IR 05000443/1986052
| ML20214T124 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1987 |
| From: | Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Tracy S EMPLOYEE'S LEGAL PROJECT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8706100134 | |
| Download: ML20214T124 (59) | |
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' s v MAY 2 71987 1 a Docket No. 50-443 Employee's Legal Project ATTN: Ms. Sharon Tracy P. O. Box 633 Amesbury, Massachusetts 01913
Dear Ms. Tracy:
l This refers to our meeting and interview with you on April 20, 1987. The purpose of the interview was to gather additional specific details concerning your re-sponses to NRC Inspection Report 50-443/86-52 provided to us in your letters of February 9 and April 2, 1987. At the April 20 meeting, you provided additional information to Mr. J. P. Durr titled, "Information Given to Jacque Durr, NRC Engi-neer, by the Employee's Legal Project During April 20, 1987 Interview," (Enclosure ' 1). The documents you presented to Mr. Durr consisted of an unsigned cover letter generally describir.g the attached affidavits and statements of alleged poor con-struction practices at the Seabrook facility. These documents have been reviewed
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I by the staff, and, where sufficient information has been provided, an inspection has been initiated to determine the safety significance of the alleged poor prac-tices.
However, many of the documents you provided on April 20 describe broad, general allegations which contain insufficient basis for our staff to make a determination of the significance of the allegations. Enclosure 2 to this letter is a list of
, those allegations for which we require additional information. Along with each allegation is a list of questions which, when answered, will provide the informa-i tion we require to make our assessment. As we have stated in the past, the pre-ferred method would be for the allegers to contact the NRC directly so that we can obtain the necessary information directly from the individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the allegations. ELP has stated that the majority of these allegers
do not desire to have direct contact with the NRC. This has made the procedure of allegation follow-up cumbersome. We recognize that the list of technical in-formation requested is lengthy; however, if the ELP intends to continue to be the sole contact with the allegers, this is the type of information we need concerning these and any other future allegations in order to adequately address the allegers' concerns.
In our review of your April 20, 1987 documents, we note that two of the affidavits, Attachments C and E, are dated November 6, 1986 and October 21, 1986, respectively.
The delay in transmitting these affidavits to us does not appear to be in accord-ance with our previous agreement that ELP provide the NRC with allegations in a timely manner. We again urge you to transmit allegations to us as soon as possible so that we can deal with them in a timely manner, particularly if they provide i additional information on items that have a potential to impact licensing decisions by the Commission.
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.O Employee's Legal Project 2 MAY 2 7 37 .
As we have done previously, we will place your transmittals to the NRC in the Public Document Room as well as provide them to the normal distribution list for Seabrook. The results of our current inspection efforts will be documented in Inspection Report 50-443/87-07, which we expect to be issued in June. Subsequent to issuing the report, we will contact you regarding the post inspection meeting we discussed in our April 16, 1987 letter.
Sincerely, ggginal SisadII3 William F. Kane, Director Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure: As Stated cc w/ encl: Seabrook Hearing Service List R. J. Harrison, President and Chief Executive Officer Ted. C. Feigenbaum, Vice President of Engineering and Quality Programs William B. Derrickson, Senior Vice President Warren J. Hall, Regulatory Services Manager Donald E. Moody, Station Manager Public Document Room (PDR) Local Public Document Room (LPDR) Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) NRC Resident Inspector State of New Hampshire bcc w/ encl: Region I Docket Room (with concurrences) DRP Section Chief Robert J. Bores, DRSS A. Cerne, SRI T. Elsasser, DRP J. Durr, DRS E. Wenzinger, DRP W. Kane, DRP A. Shropshire, RI l \ Els r/meo Durr W zinger Johnston i 5/14 87 p 5/W47
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SEABROOK UNITS 1 AND 2 HEARING SERVICE LIST Thomas Dignan, Esq E. Tupper Kinger, Esq.
John A. Ritscher, Esq. Assistant Attorney General ! Ropes and Gray Office of Attorney General 225 Franklin Street 208 State House Annex Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Mr. Bruce Beckley, Project Manager Resident Inspector Public Service Company of Seabrook Nuclear Power Station New Hampshire c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
P. O. Box 330 P. O. Box 700 Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Dr. Murray Tye, President Mr. John DeVincentis, Director Sunn Valley Association Engineering and Licensing
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209 Summer Street Yankee Atomic Electric Company ' Haverhill, Massachusetts 08139 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Robert A. Backus, Esq.
! 0'Neill, Backus, and Spielman 116 Lowell Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Mr. Phillip Ahrens, Esq. William S. Jordan, III
, Assistant Attorney General Diane Curran Office of the Attorney General Harmon, Weiss, and Jordan State House Station #6 20001 S. Street, N.W.
Augusta, Maine 04333 Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 Jo Ann Shotwell, Esq. D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr. , Esq Office of the Assistant Attorney General Counsel Public Service Company of
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- General Environmental Protection Division New Hampshire One Asburton Place P. O. Box 330 Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Manchester, New Hampshire 03105
] , Ms. Diana P. Randall Regional Administrator, Region I 70 Collins Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Richard Hampe, Esq. Mr. Alfred V. Sargent j New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency Chairman ' 107 Pleasant Street Board of Selectmen Concord, New Hampshire 03874 Town of Salisbury, MA 01950 ,
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Seabrook Units 1 and 2 Hearing Service 2 List
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Mr. Calvin A. Canney, City Manager Senator Gordon J. Humphrey City Hall ATTN: Tom Burack 126 Daniel Street U.S. Senate Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03810 Washington, D.C. 20510 Ms. Letty Hett Mr. Owen B. Durgin, Chairman Town of Breatwood Durham Board of Selectmen RFD Dalton Road Town of Durham Exeter, New Hampshire 03833 Durham, New Hampshire 03824 Ms. Roberta C. Pevear Charles Cross, Esq.
Town of Hampton Falls Shaines, Hardrigan, and McEaschern Drinkwater Road 25 Maplewood Avenue Hampton Falls, New Hampshire 03844 P. O. Box 366 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Ms. Anne Verga Mr. Guy Chichester, Chairman Chairman, Board of Selectmen Rye Nuclear Intervention Committee Town Hall c/o Rye Town Hall South Hampton, New Hampshire 03827 10 Central Road
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Rye, New Hampshire 03870 c Mr. Angie Machiros, Chairman Jane Spector Board of Selectmen Federal Energy Regulatory Comm.
for the Town of Newbury 825 North Capitol Street, N.E.
25 High Street Room 8105 Newbury, Massachusetts 01950 Washington, D.C. 20426 Ms. Rosemary Cashman, Chairman Mr. R. Sweeney Board of Selectmen New Hampshire Yankee Division Town of Amesbury Public Service Company of Town Hall New Hampshire Amesbury, Massachusetts 01913 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Honorable Peter J. Matthews Mr. Donald E. Chick, Town Manager Mayor, City of Newburyport Town of Exeter Office of the Mayor 10 Front Street City Hall Exeter, New Hampshire 03823 Newburyport, Massachusetts 01950 Mr. William B. Derrickson Mr. Warren Hall Senior Vice President Public Service Company of Public Service Company of New Hampshire New Hampshire P. O. Box 300 P. O. Box 700, Route 1 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 l
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Seabrook Units 1 and 2 Hearing Service 3
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List Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Bary J. Edles Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Howard A. Wilber Helen F. Hoyt, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal ' Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
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Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Emmeth A. Lusbke Jerry Harbour Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 , Edwin J. Reis, Esq. H. Joseph Flynn, Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal Assistant General Counsel Director Federal Emergency Management Agency '
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 500 C. Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20472 Edward A. Thomas Carol S. Sneider, Esq.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Assistant Attorney General
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442 J. W. McCormack (POCH) Office of the Attorney General Boston, Massachusetts 02109 One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Paul McEachern, Esq. Richard A. Haaps, Esq Shaines and McEachern Haaps and McNicholas 25 Maplewood Avenue 35 Pleasant Street Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Concord, New Hampshire 03301 J. P. Nadeau Allen Lampert Board of Selectmen Civil Defense Director 10 Central Street Town of Brentwood Rye, New Hampshire 03870 20 Franklin Street Exeter, New Hampshire 03833 William Armstrong Sandra Gavutis, Chairman Civil Defense Director Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter RFD #1, Box 1154 Kensington, New Hampshire 03827 10 Front Street Exeter, New Hampshire 03833 ,
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Seabrook Units 1 and 2 Hearing Service 4
. List Anne Goodman, Chairman William S. Lord Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen 13-15 Newmarket Road Town Hall - Friend Street Durham, New Hampshire 03824 Amesbury, Massachusetts 01913 Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Jerard A. Croteau, Constable Board of Selectmen 82 Beach Road South Hampton, New Hampshire 03827 P. O. Box 5501 Salisbury, Massachusetts 01950 Stanley W. Knowles, Chairman Judith H. Mitzner Board of Selectmen Silverglate, Bernter, Baker, Fine, P. O. Box 710 Good, and Mitzner North Hampton, New Hampshire 03862 88 Broad Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Norman C. Katner Bary W. Holmes, Esq.
Superintendent of Schools Holmes and Ells School Administrative Unit No. 21 47 Winnacunnet Road Aluani Drive ~~ Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 Jane Doughty George D. Bisbee, Esq.
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Assistant Attorney General 5 Market Street Office of the Attorney General Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 25 Capitol Street Concord, New Hampshire 03301 ,
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SEABROOK UNITS 1 AND 2 HEARING SERVICE LIST Thomas Dignan, Esq E. Tupper Kinger, Esq.
John A. Ritscher, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Ropes and Gray Office of Attorney General 225 Franklin Street 208 State House Annex Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Mr. Bruce Beckley, Project Manager Resident Inspector Public Service Company of Seabrook Nuclear Power Station New Hampshire c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory'Comm.
. P. O. Box 330 P. O. Box 700 ! Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 .Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 i Dr. Murray Tye, President Mr. John DeVincentis, Director Sunn Valley Association Engineering and Licensing 209 Summer Street Yankee Atomic Electric Company j Haverhill, Massachusetts 08139 1671 Worcester Road l Framir.gham, Massachusetts 01701 l Robert A. Backus, Esq.
O'Neill, Backus, and Spielman i 116 Lowell Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 i Mr.~Phillir Ahrens, Esq. William S. Jordan, III Assistant Attorney General Diane Curran Office of the-Attorney General Harmon, Weiss, and Jordan
! State House Station #6 20001'S. Street, N.W.
, Augusta, Maine 04333 Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 , Jo Ann Shotwell, Esq. D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr., Esq Office of the Assistant Attorney General Counsel-General ,.
," Public Service Company of Environmentat Frotection Divisior New Hampshire One Asburton Place F. O. Box 330 -
Bostor., Massachusetts 02?cs Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 l E!;. Diana P. Rendall Regional Administrator, Region I + JU Collins Street ' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Seabree'<, Ne.. "amor i < 03874 651 Park Avenue
# - 'r.g of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 l Richard Hampe, Esq. ne. Alfred V. Sargent
!' New issmpshire Civil Defense Agency Chairman
:r 107 Pleasant Street Board of Selectmen Concord, New Hampshire 03874 Town of Salisbury, MA 01950
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Seabrook Units 1 and 2 Hearing Service 2 List
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Mr. Calvin A. Canney, City Manager Senator Gordon J. Humphrey City Hall ATTN: Tom Burack 126 Daniel Street U.S. Senate Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03810 Washington, D.C. 20510 Ms. Letty Hett Mr. Owen B. Durgin, Chairman Town of Brentwood Durham Board of Selectmen RF0 Dalton Road Town of Durham Exeter, New Hampshire 03833 Durham, New Hampshire 03824
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Ms. Roberta C. Pevear Charles Cross, Esq.
Town of Hampton Falls Shaines, Mardrigan, and McEaschern Drinkwater Road 25 Maplewood Avenue Hampton Falls, New Hampshire 03844 P. O. Box 366 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Ms. Anne Verga Mr. Guy Chichester, Chairman Chairman, Board of Selectmen Rye Nuclear Intervention Committee Town Hall c/o Rye Town Hall South Hampton, New Hampshire 03827 10 Central Road Rye, New Hampshire 03870 Mr. Angie Machiros, Chairman Jane Spector Board of Selectmen Federal Energy Regulatory Comm for the Town of Newbury 825 North Capitol Street, N.E.
25 High Street Room 8105 Newbury, Massachusetts 01950 Washington, D.C. 20426 Ms. Rosemary Cashman, Chairman Mr. R. Sweeney Board of Selectmen New Hampshire Yankee Division Town of Amesbury Public Service Company of Town Hall New Hampshire Amesbury, Massachusetts 01913 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 , Honorable Peter J. Matthews Mr. Donald E. Chick, Town Manage-Mayor, City of Newburyport Town of Exeter Office of the Mayor 10 Front Street City Hall Exeter, New Hampshire 03823 Newburyport, Massachusetts 01950 I Mr. William B. Derrickson Mr. Warren Hall Senior Vice President Public Service Company cf Public Service Company of New Hampshire New Hampshire P. O. Box 300 P. O. Box 700, Route 1 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 i j
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O Seabrook Units 1 and 2 Hearing Service 3
- List Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Bary J. Edles Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge-Howard A. Wilber Helen F. Hoyt, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge
! Emmeth A. Lusbke Jerry Harbour Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Edwin J. Reis, Esq. H. Joseph Flynn, Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal Assistant General Counsel Director Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 500 C. Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20472 Edward A. Thomas Carol S. Sneider, Esq.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Assistant Attorney General 442 J. W. McCormack (POCH) Office of the Attorney General Boston, Massachusetts 02109 One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Paul McEachern, Esq. Richard A. Haaps, Esq Shaines and McEachern Haaps and McNicholas 25 Maplewood Avenue 35 Pleasant Street Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 Concord, New Hampshire 03301 J. P. Hadeau Allen Lampert Board of Selectmen Civil Defense Director 10 Central Street Town of Brentwood Rye, New Hampshire 03870 20 Franklin Street Exeter, New Hampshire 03833 William Armstrong Sandra Gavutis, Chairman Civil Defense Director Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter RFD #1, Box 1154 Kensington, New Hampshire 03e27 10 Front Street Exeter, New Hampshire 03833
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. Seabrook Units 1 and 2 Hearing Service 4- . List Anne Goodman, Chairman William S. Lord Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen 13-15 Newmarket Road Town Hall - Friend Street Durham, New Hampshire 03824 Amesbury, Massachusetts 01913 Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Jerard A. Croteau, Constable Board of Selectmen 82. Beach Road South Hampton, New Hampshire 03827 P. O. Box 5501 Salisbury, Massachusetts 01950 Stanley W. Knowles, Chairman Judith H. Mitzner Board of Selectmen Silverglate, Bernter, Baker, Fine, P. O. Box 710 Good, and Mitzner North Hampton, New Hampshire 03862 88 Broad Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Norman C. Katner Bary W. Holmes, Esq.
Superintendent of Schools Holmes and Ells School Administrative Unit No. 21 47 Winnacunnet Road Aluani Drive Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 Jane Doughty George D. Bisbee, Esq.
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Assistant Attorney General 5 Market Street Office of the Attorney General Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 25 Capitol Street.
Concord, New Hacoshire 03301 ; l l I l
Encus'E 1 , Empl:yee's Legal Project P.O. Box 633 Amesbury MA 01913
- (617)388-9620 INEORMATION GIVm 70 JACQUE DURR, NRC ENGINEER, BY THE D4PIDYEE'S LEGAL PRNECT DURING APRIL 20, 1987 INTERVIEW .
We following is an outline of affidavits, statements, and results of phone conversations with former Seabrook Station e gloyees presented to Jacque Durr, Nuclear Regulatory Conmission engineer for Region I, during an , interview with the Dnployee's I;egal Project on April 20, 1987.
W e information contained in these affidavits and statements reveals certain recurring themes in failures concerning the safety of Seabrook Station's design, construction, and documentation. These failures occurred in Quality Assurance and Quality Control (including that for vendors), Training, Document Control, and the failures apply to all aspects of the plant. ., , It has been the experience of the Employee's Legal Project that problems raised as exanples of generic and far-reaching violations of safety requirements are treated as " isolated instances" by the NRC. This was the case with the 61 allegations from former Seabrook Station workers given to the NRC by the ELP last fall and dealt with in NRC inspection No. 50-443/86-52. It is the position of the ELP that failures of Quality Assurance, Quality Control, Training, and Document Control, are not isolated instances, but are pervasive throughout the plant. - In the past, at other nuclear plants, problems identified by the' NRC as
" isolated cases" have later proved to be major problems. For instance, recently the Peach Bottom nuclear plant was shut down because operators were found to be sleeping on the job. According to press reports, this problem was identified in 1985, was designated an isolated instance, and no action was taken at the time.
We following is an outline of additional information the ELP has gathered from former Seabrook employees which substantiates the need for a conprehensive, independent investigation of the plant's construction, design, and documentation. W e NRC does not have the resources necessary to undertake such an investigation itself. , l It should be noted that a number of former employees of Seabrook Station i are willing to pass on infornation they have about safety problems in the i plant, but are reluctant to give their names or identifying data for fear of retribution and blackballing. This applies especially to people who are still involved with the nuclear industry. Many of them, however, are willing to cooperate with an independent investigation. They are aware of instances where the NRC has either inadvertently or deliberately conpromised confidentiality of informants, but believe an independent body would not do so.
It is the nature of the ELP that information comes in bits and pieces,
- because informants come to the ELP one by one. However, each new informant has information which substantiates previous information, thus providing a picture of an unsafe plant and of an inadequate regulatory process. Only an independent investigation can dispell that picture.
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A. Statement of a welder and pipefitter, assigned to weld pipes using a
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process for which he was not properly trained. Believes welds in the service water lines are suspect, and can specifically identify three welds he knows are bad.
B. Review of NRC Report No. 50-443/84-12 by alleger: Dravo shop welds in the turbine building were defective and uncorrected. Calls into question the vendor quality assurance program.
C. A Pullman-Higgins welder's affidavit states inadequacies in welding and pipe work were conmon. Welds weren't properly identified, weld inspections were inadequate, and training for welders was inadequate. Many welds were done without preheating, creating porosity in the welds. Installation mistakes occurred because blueprints were frequently incorrect. 'Ihousands the of arc strikes wrong occurred.
materials: when thePipe and material proper pipe supports were couldn't assembled be located using'ing to accord the required nunber, other material would be used after the identification number was ground out and re-scribed. Sledgehammers and come-alongs werer - used to force pipes into place.
i D. 'Ihe four primary coolant punps were not installed according to design, ; possibly causing stress on the welds at the reactor and the punps. Although l the engineers accepted the situation "as built" and the NRC says this is l not a problem, an unbiased, second opinion is in order. i E. A former Perini enployee who worked in the document control department states blueprints were not updated, co-workers were untrained, didn't know how to read blueprints, and put incorrect numbers on blueprints. A quality assurance person in charge of CAD welding for containment appeared to be always drunk, and consistently reported incorrect figures.
F. A former laborer says blueprints did not match the as-built plant, and blueprints were destroyed in the blueprint room.
G. A former ironworker states in an affidavit that work done by inexperienced " permit" workers frequently had to be redone. He saw concrete poured when the temperature was too low, creating a cold seam. Blueprints were very difficult to interpret. Design problems and inexperienced workers led to serious cost overruns.
H. An anonymous letter received by the ELP in April, 1987, deals with I current training on how to report problems and asks the questioni If NYH I l employees are only now receiving this training, does this inply that they have not, all along, been knowledgeable about how to correctly report problems? I. A former inspector states there were an exceptionally large nunber of
" accept-as-is" engineering dispositions to change the plant's design to reflect what had been built, particularly toward the end of construction.
He believes this was to speed up construction and to save money. He saw cracks in the equipment vault leaking water. He believes there is exposed ~
, rebar in the cooling tunnels, and the tunnels have voids in the concrete, and places where the concrete is too thin. A quality assurance inspector believes the core barrel is cracked.
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. J. Phone conversations with four former Quality Assurance engineers
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revealed: 1. Problems with document traceability, installation of inproper
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hardware, lack of weld safety, inability to trace materials ,back to vendors, and harassment when raising safety questions. 2. People hired to inspect work they had performed, large numbers of Nonconformance Reports voided when procedures were rewritten to accept the nonconforming condition, materials traceablity problem, and equipment renumbered to conform to specifications. 3. Inspector forced by a supervisor to cancel.a Non-Conformance Report on a procedural violation. 4. All large bore pipe welds may be welded beyond the pipe, thickness maximum, inproperly certified welds, poor quality assurance. 5. A former UE&C manager knows of massive destruction and theft of documents during the 1984 Reduction In Force.
K. An anonymous phone call to the ELP from a former carpenter revealed inproper gauge sheetmetal in the air conditioning system of the equipment vault and containment; wracking of the Waste Process Building during hot functional tests due to use of inproper guage of structural steel in the w _ main skeleton; flooding of an emergency cooling punp which was never stripped and cleaned; inproper construction of conponents of motors for circulating emergency cooling water which was never corrected; the cooling tower concrete was poured in two layers, and the layers are not structurally attached to each other; a weld rejected by an inspector was pencilled in 'with graphite by the welder and then passed inspecti.on.
L. A former carpenter states there was an incident of cold pulling in the middle of 1983.
M. A former carpenter knows of a two-by-four board left in the missile shield of Unit I containment after concrete was poured.
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. . POOR SERVICE WATER PIPE WELDS In 1980, I was trained at the United Engineering School of Welding. This was an off site training center manned by union personnel and funded by UE&C. ,
It's purpose was to train and familiarize velders with certain pipe welding and
, fit-up procedures; from there individuals would go to the Seabrook Stationfs welding test shop and be certified for their particular veld procedures.
At that time UELC and Pullman-Higgins had expressed their concerns over the local union's failure to meet their present personnel quota for production demands. It was necessary then to qualify as many welders as possible to meet desired production milestones.
he standard pipe test was a six inch schedule 80 carbon steel coupon, which , was to be fitted with a six inch carbon steel Kellogg insert. The " weld-out" was a shielded tungsten ine,rt gas root-pass followed by a ~1018 manual sticY - filler veld-out. After two attempts at this particular procedure, I was certified to weld all carbon steel standard pipe wall.
I remained on first shif t for approximately one week, where I received a vague and rather confusing indoctrination. I was then transferred to second shift where I was assigned to the service water pipe crew;. I was designated a fitter and assigned to my first 24 inch carbon steel standard wall pipe.jThis was the first exposure I ever had had with large-diame,terspipe.
We service water joints were fitted togeth'er with a factory installed carbon steel backing ring. I had never encountered this particular fit-up procedure before and therefore had no idea how to weld it,but the apparent difficulties where immediately obvious. W e fitted ends had serious mismatch in both the high-low (the outside diameters of the two fitted spool pieces) and the factory installed, backing ring. The sidewalls of the fitted pipes could be made to conform by the utilization of pipe alignment clamps. R ese clamps could be fastened around the pipes and the screw-dogs tightened into position. The fitter would then attempt to force the mismatch into symmetry by wrenching pressure to specific screw-dogs.
, If this were accomplished, the velder would then be instructed to place his
- tack-welds over the mismatch of the backing ring. E is was in an effort to keep the pipe-joint in fit-up specifications and Quality Assurance parameters.
It was sometimes necessary to concentrate tack-velds in many areas in order to achieve this.
If the " fit-up and tack" inspection passed, the next difficulty came in velding-out the excessive gaps created during the fit-up on the backing ring. J
" Permit welders" having less experience would always be assigned the worst i
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side of the vold by their foreman while more experienced union welders always knew what side to take first. Attempting to weld gaps like these usually required a welding technique known as " bridge welding". %is usually resulted in " burn-through" of the backing ring, and slag entrapment between the root-
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POOR SERVICE WATER PIPE WELDS - Continued
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Another serious probim was condensate in the piping itself. h re is a'
. deleterious effect on the 7018 filler metal when it comes in contact with moisture. It produces a porosity in the deposited metal which usually penetrates through the entire area of the exposed root. 'Ihe condensation was created by the varm air, caused by velding, coming in contact with the cold surface of the interior pipe vall. 'lhis temperature differential was created by.one area of the pipe being sheltered while the r eaining pipe was exposed to the ambient outside air temperature. '1he porosity was usually encountered at the bott a of the pipe, where the condensate would generally concentrate.
'lhe porosity would normally present itself through the root and hot-pass of this area but generally the fill-pas's would deposit enough metal to cover it.
From these observations, it is my opinion that these velds are extrmely suspect and should be categorically reviewed.
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11. Allegation - Turbine Building Piping Shop Weld Defect Inspection No. 84-12
"Ahile working in Turbine Building No. 1, the crew received many prefabricated sections of welded pipe made by Dravo. Many times the joints did not meet ASME codes.
One May 11, 1982, I was assisting another velder on line EX-4125-01-Rev.1, field veld No. 108, a 10" weld outlet (WOL) off a 24" carbon steel line, when I noticed a Dravo shop veld defect. Infonned the Quality Assurance Inspector about a one-inch lack of fusion zone on the interior of the w root pass. However, I was told "A Dravo shop veld is not our concern".
_ 11.4 Findings
'Ihe radiograph taken to supplement the ultrasonic evaluation exhibited one 5/16" long indication which did not correspond to the root pass ' .. .:a_ interiori. surface.
11.5 Conclusion
'1he disposition of the 5/16" radiographic indication is an unresolved item pending licensee evaluation (50-443/84-12-2).
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.. the 5/16" long radiographic indication exceeds the ANSI B31.1 standard allovable linear indication length of 1/4" that would apply H radiography was required."
RESPONSE 'IO NRC FINDINGS:
'Ihe interpretation of the radiograph is incorrect. 'Ihe defect was on the interior of the root pass. This inconsistancy with radiograph interpretations is indicative to the same renderings given on the steam g aerator nozzles.
Giving support to the theory that most radiographic renderings are a matter of interpretation subject to experience.
In Report No. 0-1-84-020, I also mentioned that Brian Kennedy, a Pullman-Higgins OA Inspector, informed me that a Dravo shop weld was not their concern and I did not have to worry about it.
The NRC has made no mention as to whether an interview was conducted with Brian Kennedy in regards to his attitude towards other related material other than Pullman-liiggin's.
1 also observed a number of improper welds fabricated by Dravo manufacturers, With excessive mismatch in the radioactive tunnel. I made management aware of these infractions, but the attitude was the same as above "a Dravo veld is not our concern".
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l AFFIDAVIT i
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i . 7 I am a former employee of Pullman Higgins at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant, and after being duly sworn, state as follows: 1. I am 24 years old and have been a resident of New Hampshire most of my life.
2. In 1980, I entered,a 12 week welding course, known to be one of the best in the nation, and learned the welding trade.
3. I was hired by Pullman Higgins on or about July of , 1982 and worked for PH at the Seabrook Plant until about April '
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of 1985 except for the layoffs during that time, which totalled about three months.
. 4. I worked under PH which had the piping contract f o ra .
- the plant until a short time after United Engineers had begun to replace PH. My job responsibilities included welding pipes ,
,i and pipe supports, working in pipe support fabrication, and
: preparing piping systems for welding.
! j 5. It was a common everyday occurrence to see 4 inadequacies in the piping and welding work around me. I r worked in every part of the plant, Unit I and Unit II.
6. One inadequacy that seemed to be rampant was that ,
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although pipes were supposed to be capped off when left overnight, or as unfinished work in progress, ,they were very ' often not capped at all. All kinds of debris was left in the pipes. On one occasion, a very large pipe wrench was left in a ;
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pipe in the waste treatment building. The horizontal pipes which are open ended became a place for workers to rest things # and place things, sometimes their own personal articles,
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sometimes debris. The debris would consist of wood, tools, I clothing, and the pipes that were supposed to be capped off * - would just be open. Often the tradesmen would simply forget
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that something was left in the pipes when the joints were r
- welded and some tra6 smen would put matter in the pipes blatantly because of that "this job sucks" attitude which I can't emphasize enough was an overwhelming attitude throughout i the plant.
a l ' i 7. Underlying the entire attitude of nearly all of the men was the feeling "I just don't give a damn. I don't care.
This job sucks." Nooody was happy with their job because you were constantly running scared. "Here come the gold hats" everybody would always say. People were getting fired every , day and we were being pushed without anybody paying attention , to whether we were being conscientious and trying to do a good i job. Nobody cared. We were- handled poorly. The idea that we j
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were working on a nuclear power plant got lost in the shuffle i and instead, the work crews developed a feeling of being pushed d around by the supervisors and the foremen, and ultimately began ! to ignore all the safety requirements and procedures. They ! just didn't care.
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. . 8. 'For instance, I witnessed several laborers on cement crews-literally throw debris into the cement as it was being n
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poured around Containment II. I am not an expert on cement, I but.I would assume that this would not be a good occurrence in i the foundation of the the nuclear reactor building, because in j my mind, debris makes voids and leads to cracks.
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- 9. . Pipes would be rusty and pitted on the inside wall of
- the pipes, some extremely bad, and they were used anyway.
j Welds were not painted to preserve them. It was common'to see ' unpainted rusty welds with welder's stencils not even et'ched
into the weld area for ID. On one occasion, another welder told me that he was told to go etch his stencil on welds he
! didn't do. The welder refused.
t j 10. All over the plant one would see hold tags placed on j machinery for various reasons. If something wasn't going as 1 planned on the design, it would be put on hold. There were '- hundreds of NCR's (Nonconformance reports) written up on l systems that were installed incorrectly that didn't meet ASME t codes. The NCR's were written on those mistakes that-i inspectors were lucky enough to see. A lot of times, the workers would force things, to "make them right" to avoid an ' NCR.
i 11. On many occasions, bad welds would be covered up by i being welded over. Whatever reason for the" bad weld was, the i basic attitude of a lot of welders was "to hell with it, who will ever know, this weld will never break" I can say I did not ! meet but a hand full of welders at Seabrook that had adequate experience and knowledge of metallurgy. These workers with that 'to hell with it' attitude, obviously didn't because bad Welds do in fact break, l i 12. Many of my co-workers didn't have the faintest idea
, how to read blueprints which led to location mistakes in the ,
j piping installations and hanger installations.
, , 13. Blueprints were wrong at times. They would show , 1 incorrect systems, in that when a blueprint called for an
- installation of a system in the designated area, we would go to i
! this area and there would be various other systems already
- there, resulting in drastic changes.
I i 14. Out in front of the Seabrook gate local 131 Pipe 1 Fitters ran a welding school which I went to for two and a half l weeks. A lot of the people in there were friends and family I members of the union nopervisors and " higher ups". Often these 4 people had no prior welding experience whatsoever, and they i would just put them through the program at times when there was i a high demand for welders. It is impossible to become a good
- welder in the amount of time that the school gave them to
: - * pass" the test.
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15 .. On one occasion, I witnessed a welder welding stainless steel when he hadn't been qualified to do so because
, his buddy took off for awhile and told this guy to finish the job. The unqualified welder finished the job and etched the qualified welder's stencil on it, and later said "nobody will know, it was damned good practice for me ".
16. One event that I thought was very significant was that a crane operator, operating a cherry picker _was rigging a heavy valve inside Containment I at ground level. He obviously was doing something wrong in" operating the crane because the weight of the valve was too much and the crane and the valve
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tipped over with a loud bang. Big Wigs were up at the plant for quite a long time checking for damage. I heard nothing more about it. I wonder where that valve is located now.
! 17. I was familiar with a few of the welding inspectors who would regularly be high on pot. Believe me, the inspector
is the bottom line. He is the one who says "yes" or "no". '- There was an unbelievable amount of favoritism among inspectors - and welders. If they had an attitude about you, like .they
didn't like you, they would make it very hard for you. Shoot your welds down constantly, but if you had a name and
l inspectors liked you, they wouldn't even look at the weld.
They would just ask for the weld slip, sign it and leave. This would lead to frustration and anger.
! 18. I could go on for quite some time about drug abuse at the plant. I would just say that workers regularly had been drinking or under the influence of just about anything you could think of. At the same time, all of these substances were readily available for sale. There was no problem getting any j kind of drug.
i 19. To illustrate the attitude of the workers I on one
occasion saw a laborer urinating down a riser pipe that was uncapped. That particular riser pipe wen uncapped for many days.
a h 20. There were literally thousands upon thousands of arc
- strikes on pipes. In the areas where I worked, pipes would be
- lined with them. Some of the are strikes were enormous, some
. were small, but whatever the size, they are not healthy for i metal, especially pipes carrying substances. An arc strike ;
occurs when a welding rod, which is attached to its holder, l
touches the metal surface for a brief moment. No welding l occurs, just a touch to the metal with a rod. This leaves pits in the metal surface and these pits can be very deep. It fractures the metal. If workers had to clean up all arc strikes at the plant it would take a year or more.
21. Sometimes welders would make a mistake, cause an arc '
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strike, and the pipe fitter would grind it out. Since the arc ' strikes go deep in the metal, they would grind below the minimum wall thickness of the pipe and'then the welder would clad weld on the low spot to build it up and the pipe fitter or welder would then grind it down smooth.
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, 22. I remcaber myself cnd coveral people working ridiculously long hours being extremely burnt out, but still pushing on because we were basically forced to work these long overtime hours or there was the reality of being fired. You
- either accepted the overtime demands of the foremen or you were "out the gate" as we would call it. This was a big reason for the "this job sucks" attitude that was so prevalent. There was a serious degeneration in the morale throughout the plant and the supervisors failed to correct it.
23. Workers would have a hard time finding correct materials (steel) for a certain hanger (pipe support). Tne ISO had a bill of materials on it. These gave sizes and descriptions of metals to be used on that particular hanger and also traceability numbers which was the ID number on the metal. qf a worker couldn't find the' correct metal and numbers, they would take other metal, cut it to the correct size, grind off that metal ID number and then airscribe on the hanger the correct ID for the hanger to be installed.
- 24. A lot of times when we were putting piping together,. the " isometric sheets" (blueprints) would tell us the materials needed. If we couldn't find the " traceability numbers" wnich were scribed on the materials, we would just find another piece of material, grind off the numbers and rescribe the correct traceability numbers. I talked with other people who had done this. I myself did it seven or eight times. We had to in order to get the job done. Sometimes the foreman gave the okay to do so.
25. One problem with the piping that was rampant w a's that it was always out of plumb. This makes it difficult to get a good weld with an even gap for proper penetration and an ability to fit up the weld, do the root pass, do the hot pass and do the final weld as many joints required. Sometimes the gaps because of the cocked ends would be enormous. On many other occasions where the pipes didn't match up, we would literally use sledgehammers r comealongs to bring the ends together, causing the pipes to be under great stress at toe moment they were tacked and welded, and leaving these stress patterns in the welded joint.
26. It was a very common fact that many welds which I witnessed, were welded wet. 'This means that'no'breheat was used on the material before being welded. Welding wet metal creates porousity in the weld and is not a proper nor adequate procedure. Porousity is a hole or holes in the weld that go deep in the weld, usually appearing throughout the entire weld from top to bottom.
27. About the time that United Engineering was appearing on the scene, the Pullman Higgins crew that I was on was no i longer allowed to do ASME welds. We could just do the B-31.1 l welds. I believe that the same condition existed throughout )
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. ' . . , the rest of the plant and I assume that this happened because PH was doing such a poor job. There was f riction .between 'PH and UENC, each trying to put the blame on the other during the transition period and from my own viewpoint, I didn't see that UENC did any better or safer job, nor did they develop a better attitude among the tradesmen.
' 28. The welding rod room had PH employees both young and old who seemed to always be confused about their job responsibilties. It seemed there would be confusion among the rod room personnel when_there were 50 welders hanging around outside waiting for their paperwork to go do their job. I would take paperwork that wasn't even completed back to my job area only to be informed of the inadequacy and then having to go back to the rod room to have it straightened out. Most times it wasn't. There were aisc times when I would go to the rod room with a slip for a certain job, the rod room personnel _ , would say they didn't have the paperwork for it, it would have been lost or whatever. All these occurrences would happen daily, sometimes several times a day.
29. _In the rod room, PH employed people to handle the paperwork, and the union provided a Pipe Fitter for dispensation of welding rod into the welder's portable oven.
On many occasions, I saw paperwork people handing welding rod into the ovens.
, I i On my oath g pi STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ROCKINGHAM, SS November C , 1986 On this 6th day of November, personally appeared before me, the undersigned officer, the above referred person, who after being duly sworn subscribed the above Afffidavit "On my oath" and stated that the above allegations in fact were true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
1r -- No ^r" Public/Justide of the Peb" ce
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. i has asked me to write you to explain my
:" sketch of the as-built condition of the primary loop
. system at Seabrook Station.
All the components of this system, which includes the Reactor, four Steam Generators and four Primary Coolant Pumps, were initially set to a tolerance of 0.001" (one thoesandth of one inch). All the connecting piping was pre-heated before any welding was done. This was done to assure that there was no strees in the en1; ire system.
Due to a misinterpretation in measuring the lengths of pipe leading from the reactor to the steam generators and pumps, the column bases were set 3/4" further from the reactor than design had called for.
When the cross-over piping was installed, the pipe was found to be too close to one of the pump columns. the space was less than one inch where six inches of insu-lation had to be installed.
, The decision was made to move the offending leg six inches toward the reactor to allow the insulation to be installed. This is the case with all four pumps. l As you can see in my sketch, when the pumps are installed according to design, the pipe from the reactor expands , when hot approximately two inches and the pumps rise ! j uniformly about 0.008" causing no stress on the system. j
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l , In the as-built condition, however, the rear legs of
- the pump cause a rise of about 0.015" while the front leg
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(column) lowers the pump approximately 0.036" making a total difference of about 0.051".
i This would tend to make the pipe leading to the reactor ' deflect (bend) approximately 1/8" (0.125").
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Since this pipe i's quite rigid, most of the stress would, I believe, fall on the welds at the pump and the reactor. This condition would also cause a slight twist in the cross-over piping.
While I was at Seabrook I discussed this situation with several of the engineers and since that time I have talked with the NRC inspector. All of these people have told me that this was not a problem. While they are probably correct, I feel that an unbiased second opinion may be in order.
I hope this explains the sketch satisfactorily but if
, - there are further questions, please feel free to let i
me know.
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AFFIDAVIT OF ,, __ , I was employed as a laborer by Perini from March 23, 1982 through the April 1984 layoff.
I am currently . My date of' birth is October 22, 1959. I currently reside at From through , I was on active duty in the Navey; and from to I was in the active reserves. I received an honorable discharge from the Navy, , When I got out of the military, I went to the local Union Hall in Portsmouth and was signed on by Perini. To obtain my job, I gave $100 tb - the Union steward through a third party.
From the time I began at the plant on March 23, 1982 through September 1982, I had a good foreman who worked us hard and kept the crew preccy busy.
There were people on the crew who smoked pot at lunch. We were working on the Containment 2 area, preparing it for concrete pours. That foreman was good and clean. He was an exception.
When that foreman left, a person about 34 took over who could not control the crew. We went to the No. 2 turbine building to assist in pours and to do bushing. We also did general labor work. Two members of my crew got caught smoking pot during that period of time and were' fired for that reason.
We did not have very much work to do on that job, and we were advised to pick up buckets full of wires, pour them out again, and pick them up again just to look busy. There were slot more people working in that area chan were needed. There seemed to be at least twice as many than were needed. When we were there, you could smoke a joint or drink on the job. A number of people drank at lunch. At that time, 1 saw people take coke and valium on the job.
A number of the iron workers got stoned. I saw lots of people drinking alot.
Right before Christmas , alot of people got layed off. Around Christmas 1982, most of the people working on Containment 2 were layed off or transferred over to Unit 1.
I was transferred to Unit 1. I vant to work in a waste process building.
Again, in the waste process building, there were many more people than were needed to do the work. I saw a number of pipefitters stoned and doing lines 1 of cocaine on the job. They did this prior to working on the pipes. Also, l they did it during their breaks while they were working. They were not the only workers that I observed dfoing drugs. I also saw welders, carpenters, and laborers drunk and stoned on the job. I have a very vivid memory of one i inspector for UE6C who was drunk a good percentage of the time, and I also observed him smoking grass. I saw him coming back frum lunch totally drunk l
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on a number of occasions. Also, on a number of occasions he was drunk when he did inspections. My observations of this inspector were in 1983 and 1984.
- In approximately January or February of 1984, he was fired, and I had observed his drinking and drug use for 6 or 8 monthe,. I do not believe he was fired for drug or alcohol use, but for timeliness with regard to reporting to work.
A friend of mine, who is an inspector for UE6C, told me that the company ' got bonuses if the inspectors put their signature on inspections to say that everything was all right. Beca.use of the situation, the supervisor pressured . them to put their names on the line even if it was not all right and had not been done by the book. They were encouraged to cut corners to get by. It is my understanding from my friend that this was across the board with regard to Perini inspectors at least. I am not sure if the bonus went to UE6C or to Perini.
I believe that at least fifty percent (50%) of the people on site used drugs and alcohol. It was the norm to drink at lunch or at work.
w . The inspector (the one who told me jabout the bonuses) also advised me that it one' tim'e'h'e worked Tecond" shift ~1n'the bluc4print ~ room. 'When revi-sions to the blueprints came through, sometimes a group of them had been sitting around smoking pot and were really stoned. they+did1 met wantWhettiePwith the revised blueprints so they would throw'the' revised blueprints into che : shredder; then, if they were called on it, they would say they never got them.
A data processor told me that the blueprints were really screwed up. To sub-stantiate that further at one time I was working second shift as a laborer.
I was asked to go out with three electrical engineers to dig up an electrical manhole. The manhole cover was supposed to be on the northerly side of the No. I turbine. There was a blueprint shack just opposite the No. 2 turbine on the northerly side also. I went down with the three electrical engineers and dug for three hours. The engineers kept going back and checking the blueprints and telling me to dig in another place. We never did find the manhole cover. In fact, after three hours, they called in a consulting engineer, and I dug for another hour. Finally, they gave up and hoped it would be found on a later shift. I dug holes in an area that was at least 10' x 20' in size. It may have been larger, but it has been awhile; so, I am not exactly certain.
I saw people dealing coke and marijuana on site. I only saw someone on my crew bring in acid one time.
In the Fall of 1982 when I was working on the No. 2 turbine, one guy on our crew brought in some little blue pills. He took some of the pills before lunch, and then, he went out and drank at lunch. When I came back, he could not talk or walk. We had him lay dowr. and tried to make him rest so he wo.Id not hurt himself. We also were worried that the supervisor might see him.-
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Page 3 On the first day of safety indoctrination 1982, we were told that the quickest way to get fired was to take the cover off the water cooler because in the past people had urinated and defecated in them. After that, I would never drink out of a cooler unless it was in a really well lit open area.
As a laborer, I had to go around and clean up a number of areas. I frequently smelled urine in the dark areas and also occasionally ran into human excrement. It was very common to throw garbage from your lunch any-where and everywhere on the site.
Fifty percent of the people working on the site at least are not from the New Hampshire area. '
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When I was at the waste process plant, my for~e man who had previously-been a supervisor offered me a drink and once took me to lunch at the South Seas. He drank constantly at lunch and was frequently drunk on the job.
Frequently I worked overtime. We did not work overtime because there was alot of work to do and we really generally stood around most of the time we were at work on overtime and did nothing. Obviously, this boredom created more of an incentive for people to smoke grass and drink on the job site. Alot of times when we worked overtime we weren't assigned to our regular foreman nor were we in our normal area. The attitude seemed to be sort of devil-may-care and nobody really cared about doing anything.
There was alot of drug and alcohol abuse on overtime.
I once saw eight carpenters build a ladder about 20' long. It took eight people a whole day to build that ladder. It was just a temporary ladder. I was assigned to tend them and of course I didn't have to do anything 'cause they weren't doing anything either.
One shift with overtice I remember reading a book and completing an entire book during my work hours. I remember one shift when I was assigned to ten carpenters en overtime for two hours, all of us stretching out and just sleeping for that period of time. We were of course paid time and a half for our efforts.
Alot of time en regular shifts we all just stood around day dreaming, waiting till the shift was over. We received good pay. We got $10.00 an hour for unskilled labor, $15.00 an hour for overtime and $20.00 an hour on Sundays. They didn't give out Sundays too often, but when they did, nchody did anything on Sundays either. They tried to give overtime to people who put in their 40.
I found a marijuana plant growing at No. 2 turbine.
There was lots of theft.
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Page 4 With regard to the dogs. I saw dogs come in to the building. However, it was announced that the dogs were coming and when it was announced people scattered all over the place and hid dope and coke and whatever. I never saw the dogs find anything.
On the minus 31 level of the waste process building there~ sre huge cracks all the way down the walls with something white seeping through. It might be sea water or salt. I'm not sure, but they came down on a number of occasions when I was there and bushed it out and patched them up. This never seemed , to solve the problem and the cracks would reappear.
DATED: January 21 , 1987
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. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ' ROCKINGHAM, SS. s ft Au r n u , dl , 1987 Subscribed and sworn to, before me,
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Notary 1%ib'ic l CYtJTHIA N:X. Notary Pubi)C My Commission EVf1Wainion Excerer. e.;r q g
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I, 6 under oath do cepose and say as follows: ' 1. I live at 6 , 6 , Mussachusetts. I was employed at the Seabrook Station as an ironworker for five (5) years; for three (3) of those years I was in a supervisory position as a foreman. I worked for three (3) ' years in actual construction and for two (2) years in the laydown area. I worked on all aspects of ironwork: reinfor-cement, structural erection anc welding.
2. I was hired in 1978 througn the Ironworkers Local t.74 out of Manchester, New Hampshire. At the time I had been a member of Local 351 in Lawrence, Massachusetts for five (5) years, w . 3. At the time I was hired, Local 474 only had a couple of hundred members. Since their membership was inadequate to supply the job at Seabrook, Local 351 out of Lawrence was contacted to supply workers. As a union member I was aware that even with recruiting members from other unions, Local 474 could not supply enough workers for the Seabrook Station job and that the contractor, with the agreement of the union, hired people who were not members of the union and had no construction experience. These workers were employed on " permits" at full journeyman's wages.
4. I was initially hired as a rodman to install reinforcing steel in the Waste Processing Building and at other locations on the site. My foreman was . After a few months I became a foreman and reported to the general fore- * man, . My crew worked primarily on the Cooling Tower but we also worked at various locations on the site hanging pre-fabricated curtains. After approximately one and one-half (li) years I went into ctructural ironwork, per-forming all aspects including erection, decking, and detail work, including welding. After approximately four (4) months I became the foreman for the structural iron crew and remained in that position until I terminated my employment at Seabrook Station. As a foreman, I reported to the general foreman on the site.
5. I always worked on the first chift. My crew often had to redo the reinforcing bar work which had been done by the second and third shifts because these shifts contained the largest concentration of the inexperienced " permit". workers, and because there was little communication between the general foremen of the different shifts, and no communication between the foremen of the different shifts.
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7. 1. .= a w concrete.pouredi ohen : tis.- tesa 6.a.s t.co low t.ner6b"y? c rea t i ng EEld@dni. ' * ^pe^"a ra tmu "ret - d. II ' liave: psr8ona l knowl edge .ot aruinf orcinq Dbard 7 in the Cooling iTow..r'that did not hav<> concrbto c'ovaring which wt"the
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i J.auien spac i f ica t ion . 9; iT nave p.trsonal kno.eledc.s o. : ..inf orcina dowels in th.- Cooli ng Tov.er ol.ich we:r.i croot.. : or out. of location.af,te.c the conc r e t.- was poured crounu them. This woulo necessitatd a non-con fo riaa nce report being <;0n rated and som:f times the l corrective action ta :n n ..cu i d :e.' to leave the dovels as built, or t.n wara r.om.0 t i me s t r.I n t o bend tne dowcln to mal:e t umn t i t . 10. Tne blueprints that .e e used v-ce very difficuit to . interpret 1 even for people on the general foreman. level. This uas ~ b?cause the orint ca s i nadequat-e and the blueprints were of a i differ 2nt .ctyle tnan what many or the workccs and foremen were accustomed to. Sometim-> Lur foreman would get the engineers, the general foreman or quali.ty assurance personc to interpret tne blocprint :- sd:n-etimes the f oreman would mak a n i r, cun ueter.ni nat ion o f e nn i. i.i.e bluepr i nte meant.
11. M/ crew often experienc : . "e l i e. s in :s t t e:st ine to fcllow:
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the alueprint.. For e:;aia;;1 , .no prints would chou sleeves
.chich were cup;)osad to go in j particultr locrtion, a but we vould find tnat therr wa s :ii . oly som4 thing olse in that
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locc ion. 'I ne der iqn ec,n f l i c i - led to co.;t ovacruns because the v.-o r k ha d to oo stopped un i i.- t ha ..eetion was re-designed.
12. Seve r.s l f ac t o r s wou l .1 e.an t. r i b.it .+ t o c.2 -i t overruns. i:'o r exaa01, in the ficld, work.>. ..ou lr! run into a problera follo.ing th.- blooprinte or inst her rienian conflict. IJ si ng
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t h e i .- kno-1:d.y from 1.. 2 st cr.i...t r uc t i o n .ea ri: , t no worker would i n f or.a t he yua l i t y a .e:u r.i n. . c a .? or tna enaineors no.: the probl.N.i cou l .1 baat b0 re n al v. .!. t.or:: uculd .:too on that por-tion of t.he construction. A ..v day. 1o a f a .. Week: later t h.2 Onc i r.o. . r -: wou l .1 cas. 0 0. 6 c :- .i na t.31 i the workers to oo ahead and do .. hat i h e w o r k.-c. n.n u qucoestad i n .t.he f irst place.
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13. I could not plan on.a full day's work for my crew at Seabrook Station. because of delays incurred in resolving design conflicts or other problems, some crews had no work to do for several days at a time. The workers could_not be hired and i fired on a regular basis so they were just kept on payroll.
In filling out time sheets, I sometimes had to make things up ' to say that certain work took longer than it actually did.
This was a consistent problem at the Eeabrook Station, which Perini had no incentive to remedy as they were hired on a r cost-plus basis.
' 14. Another factor leading to cost overruns was the amount of work which had to be redone. For example, the Waste Processing Building had twenty-five (25)-ton columns which had to be replaced because the base plates at the bottom,were' ;
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improperly installed.
15. I saw drug and alcohol usage by workers on the site prac-
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I 16. It was common knowledge on the site that an inspector was
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caught using the same x-ray on different welds.
Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury thi9 17th day I of April, 1987.
n rs By: e COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS . Essex, ss. April 17, 1987 . k The personally appeared the above-named and acknowledged the foregoing instrument to be his free act and deed, before me
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My commission expires,: g pg f7 i ! ! !
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- DURING THE PERIOD 04/02/87 THROUGH 04/09/87 PSNH/NHY EMPLOYEES RECEIVED TRAINING ON THE "NEW CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCEDURE".
THE COURSE WAS TAUGHT BY , AND DEALT WITH THE VARIOUS TYPES OF FORMS TO USE TO REPORT DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROBLEMS.
WHILE STRICTLY SPEAKING THE FORMAL " CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCEDURE" MAY BE NEW, MANY OF THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT FORMS SUCH AS NONCONFORMANCE REPORTS, 10CFR21 REPORTS, AND WORK REQUESTS ARE NOT NEW. * IF NHY EMPLOYEES ARE ONLY NOW RECEIVING THIS TRAINING, DOES THIS IMPLY THAT THEY HAVE NOT, ALL ALONG, BEEN KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT HOW TO CORRECTLY REPORT PROBLENS? DID HR. VASSALLO OBSERVE, DURING THE COURSE, THAT THE EMPLOYEES WERE DEFICIENT IN KNOWLEDGE OF THE VARIOUS FORMS, WHEN THEY SHOULD BE USED, WHO SHOULD FILL THEM OUT? - ntosS leflCJ Tc<.esV4 q, e e '3 Leyl bj"i hoyks M " l
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Anonymous Interview With-Former Painting Inspector at, t Seabrook Station by the Employee ~s Legal Project ' l. He said engineers wrote Engineering Change Authorizations (ECAs) to change the design to fic was was already built. He felt there were too many ECAs written toward the end of construction, and believes there were an exceptionally large number of " accept as is" dispositions written at the . end of construction to speed up construction and to save money. At the end of contracts, for exanple, in instrumentation, there were a lot of design changes written to speed things up.
2.41e'saw cracks in the equipmenti: vaultetiidfgieYeMingNater'&s' late-as 1986.
~3. He said that in the tunnels there was exposed ~rebar," there were major
; voids in the concrete, and some concrete was too thin, Jot salt water is very corrosive, and he thinks this could be a problem.
4. He said construction people frequently worked-with outdated bluepYints; this was a particelar problem with Pullman-Higgins, the piping contractor.
He said a lot of engineers couldn't tell you where something was supposed to go.
5. There was a lot of bulling around in the pipes. They always had come < alongs and chainfalls around.
6. A quality assurance man in Pullman-Higgins believed the core barrel was cracked. 'Ibe QA person reported this to the conpany, and engineers responded to his concern, but the.QA inspector was never satisfied that the core barrel was not cracked. , 7. United Engineers and Constructors put a lot of stress on inspectors, and New Hampshire Yankee people didn't think 11uch inspection was required. If a quality control person was not satisfied with a disposition by an engineer, they could write a Request For Information (RFI), but it usually didn't go any further even if the QC person didn't understand or agree'with the response to the RFI. Generally, no one went to the NRC, even if they were dissatisfied with a response to an RFI.
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Phone Conversations with Four Former Pullman-Higgins Quality Assurance Engineers by the Employee's Legal Project
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. Because these engineers still work in the nuclear industry, they refuse to reveal their identities for fear of being blackballed.
. 1. A. In a number of. instances, he. could not . locate , purchase orders with the name of the manufacturer and supplier 7and believes'no one was; keeping very e ud track of purchase orders.and other traceability' documentation.
B. Design requirements were changed after Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) were filed. Improper hardware was installed, passed on, and subsequently, the inproper hardware became the standard.
C. He is concerned about the use of galvanized steel in instrumentation and piping. Evan when the galvanizing is ground off, he believes high levels of lead and zinc are left in the base material. Galvanized steel is
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D. He was told by his supervisor that Class II and Class III supports did not have to meet ASME specifications. He could not find that assertion documented anywhere, and believes, based on that theory, that the welds at Seabrook Station are not certifiably safe.
E. ASME Class I supports were installed inside the reactor vessel, somewhere near the reactor internals, and were faulty. The heat numbers on these supports were not recorded.
F. When he raised issues which concerned him about the plant's safety to the allegations organization, he received unsatisfactory responses, so did not bother to report other violations he saw to that organization. All of the problems he encountered were documented, although they were not resolved to his satisfaction.
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2. A. 'Ivo men who had performed electrica) work at Seabrook Station for l Fishback Electrical were subsequently hired by New Hanpshire Yankee as ; Quality Assurance engineers to review work they had performed.
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, B. here was a process called "greylining" where procedures were i rewritten after a Nonconformance Report was issued. The NCR was then I voided. In 1986, there was an extraordinary nunter of NCRs voided.~
eC. There was a materials traceability problem. Certain valves on the
< steam generator lacked the engraved manufacturer's nunber.
D. United Engineers and Constructors engaged in a practice of ' renunbering equipment to conform to specification.~%is practice was referred to as " cannibalizing the material,", and also "retagging." He knows of at least 60 pieces of "retagged" equipment 'in'the' Unit I deisel" generator system.
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3. A. On one particular weld whose documentation he inspected, inspection procedure was violated. He wrote a Nonconformance Report on the violated
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procedure, but the Quality Assurance supervisor cancelled the NCR. Wis was one of twenty to thirty procedural violations in weld inspections he discovered.
4. A. In some cases some welders were instructed by NCR dispositions in repair of large bore pipe to weld the pipes beyond their' thickness maximum.
He observed this himself, end also spoke with various people who had also noted this practice. This may mean that all large bore pipe welds are 31dedbeyondthepipethicknessmaximum.
B. In researching the documentation on this issue he was harrassed and ultimately fired.
C. He believes the entire Seabrook Project is filled with welds which are not properly certified. - - D. He is very concerned that Quality Assurance at Seabrook Station is poor. For instance, he believes the Quality Assurance supervisor was inept.
He does not believe weld inspection requirements were adhered to.
5. %is person worked for United Engineers and COE5tructors in a management position until 1984. During the major Reduction In Force in 1984, he knows management people who worked in the offices were carrying boxes of documents offsite to their homes. People were also throwing documents away. This went on for at least a week, perhaps two, until nanagement discovered the problem and searched the garbage in an attengt to recover the documents. He believes this would certainally create traceability { problems. '
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1. The air conditioning system maintains the tenperature in the equipment vault and containment. %ere are four-by-six-foot ducts which start at -61 elevation in the equipment vault and go to the roof of the Primary Auxiliary Building. Wey provide cooling for all the buildings around the containment building. It took six to seven months to install the ducts, and everything was sealed with silicon. Just as the very last bolt was sealed, an engineer told the sheetmetal workers the wrong gauage of steel was used for,the. ducts. It was never changed.
2. %e Waste Process Building (the tank farm) stores chemicals like boron, etc., to control a reaction. November,1985, during the hot functional tests, the pressure in containment was brought up to 160. pounds per square inch, and everything expanded. W e tank farm building (about 100 feet by 150 feet) has walls of poured, concrete and steel. An improper thickness of_ structural steel was used in the main skeleton. She,Auilding wracked about
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eight-inches (asi'if someone put their hands on oppositie corners and twisted). Wey welded more plates of steel to the girders to reinforce it.
During the test, you could see'the pipes moving, and there was a lot of.
banging and popping.
3. In the BIuipment Vault, at elevation -61, he and his partner were told
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to put in a bulkhead at the bottom. Were are three compartments, front, 3 middle, and back; three cells on one side, three on the other. In the 3 southwest cell, at the very back, there is a $50,000 Westinghouse pump the size of a car. It is an emergency cooling punp. He and his partner were
, told to build a bulkhead between the motor and the other two cells.. Wis j was to separate the motor from the other two cells so when water was forced i
through the system to clean it, the motor would not get wet. .
- They built a watertight bulkhead, but someone forgot to close a sunphole in
- the floor, which is a three-foot-by-eight-foot trough. n at hole is connected to all cells, so when the system was flooded, so was the motor.
1 He worked in the equipment vault for six months after that incident, and j although the mi11 wrights were supposed to strip and clean the motor, they j never did, at least not in the six months thereafter.
l bIIthe Waste Process Building, at the boit'om,1 nee are three' cells.
%ere is a two-and-a-half-foot diameter steel pipe which descends, does a . 90-degree turn, then runs flat. In the elbows of the pipe, there are GE or , Westinghouse 200-horsepower motors to circulate cooling water. % ere are three such motors on sleds (two-and-a-half-foot by six-foot or eight-foot flat heavy steel beds). % e sleds are supported at six points on steel springs. This is so when the pipe expands and pushes the motors' shafts down, the sleds collapse with the pipes' expansion. We sleds did not work properly, and the shafts on all three motors were bent.- %e -millwrights were supposed to replace the sleds, but never did. %ese motors, which will not run correctly if the shafts are bent, are critical cooling conponents.
5. men the cooling towers were conpletely built, it was discovered that , ' the walls were not thick enough. Rather than chip off the concrete to
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f , ' attech new rebar to the old rebar before pouring the additional layer of concrete, they used Hilte bolts (or shields). They drilled a hole in the
[p concrete, and attached rebar to the bolts, so there are actually two . l. separate walls. Structurally, they are not attached [:j to each other, although to the naked eye you can't tell.
' 6. During the cold functional test, all the lines were under eighty pounds [ of pressure. His partner was moving a ladder and accidently hit a sml1 g metal valve on a one-and-a-half-inch line. Water came spurting out. In the j twenty-five to thirty seconds it, took to close the valve, the place was 4, teeming with supervisors and engineers. In thirty seconds, that one-and-a-j' half-inch line reduced the pressure in the system to twenty pounds. It was an unmarked valve; anyone could turn it.
f 7. In the equignent vault, an inspector rejected a weld, telling the welder it was not properly done. The inspector told the welder to fix it and 1.1 6 walked away. The welder took a graphite pencil and penciled in the weld.
I When the inspector returned and examined the weld, he said, "Now that 's what I call a good job." The pencil filled in the weld's porosity. Although this incident occurred in 1982 or 1983, it so inpressed him that he could point out the pipe and the exact veld.
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Statement o_ff .. ster, Massachusetts I was a carpenter at Seabrook Station frcm the Spring of 1981 to the Fall of 1982. During that time, I saw a 2 by 4 spreader which was left in the containment wall of the missile shield after the concrete was poured.
The spreader was at the level of the roofline of the Fuel Storage Building and slightly to the right facing the containment. (See sketch). . , ,
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, April 17, 1987 cc
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My name is I r esicle at
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>- Hanpshire. I worked as a carpenter at Seabrook Station from June, 1982 to December 1983.
(. . I am not against nuclear power, nor am I opposed to the Seabrook
,-Q nuclear plant. I am concerned about the plant 's piping. ' ...
In the summer or fall of 1983, when I was working in the
' Emergency Ventilation Area (elevation 21), a crew was caught ; stretching pipe in 'an area below elevation 21. I believe they were working on the Main Steam Feed, West (northwest azimuth).
They had heated the pipe and stretched it using a come-along.
At the time, all the pipefitters and carpenters in the area were discussing the incident. The crew which was caught was fired,
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down to foreman (he had only been a gold hat one month), and one M
:: crew member who .had refused to participate in the pipe " '
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-p. ' A. . . I am concerned about this incident because, before they were 'lyi f,. caught,'this crew may have stretched other pipe. Were all the i,: pipes this crew worked on rechecked?
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'Ihe above information is true to the best of my knowledge.
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ENCLOSURE 2 QUESTIONS REGARDING THE APRIL 20, 1987 SUBMITTAL Attachment C Question Is this affidavit submitted by the anonymous alleger " David Day"? Attachment C, Paragraph 11 Questions: 1. Give the location of the welds, systems affected, weld numbers, date of the incident piping sizes, or other identifying information.
2. Give the names of the welders involved.
3. Give a description of the kinds of defects that were covered up.
4. How does the alleger know that there were defects in the welds? Was the alleger trained in welding or inspection? Attachment C, Paragraph 12
"Many of my co-workers didn't have the faintest idea how to read blueprints which led to location mistakes in the piping installations and hanger installations."
Questions: 1. What was the job function of the co-workers that required them to read blueprints? 2. How would their not being able to read blueprints cause defects in the plant equipment? 3. Give examples of location mistakes that were not detected and corrected by the normal installation process and inspection. These examples should include system names, line numbers, drawing numbers, and other detailed information to permit location and reinspection by the NRC.
Attachment C, Paragraph 15
"On one occasion, I witnessed a welder welding stainless steel when he hadn't been qualified to do so..."
. Enclosure 2 2
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Questions: 1. What weld number, system, location of incident, date of incident, welder's name, his " buddy's" name, and any other detailed information that would permit identification and verification of the statement? 2. What was the qualified welders stencil number? Attachment C, Paragraphs 20 and 21
"There were literally thousands upon thousands of arc strikes on pipes. In the areas where I worked, pipes would be lined with them... Sometimes welders would make a mistake, cause an arc strike, and the pipe fitter would grind it out."
Questions: 1. Where did the alleger work; what areas did they see the arc strikes? Give the system names and locations where this occurred.
2. Were the arc strikes recorded by quality control and dispositioned? Attachment C, Paragraph 23
"...If a worker couldn't find the correct metal and numbers, they would take other metal, cut it to the correct size, grind off that metal ID number and airscribe on the hanger the correct ID for the hanger to be installed."
Questions: 1. What was the alleger's job function during the period the changing of the parts and transcribing of the numbers took place? 2. Where were the hangers located that had the altered parts installed? Give the piping system name, size, line numbers, or drawing affected.
3. What kinds of hanger parts were involved? 4. What were the dates of the observations? 5. Where did they get the "other metal"? Attachment C, Paragraph 25
"On many other occasions where the pipes didn't match up, we would literally use sledgehammers or comealongs to bring the ends together, causing the pipes to be under great stress at the moment they were tacked and welded, and leaving these stress patterns in the weld joint."
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Questions: 1. In what piping systems were these welds located? Give piping line numbers and drawing numbers where available.
2. What was the time period that the cold pulling occurred? Attachment C, Paragraph 26
"It was a very common fact that many welds which I witnessed, were welded wet.
This means that no preheat was used on the material before being welded."
Questions: 1. In what systems were the welds located? Give drawing numbers, line numbers, or other identifying details.
2. What was the material and the material thickness welded? 3. What kind of material was welded (pipe, structural steel, pipe supports, electrical supports, or other equipment)? Attachment E
"I know cement mixes that were supposed to go to one place and were put elsewhere without correction."
, Questions: l 1. Where was the concrete placed? Give date of placement, original des-tination and final destination, building column and line number of placement, and elevation.
2. What was alleger's job function that permitted him to know this informa-i
' tion? Can the alleger give any supporting information that would aid in the corroboration of the allegation?
Attachment F, Page 2 "
"The inspector (the one who told me about the bonuses) also advised me that one time he worked second shift in the blueprint room. When revisions to the blue-prints came through, sometimes a group of them had been sitting around smoking pot and were really stoned. They did not want to bother with the revised blueprints so they would throw the revised blueprints into the shredder..."
Questions: 1. What is the name of the inspector that had first-hand knowledge of the incident or other participants?
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. Enclosure 2 4 . 2. What are the number of the drawings that were shredded? 3. What was the date of the incident and the location? 4. How was the drawing control system showing the proper drawing revision bypassed? Attachment I, Paragraph 6
"A quality assurance man in Pullman-Higgins believed the core barrel was cracked.
The QA person reported this to the company, and engineers responded to his concern, but the QA inspector was never satisfied that the core barrel was not cracked."
Questions: 1. What was the basis for the inspectors concern that the core barrel was cracked? Was it the job function of the inspector to examine the core barrel? 2. Was the suspected cracking reported by the inspector on a nonconformance report? If so, what was the number of the nonconformance report and the date? 3. What was the specific location of the suspected crack? Provide sketches of the location and describe what the inspector saw.
- 4. In the statement, "...and engineers responded to his concern," what was the nature of the engineers response? Did the engineers examine the core barrel or have it inspected? Attachment J, General Question: The telephone conversation record states there are four former employees in-volved in the allegations presented. The record then is divided into 5 para-graphs. Are the allegations presented in any groupings representative of a particular alleger? Attachment J, Paragraph 1.a
"In a number of instances, he could not locate purchase orders with the name of the manufacturer and supplier, and believes no one was keeping very good track of purchase orders and other traceability documentation."
Questions: 1. What were the purchase orders or equipment that were not being tracked very well? Give examples of the affected equipment. l
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I J 2. What other equipment documentation is the alleger referring to when he says, "...and other traceability documentation"? 3. What was the date of his employment?
Attachment J., Paragraph 1.b
" Design requirements were changed after Nonconformance Reports were filed. Impro-per hardware was installed, passed on, and subsequently, the improper hardware became the standard."
Questions: 1. What equipment specifically was affected by this process? Provide ex-amples of the nonconforming conditions and nonconformance report numbers.
2. What organization was the alleger working for at.the time of the incident? What were the dates of employment? 3. How was hardware improper? Attachment J, Paragraph 1.c '
"He is concerned about the use of galvanized steel in instrumentation and piping."
Questions: 1. What systems and locations were galvanized materials used? Was the gal-vanize used in the safety related, ASME CC 1, 2, 3 piping or supports?
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l 2. What is the technical concern with the use of galvanized materia.l? ' Attachment J, Paragraph 1.e '
"ASME Class I supports were installed inside the reactor vessel, somewhere near the reactor internals, and were faulty. The heat numbers on these supports were not recorded."
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Questions: 1. Which reactor vessel was involved, Unit No. 1 or 2?
; 2. What was the faulty condition of the supports? Describe the condition and how the alleger discovered the fault.
3. What was the exact location of the supports? Provide a sketch of the ' support and its approximate location.
4. How does the alleger know what heat numbers were not recorded. Was traceability maintained by another means? a , a
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o Enclosure 2 6 o Attachment J, Paragraph 2.b
"There was a process called "greylining" where procedures were rewritten after a Nonconformance Report was issued. The NCR was then voided. In 1986, there was an extraordinary number of NCRs voided."
Questions: 1. What is the perceived problem with the process? Is the fact that large numbers of NCRs were voided the cause for concern or the process of
"greylining" perceived as the problem?
2. What kinds of procedures were rewritten? Provide the titles and numbers of the procedures.
3. What organization used the "greylining" process? 4. Were the NCRs recorded in the tracking log and then deleted? Would the log reflect a voided NCR? Attachment J, Paragraph 2.c
"There was a materials traceability problem. Certain valves on the steam generator lacked the engraved manufacturer's number."
Questions: 1. Was the materials traceability problem the lack of the engraved manufac-turer's number? 2. What is the perceived problem that the numbers were missing? 3. What specific valves were involved in the incident? Give the valve num-bers, size, function or other identifying information. Did the incident occur in Unit No. 1 or No. 2? Which steam generator was involved? 4. When did the incident occur? Attachment J, Paragraph 2.d
" United Engineers and Constructors engaged in a practice of renumbering equipment to conform to specification. This practice was referred to as " cannibalizing the material," and also "retagging." He knows of at least 60 pieces of "retagged" equipment in the Unit 1 diesel generator system."
Questions: 1. What specifically was the purpose of cannibalization or retagging?
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2. Describe in detail the practice of renumbering equipment to conform to specification. What kinds of equipment were renumbered? What was the purpose of renumbering? 3. What is the perceived problem with the practice? 4. List the 60 pieces of equipment that were retagged? 5. How can the retagged equipment be identified? Attachment J, Paragraph 3.a
"On one particular weld whose documentation he inspected, inspection procedure was violated. He wrote a Nonconformance Report on the violated procedure, but the Quality Assurance supervisor cancelled the NCR. This is one of twenty to thirty procedural violations in weld inspections he discovered."
Questions: 1. How was the inspection procedure violated? 2. What was the "one particular weld" for which the alleger wrote the non-conformance report? Give weld number, location, cause of nonconformance.
3. What was the number of the nonconformance report? 4. What was the organization the alleger was working for and his supervi-sor's name? What was the name of the QA supervisor that cancelled the nonconformance report? 5. List the remaining twenty to thirty welds that the alleger feels were deficient and why be believes the welds are deficient.
6. What time period did the incidents occur? Attachment J, Paragraph 4.a
"In some cases some welders were instructed by NCR dispositions in repair of large bore pipe to weld the pipes beyond their thickness maximum... This may mean that all large bore pipe welds are welded beyond the pipe thickness maximum."
Questions: 1. What does the alleger mean by " weld the pipes beyond their thickness maximum"? Is this a requirement of a procedure or a code? Provide a sketch of the concern.
2. Give examples of the pipes affected by this concern.
3. Provide NCR numbers or dates of NCRs that describe the condition.
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Attachment J, Paragraph 4.b
"In researching the documentation on this issue he was harassed and ultimately fired."
. Questions: 1. Who harassed the alleger? What form did the harassment take? 2. Did the alleger report this to the NRC or the licensee? 3. What documentation was the alleger researching at the time of the alleged , harassment? ' 4. What was the allegers job function? . Attachment J, Paragraph 4.c
: "He believes the entire Seabrook Project is filled with welds which are not pro-i perly certified."
l l Question: I i What specific welds does the alleger believe are not properly certified? Give examples of the welds and details of how they are not certified.
! j Attachment J, Paragraph 4.d !
- "He does not believe weld inspection requirements were adhered to."
! Question: i Based on the assumption that the alleger was a quality control inspector, have l the alleger provide the details of the requirements that were not followed.
! Where possible, provide the document title that established the requirement.
! Discuss why the alleger believes the requirements were not followed.
Attachment J, Paragraph 5
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l ...he knows management people who worked in the offices ~were carrying boxes of ! ' documents offsite to their homes. People were also throwing documents away. This went on for at least a week, perhaps two, until management discovered the problem 4 and searched the garbage in an attempt to recover the documents. He believes this would certainly create traceability problems."
' ! Questions: ! 1. What kinds of documents were specifically taken offsite?
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2. Give examples of processes that were affected by the lost documents.
Can the alleger identify specific documents that were removed and in-stances where this resulted in a traceability problem? 3. What management position did the alleger fill? What organization? Attachment K, Paragraph 7
"In the equipment vault, an inspector rejected a weld, telling the welder it was not properly done. The inspector told the welder to fix it an walked away. The welder took a graphite pencil and penciled in the weld. When the inspector re-turned and examined the weld, he said, "Now that's what I call a good job."
Questions: 1. Identify the weld, give the weld number, the location, drawing number, weld type (pipe, pipe support, etc.), or any other identifying details that will permit location of the exact weld.
2. Give the welder's name, badge or stencil number, and the inspector's name or other identifying characteristics.
3. Describe the process used to deceive the inspector using the graphite pencil. Describe the size of the defects that were concealed by the pencil.
Attachment L
"...I saw a 2 by 4 spreader which was left in the containment wall of the missile shield after the concrete was poured."
Questions: 1. The Seabrook containment structure is two buildings, the actual contain-ment structure and the containment enclosure. From the outside, the only building that can be seen is the containment enclosure. Is the structure referred to by the alleger the containment enclosure? 2. Does the spreader protrude from the structure such that it is visible from the outside now? Can the alleger provide a sketch of the orienta-tion of the spreader in the wall? 3. What was the length of the spreader? 4. Was the spreader in the wall and concrete placed over it or was it laying on top of the concrete placement?
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