ML20214V415

Final Response to FOIA Request.Forwards Document.Document Also Available in PDR

ML20214V415
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	12/03/1986
From:	Grimsley D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:	Curran D HARMON & WEISS
Shared Package
ML17198A313	List: ML20214V415
References
FOIA-86-756 NUDOCS 8612090676
Download: ML20214V415 (1)

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR RE3ULATORY COMMISSION N:.pc r it.f.EQUEST NUMBE3tSioIA-86 f . %'g s

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• INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST 2 86 (e eeee ,/ OEC 3 DOCKET NUMBER'Si ut sopaceaart REQUESTER

% Curran . Esviro PART /.-RECORD @ELEASED OR NOT LOCATED (See checker / bones)

No agency records subsect to the request have been located.

No additonal agency records subsect to the request have been located.

Agency records subject to the request that are identifed in Appendix are already available for public inspection and copying in the N AC Pubhc Document Room, 1717 H Street, N W., Washington, DC-Agency records subsect to the request that are identifed in Appendix f are being made available for public inspection and copying in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC, in a folder under this FOIA number and requester name.

The nonpropnetary verson of the proposalls) that you agreed to accept in a telephone conversaton with a member of my staff is now being made avalable for public inspecten and coying at the NRC Pubhc Document Room 1717 H Street, N W , Washington, DC, in a folder under this FOfA number and requester name.

Enclosed is information on how you may obtain access to and the charges for copying records placed in the NRC Pubhc Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC.

Agency records subrect to the request are enclosed. Any applecable charge for copes of the records provided and payment procedures are noted in the comments section.

Records subrect to the request have been referred to another Federal agencybes) for revew and direct response to you.

In view of NRC s response to this request, no further action is being taken on appeal letter dated PART li.A-INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Certain information in the requested records is being withheld from public disclosure pursuant to the FOIA enemptions described in and for the reasons stated in Part 11. sec-tons B, C, and D. Any released portions of the documents for which only part of the record is being withheld are being made available for public inspection and copying in the NRC Pubice Document Room,1717 H Street. N W., Washington, DC, in a folder under this FOIA number and requester name.

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SUITE 430 WASHINGTON, D.C. soooo-nes GAIL McGREEVY HARMON ELLYN R. WEISS TELEPHONE DIANE CURRAN (202)328 3500 DEANR.TOUSLEY j ANDREA C. FERSTER October 21, 1986 HAND DELIVERED FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Donnie H. Grimsley, Director ACT REQUEST Division of Rules and Records ~8b-78[0 of fice of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 773f Old Georgetown Road hb-C d/ ~2/~/b Bett 3da, Ma ryland

Dear Mr. Grimsley:

et seq.,

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552, the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP")

requests that you make available all docnents that relate to the cadweld test and/or construction problem referred to in paragraph 8 of s letter from Stephen M. Long, NRC, to Robert J. Harrison, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, dated October 8,1986.

A copy of that letter is attached. Please note that this request may overlap paragraph 4 of another FOIA request made by NECNP on September 12,1986 (FOIA 8 6-678) .

NECNP is an intervenor in the Seabrook operating license proceeding. The organization intends to use this information in i

the licensing hearings to further the public's interest in the

! safety of operation of the Seabrook plant. Therefore we request that you waive any copying and search fees pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 9.14(c).

I look forward to receiving your response within ten working days, as required by the Freedom of Information Act.

Sincerely, Diane Curran t

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASMNGToN, D. C. 20655

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Docket tos.: 50-443 .

and 50-444 kr. Robert J. Harrison President & Chief Executive Officer ~~ ~~ ~

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Public Service Company of hew Hampshire Post Office Box 330 F.anchester, New Hampshire 03105

Subject:

Request for Additional Information for Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2, Errergency Planr.ing Sensitivity Study The enclosed Request for Additional Information documents the oral and handwritten questions transmitted to Public Service Company of New Hampshire personnel and

' contracturs during our meeting in Bethesda, Maryland on September 23, 1986.

Please provide your responses promptly to facilitate our review.

Questions or additional information regarding this matter should be directed to the Techr.ical Project Manager for the review of the Seabrook Emergency Planning Sensitivity Study, S. M. Long (301) 492-8413.

Sincerely, l ?$$c v

Steven M. Long, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate No. 5 Division of PWR Licensing-A

Enclosure:

As stated cc: See next page

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s Enclosure REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

' SEABROOK STATION, UNIT 5 1 AND T DUtKET N05.: 50-443 AND 50-444 EMEREENCY PLANNING SEN5ITIVITY STUDY

1. Describe how the overpressurization calculations made by SMA were checked or design reviewed. l

2. A meeting should be arranged with the originator of these calculations to assist the BNL reviewers in following these calculations and understanding the assumptions.

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3. Eccument the basis for the assumptions in the calculations. In particular, explain the uncertainty factors assigned to various pressure capacities.

i 4 Explain the mechanism for transferring the load from the penetration ,

sleeves to the containment wall, in particular, the equipment hatch, when  !

subjected to high strain conditions. Explain how the rebars around the penetrations were assessed to assure that they can resist these loads in addition to the primary pressure induced loads.

5. The calculations use a rebar ultimate stain value of 4.7%, i.e., more than 21 feet of linear extension for the hoop bars. This linear extension under.the high pressure load will be accommodated by fomation of cracks in the concrete totaling approximately 21 feet in width. h stify the assumption that the pressure loads will be carried proportionately by the linear plate and the rebars (similar to the elastic condition) in this highly cracked condition. Also address the potential for developing a crack large enough for the local extension of the liner plate to lead to its failure at that point.

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6. Was compatibility of strains in the rebars and the liner plate satisfied in the calculations? For example, the outermost hoop bars will fail before the inside bars and the liner plate reach their respective ultimate strengths.

Was this fact reflected in the calculations? In addition, how is the 4

biaxial stress-strain state of the liner plate considered.

7. The combined tension, shear and bending effect at base and spring line levels was not considered in the calculations (Ref. p. 35, assumption 6).

Verify that the combined effect does not change the conclusions of the analysis.

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. Since 31 cadwelds out of a total of 169' test samples failed at a stress lower than the rebar ultimate strength and there was apparently a 3 construction problem concerning staggering of these welds, provide /

justification for not using a_ reduced.ulttra'te striiiaWfor the iebar.

9. The containment analysis is based on an axisymetric geometry and loading.

This is not the case due to the presence of adjoining structures such as the fuel building and main steam and feedwater pipe chase. Identify these axisymetric conditions and assess their impact on the.. failure modes and analysis.

10. Only a sample of pipe penetrations are considered in some detail (X-23, X-26andX-71). The justification to consider only these should be provided.

, 11. A structural evaluation of electrical penetrations should be provided.

12. The basis for the leakage area assigned to the flued head at failure should be provided.

13. A more detailed evaluation of the impact of punching shear at the Fuel Transfer Building should be provided.

14. Clarify the extent to which double ended piping failures have been considered in the overall containment performance assessment. provide isometric drawings of all piping attached to containment penetrations.

15. In PLG-0465, page 2-10, Figure 2-3, the condition:1 frequency of exceeding whole body dose vs distance appears to be driven by the S2 source term. If this is the case, please describe all accident sequences (internal and external events) that contribute to the frequency of the S2 source term given in Table 4-2, pg. 4-7. in particular, define how i,

the timing and size of containment leakage was determined for each of i

' these classes of accident sequences. Justify the appropriateness of the binning of each of the accidents into this particular source terin.

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16. Provide justification for the lir.er yield stress increase from the specified yield stress of 32 ksi to a mean yield stress of 45.4 ksi.

17. Indicate the correlation between containment failure sequences and the

, containment failure modes.

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18. Provide the basis for concluding that the sight glasses in the hatches will not fail under high containment temperature and pressure conditions.

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19. Document the effect that the recent update in seismic fragilities will have on the conclusions of the PSA results.

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20. Assess the impact on risk of using the assumption of ultimate containment capability predicted by VE&C analysis (150 psig).

21. What is the impact on risk from accidents during shutdown and refueling when the containment function may not,be available?

21. It is the staffs understanding that preexisting violations of containment integrity were " included" in the PSA by assuming the average effect was to raise the containment leak rate to the design basis value of 0.15/ day.

a. Compare this assumption with the containment integrity violation data presented in hUREG/CR 4220.

b. What contributions would these containment integrity violation data make to the probabilities for each of the release categories (Assume the S5W category is redistributed over all the appropriate categories by the conditional probabilities of preexisting leakage paths of the sizeappropriatetoeachcategory).

23. a. Provice a narrative description that quantitatively delineates the dominant contributors to the dose probability vs distance curves and the early fatality probability curves. The dominant release categories should be specified and the dominant accident sequences contributino to each of these release categories should be specified.

The probability of occurrence of each release categor'y should be stated. These data should be provided for the current study and for the original PSA results. Changes between the two studies should be attributed to specific differences in the analysis.

b. Provice a set of early fatality conditional probability curves for each release category, assuming evacuation distances of 1 mile and 2 miles,

c. Provide the conditional mean risk of early fatality for each of the curves provided in b.

24. Provide a quantitative description of the effects of the following differences between the original PSA and the current study:

! a. reduction in probability of core-melt V sequences

b. factor of 1000 scrubbing of releases through RHR seals

c. change of release category (56 to $1) for unscrubbed event V sequences.

The effects should be described in terms of differences in risk curves for early fatalities ar.d fur 200 rem vs distance. . .e i

25. Provide a list of all paths for loss of RCS inventory outside containment.

Show how these have been considered with respect to LOCA and with respect to containment bypass for radioactive materials following core damage.

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26. Indicate the extent to which the effect of local deflagration / detonation of hydrogen qas concentration in localized areas both inside and outside the containment has been considered in the assessment of risk. Include a discussion of how weak areas of containment have been considered in your assessment, for example, the containment is considerably weaker in its resistance to pressure loading from outside the containment.

27. Discuss the effect on risk of hydrogen deflagation/ detonation in the RHR vault.

28. Identify any penetrations connected directly into the containment atmosphere which rely on any remote mancal or manual valves for isolation.

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Re: FOI A 756 -

APPENDIX F RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE POR UNDER THE ABOVE REQUEST NUMBER NUMBER DATE DESCRIPTION

1. 09/01/81 Memorandum from R. Baer to T. Martin regarding the Seabrook Unit # 1 Multiple Cadweld Splices in Containment Primary Shield Wall (2 pages) ab b

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