IR 05000348/1982013

IE Insp Repts 50-348/82-13 & 50-364/82-12 on 820416-0515. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Procedure to Determine Which Engineered Safety Sys Valves Were in off-normal Position

ML20058G580
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	06/11/1982
From:	Bradford W, Brownlee V, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058G532	List: IR 05000348/1982013 ML20058G529 ML20058G539 ML20058G563 ML20058G569
References
50-348-82-13, 50-364-82-12, NUDOCS 8208030367
Download: ML20058G580 (7)

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UNITED STATES

,, ,,9,; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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0 9l 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

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Report Nos. 50-348/82-13 and 50-364/82-12 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202 Facility Name: Farley Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama Inspectors:_ W . Bradf rd,

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Senior dent l#spector

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Date' Signed

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_Tp.[eebles ResidentMnsi ect67 f Date Signed Approved by: ?/lMyfJI

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, yT U V. L. B(fwiilee, Section Chief Division of Date Signed Proje'et and Resident Programs SUMMARY Inspection on April 16 - May 15,1982 Areas Inspected

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This routine inspection involved 160 inspector-hours on site in the areas of monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, independent inspection effort, Unit 1 inoperable containment spray system, and followup of plant incident Results Of the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were found in five areas; one violation was found in one area (Failure to follow procedure paragraph 9).

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j 8208030367 820723

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PDR ADOCK 05000348 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager D. Morey, Operations Superintendent R. S. Hill, Operations Supervisor W. D. Shipman, Maintenance Superintendent C. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent L. Williams, Training Superintendent R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Superintendent L. A. Ward, Planning Supervisor W. C. Carr, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor M. W. Mitchell, Health Physics Supervisor R. D. Rogers, Technical Supervisor J. Odom, Operations Section Supervisor T. Esteve, Operations Section Supervisor R. Bayne, Chemistry Supervisor J. Thomas, I&C Supervisor J. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Graham, Security Supervisor L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Superintendent W. G. Ware Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operating personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personne . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management inter-views held throughout the reporting period with the plant manager and

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selected members of his staf The licensee acknowledged the inspection j ?indings.

! Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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Not Inspected

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Unresolved Items.

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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio !

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2 Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspectors observed Technical Specification required surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

FNP-2-STP-60 Containment Air Lock Leakage Tes FNP-1-STP-3 Power Distribution Surveillance, Plant Computer Inoperable FNP-2-STP-2 Auxiliary Feed Water System Flow Path Verifi-catio FNP-1-(2)STP- Operations Daily and Shift Surveillance Requiremen FNP-1-(2)STP-1 Containment Spray System Flow Path Verificatio FNP-1-STP-2 A. C. Source Verificatio FNP-1-STP-2 Penetration Room Filtration System Train A(B)

Operability and Valve Inservice Test FNP-0-ETP-1000 -

Startup Transformer IB and 2B Removal From and Return to Service FNP-1-STP-2 Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test FNP-1-STP-1 RHR Valves Inservice Test FNP-1-S(2)STP- RCS Leakage Test Within the areas inspected there were no violations or deviations identi-fle . Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

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The following items were considered during this review: limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems" were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as appli-cable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed: Unit 18 condenser water box - A condenser - tube leakage inspection, detection and pluggin Unit 1 - 4B feedwater heater tube pluggin B charging pump seal replacemen IC Diesel Generator A starting air compressor, C Diesel Generator starting air compresso lA Service Water Pump Valve No. 3608 - No 1 Unit turbine auxiliary feed pum Various instrument calibration and repair throughout the plants.

( Within the areas inspected there were no violations or deviations identi-fie '

7. Operational Safety Verification i

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted . discussions with control room operators during the report perio The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, diesel, and turbine buildings were conducted to obse.rve plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations. The inspectors, by observation and direct interviews, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control . The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems on Units 1 and 2 to verify operability and proper valve alignment:

, Unit 1 Containment Spray Syste ! Units 1 and 2 Component Cooling Water Syste !

Certain Radiation Monitoring Systems on Units 1 and Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feed Water Systems.

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Service Water Systems - Units 1 and 2.

Units 1 and 2 Charging / Safety Injection Suctio '

Diesel Generators Starting Air and Jacket Cooling Water.

l Station Electrical Boards in the Control Room and various parts of the plant for proper electrical line up.

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Portions of various other systems (safety-related and non-safety

related) were observed for proper line up and proper operation during

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various plant tours during the report perio Within the areas inspected, there were no violations or deviations identi-

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fied.

$ Independent Inspection Effort

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The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisors, shift foreman and licensed operators during the reporting period. These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operating and testing activities in progress as well as discussion of significant problems or incidents.

l l Unit 1 Inoperable Containment Spray System l On May 10, 1982 at 00:10 a.m. the licensee concluded a surveillance test on

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the containment penetration room filtration syste At that time the containment penetration room fans were to be stopped and their hand centrol

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switches placed in automatic. Instead of stopping the fans as intended, the

! operator apparently operated the wrong hand control switches and closed motor operated valves (MOV's) 8817A and 88178. These two M0V's are located

in the suction lines to containment spray pumps "A" and "B". Closing these i

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! MOV's rendered the containment spray system inoperable. During shift turn-

over walkdown of the control room panels, this condition was detected and corrected at 7:05 a.m., May 10, 198 The licensee promptly initiated an investigation to determine cause of event.

i Corrective Actio '

The inspector verified that the following actions were performed. On May 10, 1982 a valve position verification procedure was initiated by the licensee to ensure that all valves in the containment spray system were in the correct positio All control switches in Unit 1 and 2 control rooms were re-reviewed for correct position and indicating lights status. Annunciator panels were reviewed to ascertain that alarms were correc This event was promptly reported to NRC by red phone, resident inspector and to Region I t The licensee has counseled all licensed personnel as to the seriousness

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i Conclusions of the Inspector The Unit 1 containment spray system was inoperable from 00:10 until 07:05 a.m. on May 10, 1982. The inoperable system was the result

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i of inadverdent closing of MOV's 8817A and 88178 from the main control

] board. Closure of these M0V's to the off normal position is indicated I

on monitor light box 2 (MLB2) which illuminates an indicating light which has the valve identification number embossed on the lens. The light monitor box initiates a specific alarm on the main control board which tells the operator if any of the engineered safety system valves indicated on light monitor box 2 are out of position.

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The licensee did not utilize FNP-1-ARP-1 " Annunciator Response

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Procedure" for the alarm on the main control board. This procedure provides information for the operator to identify the specific l engineered safety function in alarm condition on MLB2. Had this

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procedure been used, as required, the system could have been restored i to operable status within minutes instead of the time lapse of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> I

and 55 minutes. This is a violation (50-348/82-13-01) - Failure to follow procedures.

Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 permits a maximum of seven hours to be in Hot Standby if the condition can not be corrected; one

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hour to correct the problem, when identified, and six hours to be in Hot Standby if the condition can not be corrected. Six hours and fifty five minutes elapsed from the time of the operator error which placed the plant in an LCO until the condition was recognized and corrected.

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1 Followup of Plant Incidents During the reporting period the inspectors conducted followup inspections of

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the following incident at the facility:

On May 12,1982 at 03:22 p.m. Unit No. 2 tripped from loss of offsite power while the licensee was in the process of restoring normal lineup of electrical station service to 18 and 2B startup transformer The l electrical switching was performed using Engineering Technical

Procedure #1000. When the operator turned the control switch to the closed position for the 4160 VAC incoming feeder breaker from startup

transformer 2B to Bus 2G, the control switch handle broke. This feeder

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breaker closed which, through electrical interlock, automatically opened the feeder from startup transformer 2A. The operator turned the broken hand switch back to off position. This opened the feed from startup transformer 2B which denergized bus 2G. The reactor tripped on loss of reactor coolant system flow. The required diesel generators started and all systems functioned as designed. Safety injection was not initiated. The control switch was repaired and electrical switching was completed. The reactor was critical at 7:30 The inspector reviewed the circumstances involved in the incident and,

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where appropriate, the actions taken by licensee management in response to the incident. The licensee's management action appeared to be timely and adequate.

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