IR 05000443/1986003
| ML20210D918 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1986 |
| From: | Anderson C, Pullani S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210D894 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-86-03, 50-443-86-3, NUDOCS 8603270091 | |
| Download: ML20210D918 (28) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
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j Report No.
50-443/86-03 Docket No.
50-443
License No.
CPPR-135 Priority
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Category B
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Licensee:
Public Service of New Hamsphire P.O. Box 330
Manche ner, New Hampshire 03105 j
Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Inspection At:
Seabrook, New Hampshire
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Inspection Conducted: January 27-31, 1986 Inspectors:
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03 04-86 3j.
S. Pullann,"Futr Protection Engineer date
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Also participating and contribution to the report were:
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R. Hodor, Mechanical Systems Specialist, BNL A. Singh, Plant Systems Branch, NRR
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l H. Thomas, Electrical Systems Specialist, BNL j
S. West, Plant Systems Branch, NRR
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Approved by:
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C. J/ Anderson, Chief, Plant Systems Section, date
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on January 27-31, 1986 (Report No. 443/86-03)
Areas Inspected:
Special, announced team inspection of the licensee's efforts
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to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, J.
and 0, concerning fire protection features to ensure the ability to achieve
and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
The inspection involved j
180 inspector hours onsite and 50 inspector hours in-office by the te<.m consisting of 5 inspectors.
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i Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Two items remained
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unresolved at the end of inspection.
For details of these items see Sections 8.0 and 9.0 of this report.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH)
D. Bemis, Senior Control Room Dperator R. Clark, Control Room Operator
- M. David, Shift Superintendent M. DeBay, Unit Shift Supervisor
- J. De Vincentis, Director of Engineering and Licensing S. Howard, Auxiliary Operator (Primary)
K. Kiper,.PRA Engineer
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- G. Kingston, Compliance Manager R. Kletzien, Auxiliary Operator (Secondary)
- J. Martin, Technical Services Manager
- L. Merrow, Senior Fire Fighter Tech.
- G. Sessler, Engineering Department Supervisor
- J. Southwell, Senior Fire Fighter Tech.
- E. Trump, Senior Fire Protection Engineer 1.2 Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)
- W.~ Clouter, Lead Systems Engineer
- R. De Loach, Project Manager - Seabrook
- 0. Jaquette, Site Licensing Engineer K. Mahler, Working Foreman - Relay
"D. Maidrand, Assistant Project Manager
- G. Mcdonald, Construction QA Manager N. Patel, Electrical Engineer
- D. Pepe, Senior Engineer E. Sawyer, Manager Engineering Services
- G. Semienko, Mechanical Engineer
- J. Stacey, Project Engineering Manager - Seabrook Project 1.3 United Engineers & Contractors (UE&C}
- C. Greiman, Supervising Electrical Engineer
- T. Stanford, Electrical Engineer 1.4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- R. Barkely, Resident Inspector
- V. Nerces, Project Manager
- D. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting.
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2.0 Purpose
This inspection was to ascertain that the licensee is in conformance with his commitments with respect to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, J, and 0, including exemptions approved by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).
l 3.0 Background i
10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 became effective on February 17, 1981 for plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979.
For plants licensed or to be licensed after January 1,1979 (Seabrook 1 falls under this
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category),10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R are invoked by the licensing
process which includes a review of the Fire Protection Program for
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conformance with.the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), Section 9.5.1, j
dated July 1981, which contains, in BTP CMEB 9.5.1, the technical
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j requirements of Appendix A'to BTP ASB 9.5-1 and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
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In response to a staff request for an evaluation of the Seabrook fire.
protection program against the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1,
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the licensee, by letter dated April 1,1982, transmitted his fire
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i protection evaluation report. At the same time, the licensee also
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provided an evaluation against the requirements of Appendix R to
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The review of the licensee's Fire Protection Program is documented in the j
Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated March 1983.
Various licensee
commitments are documented in the SER and several licensee submittals.
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These commitments were used by the team as bases for the inspection.
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j Section III.G of Appendix R requ' ires that fire protection be~provided to j
ensure that one train of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe j
shutdown remains available in the event of a fire at any location within a licensed operating facility.
For hot shutdown conditions, one train of the systems necessary must be free of fire damage (III.G.1.a).
For cold shutdown conditions, repair is allowed using in place procedures and i
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' materials available onsite with the provision that cold shutdown be achievable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the initiating event (III.G.1.b).
i Section III.G.2 lists specific options as follows to provide adequate
protection for redundant trains of equipment located outside of the j
primary containment:
. Separation by a fire barrier having a three hour rating (III.G.2.a).
- i Separation by a horizontal distance of at least 20 feet with no
intervening combustibles and with fire detection and automatic fire suppression installed in the fire area (III.G.2.b).
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Enclosure of one train in a fire barrier having a one hour rating in
j addition to having fire detection and automatic suppression
installed in the fire area (III.G.2.c).
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For non-inerted primary containment,Section III.G.2 specifies one of the i
above three protection options, or any of the following:
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Separation by a horizontal distance of at least 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards (III.G.2.d).
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Fire detection and automatic fire suppression installed in the fire
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Separation of redundant trains by a non-combustible radiant energy
shield (III.G.2.f).
If the protection required by Section III.G.2 is not provided or the
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j systems of concern are subject to damage from fire suppression activities,Section III.G.3 of the rule requires that an alternative or
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dedicated shutdown capability be provided which is independent of the area l
of concern. Any alternative or dedicated system requires NRC review and l
approval prior to implementation.
i For situations in which fire protection does not meet the requirements of Section III.G, however, such protection is deemed to be adequate by the
licensee for the specific situation, the rule allows the licensee to
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request an exemption on a case-by-case basis.
Such exemption requests are submitted to the NRC for review and approval and must be-justified by the licensee on a technical basis.
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4.0 Correspondence
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j All correspondence between the licensee and the NRC concerning compliance
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with Sections III.G, J and 0 was reviewed by the inspection team in preparation for the site visit. Attachment l'to this report is a listing l
of the correspondence reviewed.
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5.0 ' Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability 5.1 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown The systems required for the safe shutdown from the main control room i
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and those required for the alternative shutdown capability using the
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Remote Safe Shutdown Facility and how these systems are used to
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i achieve and maintain hot and cold shutdowns are described in the-
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licensee's Fire Hazard Analysis Report (FHAR) entitled " Fire Protec-q
. tion of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R), Revision 2, j
Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
The systems and components required to achieve j
major safe shutdown functions are listed in Attachment 2 to this inspection report.
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5.2 Fire Areas Required for Safe Shutdown The plant is divided into several fire areas, some of which are further subdivided into fire tones for the purpose of fire detection and protection. The plant fire areas and their constituent fire zones are listed in Attachment 3 to the report.
Those fire areas required for safe shutdown equipment, i.e., those containing safe shutdown equipment, are identified in the licensee's FHAR, Section 3.2.7, which also liststhe redundant trains (Trains A and B) of safe shutdown equipment in each fire area.
5.3 Fire Areas Where Alternate Safe Shutdown is Required The licensee committed to provide alternate safe shutdown for the following fire areas, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.3 and III.L:
Main Control Room
Control Room HVAC Room
Cable Spreading Room
5.4 Remaining Plant Areas All other safe shutdown areas of the plant are required to comply with Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, unless an exemption request has been approved by the staff.
6.0 Inspection Methodology The inspection team examined the licensee's capabilities for separating and protecting equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot and cold shutdown conditions.
This inspection sampled se'ected fire areas which the licensee had identified as being in compliance with Section III.G.
The followin; functional requirements were reviewed for achieving and maintaining hot and cold shutdown:
Reactivity control
l Pressure control
Reactor coolant makeup
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Support systems
Process monitoring
The inspection team examined the licensee's capability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and the capability to bring the plant to cold thutdown conditions in the event of a fire in various areas of the plant. The examination included a review of several drawings, safe slutdown procedures and other documents.
Drawings were reviewed to verify electrical independence from the fire areas of concern.
Procedures were reviewed for general content and feasibility.
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Also inspected were fire detection and suppression systems and the degree of physical separation between redundant trains of Safe Shutdown Systems (SSSs). The team review included an evaluation of the susceptibility of the SSSs for damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems.
The inspection team examined the licensee's fire protection features provided to maintain one train of equipment needed for safe shutdown free of fire damage.
Included in the scope of this effort were fire area boundaries, including walls, floors and ceilings, and fire protection of openings such as fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals.
The inspection team also examined the licensee's compliance with Section III.J, Emergency Lighting, and Section III.0, 011 Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump.
7.0 Inspection of Protection Provided to Safe Shutdown Systems 7.1 Protection in Various Fire Areas The team reviewed the protection provided for selected safe shutdown system and components in the following fire areas, for compliance with Appendix R,Section III.G.1, 2, and 3.
Contai nment ( Fi re Zones C-F-1-Z, C-F-2-Z, C-F-3-Z)
Control Building El.21'6" (Fire Area CB-F-1A-A)
Control Buildng El.21'6" (Fire Area CB-F-1B-A)
Condensate Storage Area (Fire Area CST-F-1-0)
Diesel Generator Building El.21'6" (Fire Area DG-F-2A-A)
Diesel Generator Building El.21'6' (Fire Area DG-F-28-A)
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Emergency Feedwater Pump Building (Fire Area EFP-F-1-A)
PAB-F-28-2, PAB-F-2C-Z, PAB-F-3A-Z)
Primary Auxiliary Building - El.7'0" (Fire Area PAB-F-1C-A)
Primary Auxiliary Building - El.7'0" (Fire Area PAB-F-ID-A)
Primary Auxiliary Building - El.7'0" (Fire Area PAB-F-1E-A)
Primary Auxiliary Building - Electrical Chase (Fire Area
PAB-F-1G-A)
Equipment Vault 2 (Fire Zone RHR-F-IC-Z)
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Equipment Vault 1 (Fire Zone RHR-F-ID-Z)
Service Water Pump House (Fire Zone SW-F-1E-Z)
The safe shutdown systems and components selected for inspection in the above fire areas were based on their relative importance to safety using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques'(see Section 11.0 for details).
The team did not identify any unacceptable conditions.
One Hour Fire Barrier Wraps for Conduits: Wall-to-Wall Installations The conduit wrapping and radiant energy shield installation has not started at this time and consequently could not be inspected. The licensee has initiated a specification No. 9763.006-149-7 to effect the installation of the conduit wraps and the radiant energy shields.
The licensee verified that the lengths of fire wraps called for in the specification are based on continuOJs runs between three hour rated walls and the licensee reaffirmed this design policy during the inspection.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
7.2 Safe Shutdown Procedures i
7.2.1 Procedure Review The team reviewed the following safety shutdown procedures:
05 1200.02, Safe Shutdown and Cooldown from the Remote
Shutdown Facilities, Revision 0 OS 1200.02A, Train A System Lineup, Revision 0
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OS 1200.028, Train B System Lineup, Revision 0
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The scope of this review was to ascertain that the shutdown
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could be attained in a safe and orderly manner, to determine
the level of difficulty involved in operating equipment, and to verify that there was no dependence on. repairs for achieving
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hot shutdown.
For purpose of the review, a repair would
include installing electrical or pneumatic jumpers, wires or j
fuses to perform an action required for hot shutdown.
For cold shutdown, repair is allowed using in place procedures and i
materials available onsite with the provision that cold shutdown.
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be achievable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The team did not identify'any unacceptable conditions.
7.2.'2 Procedure Walk-Through
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.The team walked through selected portions of the procedures to determine that shutdown could be attained in an orderly and timely fashion.
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The team did not identify any unacceptable conditions.
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Manning for Safe Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panel i
During the walkdown of Procedure'OS 1200.02, Revision 0, the
team observed that the Unit Shift Supervisor (USS)
i performed system line up and other actions in the switch-gear room that took him away from directing the shutdown.
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Subsequently, after discussions with the licensee, a revised procedure was provided for review that relieved the USS of the remote operator actions. The team found the revised procedure acceptable.
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Communication During Pr.cedure Walkdown Operator Communication during walkdown of the procedure
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(OS 1200.02, Safe Shutdown and Cooldown from tne Remote
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Safe Shutdown Facilities, Revision 0) was maintained with j
two sound powered phones. Remote operator actions called i
for in the procedure were made more difficult without the
ability to talk to the Supervisory Control Room Operator (SCRO) at the Remote Safe Shutdown Panel. The licensee i
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with hand held radio and these will be used for communica-tion in addition to the sound powered phones. The j
inspection tearr. finds this acceptable.
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Equipment Identification During the walkdown of Procedure OS 1200.02, inspection
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team observed that the operators had some difficulty in identifying equipment that required operator action.
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licensee has a plan in. process to provide larger, more readable tags.and additionally provide color coding to-facilitate the location of equipment requiring operator action during shutdown. The~ licensee has a program to implement the above plan by fuel. load date. When the plan l
1s implemented, it should solve the difficulty in identifying the equipment. The team finds this
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acceptable.
l 7.3 Protection for Associated Circuits Appendix R,Section III.G, requires that protection be provided for
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associated circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation of redundant trains of systems necessary for safe
i shutdown. The circuits of concern are generally associated with safe shutdown circuits in one of three ways:
Common bus concern
Spurious signals concern
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Common enclosure concern
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The associated circuits were evaluated by the team for common bus,
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spurious signals, and common enclosure concerns.
Power, control,
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and instrumentation. circuits were examined,for potential problems.
7.3.1 Common Bus Concern
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The common bus concern is found in circuits, either safety
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related or non-safety related, where there is a common power source with shutdown equipment and the power-source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern.
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The team examined, on a sampling basis, 4160V, 480V, 120V AC
and 125V DC bus protective relay coordination..The team also
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examined, on a sampling basis, the protection for specific-
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instrunentation, controls, and power circuits, including the coordination'of fuses and circuit breakers. The licensee has plans to perform relay settings at approximately 12 month intervals.
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Breaker Coordination of Westinghouse Uninterruptable Power, Supplies The licensee had conducted a breaker coordination study which demonstrated satisfactory coordination with the exception of the Westinghouse supplied 7.5 KVA Uninterruptable Power Supplies.
The breakers on the_ distribution panels.1-ED-PP-3A
and 3C do not coordinate with the respective feeder breakers on distribution panels 1-EDE-PP-1A & IC.
The licensee has
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initiated action to correct the deficiency before the fuel load
date. The inspection team finds this acceptable.
7.3.2 Spurious Signals Concern i
j The spurious signals concern is made up of 2 items:
False motor, control, and' instrument indications can occur
J such as tnose encountere'd during 1975 Brown's Ferry fire.
These could be caused by fire initiated grounds, short or open circuits.
Spurious. operation of safety related or non-safety related
components can occur that would adversely affect shutdown j
capability (e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves).
Team examined, on a sampling basis, the following areas to ascertain that no spurious signals concern exists:
Current transformer secondaries
High/ low pressure interface
General fire instigated spurious signals
No unacceptable conditions were' identified.
i Redundant Fuses in Control Circuits for General Fire
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Instigated Spurious Signals The licensee has recently identified that redundant fuses which are required to protect against general fire instigated spurious signals was not being-provided as part of the original
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design for post-fire safe shutdown.
Subsequent changes have been initiated to provide the appro-priate redundant fuses for the protection for train B components which are necessary to achieve hot shutdown. The modifications, when complete, should provide an adequate resolution to the provision of the desired circuit protection.
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No unacceptable conditions'were identified.
7.3.3 Comedn Enclosure Concern.
I The common ' enclosure concern is found when redundant circuits are routed together in a raceway or enclosure and they are not a
, electrically protected or when fire can destroy both circuits
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due to inadequate fire barrier penetrations.
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A number of circuits, selected on a sampling' basis, were
examined for this concern.
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' No unacceptable conditions were identified.
s 7.4 General Fire Protection Features The team examined khe general fire protection features in the plant provided to mainta;n one" train of safe-shutdown equipment free of fire damage.
Included in the scope of this effort were fire area
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l bo3ndaries, inc,luding walls, floors.and ceilings, and fire protection of ' penings such as fire doors, fire dampers, and o
penetr,ation seaYs, fire protection systems, and other fire protection features.
I The general fire protection features are in various stages of s
completion with none complete at'the time of the inspection.
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i licensee stated the fire protection features will be complete prior to fueV~1aad.
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No una'cceptable conditions were identified.
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10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery; power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.
The team examined the " plant emergency lighting system to ascertain the
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licensee's compliance withjthe'above requirement.
The team did not identify'any unacceptable conditions except as follows.
l Exemption Request for Emerger.cy Lighting In their December 2,1985 revision to the safe shutdown report, the licensee stated that individual 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> batter)y powered emergency lighting units are installed in all locations needed for safe shutdown and in
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access and egress routes thereto. The installation of these emergency
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lighting units was not complete at the time of this inspection.
Moreover, by letter dated January 24, 1986, the licensee requested certain exemptions from section III.J of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 for several areas to the extent that it requires the installation of 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery powered emergency lighting units. These exemption requests are under NRR review and will be addressed in a supplement to the-SER. This is an unresolved item pending NRR review (50-443/86-03-01)'.
9.0 Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.0, requires that the reactor coolant pump shall be equipped with an oil collection system if the containment is not inerted during normal operation. The oil collection system shall be so. designed, engineered, and installed that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions and that there is-reasonable assurance that the system will withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.
Such collection systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems.
Leakage shall be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire lube oil system inventory. A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback.
Leakage points to be protected shall include lift pump and piping, overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oil lines, and lobe oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant cumps.
The drain line shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil leak.
The team examined the licensee's oil collection system to ascertain that the above requirements were met.
No unacceptable conditions were identified except as follows:
l Exemption Request for the Oil Collection System Seabrook Station Unit I has four reactor coolant pumps.
The seismically designed lube oil collection systems for these four pumps has two collection tanks with two pumps draining to each tank.
Each reactor coolant pump contains about 240 gallons _of oil and each collection tank has a capacity of 320 gallons.
Therefore, each tank will hold the entire inventory of one pump plus 25 percent.
Consequently, if the lube oil systems for two pumps fail simultaneously, there would be an excess of 160 gallons of oil per tank.
By letter dated February 5, 1985, the licensee requested a exemption form Section III.0 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 for the oil collection system
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from providing a collection tank with sufficient capacity to hold the total lube oil inventory from all reactor coolant pumps draining to the collection tank.
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The exemption request is under NRR review and will be reported in a
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supplement to the SER.
Pending NRR review of the deviation request, this is an unresolved item (50-443/86-03-02).
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10.0 Quality Assurance During the course of the inspection, the team reviewed several drawings, fire hazard analysis, fire protection modification packages, procedures,
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and other fire protection documents.
The scope of review included verification of their technical adequacy, appropriate reviews, design and
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procurement controls, and other Quality Assurance requirements for the licensee's. fire protection program.
l The team did not identify any unacceptable conditions.
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11.0 Use of PRA Techniques for the Inspection The safe shutdown systems (SSSs) and components were selected for
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inspection of their fire prot'ection features, based on their relative importance to safety using PRA techniques as opposed to random sampling basis (see Section 7.1 of this report).
If there exists a plant specific PRA or related studies such as Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) or Reactor Safety Study Methodology Application Program (RSSMAP),
thei'r results could be used in the selection process.
In the absence of
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these type of plant specific studies, generic conclusions on the relative
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importance of PWR and BWR systems based on a study of 15 published PRAs could be used for this purpose, with lesser accuracy (see NUREG-1050, PRA Reference Document, September 1984, Section B.3.2, Figure B-5).
A plant specific PRA study for Seabrook had been performed by the licensee and was published in a document entitled "Seabrook Station-Probabilistic Safety Assessment (SSPSA)" and dated June 1984. The results of the SSPSA was used for selecting systems and fire areas for this inspection, considering their importance to fire protection and nuclear safety.
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Table 1-1 and Figure 1-6 of the SSPSA summarize the key results of the study (see Attachment 4 to this inspection report). Table 1-1 indicates that 16 percent of all latent health effects-is attributable to fires.
Figure 1-6 indicates that the fires, as initiating events,' contribute 11 percent to the core melt frequency.
The accident sequences ranked by their contribution to the core melt frequency is listed in Table 13.2-12 of the SSPSA (see Attachment 5 of
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this inspection report).
Included in this, table are 6 fire scenarios as initiating events:
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FCRCC, Control Room Fire - Primary Component Cooling (PCC) Water Loss
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FPCC, PCC Area Fire
FSRCC, Cable Spreading Room Fire - PCC Loss
FTBLP, Turbine Building Fire - Loss of Offsite Power
FCRSW, Control Room Fire - Service Water Loss a
FCRAC, Cable Spreading Room Fire - AC Power Loss
The systems and components whose failures will contribute to the above fire scenarios are:
Primary Component Cooling (PCC) - Train A and B
Service Water - Train A and B
Service Water Cooling Tower - Train A and B
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal
Charging Pumps - Train A and B
Containment Spray System - Train A and B.
- Offsite Power (Grid) System
Onsite AC Power System
Diesel Generators - Train A and B
All of the above systems and components (except Containment Spray System and Offsite Power System) constitute a subset of the post-fire Safe Shutdown Systems (SSSs) and components listed in Attachment 2 to this inspection report.
Because of their safety importance in preventing core melt, this subset was selected for this inspection.
The fire areas selected for inspection are those that contain components of the above subset systems.
The plant Fire Hazard Analysis Report (FHAR) was utilized in identifying these fire areas.
In addition, Table 9.4-1 of the SSPSA (see Attachment 6 to this inspection report)
which summarizes the results of the detailed PRA study on various fire scenarios is also utilized in selecting the fire areas for inspection.
Table 9.4-1 lists the fire scenarios in terms of location of a fire, its frequency, and its potential impact on the systems important to ris _
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i In a related PRA study entitled " Risk-Based Evaluation of Technical
Specifications for Seabrook Station" and dated August 1985, five systems
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- clearly emerged as collectively representing the most important group, I
more'important than the rest of the systems combined.
These five systems are, in approximate order of importance:
Electric Power System
.
Primary Component Cooling Water System
j Service Water System
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l Containment Isolation System
,
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'The above systems were inspected'for their fire protection features with l
due consideration for their relative order of importance to safety.
12.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required in j
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, vinlations, or deviations. Unresolved items are discussed in Sections 8.0 and 9.0.
[
13.0 Conclusions The findings of this inspection are summarized in Attachment 7.
No violations or deviations were identified. Two items remained unresolved at the end of the inspection. The details of these unresolved items are discussed in Sections 8.0 and 9.0 of this report.
These two items pertain to the two exemption requests and remain unresolved pending review by NRR.
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j 14.0 Exit Interview
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The inspection team met with the licensee representatives, denoted in Paragraph 1, at the conclusion of the inspection on January 31, 1986.
.
The team leader summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that time.
The team leader and the licensee discussed the contents of this inspection report to ascertain that it did not contain any proprietary i
information. The licensee agreed that the inspection report may be
{'
placed in the Public Document Room without prior licensee review for
proprietary information (10 CFR 2.790).
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At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the team.
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ATTACHMENT 1 Correspondence List
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May 15, 1981 Licensee Letter - Additional fire protection information - with emphasis on associated circuits.
November 27, 1981 Licensee Letter - Response to Acceptance Review Requests for additional information.
March 5, 1982 Licensee Letter - Spent Pool Water Chemistry.
March 12, 1982 Licensee Letter - Additive for Containment Spray.
April 1,1982 Licensee Letter - Will comply with the intent of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
May 11, 1982 Licensee Letter - Notes of Fire Protection Meeting
- March 10, 1982.
July 28, 1982 Licensee Letter - Installation of two redundant automatic deluge systems in each fuel oil storage tank area.
September 1, 1982 Licensee Letter - Responses to A&B questions.
September 20, 1982 Licensee Letter - Revisions to "Seabrook Station Fire Protection Program Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, Rev. 1, April 1982."
November 12, 1982 Licensee Letter - Fire Protection System.
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January 21, 1983 Licensee Letter - Redundant train fire protection and information concerning cable routing.
February 24, 1983 Licensee Letter - Protection of Fuel Oil Transfer Pump.
May 2, 1983 Licensee Letter - Protection of. Primary Component Cooling Water Pumps.
September 14, 1984 Licensee Lettter - Submittal of "Seabrook Station Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability, Revision 1."
November 29, 1984 Licensee Letter - Submittal of Fire Protection Program; Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix ',, Revision 2 Report.
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February 8, 1985 Licensee Letter - Deviation requests for RCP Oil
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Collection System and Refueling Water Tank.
May 31, 1985 Licensee Letter - Response to NRC questions about the use of non UL listed /FM approved Butterfly valves.
July 3, 1985 Licensee Letter - Response to NRC regarding redundant fuses and high-impedance faults.
December 2, 1985 Licensee Letter - Additional deviations from 10 -CFR 50, Appendix R.
January 24, 1986 Licensee Letter - Additional deviations from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
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ATTACHMENT 2 Systems and Components Required for Major Safe Shutdown Functions Reactivity Control
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Boric acid storage tanks - train A & B
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Charging pumps - train A & B
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Boric acid transfer pump - train A & B Reactor Coolant Pressure Control
=
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Pressurizer heaters group A & B
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Pressurizer relief isolation valves - train A & B
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Pressurizer relief control valves - train A & B
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Head vent valves - train B
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Letdown isolation valve - train A
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Charging pumps - train A & B
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Pressurizer relief tank Reactor Coolant Make up
Charging pumps - train A & B
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refueling water storage tank
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Safety injection valves - train A & B Decay Heat
+
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Main steam isolation valves - train A & B
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Emergency feedwater flow valves - train A & B Main steam isolation valve bypass valves - train A
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Condensate storage tank Emergency feedwater pumps (turbine) - train A
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Emergency feedwater pump (elec) - train B
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Main steam atmospheric relief valve - train A & B
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RHR heat exchangers - train A & B
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RHR cooling water pumps - train A & B Instrumentation
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Steam generator level - train A & B
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Steam generator pressure --train A & B
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Pressurizer level - train A & B
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Pressurizer pressure - train A & B
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THOT - train A & B
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TCOLD - train A & B
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Steam generator emergency water flow - train A
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Intermediate range thermal neutron flux - train A & B
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condensate storage tank level
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Source Range Monitors Supporting Equipment
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Service water - train A & B
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Service water cooling tower - train A & B
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Primary component cooling water - train A & B
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RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling Systems - train A & B
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Diesel generator - train A & B 4160 V AC
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480 V AC
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Communication system l
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ATTACHMENT 3 Listing of Plant Fire Areas BUILDING FIRE AREA FIRE ZONES Containment C-F-1-Z, C-F-2-Z, C-F-3-Z
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j Control Building - El. 21'-6" CB-F-1A-A
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Control Building - El. 21'-6" CB-F-1B-A
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Control Building - El. 21'-6" CB-F-10-A
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Control Building - El. 21'-6" CB-F-1E-A
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Control Building - El. 21'-6" CB-F-1F-A
--
l Control Building - El. 21'-6" CB-F-1G-A
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Control Building - El. 50'-0" CB-F-2A-A
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Control Building - El. 50'-0" CB-F-26-A
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Control Building - El. 50'-0" CB-F-2C-A-
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Control Building - El. 75'-0" CB-F-3A-A
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Control Building - El. 75'-0" CB-F-38-A
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Control Building - El.-75'-0" CB-F-3C-A
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Control Building - El. 75'-0" CB-F-4A-A
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Control Building - Stairwell CB-F-S1-0
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Control Building - Stairwell CB-F-S2-0
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Containment Fan Encl. Area /
C-F-1-Z, PP-F-1A-Z, Mechanical Penetration Area PP-F-2A-Z, PP-F-3A-Z,
PP-F-1B-Z, PP-F-2B-Z, PP-F-38-Z, PP-F-4B-Z PP-F-5B-Z Condensate Storage Area CST-F-1-0
Cooling Tower - El. 22'-0" CT-F-1 A-A Cooling Tower - El. 22'-0" CT-F-18-A Cooling Tower - El. 22'-0" CT-F-1C-A Cooling Tower - El. 22'-0"
.CT-F-10-A Cooling Tower - El. 46'-0" CT-F-2A-A Cooling Tower - El. 46"-0" CT-F-28-A Cooling Tower, Fans CT-F-3-0 Duct Bank-ET to SW DCT-F-1A-0
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Duct Bank-ET to SW DCT-F-1B-0
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Duct Bank-PAB to CT DCT-F-2A-0
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Duct Bank-PAB to CT DCT-F-28-0
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Duct Bank-CB to PAB DCT-F-38-0
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Duct Bank-East MUA DCT-F-4A-0
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Duct Bank-East MUA DCT-F-4B-0
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Duct Bank-West MUA DCT-F-5A-0
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Duct Bank-West MUA DCT-F-5B-0
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Duct Bank-SWPH to CW DCT-F-6-0
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Duct Bank-TB to CST DCT-F-7-0
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BUILDING FIRE AREA FIRE ZONES Diesel Gen. Bldg.-El(-)16'-0" DG-F-1A-A
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Diesel Gen. Bldg.-El 21'-6" DG-F-1B-A
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Diesel Gen. Bldg.-El 21'-6" DG-F-2A-A
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Diesel Gen. Bldg.-El 51'-6" DG-F-2B-A
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Diesel Gen. Bldg.-El 51'-6"
--
DG-F-3A-Z DG-F-3B-Z Diesel Gen. Bldg.-El 51'-6" DG-F-3C-A
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Diesel Gen. Bldg.-El 51'-6" DG-F-3D-A
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Diesel Gen. Bldg.-El 51'-6" DG-F-3E-A
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Diesel Gen. Bldg.-El 51'-6" DG-F-3F-A
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Diesel Gen. Bldg.-Stairwell DG-F-SI-0
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Diesel Gen. Bldg.-Stairwell DG-F-S2-0
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Emer. Feedwater Pump Bldg.
EFP-F-1-A
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Electrical Tunnel ET-F-1A-A
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Electrical Tunnel ET-F-1B-A
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l Ele ~ctrical Tunnel ET-F-1C-A
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Electrical Tunnel ET-F-10-A
--
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Electrical Tunnel Stairwell ET-F-SI-0
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Fire Pump House FPH-F-1A-A
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Fire Pump House FPH-F-1B-A
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Fire Pump House FPH-F-1C-A
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Fuel Storage Bldg.-El 51'-6" FSB-F-1-A East Mainsteam & Feedwater MS-F-1A-Z
--
Pipe Chase MS-F-2A-Z MS-F-3A-Z
,
MS-F-4A-Z MS-F-5A-Z West Mainsteam & Feedwater MS-F-18-Z
--
Pipe Chase MS-F-28-Z MS-F-38-Z
)
East Air Make-Up Pit MUA-F-1-0
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West Air Make-Up Pit MUA-F-2-0
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Non-Essential Swgr. Room NES-F-1A-Z
--
i Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 7'-0"
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PAB-F-1A-Z*
--
PAB-F-18-Z*
Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 7'-0" PAB-F-1F-Z*
--
Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 7'-0"
--
PAB-F-1J-Z*
Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 7'-0" PAB-F-1K-Z*
--
Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 25'-0"
--
PAB-F-2A-Z*
Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 25'-0" PAB-F-28-Z*
--
Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 25'-0"
PAB-F-2C-Z*
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BUILDING FIRE AREA FIRE ZONES Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 25'-0"
--
PAB-F-3A-Z*
Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 53'-0"
--
PAB-F-38-Z*
Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 81'-0" PAB-F-4-Z*
--
Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 7'-0" PAB-F-IC'A
--
Primary Auxiliary Bu11dng-El.
7'-0" PAB-F-10-A
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Primary Auxiliary Building-El. 7'-0" PAB-F-1E-A
--
Primary Auxiliary Building-PAB-F-1G-A
--
Electrical Chase Primary Auxiliary Building-PAB-F-S1-0
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Stai rwell Primary Auxiliary Building-PAB-F-S2-0
--
Stai rwell Equipment Vault #2
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RHR-F-IA-Z RHR-F-1C-Z RHR-F-2A-Z RHR-F-3A-Z RHR-F-4A-Z Equipment Vault #1 RHR-F-1B-Z
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RHR-F-10-Z RHR-F-2B-Z RHR-F-3B-Z
,
RHR-F-48-Z l
Service Water Pump House SW-F-1A-Z
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Service Water Pump House SW-F-1B-A
--
Service Water Pump House SW-F-1C-A Service Water Pump House SW-F-10-A Service Water Pump House
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SW-F-1E-Z
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Intake & Discharge Structure SW-F-2-0
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Turbine Building TB-F-1A-Z
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TB-F-1C-Z TB-F-2-Z TB-F-3-Z Turbine Building TB-F-1B-A
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Tank Farm TF-F-1-0 Waste Process Building W-F-1A-Z
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W-F-18-Z W-F-1K-Z
W-F-2A-Z
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BUILDING FIRE AREA FIRE ZONES Waste Process Building W-F-28-Z
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W-F-2C-Z W-F-20-Z W-F-2E-Z
- All pri[ nary auxiliary building fire zones containing safe shutdown equipment and/or cables have been combined into one fire area for analysis purposes.
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ATTACHMENT 4
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Table 1-1 and Figure 1-6 of the SSPSA TA8LE 1 1.
SLMAY OF PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS 70 RISK-!N f(RMS OF CONTAINKNT RESPONSE AND RELIASE TYPts Rehese Fraction of Containment Response.
Consequ m es Percent Fretu M F Total Release Contributing Initiators (mean values)
Frequency Early Health Early Containment Failure 2.4 x 10-6 per
.01 Effects
. Interfacing LOCA 4 18 Reactor fear or l
Setsste 4 15 Once in 410.000
.
TUU Reactor years Latent Health Delayed Contalrment Fatture 1.7 a 10*4 per
.R$
E f fects Loss of Offstte Power
Reactor Year or
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franstents
Once in 6.000
-
Ftres
Reactor Years
.
Setssic
-
Others
.
IDU No Health Containment Intact Transients
6.0 a 10-5 per
.26 Effects
.
SLOCA
Reactor Year or
.
Others
Once in 27.000
.
TOU Reacter Years Total 2.3 a 10-4 per 1.00 Reactor Year or Once in 4.300 Reactor fears DEPENOENT EVENTS TRANSIENT EVENTS
..z. s i.,.. g y,
REACTOR 77hr es fo pfg 4.
h TuneeseE TRsP 44
- N * j @;/;M,U '
['..
PARTIAL Ftt0 WATER TPowsRg I'g.
.
'.(20% {
g y
,x LOSS es
..
-
%.g
.s
- Ar, sElseslC.f g;;/;.1...,.. '
-
x STEAtelset3RsAR ds EMCESS 11R% f j_00PSleOG9ff i
'h PEEOwATER 34 g ;n%
.
h'q"w^ omsRs 75
.a 3
. y events"I inAsseisnes y lisarv closure sw
,88 5 ass
. Fines -
1.t * -
%
s gn
- / ggg(; c,y, mf oTMens es
.q ALL INITIATING EVENTS FIGunt 1 6, CONTRIBUTION $ OF ACCIDENTS CROUPfD Bf Intf!AflNG [vtNT TO CORI E LT FRt0VENCY
l l
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,
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ATTACHMENT 5 Table 13.2-12 of the SSPSA
- Denotes the six fire scenarios and their accident sequences.
TA8tt 13.2 12 ACCIDENT stMNCES RANKED SV CCNTRIBUTIOM 70 CORE 'Gi roEQUOtCY e iws emuneesseneese eneusseeemme ene amm
'*u"m es,en e
emas esamesum.m sono esams. ese aume h h.
.
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TABLE 13.212 (Conttitued)
l tooet B.
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,
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re s.ews
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teittettog swet tems one artmed te f aste ll.t.t.
f. feest trees, seewese emeers. eastitary states oed esets reisease end states are eftese te sectten t.3.
3. Fleet asegge state tems see efteed to fatte 83.l.8.
4 trotsamese uttens seresseene esta evoet tree too e eets and recewey attene entco ere ef teed te lations 5.3 ene to.l. eenentieely. se bee testcetes arterrowe et tee evoet; see moetee reHere er eseeccerceete of tee e,eet.
Ortef eftettlees are preeted selas.
!
a'cttee Cees" r="e=
eenetues tog tiestHe peer recovery f refer to feele $3.f 14).
Erg tesegency feed.etoe cuency.
leg Service estee recovery.
en ester eseely to tentateset gemet.
Cl Centetemet f eelettes er seen seestrettees le I techet).
Ct Centatuent teeleUse of large peneteettens de $ takest.
rwege Itees spee et ties of lettiating eveet.
noecetae acttee per noen pressere restesetetten.
Os at essee sweehee tv effe,te tree.
6a teste a oestte at posee e etteste (tiene itI.
Ga feste 0 esote aC eemer seetlette (Ctese til.
es feste a seestco meter e,eoesie, feste e secett.e ester seeHeele.
es freie 4 oct e ettente.
pa De feete e pCC evetteele.
frees a ette state protectsee settee e,ettesie.
la s
$s feefe 9 seHe state protectten systee evettee's.
er seectee tete meessere eseente see teatrol rees tree.
trete a DC posee ovatiotie.
De feste 0 BC esse * evetteele.
la frete 4 engteceese safety feeteres acteettee tyttee.
le feste e emeteestee oefety resteres acteettee system.
E seacter Seeleet pese seal telegetty seletetage.
.
Ce Irete & tentateut*t settetog seeers teetlebte.
CB frase 6 contateneet settetog speers evetlante.
Ll feste a Ree sygtse eyeeleste to etetfley.
L$
freie B ene systee eselleele le etetflee.
i (F teergency feeemete* systee evetteste with seceasert pressere rettef.
Ce Oseenter staatif res etent, peseiere long tere sees teetteg.
Se emerate Geerste,r acts to entonitte feet ene DIeed teeltog.
(se eats to reeste core re aefseltag veter storage tens e,esteetty.
se et t eele,
Coerstee ute to trip teresse, eP eign pressvee estese evettette.
Pe presse e reitet evesteele.
r La frate a one esses to tejettles eees.
Le frete e one sosts to t=Jesttee eoes.
LC feste 4 ese isones to recteeviettee eme.
L6 feste 8 eat seems le rectetelettee sede.
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ATTACHMENT 6 Table 9.4-1 of the SSPSA TABLE 9.4 1.
SUMMARY OF FIRE ANALYS15 RESULTS
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ATTACHMENT 7 Summary of Ir spection_ Findings Item No.
Description-For details, refer to Section 1.
Violations None 2.
Deviations None 3.
Unresolved Items 86-03-01 Exemption Request 8.0 for Emergency Lighting 86-03-02 Exemption Request for 9.0 the Oil Collection System l
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