IR 05000443/1986058
| ML20213A610 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1987 |
| From: | Dev M, Eapen P, Hunter J, Napuda G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213A594 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-86-58, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8702030391 | |
| Download: ML20213A610 (17) | |
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I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION I
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Report No. 50-443/86-58 I
Docket No. 50-443
License No. NPF-56 I
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l Licensee: Pubite Service of New Hampshire i
P. O. Box 330
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Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 i
Facility Name:
Seabrook Station, Unit 1
l Inspection At:
Seabrook, New Hampshire
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j Inspection Conducted: December 8-12, 1986 Inspectors:
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'GeorgfNapuda, Lead eactor Engineer f f Y/A
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Ma' dan Dev, Reactor Engineer date (P.
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Dr.P.K.Eapen,L[he,QualityAssuranceMdM87
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Approved by:
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on December 8-12, 1986 (Inspection Report I
No. 50-443/86-58).
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Areas Inspected:
Licensee's actions to address the concerns identified in NRC
Generic Letter 83-28 in the areas of Equipment Classification, Vendor Inter-
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face, Post Maintenance Testing, Plant Surveillance and QA/QC Interface; and
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Licensee Actions regarding previously identified items.
Results: One unresolved item was identified.
(Concern regarding spare parts for class IE automatic shunt trip relays.)
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I 8702030391 870127
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DETAILS
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1.0 Persons Contacted
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New Hampshire Yankee i
D. Abley, Maintenance Manager
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- S. Buchwald, QA Supervisor
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- E. Carley, Staff Engineer
- R. Cooney, Maintenance Services Manager
- D. Covill, Quality Services Site QA Manager
- W. OfProfio, Assistant Station Manager j
J. Gilmartin, Procurement Coordinator
- M. Harrington, Senior Engineer, Materials
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G. Kline, System Support Manager
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R. Marble, Working Foreman, Electrical
- T. Murphy, Maintenance Manager, I & C S. Orzechowski, Lead I & C Planner D. Perkins, Licensing W. Perkins, Lead Electrical Planner
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- M. Roberts, Senior Engineer
- J. Ross, Lead Electrical Engineer
- R. Savage, Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical
- W. Temple, Licensing Coordinator l
l M. Toole, Maintenance Supervisor, I & C
- L. Walsh, Operations Manager
- T. Wiebold, Auditor
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l United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- A. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector
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D. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector i
The inspectors also contacted other licensee administrative and technical l
personnel during this inspection.
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- Denotes those persons who attended the exit meeting held on December 12, 1986.
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2.0 Inspection Summary i
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2.1 Background
i The reactor trip system, as part of the reactor protection system, is i
l fundamental to reactor safety for all nuclear power reactor designs.
Transient and accident analyses are predicated on the assumption that
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the reactor trip system will automatically initiate reactivity control systems on demand to assure that fuel design limits are not exceeded. The design and regulatory philosophies for attaining the
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high reliability required of the reactor trip system have been primarily based on the use of redundancy, periodic testing, and quality assurance.
In February 1983 the Salem Nuclear Power Station experienced two failures of the reactor trip system on demand.
Regulatory and
' industry task forces were formed to determine the safety significance and generic implications of the events.
Based on these findings, certain actions were required of all licensees.
These actions, transmitted in Generic Letter 83-28, addressed:
(1) post-trip review; (2) equipment classification and vendor interface; (3) post-maintenance testing; and (4) reactor trip system reliability improvements.
The licensee submitted their response to Generic Letter 83-28 in letters listed in Attachment A.
This inspection included the areas of equipment classification, vendor interface, post-maintenance testing, and QA/QC interface.
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2.2 Inspection Results The licensee has established a program to implement the actions specified in Generic Letter 83-28.
This program was being updated and finalized during this inspection.
Within the scope of the inspection, the licensee's actions were found to adequately address the concerns of Generic Letter 83-28 and were consistent with their commitments provided in the letters listed in Attachment A.
3.0 Equioment Classification 3.1 Program Review The inspectors reviewed the applicable documents listed in Attachment A and determined that the Equipment Classification Program addressed the following:
Safety related components are identified as such in written
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procedures for procurement, maintenance, and modification.
Management oversight of source documentation for the designation
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of safety related systems and components.
Corporate level procedures for safety related component
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procurement, maintenance, and modification.
Periodic Quality Assurance audits of activities impacting safety
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related equipment.
Corrective action program for safety related equipment.
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3.2 Program Implementation The licensee's Operational Quality Assurance Program (0QAp)
references the FSAR to determine those structures, systems and components that have been designated as safety-related.
When specific guidance is not provided in the FSAR, Piping and Instrument-ation Diagrams (P&ID's),
Electrical Single Line Diagrams and Associated Instrumentation Loop and Logic Diagrams are to be used to determine safety classification.
The licensee's maintenance procedure, MA3.1,
" Work Request,"
also refers t,he cognizant individual to the FSAR and Class IE Equipment list to determine if a structure system or component is safety relatad. The licensee's 00AP also prov, ides guidance for performing an engineering evaluation to determine safety classification when diagrams and drawings do not provide detailed information to determine OQAP applicability.
The licensee also maintains a purchasing based spare parts computer data base that includes s3fety classification of the components and spare parts.
The data base was developed from the architect engineer's valve, equipment, class 1E, and standard instrument lists which are continually being updated and maintained by the architect engineer. The licensee reviews all design changes and updates to the various lists to ensure that the spare parts data base is updated as necessary.
A field comparison of system mechanical drawings and electrical elementary diagrams versus installed equipment was performed and certain components were selected for verification of the implement-ation of the licensee's Equipment Classification Program.
For each component selected, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of safety classification, procurement, receipt, storage and handling activities as discussed in the following sections of this report, a.
Reactor Trip System (RTS)
The inspector compared the as installed components with the applicable drawings and verified the safety classification of the components in'the FSAR, drawings, class IE list, standard instrument schedule and the spare parts data base. No discre-pancies were found and the components were properly classified.
The inspector reviewed Work Requests (WR) listed in Attachment A and determined that the safety classifications were consistent with the FS/2, class 1E list, standard instrument schedule, and the spare parts data base.
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Mechanical Equipment Portions of the Containment Building Spray (CBS), Charging (CS)
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and Safety Injection (SI) systems were visually inspected and a
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the following components were selected for verification of safety classification.
CBS V-14 CS LCV-112E CBS V-31 SI V-138 CBS V-53 SI V-139 CS P-2A SI V-147 CS V-234 SI V-76 CS LCV-1120 SI V-15 NOTE:
The above samples were also used for selection of procurement, work request and post-maintenance testing review samples.
A field wal kdown by the inspector verified that the above components were properly and clearly marked and corresponded to the current revision of the system diagrams.
The inspectors reviewed WRs (listed in Attachment A)
for proper safety classification, QC coverage, post maintenance test requirements, maintenance and test equipment used, spare parts used and appropriate supervisory reviews and approvals.
The inspector verified that the above components were properly classified in the FSAR, equipment list, valve list, drawings and the spare parts data base.
No discrepancies were identified.
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Instrumentation and Controls Instrumentation and Controls associated with the Containment Building Spray (CBS), Charging (CS), Safety Injection (SI) and Reactor Coolant (RC) Systems were visually inspected and the following components were selected for verification of safety classification.
CBS LT-2333 SI FT-917 CBS PT-2315 SI LT-957 CS TE-2591 SI LT-952 CS FIS-7326 RC PT-455 CS FCV-121 RC PT-405 NOTE:
The above samples were also used for selection of procurement work request and post-maintenance testing review
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samples.
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A field walkdown by the inspector verified that the above l
components were properly and clearly marked and corresponded to the current revision of the system diagrams.
Work Requests
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(WRs) (listed in Attachment A) were reviewed to verify safety classification of repairs, spare parts used, QC coverage, post-maintenance test requirements, maintenance and test
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equipment used, and appropriate reviews and approvals.
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inspector also verified that the above components were properly classified in the drawings, standard instrument schedule and the spare parts data base.
No discrepancies were identified.
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Purchasing and Storage Purchase Orders (P0s)
associated with replacement parts identified on Work Requests (WRs) (see Attachment A for a list of both) were reviewed to verify the following:
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Proper safety classification
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Environmental requirements Seismic category
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National codes (e.g., IEEE, ASME) criteria
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Applicability of 10 CFR 21
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Shelf life provisions Documentation (e.g.,
Certificate of Conformance, test
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reports)
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Vendor technical information (e.g.,
manuals, storage requirements)
- he main warehouse was toured to determine the " adequacy of cleanliness, ' storage environment, item identification and traceability, access restrictions, shelf life control and other aspects of storage conditions for items associated with the reviewed P0s and other similar ones.
It was noted that shelf life expiration was annotated on the "QA Accept" tags attached to items.
Items subject to shelf life control were stored in a temperature and humidity controlled
' dark' room.
No violations were identified.
l 4.0 Vendor Interface 4.1 Program Review The licensee instituted measures to review approximately 750 safety-related Vendor Technical Manuals on an ongoing basis during the construction of the plant to identify any inadequacies and/or discrepancies with respect to the equipment to which they pertain.
This task had been assigned to the Architect-engineer (A/E) who also
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was responsible for balance-of plant equipment procurement. The A/E is still used for manual reviews.
The progress of this review is tracked on a matrix type log. Some manuals are still being reviewed for issue. Two controlled copies are retained in the Document Control Center as are spares that may be issued only after an updating review (e.g. replacement of worn copies).
Manuals Reviewed by licensee
' engineers usually also receive an A/E review prior to issuance. "Use Only" copies of a manual are issued only after detailed technical reviews.
Subsequent Vendor Technical Information (VTI)
received for established manuals at the station is first logged by Administrative Services and distributed to appropriate personnel for review and incorporation. VTI for manuals under review is forwarded to the A/E for review and incorporation.
Copies of all correspondence between the A/E and vendors are sent to the licensee.
Any clarifying /
supplementary information is added to the vendor manuals after review using a " manual addendum" form.
The Records Management Manual, Chapter 3, describes a review process much like the one discussed above that will be used during the operational phase of the plant. Current Licensee Reviews of VTI are governed by the manual provisions. Additionally, correspondence is reviewed daily by technical personnel so as to identify critical information requiring prompt attention (e.g. NRC bulletins, Nuclear Network correspondence, Nuclear Steam System Supplier (NSSS)
bulletins).
The program for control, review and use of VTI during the plant operational phase closely parallels the Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC) recommendations. The NUTAC proposals are currently under NRC review.
No violations were identified.
4.2 Program Implementation a.
Reactor Trip System The inspector reviewed the Westinghouse Reactor Trip Circuit Braakers Type DS-416 Maintenance Manual, Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-83-03, and Westinghouse Owners Group Information letter WOG-86-193.
The licensee has evaluated the vendor recommendations and incorporated them in the station maintenance and surveillance procedures for the reactor trip breakers, as applicable.
The licensee instituted a modification to the reactor trip switchgear to add the automatic shunt trip feature and time response test points to the main reactor trip breakers, through the licensee's agent's (United Engineer's) Engineering Change Authorization ECA-03102707D. Accordingly, Westinghouse provided and installed the automatic shunt trip assemblies (Westinghouse
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Part No. 955655). A review of the licensee's design changes and modifications indicated that the automatic shunt trip relays installed were Potter Brumfield Type MDR 5134; and Westinghouse had provided analysis to support that the relay power supply (48VDC) and relay contact size were adequate to accomplish the shunt trip function when integrated with the reactor trip system at Seabrook.
The modification was designated as Class IE, and the procurement, inspection installation, operation, testing and maintenance of the equipment and the related circuitry were conducted as such. Also, the review of the design documentation and system walkdown supported that the wiring for redundant trains on the reactor trip and the safety injection control switches was separated by barriers, and was routed in sepa rate conduits / wireways within the main control board to terminal blocks for termination of field cable.
The automatic shunt trip panels were located within the switchgear enclosure for their respective trains.
The above arrangement met the licensee's physical separation criteria for redundant trains as delineated in the Seabrook Station Final Safety Analysis Report.
The Westinghouse Reactor Trip Breaker Type DS-416 Maintenance Manual recommended a minimum number of Class 1E spare parts to be available on hand.
A review of the licensee's warehouse inventory indicated that the optimum quantities of these spare parts were available in the warehouse. However, no spares for the Class IE automatic shunt trip relays, recently installed to modify the reactor trip system per Westinghouse recommendation, were available in the warehouse. The inspector identified this lack of spare parts to the licensee. The licensee stated that a purchase order will be initiated to procure the required spare parts. The adequacy of the licensee's action will be verified in a future NRC inspection.
This is an unresolved item (50-443/86-58-01).
Mechanical Equipment b.
The inspector reviewed the preventive and corrective maintenance procedures, surveillance tests and post maintenance test instructions (listed in Attachment A) for technical adequacy and the appropriate references to and incorporation of vendor technical information.
The documents reviewed contained references to vendor bulletins and manuals and also incorporated vendor recommendations where applicable.
The inspector also i
reviewed various vendor manuals (listed in Attachment A) and determined that they were administratively controlled and updated when new information was received.
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Instrumentation and Controls The instrument calibration and surveillance procedures and Repetitive Task Sheets (RTS) (listed in Attachment A) were reviewed to determine adequate incorporation of vendor information. The documents reviewed contained both references
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to and incorporation of vendor technical information where applicable. The vendor manuals were administratively controlled and updated when new information was received.
The inspector noted that the licensee incorporated the recommendations of NRC Information Notices 84-36 and 85-22 into their Limitorque Valve actuator corrective maintenance procedures.
5.0 Post Maintenance and Surveillance Testing 5.1 Program Review The inspectors reviewed the procedures in Attachment A to determine that the following were addressed during the performance of maintenance:
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Written procedures provide for initiating requests for post maintenance testing.
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Criteria and responsibilities for review and approval of maintenance.
Criteria and responsibilities for the basis of safety related/
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non-safety related activity designated.
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Criteria and responsibilities for inspection of post maintenance testing.
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Methods for performing functional testing following maintenance.
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Administrative controls for documentation of maintenance activities.
5.2 Program Implementation The licensee has developed administrative procedures MA 2.1, Preventive and Corrective Maintenance; MA 3.1, Work Request; and MA i
3.2, Repetitive Task Sheet which delineate administrative controls
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and. responsibilities for initiation, approval and the conduct of post-maintenance testing for safety-related equipment and components including the reactor trip breakers.
Accordingly, the cognizant engineer reviewing the work request and the unit shift supervisor or i
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his designee verifies that the required tests are performed prior to returning the equipment to service.
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Reactor Trip System The inspector reviewed the licensee's station maintenance and
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surveillance procedures MX 0507.17/18, Reactor Trip System Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance; IX 1680.921/922, Solid State Protection System Train A/B Logic Actuation Test, OS 1410.03, Reactor Trip Breaker, Operating Cycle Weekly Surveil-lance; and OX 1410.04, Post-Refueling, Pre-Startup Reactor Trip Breaker Surveillance.
The procedures with suffix "X" delineate the Technical Specifications related reactor trip system maintenance and surveillance.
The licensee's station operating procedure OS1410.03 required the licensee to conduct the reactor trip operating cycle surveillance on a weekly basis. The licensee has not conducted the reactor trip operating cycle weekly surveillance at the time of this inspection, as the reactor was not in the operating cycle.
The licensee initiated a procedure change notice to clarify the intent of this procedure which justified that this procedure will be effective after the reactor trip breakers are closed for the first time to pull rods.
The licensee has conducted the Technical Specifications required preventive maintenance / surveillance tests on the reactor trip system in accordance with the station operating procedures MX0507.17/18 and IX 1680.921/922.
One set of data has been obtained which adequately supported the acceptability of the result of trip force, breaker response time for undervoltage trip, undervoltage trip attachment dropout voltage, and breaker insulation resistance.
The licensee is in the process of developing a trending program for these test data.
The effectiveness of this program will be evaluated in future NRC inspection.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee preventive maintenance Repetitive Task Sheets 86RM00642 and 86RM03098 and verified that the test results of trip force; breaker response time for under-voltage trip; undervoltage trip attachment dropout voltage; and breaker insulation resistance were within the acceptable range.
The inspector reviewed the safety related RTSs (listed in Attachment A) for proper supervisory review and satisfactory results. No discrepancies or concerns were identified.
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The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Current Electrical Preventive Maintenance Schedule (Weeks 51 and 52) and found it adequate based on the licensee's Technical Specifications commitments and the station preventive maintenance program requirements for safety-related structures, systems and components.
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Mechanical Equipment The inspector reviewed the WRs (listed in Attachment A) for adequate post maintenance testing. Surveillance test procedures and completed surveillance tests performed as post maintenance tests (listed in Attachment A) were also reviewed for technical adequacy, completeness, QC coverage, acceptance criteria, maintenance and test equipment tracking, corrective action and appropriate supervisory reviews.
The WRs and surveillance procedures reviewed were complete and adequate post maintenance testing was performed.
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Instrumentation and Controls The inspection reviewed the maintenance and surveillance activities documented on the WRs and surveillance procedures (listed in Attachment A) for the selected components.
In all cases reviewed, post maintenance testing was determined to be adequate and complete.
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Trending The licensee is in the process of developing a systems trending program.
MA 2.1, Preventive and Corrective Maintenance,
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provides guidance for conducting history reviews of maintenance records to identify repetitive or generic failures and evaluate trends so that unsatisfactory conditions are corrected.
The licensee's system engineers will be responsible for trending performance and failures of components in their functional areas.
In addition, a program support group will perform equipment history data entry and computer based trending.
6.0 QA/QC Interface All maintenance work requests (WRs) are reviewed by QC and appropriate hold points are inserted as desired in addition to those previously
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incorporated into procedures.
QC has conducted in excess of 600 l
inspections to date this year.
Almost all of these inspections were
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observations of the work process or physical examinations of completed work. A recent self audit indicated only 3-4% of established hold points were waived. Inspectors must notify their supervisors when waiving a hold point.
Additionally, a log of reviewed WRs is maintained for tracking purposes.
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QC Surveillances are conducted during activities in areas such as modification installations, operability and surveillance testing, equipment tagging, weld material control, radiation surveys and valve verification surveillances (by operations personnel).
Surveillances utilize the appropriate checklist for the activity.
Approximately 300 such checklists are in an active file status with an additional 50 under development.
Since an identifier number is used only once for a given checklist, one that has been de-activated can be readily reactivated. A completed checklist including comments, etc. becomes the surveillance report and a review of selected reports (in excess of 1000 have been completed) indicated that the great majority included observation of ongoing activities (i.e. not paper review oriented).
An audit package was reviewed to verify that checklists were developed and used, identified discrepancies were followed up and the audit was comprehensive.
The area audited was associated with NRC Generic Letter 83-28 (Audit-A-06-1).
It was noted that each line item of the Generic Letter was addressed by the checklists and the preparation package included appropriate NSSS technical bulletins, recommendations of the Independent Review Group, and licensee responses to the Generic Letter.
No violations were identified.
7.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-443/86-23-01):
Establish administrative
controls to assure the independence of foremen performing inspections.
Procedure MA 5.1, Special Process Control, Revision 2 now provides the administrative controls to assure that when foremen are used to perform NDE inspections, that individual is independent of responsibility for the work being inspected (paragraphs 4.2.2 and 4.3.2).
The independent Nuclear Quality Group will continue to perform surveillances and audits of special processes and can also conduct NDE inspections (paragraph 4.3.2.4).
Based on the above this Item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-443/86-23-02): Adequate and timely imple-mentation of the Quality Element Trending effort.
The licensee has implemented the trencing analysis effort and the first report was issued to senior management October 30, 1986.
It was noted that deficiencies identified by other than licensee personnel (e.g. NRC, INPO) are not considered.
However, the seven internal methods (e.g. audit findings, inspection findings, non-conformance reports) used to identify and correct deficiencies are used for input to the analysis.
Based on the above this item is closed.
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8.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, deviations or violations.
One unresolved item was identified during this inspection and is discussed in paragraph 4.2.a.
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9.0 Management Meetings Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection at an entrance meeting conducted December 8,
1986.
The findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection.
An exit meeting was conducted on December 12, 1986 at the conclusion of the inspection (see Paragraph I for attendees) at which time the licensee management was informed of the inspection results.
During this inspection, the inspectors provided no written material to the licensee. The inspection involved no proprietary information.
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f ATTACHMENT A 1.0 References / Requirements NRC Generic Letter 83-28, " Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events" Seabrook Station, Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
PSNH Seabrook Station Quality Assurance Program ANSI N45.2.2-1972, Packing, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of Items for Nuclear Power Plants.
ANSI N45.2.12-1977 Requirements for Auditing of Quality Assurance Programs for Nuclear Power Plants.
PSNH Ltr to NRC:NRR, GL 83-28 Response dated 6/29/84 PSNH Ltr to NRC:NRR, Status Update - GL 83-28 Items, dated 9/9/85 PSNH Ltr to NRC:NRR, Status Update - GL 83-28 Items, dated 3/4/86 PSNH Ltr to NRC:NRR, Responses to GL 83-28 Items, dated 3/18/86 PSNH Ltr to NRC:NRR, Response to GL 83-28 Items, dated 6/27/86 PSNH Ltr to NRC:NRR, Additional Information to GL 83-28 Items, dated 7/8/86 PSNH Ltr to NRC:NRR, Additional Information to GL 83-28 Items, dated 8/5/85 NHY Engineering memo to UE&C Project Manager, data base list updates, dated 12/9/86.
2.0 Documents Reviewed
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2.1 Procedures / Tests MA-2.1, Preventive and Corrective Maintenance, Revision 2
JtA-3.1, Work Request, Revisions 4, 6 and 7 MA-3.2, Repetitive Task sheets, Revistor. 2 NYQA Section 2.1, OQAP Scope Determinat' ion, Revision 4
NYQA Section.1.6.1, Trending Analysis, Revision 4 MX0507.17, Reactor Trip System Inspection, Testing and PM-Train A, l
Revision 2 MX0507.18, Reactor Trip System Inspection, Testing and PM-Train B,
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IX 1680-921, SSPS Train A Logic Actuation Test, Revision 2 IX 1680.922, SSPS Train B Logic Actuation Test, Revision 2 OS1410.03, Reactor Trip Breaker Operating Cycle Weekly Surveillance Revision 2 OS1410.04, Post-Refueling, Pre-Startup Reactor Trip Breaker Surveillance, Revision 2 GT-E-33, Motor Operated Valves, Revision 11 MS0519.03, Corrective Maintenance on Limitorque Valve Actuator Type SMB-000, Revision 00 t
l IX 1662.323, P-457 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel III
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Op Test, Revision 00 MS0523.07, Pacific Charging Pumps, Revision 00
OX 1456.01, Charging Pump A&B Quarterly Flow and Valve Stroke, Revision 3
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Attachment A IS 1622.311, P-2315 CBS Pump Discharge Pressure Calibration, Revision 1 IS 1668.115, F-917 Charging Pumps Injection Flow Calibration,
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Revision 00 IS 1610.126, F-7326 Charging Pump 28 Miniflow Calibration, Revision 01 IX 1668.212, L-952 Safety Injection Accumulator 9B Level Calibration, Revision 01 IX 1668.221, PCC5 Safety Injection Accumulator Tank Level Instruments Operational Test, Revision 00 IX 1662.311, P-455 Pressurizer Pressure Protective Channel I Calibration, Revision 02 IX 1662.321, P-455 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Chtf.nel I Operational Test, Revision 00
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IX 1662.316, P-405 RC Loop 1 Hot Leg Pressure Protection Channel I Calibration, Revision 00 IX 1662.313, P-457 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II Calibration, Revision 02 IS 1622.211, L-2333 Spray Additive Task Level Calibration, Revision 01 2.2 Vendor Manuals Pacific Charging Pumps Tech Manual (P-025-1)
Barton Standard Instruction Manual (B-080-1)
Barton 763 PT Instruction Manual (I-204-18)
Westinghouse Instruction Manual MNL/ MOP Gate Valves (W-120-8)
Crosby Safety Valve Manual (C-710-2)
Westinghouse DS-416 Manual 2.3 Prints / Drawings 1-CS-D20725 Chemical and Volume Control Chargirg System Detail, Revision 2 1-SI-D20447 Safety Injection System High Head Injection System Detail, Revision 1 1-CBS-D20233 Containment Spray System, Revision 1 1-RC-D20846 Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer, Revision 2 1-SI-D20450 Safety Injection System Low Head Injection (Accumulators)
Detail, Revision 1 2.4 Work Requests / Repetitive Task Sheets
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86RM02946 Verification of Containment Penetration Protection l
480V Motor Control Center 86RM01010 Thermal Overload Protection Relay Replacement for Motor Operated Valves
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86RM01243 Weekly Battery Surveillance 4.16kV Safety Injection Pump Motor Routine Testing, Inspection and PM l
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Attachment A 86RM006744 4.16kV Safety Injection Pump Motor Routine Testing, Inspection and PM 86RI05287 Operational Test of Nuclear Instrument Source
Range Channel N32 86RIO5578 Solid State Protection System Train A Actuation Logic Test
'86RIO5579 Solid State Protection System Train B Actuation Logic Test 86RIO5362 R-6535-B Containment Manipulator Crane Train B Radiation Monitor Operational Test 86R000731 Safety Injection Train B Valve Position Indication Verification 86R000738 Train B Safety Injection Test 86 WOO 1107 RWST to Charging Pump Isolation Valve 1-CSLCV-112E 86W001108 RWST to Charging Pump Isolation Valve 1-CSLCV-1120 86W006609 Lower Tap for VCT Level ICS-V-234 86W005699 Train A Widerange Pressure Transmitter 1-RC-PT-405 86W006190 1-SI-FT-917 Indication 86W003252 1-SI-V-138 and 139 Blown Fuse 86 WOO 6105 Accumulator Level Transmitters 1-SI-LT-952, 957 86W006854 1-CBS-V-14 Repair Conductors 86W006834 1-CBS-V-14 Leaking 86W001843 1-CBS-LT-2333 Recalibration 862001842 1-CBS-PT-2315 Install "0" Ring 86W002502 1-CBS-P7-2315 Calibration Check 86W006157 1-SI-V-76 Leakage 86W003181 1-SIV-15 Poor Indication 86 WOO 6758 1-CBS-V-14 Leakage 86 WOO 5120 1-CS-FCV-121 Packing Leak 86W007220 1-SI-V-147 Packing Leak 86 WOO 6609 1-CS-V-234 Packing Leak 86W002704 1-RC-PT-455 Replace 86W006155 1-CS-FIS-7326 Poor Indication 86W006758 1-CBS-V-14 Leakage 86W007115 1-CBS-V-14 High Amperage
86W007456 1-CBS-V-31 Limit Switch Adjustment 86 WOO 7084 1-CS-P-2H Low 011
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86 WOO 7957 1-CS-TE-2591 Broken Component 86W007122 1-SI-V-138 Valve Failed to Stroke 86 WOO 7123 1-SI-V-139 Valve Failed to Stroke l
86W002062 1-CS-P-2A Replace Filters 86 WOO 5788 1-CBS-V-53 Steam Leak
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l 2.5 Purchase Orders (P0s)
P0 S45847, Fuses P0 S42878, Valves and Operators P0 SO4740, Valve Packing P0 S52666, Lubricant i
P0 T0954, Gaskets and Packing
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P0 S46101, Bolts, nuts and washers
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Attachment A
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l 2.6 Miscellaneous
Engineering Change Authorization ECA 03102707D Reactor Trip Switch--
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gear Modification, dated January 31, 1986 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Letter WOG-86-193
'RT Breaker Program EQ and Life Cycle Testing, dated May 9, 1986 Westinghouse Nuclear Service Division Technical Bulletin
NSD-TB-83-03, dated March 24, 1983.
l 2.7' Audits j
86-A06-1, Generic Letter 83-28.
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