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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217M8771999-10-25025 October 1999 Requests That Industry Studies on long-term Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Be Provided to R Dudley at Listed Mail Stop ML20217M4331999-10-19019 October 1999 Submits Rept 17, Requal Tracking Rept from Operator Tracking Sys. Rept Was Used by NRC to Schedule Requalification Exams for Operators & Record Requal Pass Dates ML20217F5841999-10-13013 October 1999 Requests Revocation of License OP-11038-1 for GE Kingsley. Individual Has Been Reassigned to Position within Naesco ML20217F5811999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Insp Data & Naesco Evaluation of a EDG Exhaust Insp Conducted on 990407.Insp Ensured That Unacceptable Wall Thinning Will Not Occur During 40-year Design Lifetime of Sys ML20217C7321999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Copy of Seabrook Station Videotape Entitled, Completion of Seal Barrier Installation. Videotape Documents Process of Selecting,Designing & Installing Seal Deterrent Barrier to Preclude Entrapment of Seals ML20217B8621999-10-0505 October 1999 Forwards Rev 28,change 1 to EPIP Er 1.1, Classification & Emergencies, Per 10CFR50.54(q).Rev to Procedure Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan ML20217B7471999-10-0101 October 1999 Provides Notification of Change in PCT of More than 50 F,Per Requirements of 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(i),(ii).Tabulation of Large Break LOCA PCT Margin Utilization Applicable to Seabrook Station,Encl ML20212J8271999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Seabrook Station. Staff Conducted Reviews for All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan for Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months.Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan Encl ML20216J2381999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to Re Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Plants During Y2K Transition.Nrc Expects All Licensees to Operate Nuclear Facilities Safety IAW NRC Regulations & Requirements ML20216J2421999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to Card Received in Aug 1999,providing Comments on NRC Interim Enforcement Policy Re Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Plants During Y2K Transition.Informs That Naesc Reported Seabrook as Y2K Ready Prior to 990701 ML20216J2471999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to Which Provided Comments on NRC Interim Enforcement Policy Re Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Plants During Y2K Transition.Informs That Naesc Reported Seabrook as Y2K Ready Prior to 990701 ML20212K7921999-09-30030 September 1999 Confirms 990922 Telcon with J D'Antonio & T Grew Re Arrangements Made for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Seabrook Facility ML20212J0301999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-10 on 990726-30 & 0809-13.No Violations Noted.Insp Discussed ML20212G5071999-09-21021 September 1999 Submits Complaint to NRC Re NRC Failure to Cite Seabrook Station NPP Operators for Failing to Periodically Calibrate & Establish Adequate Measures to Insure That Relay Equipment Met All Required Calibration Settings Prior to Installation ML20212C1881999-09-20020 September 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Raised Concerns Re NRC Enforcement Actions at Plant & Issuance of NCVs ML20212D1401999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Request to Use Proposed Alternative to Certain Weld Repair Requirements in ASME Boiling & Pressure Vessel Code ML20212B9511999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 for MG Sketchley,License SOP-10685, Along with Supporting Medical Exam Info.Nrc Form 396 Has Been Superceded by Revised Version Dtd 971222,which Was Previously Submitted to NRC on 990812.Encl Withheld ML20212C3621999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Rev 34 to Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan & Rev 85 to Seabrook Station Emergency Response Manual, Per 10CFR50,App E & 10CFR50.4 ML20212B5021999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Licensee Responses to EPA Questions Re Plant Seal Deterrent Barrier.Util Completed Installation of Subject Barriers on All Three Station Offshore Intake Structures on 990818.Barriers Will Preclude Entrapment of Seals ML20211Q8521999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That Rl Couture,License SOP-11027,terminated Employment at Naesco on 990907.Revocation of License Requested ML20211N8781999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Response to 990820 RFI Re NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20211J9291999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards mark-ups & Retypes of Proposed Conforming License Changes Required in Connection with Transfers Being Sought in 990615 Application of Montaup Electric Co & New England Power Co for Transfer of Licenses & Ownership Interests ML20211M3221999-09-0202 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License NPF-86 & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. Corrective Actions:Conducted Prompt Review of Layoff Decision to Determine Relevant Facts DD-99-10, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-10) Expired.Commission Declined Review & Decision Became Final on 990830.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9909021999-09-0202 September 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-10) Expired.Commission Declined Review & Decision Became Final on 990830.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 990902 ML20211J8811999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Seabrook Station Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid)(Version 2).Minor Discrepancies Were Noted.Proposed Changes Are Encl in Order to Correct Discrepancies ML20211J8411999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Updated NRC Form 396 for E Decosta,Nrc License OP-10655-1.Without Encl ML20211G9191999-08-27027 August 1999 Informs NRC That Name of New Company, Ref in Order Approving Application Re Corporate Merger Is Nstar Which Is Massachusetts Business Trust ML20211J0401999-08-26026 August 1999 Responds to 990819 Request,On Behalf of Gr Pageau & Williams Power Corp,For Addl Time in Which to Reply to Nov,Issued on 990803.Response Due to NRC by 991008 ML20211H0651999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-05 on 990621-0801.One Violation Re Failure to Include Multiple Components within Scope of ISI Test Program Was Identified & Being Treated as NCV, Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20211G7761999-08-24024 August 1999 Expresses Great Concern Re Lack of Enforcement Actions Against Seabrook Station Despite Citations NRC Has Issued for Violations of Seabrook Operating License ML20211J2171999-08-23023 August 1999 Expresses Disappointment with Lack of Enforcement Action Against Seabrook Station Despite Repeated Safety Violations ML20211J4971999-08-21021 August 1999 Submits Comments Re Violations Cited in Early Mar & 990509 Insps ML20211H8361999-08-19019 August 1999 Submits Concerns Re Violations at Seabrook Station ML20211F2681999-08-19019 August 1999 Discusses Former Chairman Jackson & 990602 Predecisional Enforcement Conference Re Findings of Ofc of Investigations Involving Allegations Raised by Contract Electrician.Determined That Allegations Not Supported ML20211J3241999-08-15015 August 1999 Expresses Disappointment in Apparent Failure of NRC to Cite Seabrook Station NPP for Recent Violations of Safety Regulations Uncovered During Recent Insps in Mar & May ML20211J1831999-08-15015 August 1999 Submits Concerns Over Serious Deficiencies at Seabrook Station That NRC Has Declined to Take Enforcement Actions Against ML20210T1601999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That as Result of Staff Review of Licensee Responses to GL 92-01,rev,supp1 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity, NRC Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Is Releasing It as Rvid Version 2 ML20211J2071999-08-13013 August 1999 Expresses Concerns Re Violations Occurring Recently at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.Requests Effort to See That Measures Taken to Stop Flagrant,Continuing Violations That Hold Danger to Workers & Community ML20210S9611999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That NRC Received Encl Ltr from Pb Johnston Expressing Concern About Certain Impacts on Shareholders of New England Electric Sys with Respect to Nees Proposed Merger with Natl Grid Group ML20210S9511999-08-13013 August 1999 Responds to to Collins Expressing Concerns with Certain Terms of Proposed Merger Between New England Electric Sys & National Grid Group.Nrc Has No Authority to Interject Itself in Nees Merger with National Grid Group ML20210S2001999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 396 in Support of Applications for Renewal of Operator Licenses for Individuals Listed Below. Without Encls ML20210R8401999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20210S7331999-08-11011 August 1999 Submits Third Suppl to 980423 Application to Renew NPDES Permit NH0020338 for Seabrook Station.Suppl Provides Addl Info on Input Streams & Requests Increased Permit Limit for Chemical Used in Makeup Water Treatment Sys ML20210R9581999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards ISI Exam Rept of Seabrook Station, for RFO 6, Period 3,for Insps Conducted Prior to & During Sixth Refueling Outage Concluded on 990510 ML20210Q7441999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Canal Interest in Seabrook Station Unit 1 as Requested in Application & SER ML20210R7931999-08-10010 August 1999 Forwards Cycle 7 Startup Rept for Seabrook Station, IAW Requirements of TS 6.8.1.1 ML20210N9421999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That North Atlantic Suggests Listed Revisions to 990730 Draft Revisions to Committee Rept & Order.Further Revs Consistent with What North Atlantic Proposed at 990608 Hearing ML20210N5721999-08-0303 August 1999 Discusses Investigations Rept 1-98-005 Conducted by OI at Naesco,Seabrook Station & Forwards NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $55,000.Violation Re Failure to Promptly Correct Incorrectly Terminated Cables of Control Bldg Air ML20210P3361999-08-0303 August 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept 1-98-005 Conducted by Region I OI at Naesco,Seabrook Station & Forwards Nov.Violations Re Electrical Wiring in Control Panel for Control Bldg Air Conditioning Sys ML20210P3161999-08-0303 August 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept 1-98-005,conducted Between 980129 & 0527 at Seabrook Station & Forwards Nov.Violation Re Discrimination of Williams Power Corp,Contractor of Naesco,Against Electrician for Raising Safety Issues 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217M8771999-10-25025 October 1999 Requests That Industry Studies on long-term Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Be Provided to R Dudley at Listed Mail Stop ML20217M4331999-10-19019 October 1999 Submits Rept 17, Requal Tracking Rept from Operator Tracking Sys. Rept Was Used by NRC to Schedule Requalification Exams for Operators & Record Requal Pass Dates ML20212J8271999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Seabrook Station. Staff Conducted Reviews for All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan for Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months.Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan Encl ML20212K7921999-09-30030 September 1999 Confirms 990922 Telcon with J D'Antonio & T Grew Re Arrangements Made for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Seabrook Facility ML20216J2421999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to Card Received in Aug 1999,providing Comments on NRC Interim Enforcement Policy Re Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Plants During Y2K Transition.Informs That Naesc Reported Seabrook as Y2K Ready Prior to 990701 ML20216J2381999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to Re Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Plants During Y2K Transition.Nrc Expects All Licensees to Operate Nuclear Facilities Safety IAW NRC Regulations & Requirements ML20216J2471999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to Which Provided Comments on NRC Interim Enforcement Policy Re Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Plants During Y2K Transition.Informs That Naesc Reported Seabrook as Y2K Ready Prior to 990701 ML20212J0301999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-10 on 990726-30 & 0809-13.No Violations Noted.Insp Discussed ML20212C1881999-09-20020 September 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Raised Concerns Re NRC Enforcement Actions at Plant & Issuance of NCVs ML20212D1401999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Request to Use Proposed Alternative to Certain Weld Repair Requirements in ASME Boiling & Pressure Vessel Code DD-99-10, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-10) Expired.Commission Declined Review & Decision Became Final on 990830.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9909021999-09-0202 September 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-10) Expired.Commission Declined Review & Decision Became Final on 990830.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 990902 ML20211J0401999-08-26026 August 1999 Responds to 990819 Request,On Behalf of Gr Pageau & Williams Power Corp,For Addl Time in Which to Reply to Nov,Issued on 990803.Response Due to NRC by 991008 ML20211H0651999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-05 on 990621-0801.One Violation Re Failure to Include Multiple Components within Scope of ISI Test Program Was Identified & Being Treated as NCV, Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20211F2681999-08-19019 August 1999 Discusses Former Chairman Jackson & 990602 Predecisional Enforcement Conference Re Findings of Ofc of Investigations Involving Allegations Raised by Contract Electrician.Determined That Allegations Not Supported ML20210S9511999-08-13013 August 1999 Responds to to Collins Expressing Concerns with Certain Terms of Proposed Merger Between New England Electric Sys & National Grid Group.Nrc Has No Authority to Interject Itself in Nees Merger with National Grid Group ML20210S9611999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That NRC Received Encl Ltr from Pb Johnston Expressing Concern About Certain Impacts on Shareholders of New England Electric Sys with Respect to Nees Proposed Merger with Natl Grid Group ML20210T1601999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That as Result of Staff Review of Licensee Responses to GL 92-01,rev,supp1 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity, NRC Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Is Releasing It as Rvid Version 2 ML20210Q7441999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Canal Interest in Seabrook Station Unit 1 as Requested in Application & SER ML20210P3161999-08-0303 August 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept 1-98-005,conducted Between 980129 & 0527 at Seabrook Station & Forwards Nov.Violation Re Discrimination of Williams Power Corp,Contractor of Naesco,Against Electrician for Raising Safety Issues ML20210N5721999-08-0303 August 1999 Discusses Investigations Rept 1-98-005 Conducted by OI at Naesco,Seabrook Station & Forwards NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $55,000.Violation Re Failure to Promptly Correct Incorrectly Terminated Cables of Control Bldg Air ML20210P3361999-08-0303 August 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept 1-98-005 Conducted by Region I OI at Naesco,Seabrook Station & Forwards Nov.Violations Re Electrical Wiring in Control Panel for Control Bldg Air Conditioning Sys ML20210J8421999-08-0303 August 1999 Forwards Order,Conforming Amend & SER in Response to Application Transmitted by Util Under Cover Ltr , & Suppl by Ltrs & 0407 Requesting Approval of Transfer of License NPF-86 ML20210K4911999-07-28028 July 1999 Responds to to Chairman Jackson Requesting Info on Concerns Raised by Constitutent a Menninger,Re Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Y2K Readiness IR 05000443/19990041999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-04 on 990510-0620.No Violations Noted.Emergency Preparedness Program Reviewed & Found to Be Acceptable ML20209G4711999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs That Unredacted Version of Supplemental Commercial & Financial Data for Baycorp Holdings,Ltd,Submitted in 990407 Application & Affidavit,Marked Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) ML20196J7011999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20209A6701999-06-25025 June 1999 Informs That NRC Ofc of NRR Reorganized Effective 990528.As Part of Organization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Was Created.Organization Chart Encl IR 05000443/19990021999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-02 on 990321-0509.Violation Re Failure to Ensure That Critical Relay Calibr Characteristics Were Met Prior to Installation Was Identified ML20196G8421999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards Copy of Notice of Consideration of Approval of Application Re Proposed Corporate Merger & Opportunity for Hearing Re 990315 Application Filed by Nepco ML20196J4451999-06-18018 June 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Following Up on .In Ltr of April 5,EJ Markey Highlighted Issue of EDG Reliability in Light of Recent Discovery of Defective AR Relays at Seabrook NPP in New Hampshire ML20212J2651999-06-17017 June 1999 Informs That Unredacted Version of Updated Financial Data for Baycorp Holdings,Ltd Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure & Marked as Confidential Pursuant to 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of Atomic Energy Act ML20212H6661999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards RAI Re 990315 Application Request for Approval of Proposed Indirect Transfer of Seabrook Station,Unit 1 License & Proposed Indirect Transfer of Millstone,Unit 3 License to Extent Held by Nepco ML20207B2221999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-03 on 990308-0408.Violations Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations ML20206K1811999-05-0707 May 1999 Responds to Re Event Notification from North Atlantic Energy Service Co Indicating That One of Seabrook Two EDG May Have Been Inoperable Since June 1997. NRC Insp of Problem Not Yet Completed ML20206N6811999-04-23023 April 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Re Potential Inoperability of Two Emergency Diesel Generators Since June 1997 at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.Issue Under Ongoing Insp & Review by NRC ML20205R1171999-04-20020 April 1999 Ack Receipt of Ltr Requesting Action Under 10CFR2.206 Re Enforcement Action Against Individuals Alleged to Have Unlawfully Discriminated Against Contract Electrician. Request to Attend Enforcement Conference Denied.Frn Encl ML20206B3451999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-01 on 990207-0321.Violations Identified Involving Failure to Properly Test Primary Auxiliary Building for Test Failures & Inadequate C/A to Prevent Recurrence of Repeated Pab for Test Failures ML20205P1871999-04-0909 April 1999 Discusses 990225 PPR & Forwards Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan.Advises of Planned Insp Effort Resulting from Plant PPR Review ML20205N4991999-04-0808 April 1999 Responds to Requesting Copy of OI Rept 1-1998-005,or in Alternative Summary of Investigation Rept. Request for Copy of Investigation Rept,Denied at This Time, Because NRC Did Not Make Final Enforcement Decision ML20205C1891999-03-24024 March 1999 Refers to Naesco 981030 Request for Approval of Alternative Inservice Exam to That Specified by ASME BPV Code,Section XI,1983 edition/1983 Summer Addenda.Forwards SE Supporting Proposed Relief Request IR-8,Rev 1 ML20204E4191999-03-16016 March 1999 Informs of Results of Investigation Conducted at Seabrook Nuclear Generating Station by NRC OI & Requests Participation at Predecisional Enforcement Conference in King of Prussia,Pa Relative to Investigation 1-98-005 ML20204F3101999-03-16016 March 1999 Discusses Investigation Conducted at Plant by OI Field Ofc, Region 1.Purpose of Investigation to Determine Whether Certain Activities Conducted Per NRC Requirements.Synopsis of IO Investigation Rept 1-98-005 Encl ML20210U2281999-03-16016 March 1999 Refers to Apparent Violation of NRC Requirements Prohibiting Deliberate Misconduct by Individuals & Discrimination by Employers Against Employees Who Engage in Protected Activities,Investigation Rept 1-98-005 ML20207C2991999-02-26026 February 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/98-11 on 981228-990207.No Violations Noted.Inspectors Identified Several C/A Program Deficiencies Involving Timeliness of Reviews & Effectiveness of Previous C/As ML20203A2811999-01-28028 January 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/98-10 on 981115-1227.No Violations Noted.Operators Performed Well During Two Reactor start-ups & Response to Plant Trip on December 22.Radioactive Waste Mgt Program Properly Implemented ML20198Q7391998-12-21021 December 1998 Informs That Review of Licensee Response to GL 97-05, SG Tube Insp Techniques, Did Not Identify Any Concerns with SG Insp Techniques Employed at Seabrook That Would Indicate That Naesco Not in Compliance with Licensing Basis ML20198S1661998-12-17017 December 1998 Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Records Encl & Identified in App C & D.App E Records Withheld in Part & App F Records Withheld in Entirety (Ref FOIA Exemption 5) & App G Records Withheld in Entirety (Ref FOIA Exemptions 4 & 5) ML20198D1341998-12-16016 December 1998 Forwrds Ltr from J Bean Transmitting Final Exercise Rept for 981020,MS-1,out of Sequence Drill for Elliot Hosp in Manchester,Nh.Assistance Being Requested to Offsite Officials to Address & Resolve Identified Arca Timely ML20198C1131998-12-11011 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/98-09 on 981004-1114 & Notice of Violation.Nrc Identified That Safety Equipment Removed from Service at Beginning of Forced Outage Without Appropriate Monitoring of Status of Equipment as Required ML20197K1931998-12-0909 December 1998 Forwards RAI Re Utilities Participation in WOG Response to GL 97-01, Degradation of Crdm/Cedm Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations. Response Requested within 90 Days of Submittal Date 1999-09-30
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((/[ j y[aa**u%,g UNITED STATES
, NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMISSION . !
g g WASHINGTON, D.C. 20seH001
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cham 4AN June 18, 1999 The Honorable Edward J. Markey United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515-2107
Dear Congressman Markey:
Thank you for your April 5,1999, letter following up on the letter you sent me on March 10, 1999. In the April 5 letter you highlight the issue of emergency diesel generator (EDG) reliability in light of a recent discovery of defective AR nelays at the Seabrook nuclear power plant in New Hampshire. Furthermore, you reaffirm your March 10 recommendation that "the NRC should include backup diesel generator reliability in Y2K inspections and in periodic Y2K reports, require alllicensees to have all backup electricity sources available at the turn of the year and other key Y2K dates, and ensure adequate fuel supply." Additionally, you request a response to three specific questions on the Seabrook matter.
The reported failure occurred with relays that are intended to automatically connect various circuits to the electrical bus powered by EDG B. However, we have further determined that the capability to manually connect the circuits to EDG B was always available and would have been the next step that the operators would have taken in an emergency. Similarly, the AR relay associated with the B Train EDG emergency power sequencer was incapable of automatically starting the Containment Building Spray (CBS) pump. However, operator action could have been taken to manually start the CBS pump, if needed. Therefore, backup power and CBS pump function were always available through manual action. However, the technical specifications (TSs) required that the EDG B be declared inoperable because it would not connect automatically during the test.
The EDG AR relays are part of the emergency power sequencer circuit, and are relied upon to open the offsite power breaker on a loss of offsite power to the safety-related bus to allow the EDG to automatically connect to the bus, if offsite power were lost when the AR relays were inoperable, the plant emergency operating procedures (EOPs) direct the operator to open the offsite power breaker manually from the control room. With the EDG running, this action would cause the EDG output breaker to automatically close and power the safety bus. In the event that the breaker failed to automatically close, an operator could manually close the breaker.
During a loss-of-offsite-power event, operators have sufficient time to perform such manual functions when placing the plant in a safe shutdown condition. l
/g There was also a concern that EDG A was inoperable because of maintenance and testing during a portion of the period of time that EDG B was incapable of automatic operation due to the defective AR relays. Preliminary information indicates that the cumulative number of days p[
that EDG A was inoperable since June 1997 was actually a relatively small period of time totaling approximately 7.5 days. However, as discussed above, even though there were times that EDG A was not available because of maintenance or testing, emergency backup power via' EDG B remained available through manual operator action.
9907070284 990618 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
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The staff is following up on possible generic implications relating to the relay failure but at this time it appears to be unique to Seabrook. However, if we determine that this event is a generic concern, we will then inform the industry through the proper generic communication (information notice, generic letter, etc ). The NRC staff has addressed your three specific questions on the Seabrook matter in the enclosure.
In my May 3,1999, response to your March 10,1999, letter I addressed your recommendations relating to Y2K concerns and backup power. I described the NRC's integrated approach for addressing the Y2K issue. I also responded to your concern on EDG reliability. Consistent with the Commission's regulations, EDGs are highly reliable. The selected target EDG reliability values were established in accordance with the requirements of the station blackout rule.
These values are tracked by each licensee per the requirements of the Maintenance Rule, and associated industry guidance. This tracking shows that the emergency diesel generators maintain the established reliability, and the existing regulations ensure ihat there is a high level of confidence that these diesel generators will be functional when needed. Licensees are required to monitor the performance of the EDGs against the established goals and to take appropriate corrective actions if the goals are not met. The Maintenance Rule requires that these goals be evaluated by the licensees at least every refueling cycle. Thus, existing requirements and regulations adequately ensure that these diesel generators are operable when needed and that their established reliability is maintained.
Additionally, we are confident that existing requirements for onsite power systems adequately address your suggestion that licensees be required to have all backup electricity sources availavie at the turn of the year and other key Y2K dates. Specifically, the ope <ation and maintenance of the emergency diesel generators and other safety-related equipment racessary for the safe shutdown of the reactor are controlled by the plant TSs. The TSs are intended to ensure that sufficient power will be available to supply safety-related equipment at all times regardless of key Y2K dates. Moreover, the plant TSs require that action be taken to restore inoperable diesel generators to operable status. Furthermore, the NRC expects that, consistent with industry guidance, licensees will schedule and perform preplanned maintenance and testing related to backup power sources so that such activities do not coincide with the Y2K transition date.
The adequacy of backup power systems has been demonstrated at numerous plants during weather-induced interruptions of the power grid and other types of past power grid failures.
Regulations require the automatic capability of the EDGs to supply power to the safety loads to mitigate a design-basis accident coincident with a loss of offsite power; however, the likelihood of having an accident coincident with a loss of offsite power and a loss of redundant EDGs during the Y2K key dates is very low.
The scope of the licensees' Y2K program covers emergency onsite power and other emergency i power systems at a nuclear plant. It is important to note that the onsite 7-day fuel oil capacity I required by technical specifications is sufficient to operate the diesel generators for longer than i
the time that it takes to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources. The Y2K program also f covers, through the Contingency Plan implementation, a plan for obtaining additional diesel fuel l
p 3
and other necessary supplies to cope with potential Y2K-induced long-term loss of offsite power.
As part of our reviews of licensee Y2K program implementation at all nuclear power plants, NRC ,
inspectors will confirm that licensee Y2K programs address emergency power sources, l arrangements for obtaining critical commodities (e.g., EDG fuel oil) and other considerations for l contingency planning identified in NEl/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning." Finally, I note that in its most recent reports issued on January 11.
1999, and April 30,1999, the North American Electric Reliability Council states, " Transmission outages are expected to be minimal and outages that may occur are anticipated to be mitigated by reduced energy transfers established as part of the contingency planning process." The report indicates that the transition through critical Y2K rollover dates should have a minimal impact on electric systems operations in North America and that widespread, long-term loss of the grid as a result of Y2K-induced events is not a credible scenario. Nevertheless', sufficient redundant backup power sources are currently present at nuclear plants because loss of offsite power and station blackout are issues that the nuclear industry has already addressed. l I would like to reaffirm that the Commission remains committed to ensuring that the NRC does what is necessary in its oversight of nuclear power plant licensee Y2K readiness efforts in order to assure safe operation of these facilities throughout 1999,2000, and beyond. Please let me know if you have any additional questions on this matter.
Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson
Enclosure:
Staff Responses to Questions I
l-l l
~
l Staff Responses to Congressman Markey's Questions on Seabrook 3/31/99 Daily Event Report (DER 35535)
The NRC staff has addressed the three auestions in vour April 5.1999. letter as tcIlows:
Question 1: If Seabrook tests its generators once a month, why did they not discover the !
generator was inoperable until the refueling outage? Does the NRC need to require licensees to test not only that the generators work but also that they are {
able to provide emergency power to the plants? )
I Response: The reported failure occurred in relays designed to control the automatic function l to connect various circuits to the electrical bus powered by the EDG. As detailed I in this letter, it was only the automatic loading feature that was inoperable and not the EDG. The monthly tests are not intended to test the automatic loading design feature associated with the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Some .
design features, such as automatic loading, are tested only during a refueling i outage. At Seabrook, the AR relays are part of the design that is tested only during a refueling outage. Although failures of any sort are rare, operating experience has shown that " failure to start" has been the dominant failure of EDGs, and fewer failures have involved other parts of the automatic circuitry associated with automatically loading the EDGs. This experience, the lesser significance of the automatic featuras and the potential undesirable impacts of l additional testing (such as an operating plant transient associated with such I testing) support the NRC's decision to not require more frequent testing of these automatic design features. These features are testea while the nuclear power i plant is shut down, which normally coincides with the refueling outage. However, the NRC staff will continue to review EDG failure information and take any action needed.
Question 2: On what dates since June 1997 is it possible that neither of the two generators were operable at Seabrook, and hence that the plant had access to no backup power?
Response: The licensee's determination of the specific dates that EDG A was inoperable was reviewed by the staff. The preliminary information indicates that, since the last operating cycle of June 1997, EDG A was inoperable (i.e., unable to meet all technical specification requirements) for a total of approximately 7.5 days.
During four of these days, EDG A was completely unavailable as a backup power source due to maintenance or testing. The time window when the redundant EDGs were considered inoperable is small and the likelihood of having an accident coincident with a ross of offsite power during this small time window is very low. Moreover, the failure of AR relays does not prevent the manual capability of the EDGs to power the safety buses. Our review regarding this concern is on-going, but we have not identified any period of time during the last operating cycle in which both the offsite power supplies and the EDGs would have all been unavailable. Therefore, even though there were times that EDG A l
ENCLOSURE
r l
was not available because of maintenance or teueg, emergency backup power capability remained available.
Question 3: Please inform me of the results of the licensee's ongoing investigation into the failure of the B Train relays and into "the potential for similar issues with A Train -
AR relay."
Response: The licensee has completed its investigation into the root cause for the AR relay failures and has identified corrective actions to preclude recurrence. The staff has discussed the licensee's investigation, the licensee event report and root cause analysis with Seabrook personnel. The AR relay failure at Seabrook was caused by a combination of an improper calibration setting and corrosion products. The licensee did not detect incorrect calibration of the failed relays previously, since the tests performed did not verify all relay performance characteristics.
The corrosion products were created by the breakdown of the relay's neoprene !
cover gasket due to aging which affected the surface area of the relay contact, '
impeding the movement of the relay armature. To prevent recurrence, the licensee has cleaned the AR relay cases to remove any corrosion residue and replaced the relay internals and covers (gaskets) with new units for both the EDG A and EDG B emergency power sequencer circuits. The new relays utilize {
a cover gasket made of extruded neoprene, as opposed to molded neoprene, !
which was used in the original relays that failed. The licensee and vendor have confirmed that these relays were properly calibrated before installation and completed post-installation testing. Additionally, the licensee has revised its procedures for testing the AR relays to clarify techniques and acceptance criteria, including visually inspecting AR relays for signs of corrosion and gasket degradation, to incorporate the lessons learned from this event. Our review of this event is not complete at this time, but the results of our inspection will be documented in an NRC Inspection Report.
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April 5,1999 )
Shirley Ann Jackson Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Ms. Jackson:
This letter is a followup to my March 10,1999 letter to you regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) oversight of nuclear plants' response to the "Y2K" bug. Although I realize you have not had time to prepare a detailed response to that letter, I think it important to l highlight the issue of emergency diesel generator (EDG) reliability in light of a recent discovery 1 at the Seabrook nuclear power plant in New Hampshire.
In the March 10,1999 letter I pointed out that,"Y2K problems in electricity grids that provide outside power would force plant shutdowns and force plants to rely on backup diesel generators to keep coolant flowing around the fuel rods in the reactor and in the spent fuel pools. !
At least 46 generator problems were reported by NRC licensees in 1997-1998." In response to l such concerns an Associated Press wire story on March 10,1999 described Seabrook Station spokesman David Barr's reassurance about the power backup: "Barr said Seabrook tests its two back-up diesel generators, each the size of a school bus, about once a month. lie said they have ;
never failed."
So I find it rather interesting and disturbing that one of the two backup diesel generators at Seabrook likely was inoperable at that time. According to a March 31,1999 Daily Event Report (DER 35535) from Seabrook's owner to the NRC, the "'B' Train Emergency Diesel Generator *
'"'g may not have been operable during portions or all of the previous operating cycle due to a defective AR relay." The DER states that one AR relay "would have prevented the EDG from powering the emergency bus." A second AR relay "was incapable of starting a Containment
("Og[ ,
Q'k l Building Spray (CBS) pump." The relay failures apparently could have occurred at any time l since they were replaced during the last refueling outage, which ended in June 1997. Indeed, it is quite possible that this backup generator has not been operable for the last twenty-one months.
The DER also notes that "it is possible that there were times when the A Train EDG was inoperable for maintenance or testing concurrent with the B Train EDG being inoperable." At such times theplant would have had no backuppower source. Ilad there been a blackout af offsite power (which fortunately did not occur), and had the problem not been corrected, there could have been a meltdown within hours.
PRVFD ON H1 CYCLED *A8't #
/ 2 3-
- I believe this incident highlights the potential threat to nuclear power plants from power blackouts due to .Y2K problems with the electricity grid. It also highlights an apparent lack of attention fmm nuclear utilities to problems with the backup generators that are supposed to prevent'such blackouts from causing meltdowns. I would like to reaffirm the second recommendation I made in the March 10 letter: "The NRC should include backup diesel generator reliability in Y2K inspections and in periodic Y2K reports, require all licences to have all backup. electricity sources available at the turn of the year and other key Y2K dates, and
- ensure adequate fuel supply."
In, addition, I request your assistance in answering the following questions:
- 1. If Seabrook tests its generators once a month, why did they not discover the generator was -
inoperable until the refueling outage? Does the NRC need to require licensees to test not gm only that the generators work but also that they are able to provide emergency power to the 'g .,
, plants? ~
- 2. On what dates since June 1997 is it possible that neither of the two generators were operable at Seabrook, and hence that the plant had access to no backup power?
- 3. Please inform me of the results of the licensee's ongoing investigations into the failure of the B Train relays and into "the potential for similar issues with the A Train AR relays."
Thank you for your assistance. If you have questions concerning this letter please feel free to contact Mr. Lowell Ungar or Mr. Jeffrey Duncan on my staff at (202)225-2836.
Sincerely, Up Edward J. Markey Member of Congres l