IR 05000443/1986036

Insp Rept 50-443/86-36 on 860616-20.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Repts,Const Deficiency Repts,Ie Circulars & IE Bulletins

ML20212A283
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	07/18/1986
From:	Blumberg N, Chaudhary S, Finkel A, Jerrica Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212A272	List: IR 05000443/1986036 ML20212A266
References
50-443-86-36, IEB-80-05, IEB-80-5, NUDOCS 8607280153
Download: ML20212A283 (16)

Text

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I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report N /86-36 i

Docket N ,

License N CPPR i

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Licensee: Public Service of New Hampshire

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P. O. Box 330 Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 i

! Facility Name: Seabrook Station Unit 1

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Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire

i Inspection Conducted: June 16-20, 1986

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Inspectors: f *--

// 9 /i Norman Blunbe date

s9f-)yb, Lead f2/ Reactor 4 Fpgineer 9//e/9f Suresh Chaud)fary, Lead R$to(/ Engineer date w Y Alan Finkel, Lead Reactor Engineer lP,//$b f da'te 4 Approved by: dA S- 7 f f V/ Sfo

Jon" Johnson, ' Chief, Operational Programs date

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Section, Operations Branch, DRS Inspection Summary: Routine, unannounced inspection conducted on June 16-20,1986 (Report No. 50-443/86-36).

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection reports, construction deficier.cy reports, IE Circulars, and IE Bulletins. The inspection was conducted onsite by three region-based inspector Results: No violations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000443 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Public Service of New Hampshire B. Beuchel, Senior Instrument and Control Engineer, Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)

J. Dold, Licensing Engineer, New Hampshire Yankee (NHY)

. S. Dunphy, Startup Test Department Supervisor, (NHY)

R. Gregory, Licensing Engineer, United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C)

• J. Grillo, Assistant Operations Manager (NHY)

• R. Guillette, Assistant Construction Quality Assurance (QA) Manager (YAEC)

G. Kingston, Compliance Manager (NHY)

D. Lambert, Project Field Quality Control (QC) Manager (UE&C)

• J. Malone, Operations Administrative Supervisor (NHY)

• W. Middleton, QA Staff Engineer (YAEC)

T. Pucko, Licensing Engineer (NHY)

• V. Sanchez, Site Licensing Supervisor (YAEC)

D. Snyder, Startup QC Engineer (YAEC)

S. Stasek, Licensing Engineer (NHY)

L. Walsh, Operations Manager (NHY)

• J. Warnock, Nuclear Quality Group Manager (NHY)

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• R. Barkley, Resident Inspector

• A. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector

• D. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at exit meeting conducted on June 20, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings and Other NRC Regulatory

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Issues 2.1 Notices of violations (Closed) Violation (50-443/84-07-01) The licensee's quality assurance program had not effectively provided control over activities involv-ing seismic cable tray support installations such that the instal-lations were not in accordance with the licensee's design document To assure the as-built design of the safety-related cable tray supports and bracing system, a walk-down of the safety-related tray system was performed by the licensee. The quality control organi-zation used the new as-built drawings and verified the as-built design of the safety-related cable tray system.

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i The work was performed per the following documentation:

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Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) 50-803092-C, October 1, 1985 and ECA 50-803259-A, March 27, 1986,

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FBM Support Nos. 1-5952 and 10909, and

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ULS&C Engineering - Construction Drawing (ESG-4)

To verify that the installation reflected the as-built drawings the inspector selected the following areas:

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Cable Tray Supports, Building "MSFW-A," Elevation O'0",

drawing 9763-L-370110, Sheet 15AA, and

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Cable Tray Supports, Building " Control," Elevation 50'-00",

drawing 9763-L-370123, Sheet 5 Using both the as-built drawings and the quality control inspection l records, the inspector verified that the drawings reflected the i installations and that the data was readily retrievabl ; This item is closed.

l (Ocen) Violation (50-443/86-14-01): This violation covers two instances of failure to maintain proper identification on plant equipmen The proper serial number was not maintained on Valve

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No. 1-SW-139, and the valve was mistagged with an erroneous code data tag.

i The licensee performed a reverification of code data tags on valves in the service water system. This work was tracked and controlled by NCR #74-3505, and any retagging was witnessed by i The Authorized Nuclear Inspector. The NCR was closed on April 7, 1986, verified and accepted by QC on April 11, 1986. This part of the violation was satisfactorily resolved, and close The second instance of the violation related to identical serial numbers (8005-01-001) on two Westinghouse Electric motors used in the diesel generator room ventilation system. The licensee now claims that such instances are common in Westinghouse equipment, because of a Westinghouse system of identifying equipment with " Shop Order" (S.O.) number that proceeds this serial number on the items. However, the inspector identified documents in licensee's document control system that do not appear to support this positio _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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A letter from UE&C to Buffalo Forge Company dated March 20, 1986 confirmed a conversation with Westinghouse that the serial number was in fact erroneous, and was supported by a Westinghouse

" Letter of Certification," dated June 9, 1980, and a list certi-ficate dated May 30, 1980. Also, a letter from Buffalo Forge Company to UE&C, dated March 31, 1986 acknowledged the dis-crepanc However, the licensee informed the inspector that Westinghouse stated that a mistake was made in the original list in the serial number of the moto (Test Report dated May 30,1980).

The inspector stated that due to the contradictory information the matter needs more review to determine the acceptability of their response. This item remains open pending further revie (Closed) Violation, (50-443/86-14-02): This item pertains to two instances of the licensee's failure to conform to project procedures, The licensee initiated a reinspection of the diesel day tank room penetrations for proper seals. In addition to checking the A-Diesel Day Tank rooms for adequate seals, an ECA #03/115973 was issued to provide proper instructions for installing ade-quate seals in these rooms. The required 3-hour fire seals have been installed in day tank room ~ The inspector verified that the present Work Request Program was replaced by the Station Operation Work Request Program. The new program is under the control of the station operation department and provides stricter controls. The licensee, however, initiated Work Requests (WR) #RH-0714 and RH-0786 to cover the disassembly / reassembly of hangers. Also, personnel associated with this implementation of current WR program were retrained and indoctrinated in the program requirement Based on the above information, this item is close .2 Unresolved Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-443/85-15-10) Maximum slope on instrumentation tubing. Paragraph 5.9.1.2 of General Installation of Instrument Systems procedure FIP-34, Revision 3, requires the installed instrument tubing to be sloped between a minimum of 1/2 inch per foot and a maximum of 2 inches per foot. Installed instru-ment tubing for SI-FIS-610 and 611 (4 sections each about 3 inches long) sloped approximately 5 inches per foo l

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5 Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) 05106137, Revision A May 23, 1985 deleted the 2" per foot maximum slope requirement. The changed requirement in FIP-34, Revision 4 paragraph 5.8.1.2, requires a mini-num slope of 1/4" per foot, except when shown differently on the instrument location drawings or as specified in 9763-46- The inspector verified that the installation reflects the criteria of ECA 05106137 and that retraining of personnel to the ECA changes was

, documented on the OJT/ Reading Training Attendance Record and signed by the responsible supervisor. The quality inspection records for selected installation reflected the ECA 05106137 and FIP-34 require-ment This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-443/86-02-01_h The Master Surveillance Schedule (MSS) program which will provide the data requirements of TC2.2 is scheduled to be completed by Westinghouse Corporation by April 1, 1986. The licensee expects a 30 day debug /use program to be completed by May 1, 198 The MSS program is in the verification mode by the licensee at this time. The program printouts are being verified by various department managers and it appears at this time that the data is 95% accurat The modeling is approximately 99% correct and is expected to be com-pleted within the next few weeks. The inspector reviewed the " Spec-appraisal User Training Manual" and was able to verify the data in a Mode Change Surveillance Report dated June 5, 1986 as being correct

{ and as listed in the master program scheduled.

j This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-443/86-09-03): During a plant and con-trol room walkthrough of plant procedures several discrepancies were observed in certain system operating procedures. A summary of each discrepancy and its corrective action are as follows:

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Drawing number for NIS Control power in procedure OS1011.01 was incorrect. The procedure has been changed to refer to the correct drawing numbe The Audio Count Rate Drawer power switch does not have On/0ff j label. A new On/Off label has been placed at the power switch.

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A handwritten change was observed on the 125 VDC battery charger drawing F-310041 which corrected previously incorrect informa-tion. On June 4, 1986 an engineering change authorization (ECA)

was submitted to formalize the drawing change. This ECA has been incorporated into the Change Document Tracking System Report as of June 11, 1986. As the licensee converts from Architect / Engineer (A/E) Drawings to their own system of com-puter assisted drawings all identified ECA's are to be incor-porated. Since this ECA is in the tracking system, it should be incorporated when licensee drawings are issued. In addition to the ECA noted above, a memorandum was issued on June 3, 1986 to shift superintendents and unit shift supervisors reminding them that pen and ink changes cannot be made to controlled drawing Errors should be corrected by appropriate channel Procedure OS1048.02 calls for 30VDC output from the battery charger. The procedure has been revised to specify the correct voltage of 130 VD Step 4.8 of procedure 1005.05 gives temperature limits for the refueling water storage tank (RWST) which were in conflict with one section of the Technical Specifications (T.S) but in accordance with another. RWST temperature limits given in Sections 3.1.2.6 and 3.5.4 were in conflict. The procedure has been revised to remove the temperature limit and refer to the T.S. section only. The June 1986 draft T.S. has eliminated the conflict between T.S. sections 3.1.2.6 and 3. Step 6.1.1 of OS1005.05 requires the RWST level to be 114,000

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' gallons if the RWST section is for the safety injection pump This was apparently inconsistent with T.S. 3.1.2.6 which required an RWST level of 479,000 gallons for Modes 1-4 and .1.2.5 which specifies a minimum level of 24,500 gallons for Modes 5 and 6. In addition the prints indicated an RWST capacity of 475,000 gallons rather than the T.S. level of 479,000 gallon Based on further review and discussions with licensee representatives the procedure appears to be acceptable as written. The 114,000 gallons is for SI pump NPSH considerations. Prerequisite 5.3 requires that the RWST volume be maintained within T.S. limits. These limits would be verified routinely by T.S. surveillance logs. During Mode 6 with the refueling cavity full, the charging pump takes suction on the RWST if it becomes necessary to makeup to the system. In rare situations where the SI pumps might be used in Modes 5 and 6, and the RWST was less than the 479,000 gallons then the

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114,000 gallon NPSH limit would be applicable.

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The T.S. limit given in the June 1986 DRAFT T.S. 3.1.2.6 is now 477,000 gallon minimum RWST volume for Modes 1- The inspector reviewed FSAR Figure 6.3-6 to resolve the dis-crepancy between the drawing and the T.S. From the RWST outlet to the RWST overflow there is 475,000 gallons of

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useable volume. This apparently is the nominal RWST volume referred to in the drawing. Total tank volume to the overflow is 485,000 gallons which includes 10,000 gallon unusable volume below the tank outlet. The 477,000 gallon T.S. limit includes 467,000 gallon usable volume plus the 10,000 gallon unusable volume. Therefore, the T.S. volume currently set at 477,000 gallons is approximately 8,000 gallons less than actual tank capacity to overflo Minimum flow precaution in procedure 051005.05 was unclear as to its instructions. This precaution has been revised to clearly state safety injection pump minimum flow requirement Draining of accumulators in procedure 0S1005.05 does not clearly state the final position of the accumulator vent valves after initial accumulator venting. The procedure has been revised to ensure that the accuaulator vent valves are opened for occumulator drainin Procedure OS 1005.05 did not clearly specify which RCDT control switch was to be used. The procedure has been revised to specify the RCDT pump control switc The safety injection system valve lineup, Attachment A to procedure OS 1005.05 was not required to be performed by the

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procedur The procedure has been revised so that the first step requires performance of this valve lineu The inspector verified each of the above corrective actions.

i This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-443/86-09-04): During a simulator walk through of procedures several discrepancies were observed in certain

general operating procedures. A summary of each discrepancy and its i

corrective action are as follows:

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Procedure OS 1000.02 performs the Mode 2 to Mode 1 mode change checklist as a procedural step rather than a prerequisit Although the procedural step still remains a prerequisite has

, been added to the procedure to assure that the Mode 1 check list review is in progress.

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Procedure 1000.03 identifies forms to be added later but does

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not identify these form The procedure has been changed to reflect that no forms are require Procedure OS 1000.07 references mode change checklists which are obsolete. The procedure has been changed to specify the use of the computerized SPEC APPRAISAL program which identifies states of all surveillance tests required be completed for each mode change. The procedure also specifies use of hard copy documen-tation in case of computer unavailabilit Procedure OS 1000.07 requires verification of compliance with operability requirements of certain T.S,. instrument tables; however, no checklist was available to accomplish this. The SPEC APPRAISAL system will be used as noted abov Procedure OS 1000.07 did not specify normal operating range of pressurizer leve The procedure now specifies a normal operating rang Procedure OS 1000.07 allowed a 1/M plot to be optional during reactor startup. The procedure has been revised to require the use of this plot for each reactor startu The inspector verified each of the above corrective actions. This item is close (Open) Unresolved Item (50-443/86-09-05): The " limitations" or prerequisite sections of various operating procedures did not adequately refer to T.S. requirements in that only the T.S. section number or section number and title were given. The licensee agreed to revise the twelve operating procedures identified in the inspec-tion report by reactor startup and to establish a program for correcting similar deficiencies in the remaining operating procedures within nine month The inspector observed that the twelve procedures identified in report 86-09 have been revised. In general, except where it was desired to have a specific T.S. setpoint in procedure, references in the " limitations and precautions" and " prerequisite" sections of the procedure have been eliminate Applicable T.S. which are a basis for a specific procedure are now listed in the " references" section of the procedure as information only to the operator. This will also provide a base to ensure that the procedure will be reviewed if the referenced T.S. is change A procedura has been developed called the " Procedure Consistency Review Program" which provides guidance to assure that procedure title, references, precautions, limitations and setpoints sections are written in a consistent manner and contain adequate information.

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This procedure provides a " Consistency Review Checklist" which is to be used for the review of each procedure. Approximately 200 procedures have been reviewed. The inspector observed by review of completed checklists, that this program has been implemented. For purposes of plant startup this item is completed; however, the item remains open until all operating orocedures have been reviewed by the procedure consistency progra (0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-443/86-09-06): Prerequisite steps in certain operating procedures refer to performing electrical and/or mechanical system alignments but do not refer to the procedures which actually perform tha alignments. The licensee agreed to revise the eight operating procedures identified in the report by reacter startup and to establish a program for correcting similar deficiencies in the remaining operating procedures within nine month The inspector identified that the eight procedures identified in Report 86-09 have been revised to reflect the specific system operating procedures used for alignment or specific components which are to be aiigned or checked. The procedure consistency review program previously discussed above for correction of unresolved item 86-05 is also being used to correct this deficiency which may exist in other operating procedures. The status of this action is the same as discussed above for item 86-05. For purposes of plant startup this item is completed; however, the item remains open until all operating procedures have been reviewed by the procedure consistency progra (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-443/86-14-03): The licensee performed a surveillance inspection to determine if the cables entering or

, exiting over cable tray edges were damaged, or were likely to be

! damaged in the future due to sharp edges. The inspection indicated that the cables were not damaged; the cable jackets were not indented to support excessive load; the tray edges were rolled; and the cables were bent over the tray edges in such a manner that load was minimized. This item is resolve .3 Construction Deficiency Reports (Closed) Construction-Deficiency Report (CDR)((50-443/79-00-04)- RPS Breaker Auxiliary Contacts (P-4) Interlock to ESF. An undetectable failure in the P-4 interlock circuit of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) was identified. The licensee committed to the following:

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Complete the Modification,

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Verify modification,

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Revise the test procedures, and

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Issue a Final 10 CFR 50.55(e) repor _

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On June 13, 1986 the licensee issued a final 10 CFR 50.55(e)

Report stating that the above listed items have been complete The inspector verified that the modification was completed and that the verification check and testing had been performed. The following documents were reviewed by the inspector during the verification inspections:

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ECA 03/1131328/ Work Request CP-0070

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Station Operating Procedure No IS1680.950, Revision 1, Solid State Protection System (SSPS) P-4 Contact Verification Check l

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Station Operating Procedure No. IX1680.921, Revision 2, Solid

) State Protection System (SSPS) Train-A Actuation Logic Test and No. IX1680.922, Revision 2, Solid State t --

Protection System (SSPS) Train-B Actuation Logic Test, and

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Station Quality Control Procedures (SQC) Inspection l Report No. 86-IR-5787 In each area the inspector verified that quality control inspection

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This item is closed.

I (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (50-443/84-00-16) - Deficien-I cies in Ferro-Resonant Transformers. The NRC IN No. 84-84 identified l two different deficiencies.

i i Deficiency No.1- The Ferro-Resonant Transformers manufactured j by General Electric Company (GE) changed the capacitor terminals from ring-torque to fast-on terminal connections. GE made the I connector changes concurrent with changing the capacitors from a i

polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) design to a non-PCB desig Westinghouse issued a Technical Bulletin No. NSD-TB-84-08, September 20, 1984, that describes the potential problem and provides instructions for proper connection of the GE capacitors.

i f Deficiency No. 2- General Electric determined that subject Ferro-Resonant Transformers were inadequately secured, thereby allowing the center leg to shift and vibrate while energize The vibration, in turn, caused an insulation breakdow Westinghouse Technical Bulletin No. 84-11, November 2, 1984 provides instructions for correcting the loose reactor legs.

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Nonconformance Report No. 74/2881, December 14, 1984 identified the transformers to be inspected with inspection details attached - Station Operating Procedure (SOP) No. MS0506.09, Revision 00, Change No. 85-088-MS0506.09-2 directed the replacement work for the GE Ferro-Resonant Transformers. Work Request (WR) 84WM00626, November 27, 1984 directed the work task for the two deficiencies listed abov Verification and corrective action are documented on NRC's 84-0008, 0009, 0010, 0011 and 85-000 This item is close (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (50-443/84-00-17): Structural steel I-beams supplied by Civis Steel were coped to insure proper assembly with installed wide-flanged beams. The webs of the coped beams were strengthened by welding a plate to the web. The fillet welds attaching plates to the web were found to be undersized in some area The licensee conducted a comprehensive review of vendor detail draw-ings to identify similar connections in all category-I structures. A total of 829 such joints were identified. An engineering evaluation was then performed to determine if the reinforcing plate was in fact necessary to carry the structural load. Out of the total of 829 connections reviewed and evaluated only six connections required rework to conform to the design requirements. The inspector verified that this rework was tracked and controlled by NCR #74-2723-5, and the work is complete. This item is close (0 pen) Construction Deficiency Report (50-443/85-00-07) During.the Environmental Qualification Review Effort (EQRE), the need for design changes in the HVAC System was identified in order to maintain equip-ment qualification and the specified environment. The original HVAC design was performed early in the program and design changes that increased capacity of the systems supplied by the HVAC were not identified until a revision of the EQRE program was performe To correct the problem of increased HVAC to specified areas the following changes were made:

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(1) - Equipment vault stairways and electrical areas - Add 15 ton chiller unit which supplies one air conditioner in each of three areas, (2) - Control Building Train A Switchgear Room and Train B Tunnel -Increase once-through ventilation air flow by modifications to existing fans, (3) - Mechanical penetration area - Modify duct work to direct ventilation to two equipment areas, and

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(4) - Primary Auxiliary Building - Add cooling system to the ventilation system for operation when outside air is above 75 F with distribution duct work installe The inspector verified that the HVAC re-work was performed in accordance with SBU-95100, August 20, 1985 titled, "HVAC System Modification / Additions Required to Maintain Environmental Conditions of Safety Related Equipment," DCN-66/0038A and BER-773A. The following work packages and equipment installations were inspected by the inspector:

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Equipment Vault Stairways and Electrical Area,

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Control Building Train A Switchgear Room and Train B Electrical Tunnel

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Mechanical Penetration Area Verification that the installed systems will meet the design criteria has to be completed by the licensee. The schedule and the method of testing the system modifications has yet to be established. This item remains open pending the system verification by the license (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report, (50-443/85-00-16): This deficiency involved seizure of a linkage on some safety-related HVAC dampers. All affected dampers have a primary pneumatic actuation mode. There is also a manual handwheel mode to operate the damper The licensee identified that use of the handwheel actuators caused the dampers to seize. These dampers were furnished "Contromatics" actuator The problem involved gauled threads in the extended travel stop, causing the dampers to seize. The licensee implemented the modification recommended by Pacific Air Products, the supplier, to preclude damper / operator seizure during normal damper cycling.

The modification consisted of replacement of aluminum end caps with i ductile iron end caps, spacer pipe, and a seal between the spacer and

! the end cap to minimize air leakage. The licensee has tested and i verified adequacy of this modification. This item is closed.

! (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report, (50-443/85-00-18): Possible malfunction of Y pattern diaphragm valve supplied by Dresser Indus-

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tries. The valve disc cap was capable of cocking in the disc guide

and wedging, thus, not allowing the disc to move. In such cases, the

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upper stem could have been raised with the disc remaining in closed or partially closed positio Dresser Industries, the manufacturer of these valves, evaluated the deficiency, and developed repair

! procedures that would eliminate the problems. The licensee imple-

mented the fix provided by the manufacturer. The inspector verified the implementation of the repair procedure and the QC verification of the valve repairs. This item is closed.

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4 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report, (50-443/85-00-19): This deficiency involved the misapplication of Potter-Brunfield Type MDR

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relays where they were used beyond the rated capacity. These relays were part of the Westinghouse Solid-State Protection System (SSPS).

During testing of the SSPS system, arcing occurred across the MDR relay contacts, and the heat generated by this arcing melted a nylon

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cam in the relay. This caused the relay not to return to its normal state, the licensee corrected this problem by converting the dc circuit to ac circuits; thus, taking advantage of the higher ac

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interrupting current rating of the MDR relays. Rectifier assemblies were also installed to convert the ac back to de to operate the de solenoid valves. The licensee has tested and verified the adequacy of this fix. This item is close (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) (50-443/86-00-03):

Potential malfunction of P-10 Permissive. The licensee described a potential problem with the P-10 permissive in their May 7, 1986 10 CFR 50.55(e) notification:

The recommendation made in Westinghouse letter of February 27, 1986 discussion of the P-10 Permissive concern has been incorporated into the Seabrook Station's Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure titled

" Power Range NI Instrument Failure," OS1211.04 0 The inspector verified that the operator Requalification Training Program has been up-dated to include the requirements of OS1211.04 01 and that the operators are in the 6 week requalification program at the present tim This item is close (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (50-443/86-00-04):

Malfunction of 25KVA inverter due to improper stacking of cable lugs on 600 AMP fuse blocks. The deficiency involved the incorrect electrical connection made via nuts and studs instead of direct connection of the cable lug to the bus for AC and DC input power supply. The potential effect would be abnormal heating at the connections due to high resistance. This could lead to a fault or circuit failure that would render the equipment inoperabl A licensee deficiency report (DR), 95-0012, identified the component and the method to correct the conditio The work was completed and accepted by SQCE on June 2, 1986. The inspector verified that the installation was performed per Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) NCR 95/0012A. Quality control witnessed the modification of the ECA on June 2, 1986 and documented their inspection on figure 5.6 of MA3.1, Revision This item is close _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

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l 1 2.4 IE Bulletins and Circulars .

i (Closed) IE Bulletin 80-5A - Bulletin 80-05 described a concern which involved chemical and volume control system (CVCS) tanks in which a vacuum condition resulted in damage to the tank. Bulletin 80-05 was ,,

i reviewed and closed in NRC inspector report 50-443/84-01; however,

the followup questions were generated as a result of Bulletin 80-0 To answer the followup questions listed below the NRC had assigned No. 80-BU-5A for the Seabrook sit .

The followup questions were as follows:

(a) Are vacuum breaker covered by a surveillance program?

(b) Has the system design been evaluated to ensure that cover gas can be admitted fast enough to keep up with the maximum rate of liquid removal from the volume control tanks? and '

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(c) Are the locked open valves protected by means of permanent -

warning signs?

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l The inspector verified that the licensee has taken the following actions to address the three questions listed above.

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(a) The vacuum breakers are identified as specified in -the maintenance program procedure MA3.2 and are listed on the Repetitive Task Sheet (b) The licensee re-evaluated their existing hydrogen vent control i valve WG-PCV-1492 and determined that the valve can pass a -

maximum of 20 (CFM) which exceeds the design criteria of 16 (CFM) without any supplemental nitrogen gas supply. Reference .

licensee letter of September 21, 1984, SB-1840 _- _

(c) The locked valve program requires that all valves on the locked valve list have permanent installed locking devices at the valve location. Also, the program prohibits the locking of any valve'

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i in a position other than that called for by the Station Locked .

Valve List. The inspector verified that the following valves

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were listed on the Locked Valve Lis Valve Valve Subject N Position

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Hydrogenated Vent. to PDT 66B 2-BRS-V505 Open

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Hydrogenated Vent. to PDT 66A BRS-V504 Open

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Isolation to WLD From PDT 66B 2-BRS-V453 Closed Hyd. Vent HDR

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Isolation to WLD From PDT 66A BRS-454 Closed Hyd. Vent HD .

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_.a, W Inspection of the valves listed above verified that they were

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positioned and secured as listed.

I This item is close (Closed) IE Circular No. 80-10 - Failure to maintain environmental qualification of equipment. The circular recommends that the licensee review current maintenance procedures and administrative policies to ensure the following: Adequate administrative controls exist to ensure that equipment

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which is environmentally qualified is identified prior to

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. Maintenance procedures provide necessary instructions and i precautions to ensure that the environmental qualification of

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equipment is not degraded when maintenance is completed.

! Maintenance personnel are adequately trained on environmental

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r qualification requirements and the potential for equipment j degradation from improper maintenanc The licensee's qualification maintenance requirement data (QMRD)

' sheets are supplied to the Maintenance Services Organization, which

_ has the responsibility for establishing the Maintenance Group Progra Specific parts and materials are identified on the

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Repetitive Task Sheets (RTS) in conjunction with procedures for performing the tasks. The licensee's intra company memo SS#24607,

.

.,

J' May 1, 1986 and SS#24491, April 24, 1986, which describe the func-

!

tions of the maintenance group equipment qualification program and

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the EQ PM program, are described in detail in maintenance procedure MA2.1, Revision 2, Preventive and Corrective Maintenance, May 29, 198 ;

~' The Repetitive Task Sheet (RTS) is a computer generated document which identifies as a minimum the equipment No., procedure No.,

"& equipment classification, frequency of maintenance and task descrip-tion. On a random inspection sample the inspector selected 15 RTS's

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and compared the requirements of their data with the t,uipment qualification data sheet In each case the EQ data requirements

, were identified on the RT 'J' ,

,

This item is close .

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(Closed) Circular No. 81-03-Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation The Circular recommended that holders of operating and construction permits review for applicability the specific items presented in the

" Description of Circumstances" and the enclosure to the Circular. It is further recommended that the surveillance testing and calibration programs for the seismic instrumentation system be reviewed and revised as necessary to detect and prevent the malfunctions described herein and to limit the potential for having or making the entire seismic monitoring system (active and passive components) inoperable during all plant modes of operatio The Seabrook Technical Specification (TS) identifies the Seismic Monitor channels surveillance requirements in paragraph 4.3.3. and 4.3.3.3.2. The licensee has identified the TS Seismic require-ments in Station Operating Procedure IX1670.920, Revision 00, March 28, 1985, and has listed the maintenance requirements for these Seismic Monitor channels as specified in the Station Maintenance Program Manual (SSMA) and procedure MA 3.2. The Repetitive Task Sheet, which is part of the maintenance program of MA 3.2 lists the requirements of the TS. The inspector verified that the Repetitive Task Sheet has been completea for the TS seismic equipmen This item is close . Management Meetings Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspec-tion at an entrance interview conducted on June 16, 1986. The findings of the inspection were periodically discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection. An exit interview was conducted on June 20, 1986 (see paragraph I for attendees) atswhich time the findings of the inspection were presente ,

At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the I

licensee by the inspectors.

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