IR 05000443/2002001

2002 Annual Assessment Letter - Seabrook Station (Report No. 50-443/02-001)

ML020630477
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	03/04/2002
From:	Blough A Division Reactor Projects I
To:	Feigenbaum T, Peschel J North Atlantic Energy Service Corp
References
IR-02-001
Download: ML020630477 (6)

Text

rch 4, 2002

SUBJECT:

ANNUAL ASSESSMENT LETTER - SEABROOK STATION (REPORT NO. 50-443/02-001)

Dear Mr. Feigenbaum:

On January 30, 2002, the NRC staff completed its end-of-cycle plant performance assessment of Seabrook Station. The end-of-cycle review for Seabrook involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating performance indicators (PIs) for the most recent quarter and inspection results for the period from April 1 through December 31, 2001. The purpose of this letter is to inform you of our assessment of your safety performance during this period and our plans for future inspections at your facility so that you will have an opportunity to prepare for these inspections and to inform us of any planned inspections which may conflict with your plant activities.

As discussed in our previous annual assessment letter dated June 1, 2001, this inspection and assessment cycle consisted of three quarters (i.e., the second, third, and fourth calendar quarters of CY 2001) instead of the usual four quarters. This change was implemented in order to align the inspection and assessment cycle with the calendar year beginning on January 1, 2002.

Overall, Seabrook operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and fully met all cornerstone objectives. Plant performance for the most recent quarter was within the Regulatory Response Column of the NRCs Action Matrix, based on an inspection finding (identified March 2, 2001) of low to moderate safety significance (WHITE) in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone for a problem with one emergency diesel generator (EDG). The condition resulted from several causal factors related to problem identification and evaluation. On September 28, 2001, we completed a supplemental inspection of the EDG issues and concluded that your staffs response, which included a root cause evaluation and corrective actions, was adequate.

However, during this assessment period, we identified several findings, each having very low safety significance (GREEN), which collectively indicated ongoing inconsistency in the pursuit of equipment problems. In our last annual assessment letter dated June 1, 2001, we had advised you of a potential adverse trend (now defined as a substantive crosscutting issue) in this area.

During this assessment period, you started several initiatives to address this crosscutting performance issue, including actions to improve equipment reliability and the quality of maintenance and corrective actions/self assessment. Although some progress was achieved

Mr. Ted through these initiatives, the NRC has concluded that the substantive crosscutting performance issue in the Problem Identification and Resolution (PIR) area still exists. Specifically we noted four findings where the evaluations and extent-of-condition reviews to resolve degraded equipment issues were performed inconsistently. In the Initiating Events cornerstone, effective corrective actions were not taken after control rods had dropped several steps; subsequently the problem recurred and led to an automatic reactor shutdown. In the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, you did not fully evaluate degraded emergency feedwater pump oil bubblers, material deficiencies on the A residual heat removal pump motor leads, and a buildup of debris in the service water bays.

Effective evaluations and extent-of-condition reviews are important because they can affect the operability, availability, and reliability of risk-significant equipment and systems. We will focus on your progress in addressing this crosscutting performance issue during our normal baseline inspection program.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued safeguards advisories recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants, including Seabrook Station, remain at a high level of security. On February 25, 2002, the NRC issued an Order to all nuclear power plant licensees, requiring them to take certain additional interim compensatory measures to address the generalized high-level threat environment. These additional compensatory requirements will provide the NRC with reasonable assurance that public health and safety and the common defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current generalized high-level threat environment. These requirements will remain in effect pending notification from the Commission that a significant change in the threat environment occurs, or until the Commission determines that other changes are needed following a more comprehensive re-evaluation of current safeguards and security programs. To date, we have monitored Seabrooks actions in response to the terrorist attacks through a series of audits. With the issuance of the Order, we will evaluate Seabrooks compliance with these interim requirements.

The enclosed inspection plan details the inspections scheduled through March 31, 2003. The inspection plan is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

The last six months of the inspection plan is tentative and may be revised at the Mid-Cycle Review meeting.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

If circumstances arise which cause us to change this inspection plan, we will contact you to discuss the change as soon as possible. Please contact Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief, Projects Branch 6, at 610-337-5233 with any questions you may have regarding this letter or the inspection plans.

Sincerely, Mr. Ted /RA/

A. Randolph Blough, Director Division of Reactor Projects Region I Docket No. 50-443 Licensee No. NPF-86 Enclosure: Seabrook Station Inspection/Activity Plan cc w/encl: B. D. Kenyon, President and Chief Executive Officer J. M. Peschel, Manager - Regulatory Programs G. F. St. Pierre, Station Director - Seabrook Station D. G. Roy, Nuclear Training Manager - Seabrook Station D. E. Carriere, Director, Production Services W. J. Quinlan, Esquire, Assistant General Counsel D. Bliss, Director, New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management D. McElhinney, RAC Chairman, FEMA RI, Boston, Mass R. Backus, Esquire, Backus, Meyer and Solomon, New Hampshire D. Brown-Couture, Director, Nuclear Safety, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency F. W. Getman, Jr., President and Chief Executive Office, BayCorp Holdings, LTD R. Hallisey, Director, Dept. of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts M. Metcalf, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League D. Tefft, Administrator, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire S. Comley, Executive Director, We the People of the United States W. Meinert, Nuclear Engineer S. Allen, Polestar Applied Technology, Incorporated R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff

Mr. Ted