ML20127J387

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Forwards FEMA & Associated Final Exercise Evaluations on 850306 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Lake County,Il,Kenosha County,Wi & States of Il & Wi.Deficiency Found:Inappropriate Traffic Control
ML20127J387
Person / Time
Site: Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date: 06/13/1985
From: Paperiello C
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Reed C
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 8506260585
Download: ML20127J387 (2)


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JUN 1 3 1985 Docket No. 50-295 Docket No. 50-304 Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office. Box 767

-Chicago, ILL 60690 Gentlemen:

We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

letter dated May 23, 1985, and associated final exercise evaluations on the offsite emergency preparedness exercise conducted on March 6, 1985, for Lake County Illinois, Kenosha County Wisconsin, and the States of Illinois'and Wisconsin.

This final exercise evaluation lists one deficiency for Lake County related to inappropriate traffic control measures to close off the' area impacted by the plume, thus permitting a potentia 1' route by which the public could have entered the area affected by the plume. This access control deficiency has been identified by FEMA as one which affects public health and safety. FEMA is performing a determination based on the response on the State of Illinois regarding the overall adequacy of the corrective actions and the status of approval of the offsite plans around Zion Station under 44 CFR 350.

This final exercise evaluation also lists some recommendations (which are referred to in the FEMA evaluation as other deficiencies; e.g., those not affecting public health and safety) regarding the offsite agency responses.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of

'this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

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1 8506260585 850613 PDR ADOCK 05000295 PDR

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Commonwealth Edison Company 2

,g Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Mr. M. Phillips of my staff at (312) 790-5530.

Sincerely, U90 P C. J. Paperiello, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

D. L. Farrar, Director of Nuclear Licensing K. L. Graesser, Station Manager Jan Norris, Project Manager, NRR DM8/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)

Resident Inspector, RIII Phyllis Dunton, Attorney General's Office, Environmental Control Division Mayor, City of Zion D.-Matthews, EPB, OIE W. Weaver, FEMA Region V hII. h Mo' ski /ld Ph 1 ips RII wr1ght I

er ello 06/13/85

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Emergehcy Management ' Agency Wasfngton, D.C. 20472

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MAY 2 319850 6 pod ,

. WC31". ,p tcmG MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordani Li

  • Director, Division of Emergency Praparedness and Engineering Response

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Office of InspJction and Enforcement vc . ?-

/ U.S. Nuclear Replatory Commission b

FROM:

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, Richard W. Krimm NIEk

' ~ Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs ,

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SUBJECT:

Exercise Report for tLe) March 6,1985 Exercise of the Offsite j

, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plans for the

. Zfon Nuclea'r Power Plant (NPP)

. - , 4 Attached +are two copies of the Exercise Report for the March 6,1985, joint exercife Jof the off[ site REP plans for the Zion NPP. ~The report, dated April 30,19dj,w#as prepared '

by Region V of the Federal' Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

One deficiency affectf19 the public health add safety (Category A) was identified during the ' course of the exercise. The Categori A deficiency (NUREG evaluation criterion J.10.j) for Lake County, Illir.ois resulted because

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proper procedures for determining appropriate traffic control measures were not followed and," as a results a road was allowed to remain opem by which the i public could have entered the-area affected by the plume. The Lake County staff respensible for access control shovld bd provided additi'onal training regarding proper procedures and their inplemuttation.- This training should also include ,

i a demonstration l/y the appropriate staff of their ability to effectively implement the procedures.

l FEMA Region V will provide a copy of this report to the State of Illinois and

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request a schedule of corrective actions. As soon as we receive and analyze the response, we will send you our determination.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861. ,.

Attachments As Stated ,

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EXERCISE REPORT ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY JOINT EXERCISE Facility Location: Located in the State of Illinois, Lake County, in the City of Zion, Illinois.

Exercise date: March 6, 1985 Date of Report: April 30, 1985

Participants:

State of Illinois (partial); Lake County, Illinois (full);

Curnee, Illinois ( full); North Chicago, Illinois (full);

Park City, Illinois (full); Waukegan, Illinois (full);

Winthrop Harbor, Illinois (full); Zion, Illinois (full);

State of Wisconsin (full); Kenosha County, Wisconsin (full);

Walworth County, Wisconsin (full); and Commonwealth Edison Company (full)

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION V NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION 300 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606

@569E90969- 850523 PDR ADOCK 05000295 F PDR

3 g MAY.17 '85 09:34 FEMA REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.02 {

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1. EXERCISE gUMMARY 5 tate of Illinois page 4 Lake County page 5 curnee page 5 North Chics 20 Page 6 Park City page 6 Vaukegan page 6

. Winthrop Marbor page 6 Zion page 6 State of Wisconsin page 6 Renosha County page 9 Walworth County page 11 II. EXERCISE REPORT A. Introduction Exercise Background page 13 Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments page 13 List of Evalustors page 13 Evaluation Criteria page 14 Exercise Objectives page 14 Summary of Scenario page 19 State and Local Resources Planned To le Used in the Exercise page 21 Deficiencies Noted In Past Exercises Which Persist page 22 Exercise Objectives Still To Be Ef fectively Achieved page 22 E. Narrative l

State of Illinois Page 24 Lake County page 28 Curnee Page 33 North Chicago page 33 Park City page 34 Waukegan page 34 Winthrop Harbor page 35

$ Zion page 36 State of Wisconsin page 36 Kenosha County page 45 Walworth County page 53 I

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.III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES State of Illinois Deficiencies Af fecting Public Health and Safety page 61 Other Deficiencies page 62 Recommendations page 63 Lake County Deficiencies Af fecting Public Health and Safety page 64 Other Deficiencies page 65 Recommendations page 66 State of Wisconsin Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety page 67 Other Deficiencies page 68 Recommendations page 69 Kenosha County Deficiencies Affecting Putlic Health and Safety page 70 Other Deficiencies page 71 Recommendations page 72 Walworth County Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety page 73 Other Deficiencies page 74 Recommendations page 75 3

'e o, t1AY.17 '85 09:35 FEf1A REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.03 I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

State _of Illinois The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ISDA) and th's Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) participated only to the extent necessary to support the local response effort and coordinate emergency activities with the State nf Wisconsin. For evaluation of this exercise it must also be noted that on the day of the exercise th; State of Illinois was experiencing major flood problems. Therefore, staff assigned to the exercise in the State Emergency Operations Center (E0C) had to be reassigned to support the State's response to the flood situation. The limited number of personnel who did participate in the exercise at the State EOC and the Radiological Energency Assessment Center (RIAC) capably supported the governmental units who were fully participating.

Many of the personnel assigned to the State EOC have participated in numerous nuclear power station exercises. The management of the emergency was satisfactory for the level of participation and the developing flood situation. The designated response positions were staffed according to the scenario and objectives. Information was exchanged and procedures were effectively implemented.

The operations officer held briefings and kept the staff fully apprised of events as the making process. y occurred. The staff participated in the decision The series of site specific plans were available and referred to as necessary. Message logs were kept and distributed to EOC staff. Message handling was efficient.

The Unusual Event classification was received at 0558, Alert at 0623, Site Area Emergency at 0810 and General Emergency at 0927. Protective action was ordered (shelter in place) at 0854 and upgraded (evacuate) at 0932 and 0954 The recommendations to activate the Prompt Alert and Motification System were made using the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (MARS) at 0854 and again at 0932 after the Governor's Declaration of Emergency.

The State EOC is functional for directing emergency operatio.ns.

Acenmodations are present to house operations personnel for an extended period. Emergency elsesification levels were posted. Status boards l

were kept current and have high visibility.

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i Communicationa hetween the State EOC and other points were ef fective and efficient. Telephone was the principal means of establishing the exchange of information. Periodically comununications were interrupted i between the State IOC and the Winthrop Harbor E0C on the NARS. Backup cgamunications systems were effectively utilised during this period.

Iiformation exchange between E8DA and FEMA Region V was by teletype. p The IDNS was partially participating in the exercise and had personnel at the REAC, the State EOC, the Joint Public Inforestion Center (JFIC) and the Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government Southeast Area Office.

Comunication occurred on a regular basis between Illinois and Wisconsin staff concerning protective action decisions. All State objectives were met consistent with the level of participation.

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The State of Illinois demonstrated their capability to activate and j fully staff the JPIC in a timely manner. After some early problems i press briefings were coordinated, timely and contained factual information. Protective action recommendations contained all the necessary precautions with the exception of information for transient I populations. In view of the close proximity of Illinois Beach State Park both north and south of Zion Station, special' attention should be i given to the transient population.

The State of Illinois provided appropriate recovery and reentry recommendations to the local ~ governments in a timely fashion. The

. scenario was sufficient to initiate emergency response by the State organizations and to judge the capability of these emergency response organizations.

Lake County Key agencies and municipalities were notified by the Sheriff's dispatchers. An up to date call list was utilized with the time of agency notification recorded by the participants. The capability to activate the Lake County Community Coordination Center (CCC) was not fully demonstrated. It was partially set up prior to the exercise.

The CCC was fully staf fed by all agencies listed in the plan, however a complete shift change was not demonstrated. The ability to make decisions and coordinate emergency activities was demonstrated by a well-managed staff.

The CCC was fully equipped, well lighted and had all the necessary

amenities. The Sheriff's dispatch center has primary and backup communication systems with all the necessary locations. The personnel were trained and performed their tasks in an efficient manner. A

, simulated activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System (sirens, EBS, tone alert radios) was accomplished within a fif teen 2

minute period. The CCC staff demonstrated the organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation. The special evacuation of simulated mobility impaired individuals was successful, however, there should be

. additional training for the emergency workers that escort the mobility impaired individuals during the evacuation.

Although every other-aspect of the objective to control access to an evacuated area was demonstrated by the CCC staff, the proper procedures for determining appropriate traffic control measures were not followed and, as a result, a road'was allowed to remain open by which the public could have entered the area af fected by the plume.

Lake County did not send a PIO to the JPIC. A press briefing area was not set up at the CCC and no press briefings were' presented. The ability to coordinate press' releases with the JPIC was accomplished through the use of telephone'and datafax. The CCC staff demonstrated

! the ability to determine and implement appropriate procedures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Gurnee The EOC was activated and staffed in an efficient manner. The facilities have the necessary amenities to support emergency

operations. Communications to and from Lake County were ef ficient.

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. North Chicago Activation and staffing of the EOC was completed in an efficient manner with all key organizations present. EOC operations were coordinated by the ESDA Coordinator. The facilities contained the necessary amenities and displays for emergency operations. The communications were able to support exercise activity.

Park City The Director was knowledgeable of the actions he and his staff are required to implement during an emergency. The EOC was activated and staffed in an efficient manner. They have the capability to control traffic.from the Great America Theme Park.

Waukegan All Key organizations were present in the EOC. Information flow and message handling were good. However, the handling of mutual aid requests from the CCC showed a need for improvement in the area of decision making and operations management. Facilities, displays and '

communications were adequate to support activities at this exercise.

Winthrop Harbor

.All key staff members were present in the EOC. The ability to make

. decisions and to coordinate emergency activities was demonstrated.

Occasional break-up of NARS voice communications was experienced and backup communications (commercial telephone) were successfully utilized.

Zion The ability to mobilize the staff and activate the facilities was fully demonstrated. The ESDA Coordinator was clearly in charge of the EOC.

The facility has the necessary amenities and displays. The EOC staff successfully initiated the activity with respect to the special evacuation of simulated mobility impaired individuals.

State of Wisconsin Activation and staffing procedures of the Wisconsin State EOC were fully demonstrated. The capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> activation of emergency response organization was demonstrated by the use of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> emergency call list.

Notification of the EOC personnel to mobilize and staff the EOC was initialed at 0615 by the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> DEG Duty Officer. The EOC was fully staffed by 0805, approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 45 minutes from receipt of the declaration of the Alert emergency level classification.

At 1030 relief personnel were briefed and a shif t change was completed smoothly by 1100. Both shif ts displayed knowledge of their responsibilities and the ability to successfully implement them.

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MY.17 '85 09:36 FEMA REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.04 l

The Director of the DEC was in overall charge of emergency operations as provided for in the State plan. Senior DEG staff members were designated as "of ficare-in-charge" (01C) on each shif t. The 01C conducted periodic staff briefings. Copies of the current state plan were available and used during the exercise. Various staff agencies l

, had written procedures and check lists which they used.  ;

Message logs were kept by both the message controller and by individual agency representatives. The message controller reproduced and i distributed messages as appropriate. Overall, the message handling procedures were prompt and efficient. Although an exercise objective, the EOC staff did not initiate any request for Federal assistance.

The EOC is located in the lower level of the Hill Farm State Office Building. It comprises the day to day offices of DEG. The facility has sufficient equipment and supplies for extended operations.

Communications in the EOC was well organized and controlled. The Communications Room was equipped with various primary and backup communication systens. Conferencing was available for up to six lines within the EOC and with operator assistance a " bridge" could be arranged to allow a communication link with any number of outside lines. Communications to the JFIC was demonstrated using commercial l telephone as the primary system. Hard copy capabilities were demonstrated via telefax. The communication systems operators

' performed their functions well, demonstrating skill and their knowledge of responsibilities.

A comunication problem existed at the State Highway Patrol's District 2 Office in Waukesha, Wisconsin. The District 2 facility is J responsible for transmitting the initial notification and followup I

notification messages to Walworth County. These messages were never received at the Walworth County EOC from District 2. A call was made from the Walworth EOC to the State IOC in Madison over a coimmercial l phone line at 0712. Notification of the Unusual Ivent (received by j Wisconsin at 0612) and the Alert (received by Wisconsin at 0630) was I

relayed during this call. Timely transmission of messages from the District 2 of fice continued to be a problem throughout most of the exercise. -

l The State Radiological Coordinator (SRC) and the dose assessment staff j were able to calculate dose projections based on both plant release data and readings from the field monitoring teams. These do*e estimates were calculated on a personal computer and were update 1 as conlltions changed. Monitoring teams were updated regularly and were i directed by the Forward Operating Center / Mobile Van.

krotectiveactionrecommendationdecisionsbasedonEPAexposure guidelines were given for both plume pathway and ingestion-pathway hasards. Theme rocassendations were coordinated awng the states and the utility and were updated as appropriate. The decision for the use i i

of potassium iodide (KI) was based on the potential for release of I radiciodine and was consistent with the State Plan.

Field teams assembled promptly and were conscientious about preparing for dispatch to the field. Some equipment problems were noted including the lack of instrument calibrations, lack of a full instrument capability and out-of-date equipment. Although team members were very attentive to their duties, weaknesses exist with their training in preventing contamination to themselves and to equipment.

New radios were installed since the last exercise but transmission dead spots still remain. Team members were adaptive in dealing with radio problems. The procedure for taking exposure rate readings should be modified to avoid taking readings too close to large shielding objects like cars. Field equipment should be tested for cold weather performance.

While the EOC staff do not have a direct role in public alerting, they do confirm the recommendation of the utility and direct the county to implement their alerting procedures. The state EOC staff also relay protective action information for use in public instruction, to the county and the JPIC.

Recommendations from the SRC to the operations room directed evacuation of Kenosha County to ten miles in downwind sectors. These instructions were relayed to the county and the JPIC by the operations room staff.

The Kenosha County plan states that when any part of the City of Kenosha is evacuated the entire City will be evacuated. The County plan has been approved by the State. Therefore protective action recommendations from the State to Kenosha County should conform to conditions in the State approved county plan.

Recommendations from the SRC to the operations room directed placing cattle within ten miles on stored feed. This information was relayed to the JPIC at 0935 and released by the JPIC at 0950. The Wisconsin Department of Agriculture at 1026 sent instructions to Kenosha County and Walworth County to shelter animals out to fourteen miles and place them on stored feed. These instructions were later recinded by the SRC and OIC without discussion with the Agriculture representative.

Space is available at the EOC for press briefings. No briefings were conducted at this location as all inquiries were referred to the JPIC in Zion, Illinois. There were suf ficient staf f present at the JPIC to conduct extended operations. There was some initial confusion concerning the location of the working area. Once this confusion was resolved the space requirement was well met. A move to the backup location at Northbrook, Illinois was simulated. Communications to and from the JPIC appear to be adequate although JPIC phone numbers utilized at the beginning of the exercise were incorrect.

Media kits (Illinois) were available and regular briefings were held.

Some briefings were not timely. After some early problems the coordination among the PIO's improved as they gained experience in working with each other. The briefings did not always provide sufficient detail to make maximum use of the news media as a key channel of information and instruction to the public. For example, EBS messages were not transmitted to the JPIC for use by the PIO's. A rumor control number was distributed for the Madison hotline.

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', my.17 '85 09:37 fem REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.05 Recovery and reentry procedures were implemented by the SRC and his staff. These measures were appropriate and consistent with the recovery and reentry protective action guidelines presented in the HMS publication, FDA 82-3196.

Kenosha County Renosha County demonstrated the ability to mobilise staff and activate facilities promptly. This demonstration followed the Alert classification notification that was received at 0629 by the County Communications Center. Initial notification was received over the NAWAS dedicated phone and verified by a call to the utility.

Notification was later received over the NARS phone and a hard copy form completed by the dispatcher. Three dispatchers were assigned to

' es11 EOC staff members. The call-outs were completed in less than 25 minutes and the EOC staff mobilized within one hour af ter initial notification.

The IOC staff included representatives from fourteen organisations.

The utility also provided a staff member on assignment from the E0y.

Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated with a roster and by carrying out an efficient shift change. The new shift was provided with a multi- departmental briefing. Both shifts demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of their responsibilities and promptly acted on their assignments.

The EOC staff demonstrated effective interaction among the response organizations within the EOC and with their respective emergency workers in the field. The EOC had all required maps, status boards and operational amenities to support short and long term emergency response actietties.

The primary communication linking the EOC with the state, utility, Federal agencies, EBS, JPIC and schools was by land line. Radio backup was provided by a number of high and low band radio systems in the County Communications Center which is located in the same building as the EOC. The EOC was directly linked to the Connunication Center by a phone-intercom. The EOC communications area also conceined a NAWAS and MARS dedicated phone, teletype and radio that linked southeastern Wisconsin County and Municipal agencies.

Actions were initiated following the 0817 notification of the site Area Emergency classification when sirens, voice radios an1 EM were activated. These three nstificetian systems were again activate 1 In rewpese to a shelter recommendation fran the State. In addition, the Kenosha City Police and County.8heriff's Department performed route alerting with public address messages to supplement fixed siren warning

$nthe10-mileEpZ. Throughout the shelter and evacuation perioja the alerting continued every fif te n minutes with the strens, voice ra tins an1 E43.

During the shelter, evacuation and reentry perioda prescripted movvag.es were distributed to the public via the EBS and voice radio. Messages used in these transmissions were derived directly from the County emergency plan. The content of these messages was clear and described the area af fected in familiar geographic terms.

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e, 11AY.17 '85 09:37 FEMA REGICN V CHICAGO 1 P.06 There was an evacuatio.1 of a cross section of the population which included school children, the handicapped and masbers of the general population of the county. Seventeen (17) handicapped individuals, accompanied by an Agency coordinator and the bus driver from the.

Kenosha Achievement Center, were evacuated by bus to a reception at / congregate Burlington, care center at the W' int 1u t Center Crade School, Wisconsin.  !

l The evacuees were proceste:1 at the reception / congregate care center where they were first monitored for potential radiation contamination i by a monitoring team from the State of Wisconsin Radiation Protection j

  • Section an1 the Italversity of Wisconsin Safety tiepartment. Thereafter, they were registered at the center by staff of the Ken >s'io Caunty Social Services Agency, accompanied by two nurses from the Xenosha City Public Health Department and the American Red Cross.

The avacuses were fed by the Red Cross and later returned to the Achievement Center.

In addition, thirty-five (35) students, three teachers and the bus driver were evacuated by hun from the Pleasant Prairie School to the Lakeland Counseling Center in Elkhorn, Wisconsin (Walworth County).

The staff procedurally demonstrated the manning of access control points on maps in the 500.

They additionally dispatched County l personnel control points.

of the Sheriff's and Highway Departments to two of the accesa

! They set up barricades to simulate control (ingress / egress) of the sheltered / evacuated area. The County Sheriff,

Kenosha Police Chief, County Righway Commissioner and Kenosha Chairman identified and coordinated the resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation.

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' Kenosha County denonstrated the ability to continously vuonitor and l

control emergency worker exposure. Suitable dosimeters ware available, exposure cards were issued and the EOC staff monitored their exposure.

Personnel in the field from the County Sheriff's Department and the County Department of Highways demonstrated and indicated a lack of training and understanding of dosimetry and the need to maintain radiation exposure recorda.

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The EOC staff demonstrated the ability to supply and administer KI once the decision had been made to do so. Supplies of actual RI were available but a substitute was used for the purposes of the exercise. i The administration of K1 was conducted at the appropriate tim- and  !

written Information on the KI was provided.

The r.0C staff made the decision for raentry af ter an extensive discussion an.1 a IV.S notification by the State that restricted reentry was recomended.

Procedures for reentry were derived from the county ganandimplementedthroughtheEOCdepartmentrepresentatives. The EOC ati staff expressed concern that t1.*y did not have current radiological ,

i meterological data and related health /a4Fety information to include in th,tr runtry planning. i i

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'. MAY.17 '85 09:38 FEMA REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.07 Walworth County Walworth County is a host county for Kenosha County residents. During this exercise Walworth County demonstrated its ability to alert and mobiliae staff and activate facilities. The facilities were fully' atsffed and staffing was maintained around the clock through the use of shift changes. The County 20C and one selected reception / congregate care facility were activated to demonstrate the adequacy of these facilities and displays to support emergency operations. The population distribution map by sector around the Zion Nuclear Power Plant was not available in the Walworth County E0C as a display map.

It is reconsended this display map be obtained by Walworth County and used in future exercises.

The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organisations and field personnel was demonstrated. The Federal evaluation team is aware of the new communications center scheduled for the E00 which should further enhance capability in this area. It should be noted the State Patrol District 2 office failed to establish and maintain communications with Walworth County early in the i

exercise. The District 2 office never did notify Walworth County of the tlnusual Event or Alert classification at the Zion nuclear power station. Walworth County, once aware of a probles at the Zion Nuclear Power Plant, took corrective action and obtained information either from the State EOC in Madison or Kenosha County. It should also be pointed out the Courthouse telephone system failed during the exercise 4

but the EOC telephone system continued to operate since it is a system separate from the Courthouse.

Walworth County staff also demonstrated the organisational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of a simulated 40,000 Kenosha residences to reception / congregate care facilities located in Walworth County. Part of this demonstration of capability involved the reception of students and teachers from the Pleasant Prairie School from Kenosha County to the reception / congregate care facility at the Lakeland Counseling Center. Access control was planned and actually demonstrated at three access control pointa. Estimates of expected traffic volumes sere considered and appropriate resources were

, identified to keep the evs.cuation routes clear, even in the event of bad weather or stalled / wrecked cars. Kenosha County residente evacuated to the Walworth County reception / congregate care facilities 7 were monitored for possible contamination and registered upon arrival,

' The Walworth County Department of Social Services and Red Cross planned for and simJ1sted mass feeding of the evacuees from Kenosha County.

I j Walworth County did not develop EBS messages. In addition, a problem j tys experienced in coordinating information with the JFIC. E0C i

briefings and public announcements did not include detailed information

on activities taken by Walworth County. The messages were general in nature, sostime insceurate and were basically a repest of information provided by the State.

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Tha cbility to datormina end ispiscent cppropriate secouras for controlled recovery and reentry operations was demonstrated. The Walworth County Board Chairman issued a media message announcing the start of recovery and reentry operation. This message identified routes (highways) Kenosha County evacuees should use in returning to their homes. Walworth residents were advised to avoid these routes.

Access control was maintained and congregate care facilities were kept open until all Kenosha evacuees cleared Walworth County.

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II. EXERCISE REPORT A. Introduction Exercise Background This was the third joint exercise for Illinois and Wisconsin resulting from a simulated accident at the Zion Nuclear Power Station. The first joint exercise was on July 29, 1981 and involved full participation by the States of Wisconsin and Illinois, Lake County, Illinois and Kenosha County, Walworth County and Racine County, Wisconsin. As a result of exercise omissions, a remedial exercise for Kenosha County was held on October 7, 1981 to fully demonstrate emergency response capabilities. The second joint exercise was on January 18, 1983 and involved partial participation by the States of Wisconsin and Illinois and full participation by Lake County and Kenosha County. This report addresses the most recent joint exercise for the Zion Nuclear Power Station which was conducted on March 6, 1985.

Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments The emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Zion Nuclear Power Station impacts on both of the States of Illinois and Wisconsin.

The inhalation EPZ encompasses portions of Lake County and Kenosha County as well as Lake Michigan. In addition to these areas, there are eleven counties, five in Wisconsin and six in Illinois, which are within the ingestion EPZ. These counties, Jefferson, Milwaukee, Racine, Walworth and Waukesha in Wisconsin and Boone, Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Kane and McHenry in Illinois, did not demonstrate the procedures for implementation of ingestion EPZ protective actions as this activity was beyond the scope of this exercise. This was a full participation exercise for the State of Wisconsin, Kenosha County and Lake County and a partial participation exercise for the State of Illinois. Walworth County participated fully to demonstrate their capability as a host county in support of the Kenosha County evacuation. This ;ise was initiated at night during non-duty hours and conducted curing both non-duty and normal working hours.

List of Evaluators For this exercise, there was a total of twenty-one (21) federal

evaluators observing off-site exercise activities. On-site activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Of the off-site evaluators, eight, including the Off-site Exercise Evaluation Team Director, were FEMA Region V staff; nine were contract evaluators from the Argonne National Laboratory ( ANL); and four were representatives of federal agencies comprising the Regional Assistance Committee.

These four evaluators were from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The evaluator assignments were as follows.

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O Off-site Exercise Evaluation Team Director Wallace Weaver, FEMA State of Wisconsin Evaluation Team Ray Kellogg, Team Leader, FEMA Anna Hart, USDA Eileen Courter, FEMA Cindy Boggs-Mayes, DOE Larry Jensen, EPA Kenisha County Evaluation Team Woodie Curtis, Team Leader, FEMA Cary Kaszinski, ANL Sue Ann Curtis, ANL Walworth County Evaluation Team Dan Bement, Team Leader, FEMA Bill Gasper, ANL Bill Knoerzer, ANL State of Illinois Evaluation Team Gordon Wenger, Team Leader, FEMA Jim Opelka, ANL Marcia Smith, NRC Lake County Evaluation Team Ed Robinson, Team Leader Ed Tanzman, ANL Walter O'Keefe, FEMA (Red Cross Representative)

Bob Rospenda, ANL Ken Lerner, ANL Kim Suchy, ANL Evaluation Criteria The plans being evaluated by this exercise were developed using the " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1). Therefore, these criteria and the execrit based on these criteria, " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation" dated June 1983, were used for exercise evaluation.

Exercise Objectives Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the 35 standard objectives listed in Tab "M" of the " Modular Format For i

Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations" dated June,1983. The objectives numbers listed below correlate to Tab "M".

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The State of Wisconsin selected the following twenty-one (21) objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise.

1. - Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate

. emergency activities.

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
6. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.
7. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
8. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uci/CC in the presence of noble gases.
9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection, transport and analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water, and milk.
10. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.
11. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on FACs and other relevant factors.
12. Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards.
13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
21. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

15

22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.
24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.
34. Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure.
35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Kenosha County selected the following nineteen (19) objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
16. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

16

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
18. . Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.
19. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.
20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.
24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
27. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Walworth County selected the following eleven (11) objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
15. Denonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

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. i

16. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as '

inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

27. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

The State of Illinois selected the following ten (10) objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

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3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.
35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Lake County selected the following twelve (12) objectives to be demonstrated during the exercise.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staf f and activate facilities promptly.
2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

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3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5. Demonstrate ability to. communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Summary of Scenario Zion Unit One is operating at full power. Unit Two is in cold

, shutdown due to a refueling outage. IC containment spray pump is out of service for diesel engine overhaul. IA reactor containment fan cooler is out of service due to bearing failure. The reserve feed breaker to bus 148 is out of service for a modification. An electrician has just completed his work for the day on a

, modification to add several switches on the containment isolation

! valve control panel. Due to cold temperatures, no auxiliary building supply fans are running, and one exhaust fan is running on each unit. Valve lineup for PT-6 on 1A containment spray pump is in progress.

At 0540, PT-6 has begun on IA containment spray pump. After one minute of operation, the ammeter pegs high and the breaker trips.

With this pump inoperable, technical specification requires shut down within four hours. The unit is started at .25% per minute

! and an Unusual Event is declared per EAL-13. Due to forced outages on several units and unusually high morning load, the load dispatcher requests that unit ramp downward be delayed as long as possible. At 0600 the ramp downward is stopped.

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i At 0615, the normal feed breaker to ESF bus 148 trips from unknown 1 cause. In response to the bus undervoltage signal, 1A diesel- '

generator starts, comes up to speed, and then trips on overspeed.

An Alert is declared per EAL-10 due to loss of power feed to the one operable containment spray pump. At 0700, Unit I resumes its 4

ramp down at .25% per minute.

At 0730, I A diesel generator has just been manually started af ter adjustment to its governor. Immediately after the engine is loaded, a fire breaks out. Personnel evacuate the room, but CO2 fire protection fails to actuate. The fire alarm is sounded, and offsite assistance is requested. A Site Area Emergency is declared per EAL-5.

At 0830, Unit 1 experiences a pressurizer low-pressure safety injection. Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity are elevated. Containment radiation monitors alarm and indicate full-scale (10R/hr.). One extended range containment radiation monitor spikes to 1500 R/hr, and then returns to its normal 2R/hr. Due to the inoperable containment spray pumps, containment pressure remains elevated near 40 psig, decreasing slowly. A Site Area Emergency is in ef fect per EAL-17.

At 0915, U-1 stack monitor alarms and indicates a release rate of 7.5 E + 04 uCi/sec. A General Emergency is declared per EAL 22.

At this time, wind speed is 2.5 m/sec and wind direction is from 165 degrees. Stability class is E.

At 0945, the U-1 stack monitor indicates 2 E + 07 uCi/sec and increasing. Operators have identified the source of the release as either the purge valves or the containment pressure and vacuum relief line.

At 1015, stack release rate is 3.5 E + 08 uCi/sec and holding steady. At 1115, containment spray capability is restored. This improves cooling and pressure reduction in containment. At 1145, a valve is closed to isolate the vent path and terminate the release. At 1150, a time-jump of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is given at this point. (1230 on March 7, 1985). At 1230, the plant is now in cold shutdown. Recovery / reentry phase has been initiated. At 1400, exercise terminated.

There were three separate limited evacuations conducted concurrent with this exercise, two in Wisconsin and one in Illinois. The Wisconsin evacuations involved school children, special needs individuals and the general population and were conducted as part of the general exercise scenario. Some of these people were transported to a shelter in Walworth County and the remainder to a shelter in Burlington, Wisconsin. The Illinois evacuation was conducted as a separate sub-scenario to the general exercise scenario. Around the time of the General Emergency declaration, Lake County and the City of Zion were notified that they were to evacuate mobility impaired individuals in their sector of the 20 4

- - - - - - - - - - - , . - - - . , , - - - - . - .,n , -, -- .-----,--e - , , - - ---

EPZ. They were told that for safety reasons, the mobility impaired should be transported out of the EPZ and sheltered at a relocation center. Navy corpsmen and Red Cross volunteers acted as the handicap individuals and were placed into various locations in the Zion area. They were picked up by handicap equipped vehicles and transported to a shelter in McHenry County.

The actual exercise events followed the pre-exercise scenario.

The Unusual Event was declared at 0540, the Alert at 0619, the Site Area Emergency at 0803 and the General Emergency at 0920.

The 24-hour time-jump prior to initiation of recovery / reentry activities occured at 1320. The simulated accident at the Zion Nuclear Power Station resulted in both sheltering and evacuation protective action recommendations (0854), protective action upgrades (0932 and 0954) and potassium iodide considerations as planned in the pre-exercise scenario. All three limited evacuations were conducted as planned. The simulated emergency was downgraded to Site Area Emergency at 1200.

State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise During this exercise the State of Wisconsin planned to use the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Madison; the State area EOC in Waukesha; the Joint Public Information Center in Zion, the State Field Monitoring Team and the State Radiologia1 Health Monitoring Team. They also planned to use the necessary communicatins systems to conduct emergency operations.

Kenosha County planned to demonstrate its EOC facilities, emergency response staff and communications systems. The county also chose to demonstrate its capabilities for supplemental route alerting, access control and planning and controlling two sample relocations of evacuees. Reception and congregate care procedures were demonstrated at a school in Burlington. In addition to its EOC facilities, emergency response staf f and communications systems, Walworth County also chose to demonstrate its capabilities for access control, controlling limited relocation of l evacuees and reception and congregate care procedures.

1 The State of Illinois planned to use the State EOC in Springfield, the State Radiological Emergency Assessment Center in Springfield and the Joint Public Information Center in Zion. They also planned to use the necessary communications systems to conduct

! emergency operations.

I In addition to its Community Coordination Center facilities, emergency response staf f and communications systems, Lake County also chose to demonstrate its capabilities for access control and j planning and controlling a limited relocation of evacuees.

l Reception and congregate care procedures were demonstrated at a school in McHenry County. The communities of Gurnee, North i

Chicago, Park City, Waukegan, Winthrop Harbor and Zion fully activated their EOC facilities, emergency response staff and communications systems in support of the Lake County emergency l response.

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.. _ . __ __ . . . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . - . ~ .

i Deficiencies Noted in Past Exercises Which Persist There were no significant deficiencies identified during the evaluation 'of the January 18, 1983 joint exercise for.the Zion Nuclear Power' Station. There were sixty-one (61) minor 7 deficiencies identified during that exercise in the areas of j plans, training and resources. While minor deficiencies did not

^

require a schedule of corrective actions and were not " tracked" by FEMA, these sixty-one(61) minor deficiencies were reviewed during i

this exercise evaluation to determine if the appropriate corrective actions have been implemented. The results of this review are discussed btlow. None of the deficiencies noted below j seriously affect the givernmental jurisdiction's capability l

related to public health and safety. ,

The State of Illinois had twenty-two (22) minor deficiencies. As l' a result of this Zion exercise and the two previous State of

Illinois full participation exercises (Byron in 1983 and Quad a

-Cities in 1984), all of them have been corrected and the t-corrective actions demonstrated as appropriate. Lake County had twelve (12) minor deficiencies. As a result of'this Zion exercise nine (9) have been corrected and the corrective actions demonstrated as appropriate. Two (2) are under the preview of the

-NRC and are considered during the utility hospital medical drill (F.2. and K.5.b. ) . The remaining minor deficiency (K.3.a.) was

not an exercise objective and will be addressed during a future
biennial exercise.

o The State of Wisconsin had fourteen (14) minor deficiencies. As a ,

result of this Zion exercise, thirteen (13) hav'e been corrected and the corrective actions demonstrated as appropriate. The j remaining minor deficiency (H.7.) was partially corrected, however, calibration stickers were not in evidence for all field equipment. Kenosha County had thirteen (13) minor deficiencies.

As a result of this Zion exercise, twelve (12) have been corrected and the corrective actions demonstrated as appropriate. The remaining minor deficiency (K.3.b.) involved emergency worker I

exposure control. Emergency workers in the field-during this exercise exhibited the need for additional depth of training 'in this area.

Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved l Because of the deficiencies noted elsewhere in this report, the j following exercise objectives were not completely demonstrated.

l Appropriate action will be required to correct the exercise i

deficiencies and these objectives must be successfully demonstrated during the next radiological emergency preparedness

[ biennial exercise for the' Zion Nuclear Power Station.

, For the State of Wisconsin, the following four objectives were not j completely demonstrated.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate i

emergency activities.

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5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection, transport and analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water, and milk.
32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.

For Kenosha County, the following two objectives were not completely demonstrated.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

For Walworth County, the following two objectives were not completely demonstrated.

, 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

For the State of Illinois, the following objective was not completely demonstrated.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute' appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.

For Lake County, the following four objectives were not completely demonstrated.

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
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B. N3rretivo Stnte of Illinois -

Activation and Staffing The March 6, 1985 exercise of the Zion Nuclear Power Station was the third such exercise in which the State of Illinois participated. The State of Illinois participation in this exercise was limited in that the Emergency Servics and Disaster Agency (ESDA) and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) activated and staffed facilities sufficient to support the emergency response being demonstrated by Lake County. Further,

'these agencies also coordinated emergency response activities with the State of Wisconsin to support its full participation demonstration of emergency response activities.

The IDNS did demonstrate staff alerting and mobilization for the personnel assigned to simulate the function of the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) in Springfield. The ESDA had intended to demonstrate its ability to mobilize its staff and activate facilities upon receipt of the appropriate utility notification. However, just prior to and during the exercise, the State of Illinois experienced severe flooding within the State.

As a result, staff assigned to the exercise in the Springfield Emergency Operations Center (EOC) had to be reassigned to support the State's response to the flood situation. Thus, staff mobilization and facilities activation could not be fully demonstrated as planned.

Staff mobilization and activation of facilities have been evaluated and successfully demonstrated on numerous occasions during previous exercises within the State of Illinois. For this exercise, all of the designated' emergency response functions were staffed and the personnel who did participate in the exercise at the EOC and the REAC capably supported the governmental units who were funy participating in the exercise.

Emergency Operations Management The emergency operations management was satisfactory for the level of participation and the developing flood situation. Mr. Tom Zimmerman was the designated operations officer and was effectively in charge of the overall emergency response effort by the EOC staff. The ESDA Director, Mr. Charles Jones, was unable to be present at the on set of the exercise due to flood damage assessment, but did take an active interest in the exercise at the mid point when he returned to Springfield.

The operations officer held briefings and kept staff current on happenings. Information was exchanged and' procedures were effectively implemented. The staff participated in decision making. The series of site specific plans were available and referred to on occasion. Message logs were kept and distributed to EOC staff. Message handling was efficient. A simulated request for assistance frtn FEMA (mobile connounications equipment) was prepared and sent to FEMA Region V.

24

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, N Y.17 '85 09:39 fem REGZON V CHICAGO 1 P.08 The Unusual F. vent classification was received at 0558, the Alert at 0623, the Site Area toergency at 0810 and the General Emergency

' at 0927. Protective action (shelter in place) was ordered at 0854 and upgraded (evacuate) at 0932 and 0954. The recommendatto.n to activate the Frompt Alert and Motification System was made using the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) at 0854 and again at 0932 af ter the Governor's Declaration of toergency.

Currently the State of Illinois is considering revision of the l NARS form. When revision is made it is suggested consideration be i

given to sequencia11y numbering the messages produced for quick reference and accountability and modifying the box designatore

from a letter to possibly a number to reduce confusion, especially in 48 wind direction data and #9 recommended protective actions.

l Facilities The State EOC is functional for directing emergency operations.

Furniture, space, lighting, communications equipment are exceptional. Outside notee presents no problem. Accomodations are present to house operations personnel for an extended period.

Emergency power capability is present but not activated during this exercise. Emergency cleosification levels were posted.

' Status boards were kept current and have high visibility. The required maps are present and are used during full participation esercises.

i The function of the REAC was being simulated during this exercise

' and the facilities were not fully activated and staffed. Adequacy of the REAC facilities has been demonstrated and evaluated in i

conjunction with previous exercises within the State of Illinois.

! Communications Communications between the $ tate IOC and other points were effective and efficient. Telephone (NARS and commercial) was the principal means of estabilshing the exchange of information. Hard copy capability exists between the EOC and the JpIC. periodically communications were interrupted between the State E0C and the vinthrop Harbor EOC on the NARS. This problem is addressed further later in this report. Information exchange between ESDA and FEMA Region V was by teletype.

' The NARS and commercial telephone lines utilized at the REAC functioned properly throughout the exercine. The capabi1Ity for l

hard copy transmission of news releases and color graphics 4 displays between the REAC and the JpIC should be considered to i sugment the capabilities of the IDNS staff at the Jpic. Effective cowsunications were maintained with the State of Wisconsin during this exereie, v'iich corrected the problems experiewe.1 et the l January 18, 1983 Zion Nuclear Nwer station exercise.

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Dose Assessment As noted earlier in the report, the function of the REAC was being simulated during the exercise. Neither dose assessment nor prctective action decision making were to be demonstrated.

Actions taken in Illinois were based on the pre-exercise scenario and the protective action recommendations of the utility and the State of Wisconsin. Before implementation of any protective actions was recommended to the EOC staff, IDNS staff coordinated the recommended actions with the State of Wisconsin dose assessment staff. Recommendations for protective actions for the State of Illinois were accomplished in a timely fashion, always within fif teen minutes of the receipt of the utility recommendations. Although not a specific exercise objective, there was a recommendation for the use of potassium iodide for emergency workers and selected populations within the EPZ. This recommendation was based on the release of radioiodine and was consistent with the State plan.

Public Alerting and Instruction The role of the State EOC is to disseminate protective action recommendations from the REAC to local governments for implementation. Further, the State EOC directs the activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System by local governments.

During this exercise, this was accomplished by use of the NARS for the sheltering recommendation at 0854, the first evacuation recommendation at 0932 and the expansion of the evacuation recommendation at 0954.

Protective Action Evacuation activities such as activation of reception centers, congregate care facilities, relocation of special needs individuals and access control are the responsibility of local governments. Ingestion pathway protective action was not an l objective for the State of Illinois during this exercise.

Radiological Exposure Control Since the Springfield EOC and the REAC are not within the 10-mile l EPZ and the forward command center and radiological field monitoring teams were not activated, radiological exposure control was not an objective for the State of Illinois during this exercise.

Media Relations The ESDA Public Information Of ficer (PIO) and IDNS P10 were represented at the JPIC. Because of personnel changes due to the flood situation, JPIC staff were prepositioned and staff activation and mobilization were not demonstrated. These

procedures have been observed at other exercises within the State of Illinois. Double staffing of personnel indicated a capability j to maintain 24-hour operations. Clerical help was available for 26 l

1

l MAY.17 '85 09:40 FEMA REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.09 messages, typing and reproduction. The IDMS and ISDA FIO's demonstrated their ability and knowledge of State and local responsibilities according to the State plan.

The F10's work area was well lighted, comfortable and well .

ventilated. Access to one copier was available. Typewriters were not available, however tables and space for them was available.

Approximately fifty members of the media could be ctwofortably acconrnodated at each briefing. A separate conference room was located near the Emergency Operations Pacility (EOF) for the FI0's and their clerical staff to use. This area was not fully used during the exercise. This conference room was large enough to be used as an interview room at the same time. Visual aid equipment (TV sonitor, taping, video, etc.) was available but not demonstrated. One large map was on the wall and used to show sheltering and evacuation areas.

The interia JPIC is located within two miles of the Elon Nuclear Power Station. A simulated relocation to the alternate JPIC at the Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) corporate office in j Northbrook, 1111nois occurred during the exercise. Haps with directions to the alternate facility were distributed to the media.

Commercial telephone lines were the primary consunications link between the JFIC and other locations. Hard copy capability was available over these commercial telephone lines. Speaker phones were available to JFIC staff upon request. Eight telephones were activated for this amercise of a total capability for twenty lines. Illinois Bell maintenance was on call for this esercise and was instrumental in resolving a problem with the telephones at the initial activation of the JFIC.

Illinois Press Packets were available for the media and contained plant emergency information, an EFZ map, an overview of the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA) and population

estimates. Press briefings were held every hour with a total of five conducted. Hard copy of the press briefings was available within an hour. Technical jargon and acronyms were evolded and neps were used to locate sectors involved in protective action recommendations.

Initial Press Briefings were confused as far as coordination of i information between Wisconsin, Illinois and Ceco F10's. This was worked out by all F10's and resulted in a well coordinated effort at later presa briefings. A TV was on in the FIO conference room and was occasionally checked. However, there was no media

information to monitor. 8 tate af Illinois provided reporters with 1

,, a special telephone number to answer questions concerning factual 4

infornation.

Emergency public instructions were not drafted at the JPIC. But emergency information was provided to the media by the FI0's. The sheltering instruction was clear as to closing windows, shut of f ventilation etc however transient population was not addressed.

j People were instructed not to go to schools to pick up children but to listen to EBS as to where they would be evacuated and proceed there.

27

Deficiency: E.7. Media briefings and information released at the JPIC diff not address the transient population.

4 Jecommendation: The JPIC is used to reinforce the information pr.vided by local governments directly to the public by means of the EBS. The transient popalation was adequately addressed in the vs.rious EBS announcements. As the ESDA PIO is the focal point for public information at the JIIC, local governments should provide copies of their EBS announcemeets to the ESDA PIO at the JPIC for dissemination to the media. This would ensure that the appropriate information is released to the media at the JPIC.

Rumor control was not an objective for the State of Illinois' during this exercise. However, the local number to call regarding the Zion Nuclear Power Station is listed in the CECO emergency pamphlet.

Rec 7very and Reentry The REAC receiued the utility recommendation for reentry and coordinated action with the State of Wisconsin. The #

+

recommendation to allow reentry was then forwarded to the EDJ I for dissemination to local governments for implementation. These recommendations were based on appropriate information and transmitted to local governments in a timely fashion.

Sctuario l

The scenario was sufficient to initiate emergency response by the State organizations and to evaluate the capability of these i emergency response organizations. Further, the scenario allowed for the full demonstration of the objectives selected for this exercise by tho State of 111,inois. ,

l Lake County Activation and Staffing In' general, the' activation and staffing of the Lake County Community Coordinator Center (CCC) was smooth and ef ficient. The initial notification of an Unusual Event came at 0618 from the i State ESDA to the Sheriff's dispatcher via the NARS line, which is

continuously monitored. The staff was notified in accordance with
the plan and SOPS by the Sheriff's dispatcher. The County ESDA l Coordinator arrived during the Unusual Event classification, and
most of the staff arrived between 0845 and 0915. Since every i

staff position has both a primary person and an alternate, each with both home and business telephone numbers, it is reasonable to expect that the staff can be activated under any circumstances.

All of the organizations called for in the plan were represented, except for the Salvation Army. Most of the organizations,-

demonstrated a shif t change and all of the replacements knew their jobs atd what had happened during the previous shift.

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-_ _ . _ ,, .. .- _____ _ _ _ _ _______ _ _. _ =__

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A shif t change was not demonstrated by Commonwealth Edison, the Park District, the North Shore Sanitary District, the Great Lakes Naval Training Center and the Fire Chiefs. While some of these organizations did not have backup staff present for good reasons, all should demonstrate their capability to operate for long periods by presentation of a roster, double staffing or performing a shift change at the next exercise. The plan does not mention j that the Great Lakes Naval Training Center is to be represented in  ;

the CCC. Since it was, both at this exercise and previously, its  !

responsibilities should be formally incorporated into the plan. ]

l Emergency Operations Management The CCC was a well-run operation. The County Board Chairman and his replacement were in charge and assured that the CCC operations l ran smoothly, without becoming overwhelmed by the technical details of the response organizations. The staff had copies of their own SOPS and the County ESDA Coordinator had a copy of the County plan. Message handling was smooth. The CCC was notified of emergency classification changes and recommended protective '

actions promptly upon their receipt by the Sheriff's dispatcher.

The staff.was very closely involved in the decisions and coordinated their responses well.

While the staf f briefings were frequent, informative and effective, they could be enhanced by utilizing the technical experts present. For example, it would have benefited the staff i for the utility representative to have explained early in the accident how the plant worked and what had gone wrong in lay terms. Similarly, the IDNS representative could have been asked to go over the wind and other weather conditions in detail, as well as the types of radioactive releases that might result and their respective dangers. Finally, coordination among staff actions might have been enhanced if the CCC Director had asked each staff member what they expected to do next if things got worse and not just what was happening currently.

Facilities 1

The' facility contained all the necessary amenities with adequate

! space and lighting. The Sheriffs dispatch center is located in the same building with easy access from the CCC operations room. ,

j, There was a time during the exercise when the conversation became L loud, however this was taken care of very quickly by the person in -

charge. The County can support extended operations at the -

Winchester House located in close proximity to the CCC. The County has an agree:3*t with the Winchester House to house and feed emergency works?2 if necessary. Backup power is available in

the EOC from a 100 KW generator. The emergency classification levels were posted and the status board visible throughout the room with major events posted. All the necessary maps were posted, which corrects the minor deficiencies noted at the previous exercise. '

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. _, - -.- ,_, ._ , ,, - . , - . ~ , _, ,,

Communications The County has primary and backup communications with all EOC's licensee, EBS Station, media center, support hospitals and ambulances. Conferencing capability is available through the use of r.sdio. They have hard copy capability through the use of data-fax. The Communications Center is a new installation at the CCC. It is well lighted and ventilated. The Sheriff dispatchers were trained and were able to perform their assigned tasks in a efficient manner. Appropriate backup communications were utilized during this exercise thereby correcting a minor deficiency noted during the January 18, 1983 exercise.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation This is a State objective and thus not demonstrated by Lake County.

Public Alerting and Instruction The CCC teceived a NARS message from IESDA at 0854 with instructions to notify the public to shelter in place within the 0-2 mile radius. At 0901 the'EBS was activated with the sirens and tone alert radios activated (simulated) at 0903. Waukegan and North Chicago were similarly instructed to activate their public alerting by the CCC staff. The appropriate prescripted messages listed in the plan were used to inform the public. These messages contain all of the appropriate information for sheltering procedures and transient population. The appropriate procedures were followed when the protective actions were upgraded to include evacuation later in the exercise. o In the rec'very and reentry phase of the exercise the County Board Chairman formulated an EBS message informing the public what actions they should take. This same message was relayed to the JPIC by the County Board Chairman.

Protective Action Traffic control points were established to correspond to the protective actions ordered at 0932, and then altered when-evacuation was ordered in sectors Q, R and A out to ten miles at 0954. Help was requested from the State Police to cover several gaps. CCC staff recognized the threat of snow to an effective evacuation and the highway and public works department felt they could keep evacuation routes clear during all but the worst weather. Most towing in Lake County is accomplished by private companies. In case of an evacuation, they would be needed to i supplement the few government-owned trucks. This situation should be addressed in the plan. Reception centers were activated ~by the Red Cross in a timely manner.

The selection of access control points following the order to l evacuate the 0-2 mile ring and sectors Q, R and A from 0-10 miles l

was deficient. Instead of consulting the procedure written for this purpose, traffic control points were selected based on the ,

experience of the CCC staff responsible for this function. As a 30 1

+.

result, traffic control point C-513 (intersection of Kilbourn and Russel Roads) was not blocked and people driving north on Kilbourn Road could have entered the plume just north of the Illinois -

Wisconsin state line. This problem may have been compounded by the fact that the map for tracking traffic control points did not include indicators of which roads had been blocked by Wisconsin or the Lake County Municipalities.

Deficiency: J.10.j. The proper procedures for determining appropriate traffic control measures were not followed and, as a result, a road was allowed to remain open by which the public could have entered the area affected by the plume.

Recommendation: The CCC staff responsible for access control should receive additional training on the procedures and implementation of those procedures. This training should also include a demonstration by the appropriate CCC staff of their ability to effectively implement the procedures.

The sub-scenario involving the demonstration evacuation of simulated mobility impaired and handicapped individuals was initiated at about the time of the Ceneral Emergency declaration.

Personnel at the CCC and the Zion EOC were tasked with the responsibility to evacuate the special needs individuals from the City of Zion. The transition into the sub-scenario went smoothly. As a first step, the normal procedures for alerting the Red Cross were utilized to notify them to standby to open a reception center and receive the evacuated individuals.

Upon notification of the need for shelter the McHenry County Red Cross responded to a predesignated school to prepare and open a shelter to provide for special-needs evacuees. This reception center was staffed by ESDA personnel and Red Cross volunteers with the McHenry County Sherif fs Department providing security. A health career training class, working with their nurse instructor, assisted with the registration and taking of vital signs.

Three separate vehicles were utilized to transport the special-needs individuals from their homes to the assembly area. At the assembly area, each individual was registered and the specific problem and special needs noted. When all the buses were back at the assembly point, they were dispatched to the reic;ation center in McHenry County.

Because of the significant number of special-needs individuals in the Zion area, the persons designated to assist in pick up should receive training to assist them in introducing the impaired person to the necessity of the move, should understand the requirements for the special movement of impaired persons (e.g. wheel chair movement), should have a personality and attitude conducive to this type of activity and should be specially trained to deal with special problems (e.g. child with animal concerned with leaving it behind or giving it up because "its my best friend").

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a The congregate care center at the Johnsburg High School was adequate to provide care for evacuees. Security was well maintained. The operation of the facility would be enhanced by separating the reception area from the area where vital signs were being recorded, by providing a separate area for the media and by designating a controlled area for handling special medical problems.

The drama club students and Navy corpsmen provided a realistic and positive training experience for those individuals involved with the relocation and care of the special-needs individuals.

Radiological Exposure Control This was not an objective for Lake County during this exercise.

Media Relations The Lake County PIO was not located at the JPIC, however, the ESDA P10 staff maintained telephone communication with County personnel and were informed of all local activities in progress. Facsimile messages were sent to the ESDA PIO to provide hard copy of local information and activities. Information in the fax messages regarding protective actions, relocation centers and reentry activities were then provided to the media by the ESDA PIO.

However, information for transients which was included in the EBS messages was not provided to the JPIC for dissemination to the media.

Deficiency: E.7. Media briefings and information released at the JPIC did not address the transient population.

Recommendation: The JPIC is used to reinforce the information provided by local governments directly to the public by means of the EBS. The transient population was adequately addressed in the various EBS announcements. As the ESDA PIO is the focal point for public information at the JPIC, local governments should provide copies of their EBS announcements to the ESDA PIO at the JPIC for dissemination to the media. This would ensure that the appropriate information is released to the media at the JPIC.

A media briefing area was not set up at or near the CCC. The plan dated February 1985 designates a primary and alternate location in Libertyville with the County Board Chairman and County

(

Administrator designated as the contact persons. The plan further states a public information officer will be sent to the EOF, however this was not done. Press releases were sent to the JPIC for release to the media by the ESDA PIO.

Deficiency: C.3.a. Lake County did not demonstrate its capability for handling the media as described in their plan.

Recommendation: Lake County should demonstrate its capability to activate a media briefing area and provide effective media briefings by the designated spokesperson at the next exercise for the Zion Nuclear Power Station.

32 I- _ _d

4 Recovery and Reentry Recovery and reentry were well demonstrated at the CCC. The evacuated areas were secured both with sherif f's deputies and 200 Illinois National Guardsmen. Provisions were made for allowing entry past traffic control points by those who needed access to the evacuated areas. The decision to reenter the plume EPZ once the radiation had subsided was communicated promptly to the CCC staff and then to their respective organizations. Each organization followed its SOPS for recovery, thinking through how this would be implemented in an orderly fashion. In particular, the Sheriff redeployed traffic control points so that deputies guarded four routes for residents to go home by which was announced over the EBS. Similarly, the school superintendent carefully thought through the best way to get evacuated children back'to their parents and then made sure it was announced over the EBS so that parents would know what to expect.

Scenario The scenario provided an adequate test for the CCC staff. It provided sufficient activity, was realistic, tested prior deficiencies and allowed Lake County to fully demonstrate the objectives selected for this exercise. A future exercise scenario should address the special considerations for evacuation of Illinois Beach State Park and/or Great America Theme Park on a summer weekend.

Gurnee The exercise scenario was not intended to have the plume enter the Gurnee area. However, the exercise did allow for the EOC Director and his staff to demonstrate a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. Specifically, Gurnee demonstrated a timely activation and staffing of its EOC. The facilities where the EOC was housed were more than adequate to support the activities of the EOC staff. Communications to and from the Lake County EOC were timely and efficient.

The EOC Director and his staff were competent in the performance of their duties. Although action was limited due to the scenario, the staf f discussed many hypothetical situations and appropriate actions and precautions they would take.

North Chicago The dispatchers' office received the initial notification and alerted the EOC staff using a written call list. On the Mayor's authorization, the ESDA coordinator initiated staff activation procedures at the Alert classification. Staffing was complete by the time the Site Area Emergency notification was received. All staff mobilization procedures were appropriately implemented.

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MAY.27 '85 09:40 FD1A REGZON V CHICAGO 1 P.10 h

All key organisations were present, specifically ESDA, the North ,

Chicago Mayor's office, and the police, fire, water and streets i departments. All positions were relieved by second shift staff at some time during the exercise. IOC operations were managed by the ESDA coordinator, with authorisation from the Mayor as appropriate. The staff kept up to date on the progress of the exercise and held periodic briefings.

Facilities and displays at the North Chicago IOC were good. All maps, including shelter locations, were posted. The telephone system was set up promptly. Consunications were adequate to support the exercise activity. Telephones were the primary communication system used. Radio communication was available to direct field units as needed. Backup radio communication to the CCC was demonstrated.

Park City Park City was not required to actively participate in this exercise since the plume was not near the E0C. However, the EOC Director was knowledgeable of the actions he and his staff would be required to take should the plume affect Park City. The exercise did allow for the E0C Director and his staff to demonstrate many emergency response activities.

Park City activated and staffed its E0C in a timely and efficient manner. The facilities were adequate enough to support a lengthy emergency. Communications and message handling were performed in a timely and efficient manner. The E0C Director demonstrated that he could handle a variety of response procedures should the plume enter Park City. Furthermore, they have the capacity to handle and control traffic out of the Creat America These Park. This is important given the traffic volume in and out of Great America on busy days.

Waukeaan The Police Dispatcher receives the initial energency notification and is staffed on a 24-hour basis. The dispatchers have written es11 lists to notify staff. All key organizations were present in the EOC, specifically ESDA, the Waukegan mayor's of fice, and the police, fire, water and public works departments. There was only a partial shift change. Second shift staff were brought in to relieve the ISDA, fire department and public works representatives. i l

All appropriate maps and displays were present within the E00.

Information flow and message handling in the E0C were efficient

n. However, the handling of mutual aid requests from the CCC showed a seed for improvement in the area of decision making and operations management. In response to a request from the fire department mutual aid contdinator at the CCC, two hundred transients evacuate 4 from the Illinois Beach State Park were sheltered (simulated) at the Waukagen fire station.

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Municipalities do not bear the primary responsibility for care of evacuees. The staf f should have recognized that provisions for monitoring, shelter and care of evacuees would be performed better at a designated congregate care center outside the EPZ.

Deficiency: J.10.h. Evacuees from the Illinois Beach State Park were sheltered in Waukegan instead of a designated congregate care facility outside of the EPZ.

Recommendation: The munic,ipalities within the EPZ should be instructed that only temporary staging for evacuation should occur within the EPZ and all sheltering activity should take place at the designated congregate care facilities. (Future free play activity in this area should be realistic with respect to sheltering locations.)

Facilities and displays at the Waukegan EOC were adequate to support activities for this exercise. Relocation center locations were available although not posted. Communications were adequate to support activities of this exercise. Primary (telephone) and backup (radio) communications were demonstrated with the CCC.

Winthrop Harbor The ability to mobilize staff and activate the facilities was demonstrated. The EOC was reported to be fully staffed and operational by about 0830. All key staff members were present.

Although not directly observed by the federal observer, staff changes occurred during the exercise. The ability to fully staff the facilities and maintain 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing was therefore, demonstrated. Overal1 management of the EOC was good. The ability to make decisie.s and to coordinate emergency activities was demonstrated.

The facilities at the new EOC are adequate, with the exception that the EOC building itself could not support extended operations due to lack of kitchen and sleeping facilities. The nearby fire department facilities could be used if necessary.

The communications systems at the Winthrop Harbor EOC were good and the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel was demonstrated. There was also a reported problem with the NARS message line to Winthrop Harbor. Occasional break-up of the voice communications was reported and the backup commercial telephone system had to be used. It is noted that the NARS line has not yet been hooked up to the new EOC building. The NARS calls presently come to the police station. The police dispatcher then relays the message to the E00 by commercial telephone. Permanent installation of the NARS at the new EOC location should be accomplished-as soon as possible.

35 t j

i Although public alerting was not an objective for Winthrop Harbor, several emergency vehicles were dispatched in free play to drive some routes to simulate route alerting. The ability to control access to an evacuated area and to control recovery and reentry was demonstrated by dispatching emergency vehicles to simulate traffic control.

Zion The ability to mobilize staff and activate the facilities was fully demonstrated. The EOC was fully staffed and operational at approximately 0730. All key staff members were present according to the plan. Shift changes with individual EOC staff members were performed periodically throughout the exercise. The ability to fully staff the facilities and maintain 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staf fing was, therefore, adequately demonstrated.

Management of the EOC was effective. The ESDA Coordinator was clearly in charge. The ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities was fully demonstrated.

The facilities at the City of Zion EOC are excellent. The adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency activities was demonstrated including the posting of maps showing relocation centers and population densities. However, the set-up time for the facilities could not be verified since the facilities were already partially set up. The communications systems at the EOC were very good. All systems, including the NARS line, operated trouble free. At one time during the exercise the status board indicated Site Area Emergency while the separate sign posting still showed Alert status. Care should be taken to have those displays consistent to avoid confusion on plant status.

Although public alerting was not an exercise objective for the Zion EOC, it participated by dispatching vehicles to simulate public alerting along some routes. However, the City of Zion EOC did demonstrate its organizational ability and resources necessary to assist in the orderly evacuation of part of the EPZ by arranging for buses and police vehicles for the evacuation of mobility impaired. Emergency vehicles were also dispatched for the simulation of traffic control points.

State of Wisconsin Activation and Staffing Activation and staffing procedures of the Wisconsin State EOC in Madison were fully demonstrated. The capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> activation of the emergency response organization was demonstrated by the use of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> emergency call list. Notification for the EOC personnel to mobilize and staff the EOC was initiated at 0615 by the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Division of Emergency Government (DEG) Duty Officer. The EOC was fully staffed by 0805.

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'. Bsecuse of the ocannrio of this exercise, notification procedures

. began while the EOC personnel were preparing for departure or were in transit to their place of work. Since some were in route, two phone calls were made by the Duty Officer and notification to mobilize to EOC was in some instances received upon arrival at the place of work. At 1030 relief personnel were briefed and a shift change was completed smoothly by 1100. Both shifts displayed knowledge of their responsibilities and the ability to successfully implement them.

Emergency Operations Management The DEG Director was in overall charge of emergency operations, as provided for by the State plan. Senior staff members were.

designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) on each shift. The OIC conducted periodic staff briefings, involving the full staff in the decision making process. Copies of the current State plan, written procedures and check lists were available and used throughout the exercise. Messaje logs were kept by both the message controller and by indiv1 dual agency representatives. The Message Controller reproduced and distributed messages as appropriate. Overall the message handling procedures were prompt and efficient. No request for federal assistance was formulated

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during the exercise.

Deficiency: C.1.a. The objective to request federal assistance was not demonstrated during the exercise.

  • Recommendation: The ability.to request federal assistance should be demonstrated at the next full participation exercise involving the State of Wisconsin.

Two incidents involving EOC coordination concerning protective actions are discussed in this section of the report because they represent an area of weakness in the ability of the EOC staff to effectively coordinate their activities. The State Radiological Coordinator's (SRC) protective action recommendations involving in part the sheltering and placing on stored feed for animals in sectors P,Q,R and A (0-10 miles) was provided to Kenosha and Walworth Counties at 1009. The Wisconsin Department of Agriculture EOC representative (DATCP) notified Kenosha and Walworth Counties to take the same precautionary actions out to fourteen miles at 1026. A message from the OIC at 1105 reaffirmed the DATCP 0-14 mile recommendation. Then at 1121 the OIC sent a message to the Counties to disregard the DATCP recommendations and

' maintain actions in sectors P,Q,R and A (0-10 miles). In response Kenosha County advised the State EOC at 1135 that they had l

implemented protective actions for animals out to a 20-mile radius as of 1035.

. It was not observed what the basis was for the protective action recommendation given by the DATCP. Nor was any conversation

[

observed between the OIC and the DATCP personnel prior to the change from fourteen miles to ten miles. The DATCP may have had

  • basis for their determination as the OIC may have had for his.

! 37

~ - -. - - - . - - .._. - _ _ , . _ , __ _ _

The second incidant. involved the issuance of press releases concerning the evacuation of the City of Kenosha. A message from

~

the DEC PIO to the JPIC.at 1035 indicated that Kenosha County officials decided to evacuate the entire city limits of the City of Kenosha (approximately one-third of which is beyond the 10-mile EPZ.) A message from Walworth County to the DEG PIO at 1027 indicated that the Governor of Wisconsin made the decision to-evacuate the City of Kenosha. When the DEG PIO brought this to the attention of the SRC, the SRC said that the Governor had only determined it necessary to evacuate out to a 10-mile radius and that was.the-information to release. The problem could not be resolved because the DEG PIO recommendation was to inform the media that evacuation should include the entire city of Kenosha, since the Kenosha County officials were doing so.

'The decision by the Kenosha officials to evacuate the entire city limits was within their authority as stated in the county plan.

The SRC-might have recognized this and if he did not have authority to support the County decision, might have contacted someone who did. To provide an immediate solution, the DEC PIO might have informed the JPIC of the Governors determination and added that Kenosha County officials, in consideration for the safety and protection of the residents of the City of Kenosha, had recommended evacuation of the entire city. However, this conflict should have been brought to the attention of the OIC for immediate resolution.

Deficiency: A.2.a. There were instances during the exercise when the s lack of effective coordination by-the EOC staff resulted in

, .the need to issue-followup messages'from the EOC to rescind or clarify information released earlier. Further, conflicts among-EOC staff elements were not always referred to the OIC for resolution.

Recommendation: It is important to recognize the need for consistent and coordinated information which is being disseminated by the State EOC. To prevent the confusion which could be . created by this situation, standard operating procedures whould be developed which assign one key individual (Message Controller) the responsibility to read messages, look for inconsistencies and bring them to the attention of the OIC. Further, there should be staff discussion prior to the issuance of important' messages (e.g.

protective action recommendations) to coordinate the information.

Any conflicts should be resolved by the OIC or other appropriate official.

Facilities The State EOC is located in the lower level of the Hill Farms State Office Building in Madison in the day-to-day offices of the DEG. The facility has sufficient equipment and supplies for conducting emergency operations over an extended period. When the first staff members arrived at the EOC, the operations room and other work areas were in their normal day-to-day configuration.

Staff members began to set up the area for emergency operations.

38

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9 They rearranged furniture as necessary, installed temporary telephones and set up the required maps and other aids to operations.

The status board was clearly visible throughout the operation room and as the exercise progressed significant events were noted on it. -The emergency classification level was posted and changed as operational conditions changed.

Communications Communications in the Wisconsin EOC is well organized and controlled. The Communications Room was equipped with various primary and backup communication systems.

Organizations Primary systems Backup Systems County EOC's TIME Radio / Microwave /

Commercial Phone Contiguous States FENATS FEMAVS Utility NAWAS/NARS NARS/Commerical phone EOF NAWAS/NARS NARS/ Commercial phone JPIC Commercial phone Telefax The communication capabilities are in compliance with the State plan. Additional capabilities exist to provide support communications for the county EOC's and contiguous states.

Conferencing was available for up to six lines within the EOC and with operator assistance provided by the Wisconsin Telephone Company a bridge could be arranged to allow a communication link with any number of outside lines at any number of locations.

Communications to the JPIC was demonstrated using commercial telephone as_the primary system. Hard copy capability was demonstrated, both transmission and reception, via telefax.

Microcomputer capabilities exist for public information communication coordination, but was not used during this exercise.

The communication systems operators performed their functions well, demonstrating skill and knowledge of their responsibilities. Overall communication in the Wisconsin State EOC was appropriately maintained.

A communication problem existed at the State Highway Patrol's District 2 Office in Waukesha. The District 2 facility is responsible for transmitting the initial notification and followup notification message to Walworth County. These messages were never received at the Walworth County EOC from District 2. A call 39

my.17 '85 09:41 fem REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.11 was made from the Walworth ROC to the State IOC in Madison over a commercial phone line at 0712. Rotification of the Unusual tvent (received by Wisconsin at 0612) and the Alert (received by '

Wisconsin at 0630) was relayed during this call. Timely transmission of messages from the District 2 office continue'd to be a probles throughout most of the exercise.

De ficiency: E.1. The State Highway patrol's District 2 Office in Waukesha did not provide timely notification of energency action levels to Walworth County.

Recommendation: The role of the District 2 Office should be reviewed. "ifft is to continue to provide notification to Valworth County then appropriate training should be provided. If an alternative means of notification is determined to be more effective then the State and County plans should be revised to indicate the new procedure for notification.

Dose Asses Anent and Protective Action Rasconraendation The dose assessment function was performed by the SRC at the State EOC as stated in the plan. The SRC kept in touch with the Forward Operating Center / Mobile Lab which was in radio contact with the field teams. Dose estimates were calculated from both plant release data and field readings. A personal computer was used to calculate the whole body and thyroid doses at varying distances from the reactor. A hand-held calculator was used to perform short calculations, such as converting units, and was also used to quickly estimate doses. These estimates could then be compared with the results from the personal computer. All calculations were promptly performed.

Some calculations by the dose assessment staf f were not checked by a seennd independent calculation. An effort should he made to have two individual calculations separately performed and compare results rather than two people working on a calculation together.

i This will result in independent results and should ensure that calculations are correct.

The monitoring data from the field teams was not plotted on a map in the St.ata F.M . The readings were written dwt it a l y '. - s t ,

l and were dis:assed as the N naa.w nsat stuf f loAe t at the

,v e- e l r - l . ' .Siipling points on the map. The fitF1 te m were directed to locations to defin- the extent of the plume by the Forward Operating Center / Mobile Lab. The SRC was able to communicate with the Forward Operating Center / Mobile Lab to give the field team directions. The plume was defined correctly.

$ Field reading- wrre ciranunicated proinptly to tV W, a d N MC opdated the field teams at least e.v ry thirty minutes.

Consideration =1m1d be given to providing this radiological data to local governments.

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TW h e &asessment Staff provided an estimate of the total i

population esposure. This total dose estimate was esiculated using the highest dose rate and the actual time required for evacuation a catimatml by the State police.

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Protective action measures for both plume pathway hazards and

ingestion pathway hazards were decided by the SRC and were based on the EPA exposure guidelines. These actions included sheltering, evacuation and placing animals on stored feed.

Evacuation times and the accelerated degradation of.the plant were factors which were considered when making-protective action recommendations. The protective action recommendations were discussed among CECO, Illinois DNS, and the Wisconsin SRC before they were released and were promptly reviewed and updated as-conditions changed.

A need. for improvement was noted in that messages going to other organizations should be written such that the message is complete '

and not subject to interpretation. For example, protective actions recommendations for sheltering animals and placing on stored feed should be given not simply as " place animals on stored feed." It may be implied that stored feed will be given to animals if told to shelter, but animals may not necessarily be sheltered if placed on stored feed.

4 The use of potassium iodide (KI) was recommended for emergency workers by the.SRC at 0921. The SRC sent a message to the field monitoring teams and to the counties advising the use of KI for emergency workers. This decision was not based on a known

radioiodine release, but rather it was based on the potential for a release and was consistent with the State plan. KI was available to the field teams and County teams from the Kenosha County EOC and County Health Department. Backup supplies were l available from.the Forward Operating Center / Mobile Lab.

Public Alerting and Instruction

- While the State EOC does not have a direct role in public alerting they do confirm the recommendation of the utility and direct local governments to implement their alerting procedures. The State EOC'

, also relays protective action information, for use in public instruction, to the local governments and the JPIC.

Radiological Field Monitoring i Activation of radiological field teams from home by a telephone callup list worked as planned and resulted in prompt assembly of personnel at the Kenosha Municipal Building. Teams had two trunks of equipment and instruments which they compared to a written checklist before they were dispatched. Teams also received a

, briefing before they were dispatched. The team's vehicle was

. adequate in terms of space and of suitability for terrain and weather, although extensive interior space was taken by an i extremely bulky radio.

The G-M and ionization chamber showed 1985 calibration stickers but the Reuter Stokes pressurized ionization chamber and the air t-sampler did not. - Lack of calibration stickers was a deficiency noted in the last exercise and not fully corrected in this one.

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- _ _ . . - . . _ . ~ ., - _._ . , , , , ,

m._ . _ , . - _ , _ , . . , ,.m., , _ . . ., - _ _ . - , ~ _ , _ , . - _ _ , . . _ , . . _ . ,

! o The instrument inventory lacked an alpha detector (or thin window G-M) and a single channel Na1 scintillation detector. Without an alpha detector the teams lack the capability to assess all forms of radiation. This prevents obtaining complete information about the results of a release and may put the teams at risk, especially in terms of surface contamination to themselves. Moreover, while the Reuter Stokes is very sensitive and provides a continuous chart of exposure rate it does not alert teams to their presence in or their passage through a high radiation area.

Masking tape got brittle in the cold and did not stick well. Glue on labels did not stick well in the cold. Plastic dust pans used for snow collection were not very sturdy and might become brittle in the cold. The large respirator gas cannister was beyond the expiration date. Tweezers would be a useful addition to the field kits to avoid touching the air filter with fingers.

Deficiency I.8. The radiation instrument inventory was insufficient and not all instruments showed evidence of up-to-date calibration. Some field supplies proved ineffective in cold weather.

Recommendation: Field teams should be provided with an alarming scintillometer (preferably a 2 x 2 NaI) that can be left on throughout field investigations. Such an instrument would meet the prescribed instrument inventory requirements, greatly improve the detection capability, and also protect field teams by alerting them to high radiation areas that might be unsafe. All field instruments should have up-to-date calibration stickers and field supplies should be current and field tested for cold weather performance.

Field teams used written SOPS to properly check and activate equipment. Procedures were demonstrated in the field for G-M, ion chamber and air sampler measurements and for the collection of vegetation, snow, surface water and milk. Soil samples were not taken because of the frozen ground. No TLD's were exchanged.

Samples were transferred to a courier who delivered them to the radiation control van. The two regular team members were residents of the area and were familiar with roads, landmarks and sampling points.

Ion chamber measurements were taken out of the car window (4') and out the open car door (f."). This corrects a deficiency from the last exercise. However, measurements taken this way should only be viewed as adequate to alert field teams about conditions in the area they have just entered. Partial shielding of the ground will occur because of the vehicle. Representative measurements of surface and air exposure rates should be taken away from the vehicle to more adequately characterize the area for protective ACliO4 deO[S[ons.

Snow and vegetation samples should be taken with at least one pair of gloves on and the sample should be taken over the full square meter. The general area should be first surveyed with a G-M to select the most representative area for collection.

42

MAY.17 '85 09:42 FEMA REGION V CH2CAGO 1 P.12 Team members should familiarise themselves with radiation units and their meanings. Several team members referred to the Reuter Stokes output as picoeuries when in fact it was micro roentgen per I hour.

_De fic ioney : 1.8. The field monitoring team demonstrated weaknesses in their ability to implement the procedures for obtaining samples.

Reconnendation: These weaknesses can be corrected by the field tenias reviewing the SOPS and additional training on sampling procedures.

The team was generally able to keep in contact with the radiation controller although there were transmission dead spots. These were dealt with by driving out at the area and transmitting from a new location. Team members said they had a CM radin backup and could also replace their radio with a backup at the radiation control van if r.ecessary. The CB system was not used during this exercise.

Radiological Exposure Costrol The team was provided with at least one set of anti-contamination clothing. This was sealed in plastic in the equipment trunks but not used during the exercise. Cloves were used. No tongs were present. Tweezers would have been useful to avoid touching air fillers with fingers. Respirators and respirator cartridges were present. The team had KI (simulated) and was aware of procedures for use. Low and mid range dosimeters were available (up to 20R) l but high range dosimeters were not. A charger was available and was used. Records of periodic dosimeter readings were kept by individual team members and were also recorded at each sampling location. Team membera were aware of maximum allowable dose limits and where to proceed for personnel decontamination.

i When field team members enter a known cantamiered area they should minimally don protective shoe covers and then survey thunaelves for surface contamination before reentering the j vehicle. Protective gloves should be removed before touching '

clean equipment in the vehicle.

Media Relations Space is available at the State EOC for media briefing *. No briefings were conducted at thin location shiring this exercise.

All inquirica were referred to the JPIC.

The DEG, the Department of Health and Social Services, the neportment of Natural Resources and the Wisconsin Public Service Commission were represented at the JPIC. Wisconsin representatives at the JPIC were prepositioned and arrived between 0715 and OR30. Double staffing of personnel indicated a capability to maintain 24-hour operations. Clerical help was available for messages, typing and reproduction. The Wisconsin FIO's demonstrated their ability and knowledge of state and local responsibilities according to the State plan.

43

l q The JPIC facilities and equipment are discussed in the State of Illinois Media Relations. Commercial telephone lines were the primary communications link between the JPIC and other locations.

Hard copy capability was available over these commercial lines.

Initial phone listings were incorrect, and the phone numbers listed for the JPIC were numbers used in a previous exercise for a JPIC located at the Moose Lodge in Zion. This was corrected.

, Illinois Press Packets were available for the media. Wisconsin should consider distribution of similar media kits. Initial Press Briefings were confused as far as coordination of information between Wisconsin, Illinois and CECO PIO's. This was worked out by all PIO's and resulted in a well coordinated effort at later press briefings. A TV was on in the PIO Conference room and was occasionally checked. However, there was no media information to monitor.

Emergency public instructions were not drafted at the JPIC. But emergency information was provided to the media by the PIO's. The rumor control number (located in Madison) was provided to the media during the briefings.

Recovery and Reentry One day af ter the release had been terminated, reentry and recovery began. The field monitoring teams went back into the evauated sectors to determine radiation levels and sample vegetation, snow, milk and Kenosha County's water supply.

Analysis of these samples indicated that the radioactivity in the milk and water samples was below the derived limits equivalent to FDA's " Preventive Protective Action Guide" of 0.5 rem whole body and 1.5 rem to the thyroid (FDA-82-8196). The I-131 concentration in the vegetation and snow samples exceeded the derived level for the FDA " Preventive Protection Action Guide" as given above. This information can also be found in the State Plan. Consequently, the protective actions were relaxed. People were able to return to their homes, and milk and water consumption could be resumed.

However, given the slightly elevated levels of I-131 in the vegetation and snow samples, the SRC recommended that animals be kept on inside-stored feed and that people avoid excessive contact with old snow. These recovery and reentry procedures were promptly communicated to the OIC. The OIC then provided this information to the Counties.

The statement regarding no contact with the old snow was confusing. The Counties did not fully understand what this meant and were hesitant to allow reentry to the evacuated areas until they obtained clarification. A more thorough and informative message should be prepared when reentry recommendations have restrictions.

I 44

. i Scenario The scenario was sufficient to initiate emergency response by the State organizations and to evaluate the capability of these emergency response organizations. Further, the scenario allowed for the full demonstration of the objectives selected for this exercise by the State of Wisconsin. Future scenarios which include a time jump should also include a description of activities which occurred or were completed during the time jump (e.g. evacuation).

Kenosha County Activation and Staffing Kenosha County received notification of an Unusual Event at 0602.

This call was received by the County Communications Center from the NAWAS. This call was verified with the Zion Plant by the dispatcher, who followed written procedures stipulated in the Emergency Manual. Following verification, the dispatcher alerted the Sheriff, EOC Director and back-up dispatch staff. A message on the plant status was also received on the NARS system and a hard copy form was completed.

The Alert notification was received at 0629 over the NAWAS.

Verification with the utility and a message from the NARS system followed. The dispatcher then began the Alert call-out procedure. Three dispatchers were assigned to call the EOC

. staff. Call-out was completed in under 25 minutes and the EOC was completely staffed within 35 minutes. Activation was completed during an off-hour period.

The system in place to call-up staff and activate the EOC had 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> capabilities and used a list with current phone numbers. The notification system was based on the effective staffing and communication networks of the County Communication Center. There was available radio equipment as backup communications for the NAWAS/NARS land-line phones.

EOC staff included representatives from fourteen organizations as well an a utility representative from the EOF. Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated with a roster and by carring-out an efficient shift change. The new shift was provided with multi-l departmental briefing. Both shifts demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of their responsibilities and performed their assigned duties promptly.

Emergency Operations Manegement The EOC staff demonstrated the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. As a result of the shift change, two different individuals were in charge of EOC operations. The two individuals from the County Board worked closely with the County Energency Government representatives and the staff from the Kenosha Mayor's office, as indicated in the Kenosha County plan.

45 i

Periodic briefings were held throughout the day and these were particularly effective in allowing coordinated interaction among all response organizations present. A utility representative was present and provided clear and concise updates of the plant condition. Copies of plans and procedures were available and referenced when needed. Messages were reproduced and distributed and message logs were kept. Message handling was carried out in an efficient manner. Access to the EOC is controlled upon entering the Public Safety Building and again at the entrance to the EOC.

Facilities The Kenosha County EOC is located in the County Public Safety Building in Kenosha, Wisconsin. Kenosha County demonstrated its ability to adequately support emergency operations through the use of maps, status boards and other displays, as appropriate.

Adequate furniture, space, lighting, telephones, and noise control were evident to effectively carry out emergency operations. To the operations room is separate from the EOC communications room.

The facility can support extended operations and back-up power is available. The emergency classification level was posted, status boards were clearly visible and updated, and all appropriate maps were posted. These included the plume EPZ map with sectors and population figures by evacuation area, maps with evacuation routes, traffic control points and special facilities, and a map of congregate care centers for Kenosha and Walworth Counties.

' Communications The communications network in the Kenosha central dispatch center

., and the EOC was effective and operated efficiently. The communications center managed the major emergency dispatch activities and received initial notification messages. This center contains the NAWAS/NARS dedicated phones, teletype, siren / tone alert radio activation and interlink between police, i sheriff, fire / ambulance, highway, public works and emergency government organizations.

The EOC communications staf f was directly linked to this center by an intercom phone.- The EOC also contained a teletype, RARS/NAWAS phones and a radio that interlinked with the DEG Southeast Area Office, County and municipal agencies. Access to the County Communication Center radios provided the EOC staf f with several

back-up systems.

l The primary communications for the EOC to contact the State, utility, Federal agencies, EBS, media center and schools was by land line. Radio backup was available to indirectly link the EOC with the JPIC and EBS stations.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations This is a State objective and thus not demonstrated by Kenosha County.

46

MAY.17 '85 09:43 FEMA REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.13 Public Alerting and Instruction The EOC participated in the public alerting process. The actions were initiated following notification of an Alert status at 0817.

Sirens, tone alert radios and EBS messages were ordered 'to be activated by the EOC staf f at 0825. Tone alert radios are located in public facilities including schools, hospitals and factories.

At 0924, sirens, tone alert radios and 133 were.again activated in response to a shelter recommendation from the State. The tenosha City Police and County $heriff performed route alerting to supplement the fixed siren warning network.

A total of sixteen squads were assigned, fourteen in the city and two in the county. The city squads with PA speakers were requested to complete their routes and return to their assignments. The County squads were requested to continue re-running routes and making PA announcements for about two hours and then call the dispatch center.

Throughout the shelter and evacuation periods alerting continued every fifteen minutes as the sirens, tone alert radios and EBS were activated. Prescripted mensages were utilized as appropriate from the county plan for these transmissions over the EBS and tone alert radios. The content of the messages was clear and described the affected area in clear geographic terms that would be familiar to the populace. Message content was changed throughout the day to reflect the changing emergency status, although EOC staff were somewhat unsure of the procedures for formulating messages when prescripted messages were inappropriate. Specific procedures and instruction for EOC staff in the formuistion of EM m**=sges would be useful. A general outline for message preparation could be included in the county plan. At 1445, an EBS mensage was released terminating the state of emergency declaration and permitting the restricted reentry to the evacuated areas.

Protective Action Traffic and access control points, located at the intersections of State Mighways $0 and 31, and State Highway 83 and County True C were manned by officers of the County Sheriff's Department.

Individus1s at the traffic and access control points indicated they had received their assignments shortly before 1100 and arrived at the designated assignments at approximately 1100.

Only the officer at State Highway 83 and County Trun'. C iniicate t that he is familiar with the evacuation routes, as a result of 4 having onc observed a map depicting the routes. The officers have received no specialised training regarding the locations of reception and care centers, familiarity with evacuation routes, nor radiation in preparation for a potential incident at the Zion Nuclear Power Station.

47

s They was explained that they routinely receive their assignments, directions and instructions from their Central Dispatch regarding their response to all incidents, except those which are spontaneous and require immediate response and/or actions.

The County Highway Department representative from the County's Silver Lake Garage also stated he has received no training in dosimetry nor radiation in preparation for emergency work in case of an incident at the Zion Nuclear Power Station. He stated that his instructions were to load barricades onto a truck and proceed with them to his assignment at State Highway 83 and County Trunk C. There he was to receive any additional instructions through the Departments Central Dispatcher via radio. He was further told that he was to set-up the barricades when instructed by the dispatcher.

These emergency workers demonstrated the ability to capably implement their specific field assignments, however, personnel of the County Sheriff's Department and County Highway Department should receive specialized training in preparation for their possible participation in an incident involving the Zion Nuclear Power Station. This training would provide them with an in-depth familiarity of the specific nature of problems arising from a radiological emergency and a better understanding of their emergency response functions.

The officers of the Sheriff's Department explained their routine for acquiring tow trucks for removal of vehicles and other obstructions from roadways. This too is accomplished through the Sheriff's Central Dispatcher, upon notification of the obstruction (s) by the patrol vehicle operators. The EOC staff demonstrated. the organizational ability and resources necessary to identify and locate personnel and equipment to deal with impediments to evacuation. According to the EOC staff, appropriate resources.are available to keep evacuation routes clear during bad weather or in the event of stalled or wrecked cars. Similarly, local resources (personnel and vehicles) were indicated to be adequate to cover all traffic and access control functions simultaneously. The emergency response staff from the Kenosha County- Sherif f's Office, the Police Chief, the Highway Commissioner's Office, the Public Works Department, as well as the Pleasant Prairie Town Chairman, coordinated resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation.

Access to contaminated areas via roads, airways, and waterways was adequately controlled. However there was not a clear understanding by key EOC staf f regarding plan procedures to control acce, Em+rgency staffs in the local fire departw nta a.tl town hall were 1 recalled first. Personnel manning the traffic control pointo were i then notified to parait evacuated residents to return. An EBS l message was released to notify residents of the restricted reentry.

52 i

i

r1AY.17 '85 09:44 FEMA REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.15 The EOC staff expressed concerns that they did not have current radiological and meteorlogical data and the related health / safety information to include in their reentry planning. They requested this information from the State 20C before ordering reentry. To avoid additional time burdens to the evacuees, a staff consensus was appropriately reached to accept and act on the State recommendations to recover the area.

Scenario The scenario was sufficient to initiate emergency riesponse by the Kenosha County organisations and to evaluate the capability of these emergency response organisations. Further, the scenario allowed for the full demonstration of the objectives selected for this exercise by Kenosha County.

During the recovery and reentry phase, it was estimated by the E00 -

ataff that almost 50% of the local residents had left their homes in response to the evacuation order. However, this estimate did not include the impact to evacuation times of the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time jump. Future scenarios which include a time jump should also include a description of activities which occurred or were completed during the time jump (e.g. evacuation).

Walworth Coun_ty Activation and Staffing Initial notification to Walworth County occurs through the State Highway Patrol's District 2 of fice in Waukesha at the Unusual Event classification. The District 2 offlee is manned 24-hours a day. In Walworth County the incoming notification call 14 i

received in the Sherif f's dispatch center located in the sherif f office in T.1khorn, Wisconsin. The 24-hour dispatch operator receives the message and proceads to alert the energency staff.

The initial notification message was not received from District 2 as per the plan. This message was received from the state E0C in Madison through the state laision in Walworth County and from the X-Wish Ciunty U O. The Alert vos de:Isrs! 0919 dth notification arriving at Walwth County from the State E00 at 0712. TW

" m uel Event was declared 0540 with notification arriving at '

Walworth County 41ong with the 0712 notification of Alert.

1 l Following receipt of the notification message from the state IOC l and Kenosha County E00, the communication of ficer in the dispatch center alerted all energency response agency representst tvr- vin telephone using a standard call up list. Phone nu'abers are available for both hose and work locations of the MC staff. All numbers appear to be current. 9taffing was completed for the

' first shift at 0805. All agencies as specified in the plan were represented at the EOC.

Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated through a complete shift change of all represented agencie6 et the E00 v'.ith .gcorred at l

1134. The ineoning staf f was briefed on current con titions and er4taa .nsisting in Walworth County.

33

Emergency. Operations Management The Deputy Sheriff.of Walworth County is the individual who is responsible for coordinating and managing the EOC operation. It was apparent that extensive training and planning by the EOC director had occured prior to the exercise. Periodic briefings were held.at appropriate times, involving all agencies represented at the EOC. Each agency's representative was asked to give it's current status and any action that had occurred since the previous briefing. Some agencies were not relaying all the necessary information during briefings, such as traffic volume, congregate care status, dose data and plume information. Written SOP's were available and utilized by the emergency staff. Adequate supplies of the current County Plan were available in the EOC.

Messages were logged in as they were received by the communication officer and made accessable to the appropriate EOC staff members.

Internal message flow was efficient.

Prior to the final briefing during the first shift, the director requested a written status report from each agency which was read to the incoming second shif t. The second shift staff demonstrated the ability to maintain the emergency response activity initiated i

by the first shift.

Deficiency: A.2.a .During periodic EOC staff briefings by agency representatives some pertinent information which would have been beneficial to the overall operation was not discussed.

Recommendation: EOF staff members should be instructed to include all relevant information within their area of responsibility during staff briefings. The EOC Director should insure the effective exchange of information if it is not readily available to all EOC staff.

Facilities ,

The EOC operations room is located in the basement of the County Courthouse in Elkhorn. The facility is equipped with all appropriate and necessary resources and supplies. Ample space and furniture is available for all agencies represented in the EOC.

It-is equipped'dith facilities to sustain and support continuous operations. Bunks, showers and a kitchen setup are available, in -

addition, emergency back-up electrical power generators are in line.to provide e'mergency power.

Appropriate maps, displays and status boards were posted and maintained throughout tie exercise, with the exception of an EPZ population distribution map. This rap would be particularly i useful for the EOC staff when preparing to receive evacuees.

A status board depicting the functions and operations at the

! ' reception / congregate care center was established and updated with information from the shelter site. The main operations status i board lists only those items which impact on the Walworth County 54 r

activities. This system appeared to work well. Emergency classification levels were announced to the staff and posted in a prominent place.

Communications The Walworth County EOC during this exercise was in the process of being upgraded through FEMA matching funds programs. Once completed, the EOC will meet federal requirements. The 24-hour communications center, now located on the first floor, will be relocated to the communications room in the EOC with state of the art equipment to include pagers for alerting staff. The capability of the 24-hour dispatch center was duplicated in the communication room in the EOC and used during the exercise to transmit and receive exercise messages.

The cosaunication room in the EOC also had a TRS-80 Micro Computer set-up to demonstrate its hard copy and word processing capability between Walworth County and the State EOC. This system was from the District 1 of fice (Madison) and was operated by District I staff during the exercise. The only hard copy (telecopy) machine was located upstairs in the 24-hour dispatch center. This hardcopy was between Walworth and Madison. Messages had to be carried down to the EOC. Hard copy capability was not available from the EOC to the'JPIC. It is recommended this capability be considered.

... .The EOC currently relies on ten telephone lines. These are direct

- -lines:from the EOC to the telephone company and are not part of the County Centrex system. The benefit of the* separate system was highlighted during the exercise when the County Centrex telephone system failed. When this happened, telephone communications from the Walworth County EOC continuted to operate.

The EOC telephone system currently does not have conferencing capability but will once the new communications system is installed starting in April 1985. The current telephone system will be expanded to sixteen lines.

. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation This is a State objective and as such was not evaluated in

. Walworth County.

Public Alerting and Instruction Walworth County had a limited role to play in the area of public alerting and instruction. Walworth County did not develop EBS messages. Information was provided by Walworth County to the JPIC staff and the State EOC staff. This information was to be incorporated into EBS messages by either the State EOC staff or

. the JFIC staff. Both pre-scripted messages an1 original messages were developed and used during the exercise. However, most of the messages developed by Walworth County were basically a repeat of

[ information provided by the State rather than information 55

, ~+ +-  %-r, _ , - . - - - - , , . - - - _ _ . , , . . , = , , - - , _ , , - , - - , - - - - - . - - - , _ _ . . . . ~ _ , - _ . , -,,- , _ . - . - - -

% +

b s '

( .c concerning Walworth County activities. These messages were general in nature and sometimes inaccurate. For, example, a message generated in Walworth County indi;cated that the Governor of Wisconsin ordered the evacuation of the entire City of Kenosha. This was dot true as that evac 6ation decision was made by Kenosha County.

Deficiency: E.7. The messages developed by Walworth County for release to the public through the JPIC were often a repeat of information from other sources, sometimes inaccurately, and did not include relevant information on Walworth County activities.

Walworth County had no method to derify if information put out at the.JPIC was accurate, y n i Recommendation: Messages prepared by,Walworth County for release at the JPIC should include specific information on actions taken by Walworth County and be coordinated with the State and Kenosha County. The EOC staf f should monitor the EBS Station broadcasts to dete,rmine if their information 'is incorporated by the JPIC staff in an accurate manner. Consideration should be given to having Walworth County provide their emergency information directly to an EBS station as pre-supposed by the exercise.)

t Protective Action-(

f

,?

Walworth County played a limited role in this area of the exercise. Activities included the planning and activation of ,

traffic control points within Walworth County to facilitate 2the

.- evacuation of approximately 40,000 Kenosha residents into Walworth County.

Access control capabilities were demonstrated at three access control points established to control the flow of evacuees to the reception center. Estimates of expected traf fic volumes were considered and appropriate .resot;rces were identified to keep evacuation routes clear, even in the event of bad weather or stalled / wrecked cars. Walwort' founty . residents were advised not ,

to travel on the evacuation ' cut s or to attempt to cross the evacuation routes in any 4 da travels. Walworth County received the first shelce 'in , te recommendation at 0910.

The EOC staff during the 1000 briefing indicated they were doing stand by planning concerning the protective action recommendations. Planning took place for the possibility of establishing access contral an1 the possible opening of reception and congregate care centers. Staff to accomplish this were placed on standby and the County Engineer inventoried his resources. The Red Cross and Department of Social Services planned for the possibility of mass feeding. This planning continued when the county learned at 1015 that the covernor had ordered evacuation affecting areas within Wisconsin.

+

56 I

i

. .-. -. ._ i . . . .. . .

t

( MAY 17 '85 09:45 FEf1A REGZON V CHICAGO 1 P.16 i

Walworth County prepared to receive evacuees on the basis of information in the Kenosha County plan. This plan indicated Sector A from 3 to 10 miles had a population of 36,333 and an estimated evacuation time of 9-12 hours; sector Q from 3 to 10 j miles had a population of 2,158 and an estimated evacuation time of 2-3 hours; sector R from 3 to 10 sites had a population of 33,976 and an estimated evacuation time of g-11 hours and sector P between 5 to 10 miles had a population of 41 people with an eatinated evacuation time of 1-2 hours. Kenosha County subsequently informed Walworth County that approximately 40,000 evacuees would come to Walworth County. The remainder of the evacuees would be going to Racine County. A total of six congregate care centers were planned by Walworth County.

l Capability was demonstrated only at the Lakeland Counseling Center congregate care feellity.

There was a demonstration of an actual evacuation of students from j the Pleasant Frairie School in Kenosha County to the reception / congregate care center opened at the Lakeland Counseling Center. Timely activation and staffing of this facility was effectively accomplished. A shift change was exhibited by all staf f except the radio operator.

When the Kenosha County evacuees arrived they were processed in approxirsately one-half hour. Reception and monitoring was effectively accomplished, registration was on a three part Red Cross form. Monitoring was performed by a three man team, two from the University of Wisconsin and one from the Deportievnt of halth. Two people used geiger counters and one persen checked thyroid. Any contaminated people would be enclosed in protective covering and transported to the Hospital Pacility. An ambulance was on stand by.for this trip of 100-200 feet.

The ham operator received the nam and phone number of each student for transmission to either a Kenosha or Racine RACES Station for alerting parents of the location of the evacuated children. This facility could handle 300 evacuees with no problems expansion to other buildings within the complex was readily feasible. People could be fed for the first day with existing supplies and facilities. The Red Cross would then take over with food vans frois Milwaukee and Madison. The. facility has handicapped capabilities and a nursing and first aid station.

Radiological Exposure Control This was not an objective for Walworth County during this exercise. However, Walworth County did have both the primary ani

  • e sosistant radiological officers as part of the EOC staff. Some contingency planning took place such as piscing county monitoring teams on standby at the Police Department of the !!aiversity of Wisconsin at Whitewater, the Whitewater City Police Department, the Walworth County Sherif f's Department, and th* L4keland Mospital. Both Radiological Officere kept in contact with the Atat- of Wia u n,in Radiological Officer and kept 4Seeast of the l

i plume direction and protective action recommendation issued by the State of Wisconsin.

57

my.17 '85 09:46 fem REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.17

-Media Relations This was not an objective for Walworth County during this amercise. However, several incidents occurred during the exercise which warrant discussion here.

The E0C staff included a FIO who was in contact with the State EOC and the JPIC by telephone. No hardcopy capability was available between the Walworth County EOC and the JFIC. Consequently the Walworth County EOC staff did not know what information was diseminated by the JPIC staff since Walworth County did not have a PIO/spokesperson located at the JPIC. In addition, the PIO located at the Walworth County ROC did not always know who he was talking to at the JPIC.

It should also be pointed out Walworth County had problems initially making contact with the JPIC by telephone at 0900.

Follow-up attempts proved to be successful and telephone numbers were corrected. The PIO also called WTVO television channel 17 (NBC), WHIR Radio, the Elkhorn Independent, and the Janesville Gazette to provide them with the telephone number at the JFIC, including the number to contact for rumor control.

The press from Walworth County did show up at the EOC but were not allowed access to the ROC itself. The media wanted information concerning the exercise for the next edition of their papers.

Walworth County officials feel a responsibility to the local Press and allowed the PIO to give one briefing outside the E0C.

Walworth Coimty should consider placing a PIO at the JPIC to assist in coordinating information at the JPIC and/or have hard copy capability between the JPIC and Walworth County. The County would then be able to determine if their information as put out by the JFIC staff was correct. Furtha.r the proMee of media visiting the E00 for information during an emergency would be mitigated by Walworth County having a PIO/spokesperson at the JFIC.

Recovery and Reentry The State operations officer in Madison informed Walworth County )

[

that the situation at the Eion Nuclear Power Station had been down graded to the recovery stage as of 1320 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.0226e-4 months <br /> and restricte.1 l reentry for people returning to Kenosha County could be '

implemented. People were cautioned to avoid contact with existing l snow cover and advised that aniasts be kept on stored feed until notified differently.

, At 1430 the Walworth County Board Chairisan issued a message to the P media announcing the start of recovery and reentry operations.

Walwarth Csunty residents were urged to cooperate in allowing Kenosha County residenen to leave and pass through Walwarth C wnty Highway 50, 11, 20, 12, and 14. Traffic control (access control) was maintained during this period. Congregate care staff continued operations at the congregate care center until they were cleared of Kenosha County residents and closed. The E0C staff continuted operating until recovery and reentry operati'ns we completed and the exercise terminated at 1500.

58 1

O.

Scenario The scenario was adequate for Walworth County to demonstrate its capabilities as a host county and the objectives selected for this j exercise. It allowed for sufficient activity for the role played by Walworth County and provided Walworth County officials with the opportunity to test their emergency response planning.

59 i

III. Sumary Listing of Deficiencies i

l t

60 l

I

UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Illinois March 6, 1985 A. Deficiencies Affecting'Public Health and Safety (State) (Date)

Illinois (Community)

NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled A'ctual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date None 61

F1 n l

UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Illinois March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

B. Other Deficiencies (Community)

NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date E.7. Media briefings and information released at the JPIC did not address the transient population.

62

UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary . Listing of Deficiencies Illinois March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

C. Recommendations Illinois (Community)

1. Currently the State of Illinois is considering revision of the NARS form.

When revision is-made it is suggested consideration be given to sequentially numbering the messages produced for quick reference and accountability and modifying the box designators from a letter to possibly a number to reduce confusion, especially in #8 wind direction 4

data and #9 recommended protective actions.

2. The capability for hard copy transmission of news releases and color graphics displays between the REAC and the JPIC should be considered to augment the capabilities of the INDS staff at_the JPIC.

63

Tl

, .o '

UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Illinois March 6,.1985 (State) (Date)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety Lake County (Community)

NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date J.10.j. The proper procedures for determining appropriate traffic control measures were not followed and, as a result, a road was allowed to remain open by which the public could have entered the area affected by the plume.

64

~_

,e

UTILITY
Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Illinois March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

B. Other Deficiencies Lake County (Community)

NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date E.7. Media briefings and infonaation released at the JPIC did not address the transient population.

C.3.a. Lake County did not demonstrate its capability for handling the media as described in their plan.

i 4 J.10.h. Evacuees from the Illinois Beach State Park were sheltered in Waukegan instead

of a designated congregate care facility outside of the EPZ. (Waukegan) l 65

l UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Illinois March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

C. Recommendations Lake County (Community)

1. The plan does not mention that the Creat Lakes Naval Training Center is to be represented in the CCC. Since it was, both at this exercise and previously, its responsibilities should be formally incorporated into the plan.
2. Staff briefings at the CCC could be enhanced by more effective utilization of the technical representatives (IDMS and CECO) located at the CCC.
3. Most towing in Laking County is accomplished by private companies. In case of an evacuation, they would be needed to supplement the few government-owned trucks. This situation should be addressed in the plan.
4. Personnel involved with the relocation of special needs individuals should receive training as to the procedures for relating to these individuals.
5. The operation of the receptiun/ congregate care facility would be enhanced by seprating the reception area from the area where vital signs were being recorded, by providing a separate area for the media and by designating a controlled area for handling special medical problems.
6. The NARS line is not yet directly hooked-up to the new EOC building. A schedule should be established to indicate when this hookup is to be made. (Winthrop Harbor)
7. At one time during the exercise the status board and the emergency classification sign were in conflict. Care should be taken to have all EOC displays consistent to avoid confusion. (Zion) i 66 l

i

r, UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power-Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Wisconsin March 6,1985 (State) -

(Date)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety Wisconsin (Community)

NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date- Date None 67

C UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station-Summary Listing of Deficiencies Wisconsin March'6, 1985 (State) (Date)

5. Other Deficiencies Wisconsin-(Community)

C3 REG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date A.2.a. There were instances during the exercise when the lack of ef fective coordination by the EOC staff resulted in the need to issue followup messages from the EOC to rescind or clarify information released earlier. Further, conflicts among EOC staff elements were not always refereed to the OIC for resolution.

C.I.a. The objective to request. federal assistance was not demonstrated during the exercise.

E.1. The State Highway Patrol's District 2 Of fice in Waukesha did not provide timely notification of emergency action levels to Walworth County.

I.8. The radiation instrument inventory was insuf ficient and not all instruments showed evidence of up-to-date calibration. Some field supplies proved ineffective in cold weather.

The field monitoring team demonstrated weaknesses in their ability to implement the procedures for obtaining samples.

68

~l UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Wisconsin March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

C. Recommendations Wisconsin (Community)

1. Some calculations by the dose assessment staff were nat checked by a second independent calculation. An effort should be made to have two individual calculations separately performed and compare results rather than two people working a calculation together.
2. Protective action recommendations for sheltering animals and placing on stored feed should be given not simply as

" place animals on stored feed."

3. When field team members enter a known contaminated area they should minimally don protective shoe covers and then survey themselves for surface contamination before reentering the vehicle. Protective gloves should be removed before touching clean equipment in the vehicle.
4. The State of Wisconsin should consider distribution of media press kits at the JPIC.
5. Reentry restrictions should be thoroughly explained in the messages sent to local governments.
6. Future scenarios which include a time jump should also include a description of activities which occurred or were completed during the time jump (e.g. evacuation).
7. Consideration should be given to providing radiological information from the SRC to local governments.

69

J UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Wisconsin March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety Kenosha County (Community)

NUREG Marrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date None 70 e

L-

m e'

UTILITY: Zion' Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Wisconsin March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

B. Other Deficiencies Kenosha Coun_tg (Community)

NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed _ _D,a t e , , , ,Da,t,e ,

E.7 Media briefings and information release 3 at the JPIC did not address the transient population.

K.3.b. Personnel of the County Sherif f's Department and County Highway Department have had no training in dosimetry and emergency worker exposure control.

71

_a

I l UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Wisconsin March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

C. Recommendations Kenosha County (Community)

1. Specific procedures and instruction fo* EOC staf f in the formulation of EBS messages would be useful. A general outline for message preparation could be included in the County plan.
2. Personnel of the County Sheriff's Department and County Highway Department should receive specialized training in preparation for the potential of their participation in an incident involving the Zion Nuclear Power Station.
3. Plan procedures for controlled railroad access to the EPZ should be addressed during the next annual training session and identified in the planning process.
4. Rosters should be available to the Center Manager if this individual is to be responsible for maintaining continuous operations at the reception / congregate care center.
5. A multi-copy registration form should be considered for the registration of evacuees.
6. The Wheatland Center Grade School is not suited for special needs individuals, therefore a more suitable reception / congregate care center should be designated.
7. Additional training on EPA PAC's for the RADEF staf f and inclusion of the EPA PAC's in the county plan is recommended.
8. Future scenarios which include a time jump should also include a description of activities which occurred or were completed during the time jump (e.g. evacuation).

72

E e

M a

UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencica Wisconsin March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

A. Deficiencies Af fecting Public Health and Safety Walworth County (Community)

NUREC Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Progosed Date Date None 73 J

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E.

M UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Wisconsin March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

B. Other Deficiencies Walworth County (Community)

NUREC Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency P rogo s,ed _

Date Date A.2.a During periodic EOC staf f briefings by agency representatives some pertinent information which would have been beneficial to the overall operation was not discussed.

E.7. The messages developed by Walworth Caunty for release to the public through the JPlc were often a repeat of information from other sources, sometimes inaccurately, and did not include relevant information on Walworth County activities.

74 a

I 1 e

~

' Jgl UTILITY: Zion Nuclear Power Station

-~~

Summary Listing of Deficiencies Uisconsin March 6, 1985 (State) (Date)

C. Recommendations U^Iworth County (Ca=munity)

1. The Walworth County EOC should be provided an EPZ Population Distribution
  • Map to f acilitate their planning for hosting evacuees.
2. Hard copy capability between the Walworth County EOC and the JPIC should be considered.
3. Walworth County should consider providing a PIO/spokesperson at the JPIC to coordinate the information flow and handle media inquiries.

15