791999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 13A to Pilgrims COLR for Cycle 13,IAW TS 5.6.5 Requirements.Rev 13A Provides cycle-specific Limits for Operating Pilgrim During Remainder of Cycle 13 ML20209A8761999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards SER Authorizing Licensee 990317 Relief Request to Use ASME Code Case N-573 as Alternative to ASME Code Section XI Article IWA-4000 for Remainder of 10-year Interval Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20209A8701999-06-25025 June 1999 Responds to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant,Reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Encl ML20210U5901999-06-25025 June 1999 Opposes Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts.Expresses Skepticism Re Claim by Companies That Consumers Will Benefit from Proposed Consolidation & four-year Freeze in Base Rates ML20209C3431999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Addendum 1,Rev 14 to Pilgrim Station Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Changes Proposed Have Been Implemented & Constitute Increase in Plant Defense Plan Commitments.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:NRC TO UTILITY
MONTHYEARML20062E0071990-11-14014 November 1990 Forwards List of Unimplemented GSIs at Facility,Per Generic Ltr 90-04 ML20062D6651990-11-0808 November 1990 Ack Receipt of Forwarding Util Evaluation of NRC Inspector General Rept 90N-02 Re Offsite Emergency Planning ML20058G9761990-11-0707 November 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-293/90-20 on 900816-1008 & Notice of Violation ML20058C5501990-10-26026 October 1990 Requests Written Policies & Procedures Needed for NRC Preparation for Planned fitness-for-duty Insp ML20062B4311990-10-17017 October 1990 Advises That 901012 Response to Generic Ltr 90-03 Re Vendor Interface for safety-related Components,Acceptable ML20062B7161990-10-12012 October 1990 Extends Invitation to Attend 910220-21 Util Symposium/ Workshop in King of Prussia,Pa Re Engineering Role in Plant Support.Interest to Participate,Intent to Attend & Approx Number of Representatives to Attend Requested by 901115 ML20062B6281990-10-12012 October 1990 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/90-21 on 900905-07.Insp Conducted to Review Event of 900902-03 Which Involved Number of Component Malfunctions & Operational Complications Following Shutdown ML20059N7251990-10-0101 October 1990 Requests That Matls Listed in Encl Be Furnished to Assist Maint Program Team Insp Scheduled for 901105-16 ML20059K6901990-09-11011 September 1990 Forwards Transcript of 900906 Public Meeting in Plymouth,Ma W/State & Local Officials Re Emergency Planning.W/O Encl ML20059H5871990-09-0101 September 1990 Advises That Reactor Operator & Senior Reactor Operator Exams Scheduled for 901203.Encl Listed Ref Matl Requested ML20059J6521990-08-29029 August 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-293/90-09 on 900806-10.No Violations Noted.Concludes That Engineering & Technical Support Organizations Continue to Provide Strong Station Support ML20059A1481990-08-17017 August 1990 Forwards 900816 Summary of 900807 Meeting Re Inservice Testing Program ML20058P0471990-08-0909 August 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-293/90-18 on 900709-13.No Violations Noted ML20058N0401990-08-0606 August 1990 Discusses Licensee Engineering Initiatives.Power Reactor Licenses in Region 1 Should Initiate Similar Program to Provide Sharing of Info & Experiences Involving Engineering Initiatives & Solution to Problems Common to All ML20056A4801990-07-30030 July 1990 Forwards Safeguards Insp Rept 50-293/90-16 on 900625-29.No Violations Noted.One Unresolved Item Identified ML20058L7051990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-293/90-17 on 900625-29.No Violations Noted ML20055F2461990-06-29029 June 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-293/90-13 on 900501-0611.No Violations Noted.Repetitive Failures of Diesel Driven Fire Pump Noted,Requiring Increased Mgt Attention ML20059M8421990-06-13013 June 1990 Forwards NRC Performance Indicators for First Quarter 1990. W/O Encl ML20247R8071989-09-21021 September 1989 Forwards SALP Rept 50-293/88-99 for 880516-890630.Instances of Deviation from Approved Practices & Lack of Attention to Detail Which Led to Challenges to Plant Equipment & Personnel Noted ML20247K6661989-09-0707 September 1989 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/89-07 on 890525-0710 & Notice of Violation ML20246K5091989-08-24024 August 1989 Accepts Summary of QA Program Description Changes for 1989, Forwarded by ML20246L7821989-08-23023 August 1989 Forwards Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $25,000.Failures to Properly Plan, Supervise & Inspect Tagout of Circuit Breakers Directly Contributed to Event ML20246D7261989-08-18018 August 1989 Submits Response to Re Plant Power Ascension Program.Util Proposal to Defer Phase 2 of Shutdown from Outside Control Room Test to Planned Fall 1989 mid-cycle Outage Accepted IR 05000293/19890071989-08-18018 August 1989 Approves Reactor Operation Up to 75% of Full Power Per Licensee Power Ascension Test Program.Nrc Findings Docketed in Insp Repts 50-293/89-07 & 50-293/89-08 & Status of Emergency Preparedness for Communities Encl ML20246J4811989-08-18018 August 1989 Clarifies NRC Position Re Definition of Extremity for Purposes of Setting Occupational Exposure Limits.Due to Misunderstanding,No Enforcement Action Planned If Licensee Procedures Incorporated Misunderstanding ML20246G1861989-08-18018 August 1989 Approves Reactor Operation Up to 75% of Full Power Per Licensee Power Ascension Test Program.Nrc Findings Docketed in Insp Repts 50-293/89-07 & 50-293/89-08 & Status of Emergency Preparedness for Communities Encl ML20245F1781989-07-31031 July 1989 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/89-06 on 890411-0524.No Violations Noted.Licensee Actions W/Respect to 890503 Turbine Trip/Reactor Scram Demonstrated Excellent Approach to Problem Investigation & Resolution ML20247D0181989-07-18018 July 1989 Ack Receipt of Re Response to NRC Bulletin 89-003, Inadequate Latch Engagement in Hfa Type Relays Mfg by Ge. Necessary Actions Performed to Address Issues in Bulletin ML20246N3921989-07-14014 July 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-293/89-09 on 890619-22.No Violations Noted ML20246D4961989-07-0606 July 1989 Advises That 880713 Response to NRC Bulletin 88-004, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss Acceptable ML20246A7561989-06-26026 June 1989 Approves Reactor Operation Up to 50% Full Power,Per Util Power Ascension Test Program & Confirmatory Action Ltr 86-10.Assessment of Licensee Readiness for Release from NRC Approval Point 3 & Related Info Encl ML20246B5961989-06-22022 June 1989 Forwards,For Info,Nrr Ack Receipt of Petition Filed by Ecology Ctr of Southern CA & Stating That Petition Being Treated Under 10CFR2.206 of Commission Regulations ML20245A5371989-06-0909 June 1989 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/89-05 on 890311-0410.Weaknesses Noted Re Evaluation of Failure Rate & Root Causes for Failures of Airlock Doors & Interlocks ML20244C2121989-06-0707 June 1989 Responds to Util 881011 Response to Generic Ltr 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors. Implementation Schedule Contingent Upon Resolution of Procedure ML20244C2751989-06-0606 June 1989 Forwards Draft Safety Evaluation Re Plant Compliance W/ 10CFR50.62, ATWS Rule. Requests Response to NRC Concerns Re Diversity & Testability of Alternate Rod Injection & Reactor Pump Trip Sys NUREG-1275, Informs That Util Fulfilled Requirements of Generic Ltr 88-14, Instrument Air Supply Sys Problems Affecting Safety Related Sys1989-06-0202 June 1989 Informs That Util Fulfilled Requirements of Generic Ltr 88-14, Instrument Air Supply Sys Problems Affecting Safety Related Sys ML20247P5501989-06-0101 June 1989 Forwards Request for Addl Info on Proposed Tech Specs Change Re Visual Insp of High Energy Piping.Listed Concerns Based on Review of Bechtel Calculation 17322-S5,Rev 1 ML20247M2661989-05-26026 May 1989 Forwards Director'S Decision,Ltr of Transmittal & Fr Notice in Response to Ocre 2.206 Petition Expressing Concerns Re 880309 Power Oscillation Event at LaSalle Unit 2 & Request to Reopen Rulemaking on ATWS Issue.W/O Encls ML20246P6051989-05-15015 May 1989 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Amend to License DPR-35.Amend Would Modify Tech Specs Re ECCS Surveillance Requirements ML20247D5481989-05-0808 May 1989 Forwards Augmented Insp Team Rept 50-293/89-80 on 890413-19 & 17-26.Team Concluded That Safety Significance of 890412 Pressurization Transient Was Minor,Though Event Raised Concerns Re Proximate Human Factors & Equipment ML20246N7951989-05-0404 May 1989 Forwards Mgt Meeting Rept 50-293/89-04 on 890328-30 W/Commonwealth of Ma & Local Officials ML20247A6911989-05-0303 May 1989 Extends Invitation to Attend Power Reactor Operator Licensing Seminar on 890531 in King of Prussia,Pa.Agenda & Info Re Lodging Arrangements Encl ML20245H8371989-04-26026 April 1989 Forwards SAIC-89/1121, In-Progress Audit Rept of Dcrdr at Boston Edison Co Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station & SAIC-89-1119, In-Progress Audit Rept for Boston Edison Co Pilgrim Nuclear Poser Station Spds ML20245H9551989-04-26026 April 1989 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/89-01 on 890206-0310 & Notice of Violation ML20245J1441989-04-25025 April 1989 Advises That 880921 & 890302 Responses to NRC Bulletin 88-007 & Suppl 1, Power Oscillations in BWRs Meet Requirements of Both Bulletins ML20244E4611989-04-14014 April 1989 Requests Prompt Review & Reporting of Status of Implementation of TMI Action Plan Items at Facility.Printout of All TMI Items Annotated Where Tracking Sys Indicates That Implementation Not Complete Encl ML20244C2771989-04-10010 April 1989 Informs of Completion of Followup on Plant Regulatory Effectiveness Review Effort & Activities Re TAC 56995. Previous Compensatory Measures Removed as Result of Implementing Corrective Action ML20244A6931989-04-0707 April 1989 Forwards Mgt Meeting Rept 50-293/89-43 on 890309 to Discuss Util Followup Actions to 890304 Reactor Scram ML20244A6281989-04-0303 April 1989 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/88-37 on 881227-890205.Violation Noted Re Failure to Control Locked High Radiation Area Access ML20236A8451989-03-0303 March 1989 Approves Reactor Operation Up to 25% of Full Power Per Util Power Ascension Test Program & Confirmatory Action Ltr 86-10.Urges Util to Cooperate W/Commonwealth of Ma & Local Govts to Further Improve State of Emergency Preparedness 1990-09-11
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217D3951999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990806 Submittal on USI A-46, Implementation Methodology Used at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Per GL 87-02 ML20217E1581999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-05 on 990726-0905.Three Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.Violations Include Failure to Assure That Design Bases Correctly Translated Into Specifications ML20212J8301999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.Staff Conducts Reviews for All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months ML20212F7871999-09-24024 September 1999 Advises That Util 990121 Application for Amend Being Treated as Withdrawn.Proposed Changes Would Have Modified Facility UFSAR Pertaining to Values for post-accident Containment Pressure Credited in Pilgrim Net Positive Head Analyses ML20212C2861999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards SER Accepting Licensee 981123 Request for Relief RR-E1,RR-E5,RR-E6 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & Request for Relief RR-E2,RR-E3 & RR-E4 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20211H5701999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-04 on 990610-0725.Two Violations Identified Being Treated as non-cited Violations ML20210U7521999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opossing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems ML20210U5761999-08-18018 August 1999 Responds to Opposing Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Informs That for Sale,Nrc Responsible for Only Ensuring That Entergy Technically & Financially Qualified to Operate NPP ML20210U6691999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opposing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems ML20210U5151999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Approval of Indirect Transfer of FOL for Pilgrim in Response to .Approval No Longer Needed Since Beco Sold Interest in Pilgrim to EOI on 990713 ML20216E2321999-07-26026 July 1999 Discusses GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. NRC Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing as Rvid Version 2 ML20210E2231999-07-20020 July 1999 Discusses Arrangements Made by Dennis & M Santiago During 990615 Telephone Conversation for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Pilgrim During Wk of 991004 ML20210A9441999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to Re Changes to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Physical Security Plan Identified as Issue 2,rev 14, Addendum 1,respectively.No NRC Approval Is Required IAW 10CFR54(p) ML20209G2251999-07-0909 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-03 on 990419-0609.Five Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C. Several Individual Tagging Errors Occurred ML20209C4661999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Addendum on Proposed Change in Corporate Ownership Structure Involving Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20196J7251999-07-0101 July 1999 Informs of Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20196H2381999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards SER Denying Licensee 980820 Request for Alternative Under PRR-13,rev 2 for Use of Code Case N-522 During Pressure Testing of Containment Penetration Piping ML20209A8761999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards SER Authorizing Licensee 990317 Relief Request to Use ASME Code Case N-573 as Alternative to ASME Code Section XI Article IWA-4000 for Remainder of 10-year Interval Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20195K3071999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request to Use Guidance of GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Water Sys Piping for Plant ML20195K3851999-06-11011 June 1999 Forwards Copy of Notice of Consideration of Approval of Application Re Proposed Corporate Merger & Opportunity for Hearing.Application Seeks Approval of Proposed Indirect Transfer of FOL for Plant ML20196K9921999-06-0404 June 1999 Informs That NRC Ofc of NRR Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Division of Licensing Project Mgt Created ML20207E7351999-05-27027 May 1999 Responds to Requesting Reduction in IGSCC Insp Frequency Per GL 88-01 to Be Performed During Upcoming RFO 12.Forwards SE Re Reduction of IGSCC Insp of Category D Welds Due to Implementation of H Water Chemistry ML20207B6341999-05-26026 May 1999 Informs That Licensee 990415 Submittal Re Financial Position of Entergy Intl Ltd,Llc Will Be Marked as Proprietary & Withheld from Public Disclosure Pursuant to 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of Atomic Energy Act ML20207B7391999-05-24024 May 1999 Forwards from Kc Goss of FEMA to Cl Miller Forwarding FEMA Analysis of Prompt Alert & Notification Sys for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.Based on Review,No Significant Problems Exist with Alert & Notification Sys ML20207B0701999-05-24024 May 1999 Responds to Sent to Ofc of Congressional Affairs Requesting Info on Concerns Raised by One Constituent,J Riel Re Y2K Compliance of Pilgrim NPP in Plymouth,Ma ML20207C0321999-05-18018 May 1999 Forwards Fifth Rept Which Covers Month of Apr 1999. Commission Approved Transfer of TMI-1 Operating License from Gpu to Amergen & Transfer of Operating License for Pilgrim Station from Beco to Entergy Nuclear Generating Co ML20206U7501999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-02 on 990308-0418.Two Severity Level 4 Violations Occurred & Being Treated as NCVs ML20206M1891999-05-11011 May 1999 Forwards SE of 980826 Request to Use Guidance of GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Sys Piping for Plant ML20206E0551999-04-29029 April 1999 Discusses Bulletin 96-03 Issued on 960506 & Beco Responses ,970207,981230,990121 & 990309 for Pilgrim Npp. Determined That Actions Taken Should Minimize Potential for Clogging of ECCS Suction Strainers ML20206B3031999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-01 on 990125-0307.Two Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy.Security Program Was Also Inspected ML20205Q9491999-04-0909 April 1999 Informs That on 990225 NRC Staff Completed PPR of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.Staff Conducts Reviews for All Operating NPPs to Develop an Integrated Understanding of Safety Performance ML20205B9391999-03-24024 March 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re GL 95-07, Pressure-Locking & Thermal-Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20204C7871999-03-17017 March 1999 Informs That Application Submitting Transfer of Facility Operating License & Matls License & Proposed Amend, Will Be Marked as Proprietary & Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Pursuant to 10CFR2.709(b)(5) ML20199K8321999-01-22022 January 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Transfer of Facility Operating License for Plant ML20199H5811999-01-20020 January 1999 Submits Exemption Withdrawal of 10CFR70.24(a) Re Criticality Accident Monitoring Requirements ML20198L7781998-12-22022 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/98-10 on 981020-1208.No Violations Noted.Nrc Regional Specialists Reviewed EP & Fire Protection Programs.Ep Program Was Found to Be Well Implemented ML20198J0891998-12-21021 December 1998 Forwards NRC Response to Me Lampert Re Transfer of Ownership of Pilgrim Station in Response to Senator Kerry Ltr Dtd 981019.NRC Will Terminate License Only When Licensee Remediates Site to Levels Specified in Regulations ML20198J1041998-12-21021 December 1998 Forwards NRC Response to Me Lampert Re Transfer of Ownership of Pilgrim Station in Response to Congressman Markey Ltr Dtd 981019.NRC Will Terminate License Only When Licensee Remediates Site to Levels Specified in Regulations ML20137T2211998-12-17017 December 1998 Responds to to Chairman Jackson Re Concerns About Possible Sale of Pilgrim Station & Waste Disposal Issues.No Application for License Received Nor Contract of Sale Between Beco & Entergy.Record Copy ML20198J1161998-12-17017 December 1998 Responds to to Chairman Jackson in Which Recipient Expressed Concern About Possible Sale of Pilgrim Station & About Waste Disposal Issues.Nrc Has Not Received Application for Transfer of License to Date ML20198P2781998-12-17017 December 1998 Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Forwards App a Records Being Released in Entirety.App B Records Being Withheld in Entirety (Ref FOIA Exemption 4) ML20198B2021998-12-0909 December 1998 Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Licensee Irpm Review.Details of Insp Plan for Next 6 Months & Historical Listing of Plant Issues Encl ML20197H8521998-12-0909 December 1998 Responds to Ltr Sent to Chairman SA Jackson on 981028 Re Concern That NRC Will Not Perform Environ Assessment in Connection with Consideration of Approval of Transfer of License for Plants to Permit Sale ML20196J1201998-12-0404 December 1998 Ack Receipt of 971217 & 30 & 980112,0309,0423 & 0630 Ltrs Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-293/97-02,50-293/97-11,50-293/97-13, 50-293/97-80 & 50-293/98-01.Actions Found Acceptable ML20196B5421998-11-24024 November 1998 Forwards Plant SRO & RO Initial Exam Rept 50-293/98-301OL During Wk of 981016-23 ML20196F7631998-11-24024 November 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/98-203 on 980928-1023.No Violations Noted.Three Issues Identified Re Containment Flooding,Surveillance Testing Criteria & Protection for RBCCW System from High Energy Line Break Inside Drywell ML20196C1191998-11-20020 November 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/98-08 on 980907-1019.No Violations Noted.During Insp Period,Chemical Decontamination of Residual Heat Removal Sys Was Well Planned & Implemented Which Reduced Radiation Doses in Heat Removal Quadrants ML20195H7361998-11-16016 November 1998 Informs of Individual Exam Results for Applicants on Initial Exam Conducted on 981016 & 981019-23 at Facility.Nine Applicants Were Administered Exam & Nine Passed.Licenses Issued & Individual Test Results Encl.Without Encl ML20155C4781998-10-29029 October 1998 Forwards RAI Re Resoultion to GL 96-06 Issues at Plant,Unit 1.Response Requested by 981130 ML20154J7881998-10-0808 October 1998 Authorizes Mb Santiago to Administer Initial Written Exams to Applicants Listed (Except Applicants Redlined), on 981016.NRC Region I Operator Licensing Staff Will Administer Operating Tests During Week of 981019 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
See also: IR 05000293/1988011
Text
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JUL 221988
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Docket No. 50-293
Boston Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. Ralph G. Bird
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
RF0 #1 Rocky Hill Road
flymouth, Massachusetts 02360
Gentlemen:
Subject: Inspection No. 50-293/88-11
This refers to your letter dated June 21, 1988, in response to our letter dated
May 17, 1988.
Thank you for informing us of the actions taken to resolve the issues
identified from the E0P inspection. Your actions taken to resolve several of
the items were reviewed in inspection 50-293/88-19. Those not yet examined
will be re" %d in a future inspection of your licensed program.
Your cooperation with us is appreciated.
Sincerely,
h #
Robert M. Gal o, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
cc:
K. Highfill, Station Director
R. Anderson, Plant Manager
J. Keyes, licensing Division Manager
E. Robinson, Nuclear Information Manager
R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager i
The Honorable Edward J. Markey
The Honorable Edward P. Kirby l
The Honorable Peter V. Forman
B. McIntyre, Chairman, Department of Public Utilities ,
Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen !
Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen f
Plymouth Civil Defense Director i
P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of public Safety, Commonwealth of Massachusetts !
S. Pollard, Massachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources i i
R. Shimshak, MASSPIRG \ ;
Public Document Room (POR) /
b !
Local Public Document Room (LPOR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) \ \\
f
NRC Resident Inspector
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2) ,
6800040101 800722
'
IAL ORD COM E M IM 88-11 - 0001.0.0 '
$DR ADOCK 05000293 PNV __
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Boston Edison Company 2
,
bec:
Region 1 Occket Room (with concurrences)
M. Perkins, Management Assistant, DRMA
S. Collins, DRP
R. Blough, ORP
L. Doerflein, DRP
R. Sores, DRSS
0. Mcdonald, PM, NRR
k
R I,- f R ORS RI:0RS' , RI:0RP RI:0RS
F rq). Evans Lange Blough Gallo
0784/88 OT/}D/88 07/20/88 07/'?R/88 07/ Af88
0FFICIAL RECORD COPY RL PILGRIM 88-11 - 0002.0.0
07/19/88
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Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth Massachusetts 02360
Ralph G. Bird June 21. I988
Senior Vge President - Nuclear
BECo Ltr #88-097
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Hashington, D.C. 20555
Docket No. 50-293
License No. DPR-35
Subject: NRC Inspection Report 50-293/88-11
Dear Sir:
Attached is Boston Edison Company's response to the unresolved items described
in the subject inspection report.
An excerpt from the appropriate section(s) of the inspection report is first
stated, followed by the Boston Edison Company response. The corrective action
for each of the items has been satisfactorily completed to support plant
operation.
Please do not hesitate to contact me directly if there are any questions.
hd
R.G. Bird
CS/b1
Attachment 1: Respcose to Unresolved Items
, Attachment 2: i. valuation of Combustible Gas Control Discrepancy
,
cc: Mr. H1111am Russell
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Rd.
King of Prussia, PA 19406
Sr. Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Station
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, ATTACHMENT 1
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Resoonse to Unresolved Items
. (Inspection Report 88-11)
NRC Unresolved Item 88-11-01
Exterot from Insor: tion Reoort. Section 4
Comparison of Plant Specific Technical Guidelines, BHR Owners Group Emergency .
Guidelines _and Emergency Ooerating Procedures (EOP's) -
Plant Specific Technical Guidelines (P-STG)/EOP Review
"All EOPs and those portions of satellite procedures which contained steps
based on the P-STGs were compared to the P-STG. The following differences
were noted.
"EOP-3: Primary Containment Control"
"PSTG steps PC/H-2,1 (suppression chamber spray), 2.2 (torus or drywell
vent), 2.3 (purge), and 2.4 (drywell spray) were reordered in the E0P in the
order of: 2.2, 2.3, 2.1, 2.4. The licensee had not previously identified
this potential safety-significant deviation. Either analysis of the
acceptability of E0P sequence or procedure revision to match the PSTGs is
required. This is an unresolved item (50-293/88-11-01)."
BECo Resconse to Unresolved Item 88-11-01
This condition has been evaluated and determined to not be a safety
significant deviation. The detailed evaluation is provided as Attachment 2.
This item is a technical inaccuracy and will be corrected as part of the next
major revision to the E0Ps. This discrepancy is formally captured as
verification discrepancy number D-7-2 for E0P-3.
NRC Unresolved Item 88-11-02
Exteret from Insoection Reoort. Section 8
"Walkthrough of Emeraency Ooeratina Procedures
and Satellite Procedures"
"A number of the E0P-related items identified by the inspectors h.ad also been
identified by the facility review process and actions were being taken to
address the observed problems. However, the facility review of the satellite
procedures was still in progress even though the procedures were approved and
issued, i.e., they had not yet finished their own walkthrough of the
satellite procedures. Furthermore, the operation management agreed to assure
that the plant labeling was consistent with the E0Ps and satellite
procedures. Therefore, pending further NRC review following completion of
the facility walkthrough of the satellite procedures and the licensee actions
to correct the identified deficiencies, this item will remain unresolved
(50-293/88-11-02)."
Page 1 of 3
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ATTACHHENT 1 (cont'd)
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BECo Resco'nse to Unresolved Item 88-11-02
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Review of E0P satellite procedures has been completed. The discrepancies
identified by the NRC, including those identified in Attachment C of the
Inspection Report, and by walkdowns performed by PNPS licensed operators have
been corrected.
NRC Unresolved Item 88-11-03
Excerot from Insoection Reoort. Section 4
"P-STG/EOP Review"
"EOP-3: Primary Containment Control"
"Primary contair. ment venting was allowed by procedure after torus pressure
exceeds 11 psig but before reaching the Primary Containment Pressure Limit
(PCPL; 48 psig) irrespective of resultant reactivity release rate. Procedure
5.4.6 stated that venting, irrespective of resultant reactivity release rate,
was appropriate only when the primary containment pressure is above the PCPL
(or when drywell or torus hydrogen concentration was above 61.). The licensee
stated that they will revise the procedures to remove the inconsistency and
instruct operators to vent before reaching the PCPL."
"Saf ellite Procedures Review"
"5 4.6: Post Accident Containment Control (Ventina)"
"The procedure directed using both a small vent path (1 or 2 inch valves) and
a large path (through 8 inch valves) for containment venting. In some
scenarios it inay not be necessary to open both sets of valves if after
opening only the 2 inch or the 1 inch valves the containment pressure is
cori trolled appropriately. The licensee agreed to revise the procedure or
justify not revising it."
"A caution contained the words "If at all possible . ... shall ...". This
statement did not provide clear direction to the SRO. The licensee agreed to
revise the procedure or justify not revising it."
"Step 2 of Attachment A of this procedure stated that the E0P is applicable
when primary containment pressure ntarAe12.5 psig, as opposed to above 2.5
psig. The licensee agreed to revise this statement."
"The caution statement about rupture of the ductwork with venting did not
include notification of Health Physics. The licensee agreed to revise the
procedure or justify not revising it."
"Step 2 of Attachment A of this procedure was missing a statement regarding
opening the appropriate valves as necessary to perform the step. The
licensee agreed to consider revising this statement."
"Step 3 of Attachment A of this procedure did not provide clear direction to
the operator on the value of primary containment pressure to terminate torus
venting. The licensee agreed to revise the procedure or justify not revising
it."
Page 2 of 3
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ATTACHMENT 1 (cont'd)
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"The ltems concerning containment venting will be collectively included as
o
- part of unresolved items 50-293/88-11-03. See Section 8 for additional
containment venting items."
"
Excerot from Insoection Reoort. Section 8"
"One item identified during the walkthrough of the E0Ps was an apparent need
for additional training on when to initiate and when to terminate venting of ;
the containment in accordance with the intent of the EPGs and the
procedures. Items concerning containment venting will be considered an
unresolved item (50-293/88-11-03.)"
BEco Resoonse to Unresolved Item 88-11-03
i
PNPS Procedure 5.4.6, "Primary Containment Venting and Purging Under i
Emergency Conditions" - Attachment A, has been revised (Revision 18) to j
correct all the identified discrepan:les.
!
Operator training on when to initiate and when to terminate venting, in ;
accordance with the intent of the PSTGs, is given as part of training module
87-0-RQ-05A-01-07. The intent of venting is stressed to each operating crew.
NRC Unresolved Item 88-11-04
Excerot for Insoection Reoort. Section 11
"EOP Ouality Assurance Measures"
"A review was conducted to determine if Quality Assurance Measures are
adequate to ensure that high quality E0Ps are developed, implemented and
maintained."
"The QA measures associated with the development of the E0Ps were found to be
acceptable, based on discussions with the Quality Engineering Division
Manager and Senior Quality Engineer. However, it was concluded that a
programmatic approach to ensure the continued quality of the E0Ps through
audits of the maintenance of the E0Ps did not exist in the area of auditing
of the E0P program."
"In subsequent discussions with the Vice President, Nuclear Engineering
Division and Quality Assurance management, 8ECo committed to revise the 1988
Internal Audit Schedule to include an annual audit of the E0P program. This
audit will be performed as a Safety System Audit in the fourth quarter of
1988. The proceduralization of continued quality assurance measures is an
Unresolved Item (50-293/88-11-04)."
BECo Resoonse to Unresolved Item 88-11-04
As indicated in the inspection report excerpt, the 1988 Quality Assurance
Audit Schedule was revised to include an annual audit of the E0P program
beginning in the fourth quarter of 1988. The Audit Schedule revision was
formally approved March 17, 1988.
In addition Quality Assurance Department Procedure No. 18.01, "Preparation,
Performance, Reporting and Follow-up of Quality Assurance Department Internal
Audits" was revised on April 25, 1988 to reflect, an annual audit frequency
for the EOP program.
Page 3 of 3
. ATTACHMENT 2
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EVALUATION OF THE E0P-PSTG DISCREPANCY
. RELATIVE TO
COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL
Nhen primary containment hydrogen and oxygen concentrations reach the
deflagration limits (6% and 5%, respectively), the PSTGs require wetwell
spraying, venting, and purging in that order (PSTG Steps PC/H-2.1, 2.2, and 2.3).
Procedure 5.4.6 (Rev. 17) specifies that venting precede purging. However E0P-3 .
(Rev. 0) does not specify that wetwell spraying should precede the vent and purge
evolution.
The effect of this dis:repancy between the PSTGs and the E0Ps may be evaluated by
examining all events to which E0P-3 may apply. All such events may be segregated
into two classes: those for which the containment remains inerted (i.e., oxygen
concentration remains below 5%) throughout the event and those for which it does
not. Events within the former class are not affected by the E0P discrepancy
because the conditions required for execution of the discrepant step, hydrogen
and oxygen concentrations reaching their deflagration limits, are not met. Thus
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the discrepancy can affect only those events within the latter class.
This smaller set of potentially affected events, those for which the containment
does not remain inerted, may be further segregated into two additional classes:
those for which the containment is deinerted when the event initiates (e.g.,
events initiated within one of the 24-hour periods when power operation is
permitted without containment inertion) and those for which the containment
becomes deinerted during the event. The Boston Edison Company has removed all
air sources from within the Pilgrim primary containment. Therefore, with the
exception of deliberate deinertion, which is not called for in the EOPs, the
primary containment will become deinerted during an event only if its pressure is
reduced to the point at which the reactor-building-to-torus vacuum breakers open,
drawing air from the reactor building into the wetwell airspace. This will
happen only if containment temperatures are reduced to well below those which
existed when the event initiated, and the only viable mechanism for effecting *
such temperature reductions is the prolonged operation of containment sprays.
However, the E0Ps preclude the use of containment sprays when containment
pressure is below 2.5 psig. Thus the Pilgrim systems configuration together with
the EOPs preclude the containment from becoming deinerted during an event, so
that there are no events within the latter class and the EOP discrepancy can
affect only those events within the former.
This smaller set of potentially affected events, those which initiate during a
period when the containment hns been deinerted, may be further segregated into
two classes: those which initiate before the reactor has developed a significant
power history (i.e., startup events) and those which initiate afterwards. With
no significant power history, the reactor core cannot develop decay heat
sufficient to generate enough hydrogen to approach the hydrogen deflagration
limit. Events within the former class are therefore not affected by the EOP
discrepancy because the conditions required for execution of the discrepant step,
hydrogen and oxygen concentrations reaching their deflagration limits, are not
met. Thus the discrepancy can affect only the events within the latter class.
Page 1 of 3
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. ATTACHMENT 2 (cent'd)
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This smaller set of potentially affected events, those which initiate during a
'
period when the containment has been deinerted but only after the reactor has
developed a significant power history, may be further segregated into two
additional classes: loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and non-LOCAs. During a
LOCA the steam released into the drywell will quickly increase containment
pressure to the Suppression Chamber Spray Initiltion Pressura (refer to the
definition of the SCSIP in Appendix A of the BHORG EPGs), and this will occur ,
before any appreciable hydrogen can be generated. E0P-3 requires initiation of
wetwell sprays before containment pressure reaches SCSIP, so that the operator
will have been directed to operate wetwell sprays before the conditions required
for execution of the discrepant step, hydrogen and oxygen concentrations reaching
their deflagration limits, are met. Thus the E0Ps will require wetwell spraying
before the vent and purge evolution for any event within the former class, so
that the EOP discrepancy can affect only those events within the latter.
This smaller set of potentially affected events, non-LOCAs which initiate during
a period when the containment has been deinerted but only after the reactor has
developed a significant power history, may be further segregated into two
additional classes: those for which adequate core cooling is maintained and those
for which it is not. If adequate core cooling is maintained then no significant
hydrogen generation occurs and the conditions required for execution of the
discrepant step, hydrogen and oxygen concentrations reaching their deflagration
limits, are not met. Thus the discrepancy can affect only those events within
the latter class.
This smaller set of potentially affected events, non-LOCAs, with loss of adequate
core cooling which initiate during a period when the containment has been
deinerted but only af ter the reactor has developed a significant power history,
may be further segregated into two additional classes: those which generate
sufficient hydrogen to reach the deflagration limit and those which do not.
Clearly events within the latter class are not affected by the E0P discrepancy
because the conditions required for execution of the discrepant step, hydrogen,
and oxygen concentrations reaching their deflagration limits, are not met. Thus
the discrepancy can affect only those events within the former class.
This smaller set of potentially affected events, non-LOCAs with loss of adequate
core cooling, which generate sufficient hydrogen to reach the deflagration limit,
and which initiate during a period when the containment has been deinerted but
only after the reactor has developed a significant power history, must be further
reduced to actually define the set of events which can be affected by the E0P
discrepancy. As a minimum, the following subsets of events must be excised:
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1. Events in which the RPV is blown down to the suppression pool after the pool
has been substantially heated. The E0Ps require that the RPV be rapidly
depressurized prior to loss of adequate core cooling and, therefore, prior to
any significant hydrogen generation. If the RPV is depressurized by blowing
down to the suppression pool, then the thermal energy transferred to the pool
will raise the wetwell water temperature, which in turn raises the partial
pressure of the water vapor in the wetwell airspace and the temperature and
partial pressure of the dry gas in the airspace. If the wetwell water
temperature is relatively high when the blowdown is initiated, this will be
- sufficient to raise containment pressure to the Suppression Chamber Spray t
"
Initiation Pressure. E0P-3 requires initiation of wetwell sprays before
containment pressure reaches the SCSIP, so that the operator will have been
directed to operate wetwell sorays before the Londitions required for
execution of the discrepant step, hydrogen and oxygen concentrations reaching
their deflagration limits, are met. Thus the E0Ps will require wetwell
spraying before the vent and purge evolution for these events. ,
Page 2 of 3
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ATTACHMENT 2 (cont'd)
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significant hydrogen generation occurs. Events in which safety
_
Because the Pilgrim safety valves
are unpiped, any continued steam discharge through these valves will raise
containment pressure to the Suppression Chamber Spray Initiation Pressur
E0P-3 requires initiation of wetwell sprays before containment pressure
reaches the SCSIP, to that the operator will have been directed to operate
wetwell sprays before the conditions required for execution of the discr
4
step,
are hydrogen
met. and oxygen concentrations reaching their deflagration
Thus the
purge evolution EGPs events.
for these will require wetwell spraying before the vent and
3.
the SRVs are inoperable). Events in which the main condenser is utiliz
For these events, any hydrogen generated will be
discharged
primary through the offgas system and will therefore not accumulate in
containment.
discrepant step, hydrogen and oxygen concentrations reachin
deflag ation limits, are not met for these events.
4.
Events in which reactor core decay heat cannot be effectively removed from
the primary
generation containment for a prolonged period before significant hydrogen
occurs.
the pool will raise the wetwell water temperature, which in
partial pressure of the water vapor in the vetwell airspace and the
temperature and partial pressure of the dry gas in the airspace. If this
Suppression Chamber Spray Initiation Pressure. occurs over a prolo
E0P-3 requires initiation of
wetwell sprays before containment pressure reaches the SCSIP, so that the
operator will have been directed to operate wetwell sprays b(fore the
conditions required for execution of the discrepant step, hydrogen and oxyge
concentrations reaching their deflagration limits, are met. Thus the E0Ps
will require wetwell spraying before the vent and purg0 evolution for these
events.
the preceding logic.Thus the set of avents which may be affected by the E0P
set is vanishingly small and clearly does not warrant correction of t
discrepancy in ';he near term (i.e., before the E0Ps undergo their next revision).
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