IR 05000443/1986010

Emergency Preparedness Insp Rept 50-443/86-10 on 860224-28. No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:First full-scale Emergency Exercise Performed on 860226

ML20141D749
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	04/01/1986
From:	Harpster T, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20141D740	List: IR 05000443/1986010 ML20141D736
References
50-443-86-10, NUDOCS 8604080259
Download: ML20141D749 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-443/86-10 Docket No. 50-443 License N CPPR-135 Priority --

Category B-1 Licensee: Public Service of "ew Hampshire P.O. Box 330

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Manchester, New Hampshire i

Facility Na *: S_eabrook Unit 1 Inspection At: Seabrook,,. New Hampshire ,

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Inspection Condiscted: February 24-28, 1986

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Inspectors: / ' we- .

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.L s, n or EP Specialist ie .

W. Thomas, E9 Specialist C. An:ato, FP Eoecialist ,

C. Gordon, EP Specialist

.), Hanhurst, EP Specialist G. Bryan, COMEX Corporation G. Vehmann, Battelle Approved by: _ ( _ Chief, M v _

f f4 pst r 4/ date Emergency reparedness Section  ;

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Inspection Summary: Iaspection ch February _24-78,1986 (Report Number T

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50-443786 10)

Areas I,nspected: Routine a.nounced emergenc'f preparedness inspection to ,

observe the Tie.ensee's first rull scale en,argency exercise performed on

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Februaiy 26, 198 Re g ts: No violattens were identifie The licensee's emergsncy response actions ihmonstrataj durIng this exercise were adecuate.to provide appronrhte 1 l pectective measures for the health and safcty of the publi ,

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OETAILS PersonsContac:p

• A. Callendrello, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor

• P. Casey, Senior Emergency Planner

• W. DiProfio, Assistant Station Manager

• S. Ellis, Security Department Supervisor

• J. MacDonald, Radiological Assessment Manager

• 0. Moody, Station Manager W. Otto, Emergency Planner

• J. Quinn, Director of Erergency Planning

• G. Thomas, Vice President - Nuclear Production

*L. Walsh, Operations Manager Tb- inspectors also interviewed several licensed o physicists, administrative and training personnel.perators, health

• Denotes those present at the exit intervie . Emergency Exercise The Seabrook Station full scale emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on February 26, 198 Pre-Exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had telephone discussions and met with licensee representatives to review the scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result of these discussions, revisions were made to the scenario and supportir,g data sheet The N4C observers and licensee observers and controllers attended a scenario briefing on February 25, 1986. The emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario were discusse The scenario included the following events:

- An explosion in the chlorination building due to defective instrumentation and a pump electrical fault which ignited an undetected hydrogen accumulatio * A fire in the "B" containment building spray pump area when the pump was started for testing following maintenance. The fire damage rendered the pump inoperabl * A dnuble-ended shear of cold leg "B".

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In conjunction with the cold leg break the containment Building Spray Valve CBS-VII failed to open and Safety Injection Pump A failed to operat * Electrical Emergency Buss E6 faile * Station conditions degraded to the point where in-core thermo-couples indicated greater than 700*F with Reactor Vessel Level Indication System less than 40%. _ , , _ ,

• Station radiological conditions indicated significant core damage due to the LOC * Reactor vessel level was restored, however, in-containment pressures and radiation levels increased drasticall * The "A" SI Pump was restored and cold leg recirculation initiate *

The closed indication for several containment on-line purge valves was lost and an off-site release bega The above events caused activation of the licensee's emergency facilities and also permitted state and local governments to exercise their Emergency Plan B. Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augumentation of the emergency organization; activation of emergency response facilities; and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

• Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events;

• Direction and coordination of emergency response;

• Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information;

• Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data;

• Recommendation of protective actions;

• Provisions for in plant radiation protection;

• Performance of offsite, onsite, and in plant radiological surveys;

• Maintenance of site security and access control;

• Performance of technical support;

• Performance of repair and corrective actions;

• Communications /information flow, and record keeping; and

• Management of Recovery Operation .

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The NRC team noted that the applicant's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of the emergency response facilities; and actions and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following positive aspects of the licensee emergency response that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

• The control room operators demonstrated excellent knowledge of the plant emergency operating procedure * The development of plant actions by control room personnel to effectively mitigate the consequences of the accident were excellen * Shortly after the initial offsite release an excellent briefing of the Control Room staff was provided by the TSC Emergency Operations Manage * The TSC contained an excellent document library, which was well used as a resource throughout the exercis * The activation of the TSC was timely and plant condition briefings by the Site Emergency Director (SED) were frequen * The activation of the OSC was timely and frequent briefings were held to update personnel on plant condition * Good control over the OSC in plant teams and good communications with the teams were demonstrated throughout the exercis * The OSC team members demonstrated a generally good knowledge of sound health physics practice * The Incident Field Office location in the E0F functioned very well during the exercis * Good coordination between the dose assessment specialist and the field monitoring team coordinator was demonstrate * Offsite field monitoring teams were well briefed prior to dispatch from the EOF and were frequently updated on changing plant condition * Offsite sampling coordinates were quickly located, and sarpling results were promptly reported back to the Offsite Team Communicato ,

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• Offsite teams demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the use of offsite monitoring team equipment and procedure Although the ability to analyze plant conditions, and make appro-priate, timely, protective action recommendations for the public were found to be acceptable, the following items were identified which could have degraded overall response during emergencies and require evaluation for possible corrective action:

• The classification of the chlorination building explosich as a Notification of Unusual Event was incorrect. (This appears to be partly due to a deficiency in EPIP ER-1.1 in that the station initiating condition is misleading). A second independent verification of correct classification should be considere to avoid errors in classification. (50-443/86-10-01)

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• EPIP ER-1.4 directs evacuation to the the Seabrook Greyhound Track if the wind is from the east. This is in error as the dog track is due west of the plant (50-443/86-10-02).

• There was no security representation in the TSC. The Mainten-ance Coordinator assumed this function, but he is not security trained. It may be more appropriate to station the Security Coordinator in the TSC rather than in the EOF (50-423/86-10-03).

• There was no dose assessment / dose projection capability demon-strated in the TSC (neither prior to EOF activation, nor as a backup to EOF after activation). Instead the TSC relied on YAEC to perform dose projections based on core damage. This resulted in a one hour delay (because of a computer malfunction) before this information was available to the SED. (No actual release was taking place at that time). The capability to perform pre-liminary dose projections onsite exists by jrocedure and is required by ER-3.1 (50-443/86-10-04).

• Priorities of TSC activities were occasionally inappropriat The General Emergency classification was made by the Emergency Operations Manager without verification by the Site Emergency Director (SED) (50-443/86-10-05).

• The TSC was somewhat slow in analyzing the indications of a DBA LOCA (50-443/86-10-06).

• The SED was not informed of the failure of the Containment Building Spray (CBS) discharge cross-connect valve untti 30 minutes after the failure was identified. TSC personnel were not briefed on the failure untti an additional ten minutes had passed (50-443/86-10-07).

• The general plant status board in the TSC at times lagged actual plant conditions by 30 minutes (50-443/86-10-08).

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• Form ER-3.28 (Rev. 2) from OSC Operations procedure EPIP ER- had been issued, but the procedure in the OSC had not been revised to reflect the change (50-443/86-10-09).

• Extremity TLDs were not considered for the containment atmos-

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phere sample te'am although thsy were involved in handling a 40R/hr (contact) source. Revised form ER-3.28 (Rev. 2) does not have provisions for the Radiological Controls Coordinator to specify the use of ' extremity TL0s (ER-3.2 and ER-6.2 contain these provisions) (50-443/86-10-10).

• The methbd of tracking personnel exposures by team members when RWPs are not used is not clearly s~pecified (50-443/86-10-12).

• EBS messages are not monitored for accurac The EBS message issued at IDM was, contrary to protective action reconinendations agreed to by NH Yankee and NH CD. (Message announced that the beaches at Seabrook, Hampton and Hampton Falls would be evacuated and that those three towns-would be sheltered. It should have announced evacuation of the towns of Seabrook, Hampton, and Hampton Falls, with sheltering downwind out to five miles).

(50-443/86-10-13).

• Tracking of feedback on actual offsite protective actions taken was not indicated on the E0F status boardj(50-443/86-10-14).

• On occasion, delays occurred in EOF discussions / decision making while searching messages for the most recent values of critical plant parameters (containment pressure, containment radiation levels, plant vent stack release rates, etc.)

Trending such information on a status board wculd improve response, times (50-443/86-10-15).

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• The Response Manager interfaced with several different levels in I

the various organizations in the EOF. He should consider a single point of contact with each organization and delegate other contacts to the Technical Coordinator (50-443/86-10-16).

• There is no PA speaker in the dose assessment area of the E0 Several important announcements were not heard as a resul (50-443/86-10-17).

• Critical information was not recapitulated on a frequent enough basis during press briefings in the media center (50-443/86-10-18).

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3. Exit' Meeting The inspectors attended the applicant's critique on February 27,-1986-following the critique, the NRC team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise as detailed in this report (See detail 1 for attendees).

At no time during.the inspection was any written material provided to the licensee by the inspector .

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