IR 05000443/1986033
| ML20206M887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1986 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson, Lodewyk A, Prell J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206M872 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-86-33, NUDOCS 8607010309 | |
| Download: ML20206M887 (7) | |
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/4 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-443/86-33 Docket No.
50-443 License No.
CPPR-135 Licensee:
Public Service Company of New Hampshire P.O. Box 330 Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Inspection At:
Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Conducted: June 2-6, 1986 Inspectors:
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James Pr4M, Reactor Engineer V
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09 deVC Audrey Lc(5(ewyk, Reactor Engineer v
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k Approved by: _
6/2N/5 Jon Johnsoli, Chief, Operational Programs
' date Section, OB, DRS
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Inspection Summary: Routine Unannounced Inspection Conducted On
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June 2-6, 1986, (Report No. 50-443/86-33)
Areas Inspected: Abnormal and Emergency Operating Procedures and licensee actions on previous inspection findings. The inspection was performed onsite by one region based inspector and in the Region I Office by a specialist in-spector.
Results: No violations were identified.
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j DETAILS
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j 1.0. Persons Contacted New Hampshire Yankee Personnel
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- F. Bear, Quality Assurance Engineer (YAEC)
M. David, Shift Supervisor
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- S. Dunphy, Technical Support Supervisor
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L. Girnard, SR0 Training Instructor a
- R. Gregory, Licensing Engineer j
- G. Kahn, Test Group Manager
- J. Malone, Operations Administrative Supervisor
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i R. Mayers, SRO Training Instructor
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- D. McLain, Startup Manager
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- W. Middleton, Quality Assurance Staff Engineer (YAEC)
"T. Pucko, Licensing Engineer
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- W. Sullivan, Senior QA Engineer
- L. Walsh, Operation Manager
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- A. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector
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- P. Wen, Reactor Engineer
F. Cassella, Resident Inspector - Millstone 3
D. Haverkamp, Reactor Licensing Engineer
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D. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector
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- Denotes those present at the exit meeting conducted on June 6, 1986.
j 2.0. Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Unresolved Item (443/86-11-01):
Inadequate weld surface prepara-i tion for ultrasonic examinations (UT).
A previous unresolved item (443/-
l 85-19-01) addressed weld data sheets which contain UT scan limitations due
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j to the weld surface contour. During a subsequent inspection (443/86-11),
j the inspector visually examined a sample of the weld profiles with identi-
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fied scan limitations. Of the four welds selected for inspection, one weld profile was found to be unacceptable for UT.
i In response to this finding, the licensee completed a review of UT data
sheets and limitations. A sample of Class I welds (including the reactor j
coolant large bore piping welds) was visually inspected.
This inspection j
identified two welds with unsatisfactory weld profiles which have since been corrected through NCR 94-1534.
The inspection sample size was in-I creased, and during the supplemental visual inspection no additional im-I proper weld surface preparations were identified.
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The results of the sampling plan indicate that the three questionable weld surface contours found were anomalies.
The data sheet review found in most cases, an exaggeration of the weld surface contour and an extremely limited allowance for UT beam spread.
Due to the conservatism found in recording UT coverage of welds, questionable beam spread and beam plot calculations have been redone to determine if code coverage has been
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obtained. The inspector reviewed the documents associated with this item j
and has no further questions at this time.
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This item is closed.
(Closed) Varesolved Item (443/86-11-02):
Site PSI ultrasonic data did not
cross-refcrence previous ultrasonic examinations of the same weld.
(Re-
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ference previously identified unresolved item 443/85-19-01, concern d).
The NRC inspector identified that the licensee had not cross-referenced previous ultrasonic examinations on data sheets for individual welds.
The inspector expressed concern for retrievability of associated examination records and the licensee's ability to assure completeness of
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PSI program requirements.
Since the time of the initial concern, the lic-ensee has taken the following actions:
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(i) A cross-reference data log has been completed and a copy of this log
is retained on-site.
(ii) Specific PSI weld file folders with correlated data sheets have been compiled and are to be maintained for PSI program inspections.
The cross-reference system that has been established by the licensee-ade-
quately addresses the inspector's concerns.
The licensee's system will be
reviewed during future PSI /ISI programmatic inspections.
This item is closed.
3.0. Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures 3.1. References / Requirements
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10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants.
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Regulatory Guide 1.33-1978, Quality Assurance Program Require-
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ments (Operation).
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ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants.
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Seabrook Station, Unit 1, Technical Specifications, DRAFT, March, 1986.
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Seabrook Station, Unit 1, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),
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Sections 1.8, 13.2 and 13.5.
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NUREG-0737, November, 1980, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, Item I.C.1.
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Westinghouse Owners Group, " Emergency Response Guidelines", 1984.
3.2. Program Review The Seabrook program for preparation and control of the plant's emer-gency and abnormal operating procedures was reviewed to verify con-formance with the requirements referenced in paragraph 3.1.
The following administrative control procedures were reviewed:
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SM-6.2, Revision 2, Station Operating Procedures
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OP-9.1, Revision 0, Emergency Operating Procedures Writers Guide.
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OP-9.2, Revision 0, Emergency Operating Procedure User's Guide.
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OP-9.3, Revision 0, Administrative Control of Emergency Operating Procedures.
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OP-9.4, Revision 0, Administrative Control of Abnormal Procedures.
3.3. Implementation Review Selected plant emergency and abnormal procedures were reviewed to verify compliance with the requirements referenced in paragraph 3.1.
and administrative controls listed in paragraph 3.2.
All emergency and abncrmal procedures reviewed had been SORC reviewed and approved.
The procedures were reviewed to verify:
all data points, e.g. flows, pressures, temperatures, levels,
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valve numbers, etc., had been inserted completeness when compared to the Westinghouse Owner Group (WOG)
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Emergency Response Guidelines correct and proper furmat
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correct cross references
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completeness when compared to requirements of R.G.1.33,
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Appendix A l
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' proper review and approval, and
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QA review and approval.
I Selected procedures were then compared with the plant's Piping and Instrument Drawings (p& ids) for correct valve numbers and valve line-ups for the proposed mode of operations. The inspector also witness-ed the use of abnormal and emergency procedures by a class at the i
training simulator and verified that the control room had readily available a complete and current set of emergency and abnormal proce-
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dures.
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The following procedures were reviewed:
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Emergency Operating procedures
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E-0, Revision 00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
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E-1, Revision 00, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
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ES-0.1, Revision 00, Reactor Trip Response
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ES-1.1, Revision 00, SI Terminatior,
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ECA-1.2, Revision 00, LOCA Outside Containment
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ECA-2.1, Revision 00, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators
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F-0.1, Revision 00, Subcriticality a
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F-0.2, Revision 00, Core Cooling
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F-0.3, Revision 00, Heat Sink
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F-0.4, Revision 00, Integrity I
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F-0.5, Revision 00, Containment
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F-0.6, Revision 00, Inventory
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FR-C.1, Revision 00, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling i
FR-I.2, Revision 00, Response to Low Pressurizer Level
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FR-S.1, Revision 00, Response to Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS
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FR-C.3, Revision 00, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink i
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- Verified valve identification and valve line-up per the appropriate P& ids.
i Abnormal Operating Procedures
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OS1210.06, Revision 00, Misaligned Rod (s)
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OS1202.02, Revision 00, Loss of Charging
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0S1212.01, Revision 00, PCCW System Malfunction i
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OS1201.01, Revision 00, RCP Malfunction
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0S1246.01, Revision 00, Loss of Offsite Power - Plant Shutdown
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0S1200.02, Revision 00, Safe Shutdown and Cooldown from the Re-
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mote Safe Shutdown Facilities I
3.4. Findings
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All emergency operating procedures are placed in one of three three-ring binders. All abnormal operating procedures are located in one of two three-ring binders.
During the review of these procedures it
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l was noted that a single cover sheet showing the review / concurrence
signatures was used for each binder to cover all procedures located l
in the binder.
It was not clear how this method agreed with admini-
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strative procedures OP9.3 and OP9.4 which require that "each proce-i dure shall be independently reviewed.." The applicant stated that
because of the nature of these procedures they did not want to clut-ter the manuals with extra forms.
Prior to the inspector leaving the
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i site procedures OP9.3 and OP9.4 were modified and SORC approved to
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reflect their current practice.
It was noted during the review of OP9.3 that the review cycle for emergency procedures was not specified.
Prior to the inspector leav-i ing the site, OP9.3 was modified and SORC approved to identify the i
review cycle required for emergency procedures.
4.0. Plant Tours
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l The inspector toured the training facility, turbine building, control
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room, primary auxiliary building, diesel generator building, and contain-j ment building. A review of the work in progress, security, cleanliness j
and housekeeping was made.
No problems were identified.
l 5.0. Independent Inspector Verification i
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Using the plants P&ID't the inspector independently verified the proper
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valve line-up for emergency procedure FR-C.3.
In addition, the inspector
witnessed at the simulator the proper use of emergency procedures by ope-
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rators undergoing requalification training.
During this witnessing the
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inspector modified the emergency scenario slightly in order to verify the operators' familiarity with, and use of, the " Operators Action Summary" sheets of the emergency procedures. Operators' actions were verified to proper.
6.0. QA/QC Interface The emergency and abnormal operating procedure cover sheet specifies a quality assurance (QA) review. QA must review those procedures related to plant safety. All SORC approved procedures reviewed by the inspector had received a QA review.
7.0. Management Meetings Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspec-tion at an entrance interview conducted on April 7,1986.
The findings of the inspection were periodically discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection.
Aq exit interview was conducted on June 6,1986 (see paragraph I for attendees) at which time the find-ings of the inspection were presented.
At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.
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