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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217M8771999-10-25025 October 1999 Requests That Industry Studies on long-term Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Be Provided to R Dudley at Listed Mail Stop ML20217M4331999-10-19019 October 1999 Submits Rept 17, Requal Tracking Rept from Operator Tracking Sys. Rept Was Used by NRC to Schedule Requalification Exams for Operators & Record Requal Pass Dates ML20217F5841999-10-13013 October 1999 Requests Revocation of License OP-11038-1 for GE Kingsley. Individual Has Been Reassigned to Position within Naesco ML20217F5811999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Insp Data & Naesco Evaluation of a EDG Exhaust Insp Conducted on 990407.Insp Ensured That Unacceptable Wall Thinning Will Not Occur During 40-year Design Lifetime of Sys ML20217C7321999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Copy of Seabrook Station Videotape Entitled, Completion of Seal Barrier Installation. Videotape Documents Process of Selecting,Designing & Installing Seal Deterrent Barrier to Preclude Entrapment of Seals ML20217B8621999-10-0505 October 1999 Forwards Rev 28,change 1 to EPIP Er 1.1, Classification & Emergencies, Per 10CFR50.54(q).Rev to Procedure Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan ML20217B7471999-10-0101 October 1999 Provides Notification of Change in PCT of More than 50 F,Per Requirements of 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(i),(ii).Tabulation of Large Break LOCA PCT Margin Utilization Applicable to Seabrook Station,Encl ML20212J8271999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Seabrook Station. Staff Conducted Reviews for All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan for Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months.Plant Issues Matrix & Insp Plan Encl ML20216J2381999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to Re Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Plants During Y2K Transition.Nrc Expects All Licensees to Operate Nuclear Facilities Safety IAW NRC Regulations & Requirements ML20216J2421999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to Card Received in Aug 1999,providing Comments on NRC Interim Enforcement Policy Re Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Plants During Y2K Transition.Informs That Naesc Reported Seabrook as Y2K Ready Prior to 990701 ML20216J2471999-09-30030 September 1999 Responds to Which Provided Comments on NRC Interim Enforcement Policy Re Enforcement Discretion for Nuclear Plants During Y2K Transition.Informs That Naesc Reported Seabrook as Y2K Ready Prior to 990701 ML20212K7921999-09-30030 September 1999 Confirms 990922 Telcon with J D'Antonio & T Grew Re Arrangements Made for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Seabrook Facility ML20212J0301999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-10 on 990726-30 & 0809-13.No Violations Noted.Insp Discussed ML20212G5071999-09-21021 September 1999 Submits Complaint to NRC Re NRC Failure to Cite Seabrook Station NPP Operators for Failing to Periodically Calibrate & Establish Adequate Measures to Insure That Relay Equipment Met All Required Calibration Settings Prior to Installation ML20212C1881999-09-20020 September 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Raised Concerns Re NRC Enforcement Actions at Plant & Issuance of NCVs ML20212D1401999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Request to Use Proposed Alternative to Certain Weld Repair Requirements in ASME Boiling & Pressure Vessel Code ML20212B9511999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 for MG Sketchley,License SOP-10685, Along with Supporting Medical Exam Info.Nrc Form 396 Has Been Superceded by Revised Version Dtd 971222,which Was Previously Submitted to NRC on 990812.Encl Withheld ML20212C3621999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Rev 34 to Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan & Rev 85 to Seabrook Station Emergency Response Manual, Per 10CFR50,App E & 10CFR50.4 ML20212B5021999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Licensee Responses to EPA Questions Re Plant Seal Deterrent Barrier.Util Completed Installation of Subject Barriers on All Three Station Offshore Intake Structures on 990818.Barriers Will Preclude Entrapment of Seals ML20211Q8521999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That Rl Couture,License SOP-11027,terminated Employment at Naesco on 990907.Revocation of License Requested ML20211N8781999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Response to 990820 RFI Re NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20211J9291999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards mark-ups & Retypes of Proposed Conforming License Changes Required in Connection with Transfers Being Sought in 990615 Application of Montaup Electric Co & New England Power Co for Transfer of Licenses & Ownership Interests ML20211M3221999-09-0202 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License NPF-86 & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. Corrective Actions:Conducted Prompt Review of Layoff Decision to Determine Relevant Facts DD-99-10, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-10) Expired.Commission Declined Review & Decision Became Final on 990830.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9909021999-09-0202 September 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-10) Expired.Commission Declined Review & Decision Became Final on 990830.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 990902 ML20211J8811999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Seabrook Station Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid)(Version 2).Minor Discrepancies Were Noted.Proposed Changes Are Encl in Order to Correct Discrepancies ML20211J8411999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Updated NRC Form 396 for E Decosta,Nrc License OP-10655-1.Without Encl ML20211G9191999-08-27027 August 1999 Informs NRC That Name of New Company, Ref in Order Approving Application Re Corporate Merger Is Nstar Which Is Massachusetts Business Trust ML20211J0401999-08-26026 August 1999 Responds to 990819 Request,On Behalf of Gr Pageau & Williams Power Corp,For Addl Time in Which to Reply to Nov,Issued on 990803.Response Due to NRC by 991008 ML20211H0651999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-443/99-05 on 990621-0801.One Violation Re Failure to Include Multiple Components within Scope of ISI Test Program Was Identified & Being Treated as NCV, Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20211G7761999-08-24024 August 1999 Expresses Great Concern Re Lack of Enforcement Actions Against Seabrook Station Despite Citations NRC Has Issued for Violations of Seabrook Operating License ML20211J2171999-08-23023 August 1999 Expresses Disappointment with Lack of Enforcement Action Against Seabrook Station Despite Repeated Safety Violations ML20211J4971999-08-21021 August 1999 Submits Comments Re Violations Cited in Early Mar & 990509 Insps ML20211H8361999-08-19019 August 1999 Submits Concerns Re Violations at Seabrook Station ML20211F2681999-08-19019 August 1999 Discusses Former Chairman Jackson & 990602 Predecisional Enforcement Conference Re Findings of Ofc of Investigations Involving Allegations Raised by Contract Electrician.Determined That Allegations Not Supported ML20211J3241999-08-15015 August 1999 Expresses Disappointment in Apparent Failure of NRC to Cite Seabrook Station NPP for Recent Violations of Safety Regulations Uncovered During Recent Insps in Mar & May ML20211J1831999-08-15015 August 1999 Submits Concerns Over Serious Deficiencies at Seabrook Station That NRC Has Declined to Take Enforcement Actions Against ML20210T1601999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That as Result of Staff Review of Licensee Responses to GL 92-01,rev,supp1 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity, NRC Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Is Releasing It as Rvid Version 2 ML20211J2071999-08-13013 August 1999 Expresses Concerns Re Violations Occurring Recently at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.Requests Effort to See That Measures Taken to Stop Flagrant,Continuing Violations That Hold Danger to Workers & Community ML20210S9611999-08-13013 August 1999 Informs That NRC Received Encl Ltr from Pb Johnston Expressing Concern About Certain Impacts on Shareholders of New England Electric Sys with Respect to Nees Proposed Merger with Natl Grid Group ML20210S9511999-08-13013 August 1999 Responds to to Collins Expressing Concerns with Certain Terms of Proposed Merger Between New England Electric Sys & National Grid Group.Nrc Has No Authority to Interject Itself in Nees Merger with National Grid Group ML20210S2001999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 396 in Support of Applications for Renewal of Operator Licenses for Individuals Listed Below. Without Encls ML20210R8401999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20210S7331999-08-11011 August 1999 Submits Third Suppl to 980423 Application to Renew NPDES Permit NH0020338 for Seabrook Station.Suppl Provides Addl Info on Input Streams & Requests Increased Permit Limit for Chemical Used in Makeup Water Treatment Sys ML20210R9581999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards ISI Exam Rept of Seabrook Station, for RFO 6, Period 3,for Insps Conducted Prior to & During Sixth Refueling Outage Concluded on 990510 ML20210Q7441999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Order Approving Indirect Transfer of Control of Canal Interest in Seabrook Station Unit 1 as Requested in Application & SER ML20210R7931999-08-10010 August 1999 Forwards Cycle 7 Startup Rept for Seabrook Station, IAW Requirements of TS 6.8.1.1 ML20210N9421999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That North Atlantic Suggests Listed Revisions to 990730 Draft Revisions to Committee Rept & Order.Further Revs Consistent with What North Atlantic Proposed at 990608 Hearing ML20210N5721999-08-0303 August 1999 Discusses Investigations Rept 1-98-005 Conducted by OI at Naesco,Seabrook Station & Forwards NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $55,000.Violation Re Failure to Promptly Correct Incorrectly Terminated Cables of Control Bldg Air ML20210P3361999-08-0303 August 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept 1-98-005 Conducted by Region I OI at Naesco,Seabrook Station & Forwards Nov.Violations Re Electrical Wiring in Control Panel for Control Bldg Air Conditioning Sys ML20210P3161999-08-0303 August 1999 Discusses Investigation Rept 1-98-005,conducted Between 980129 & 0527 at Seabrook Station & Forwards Nov.Violation Re Discrimination of Williams Power Corp,Contractor of Naesco,Against Electrician for Raising Safety Issues 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217F5841999-10-13013 October 1999 Requests Revocation of License OP-11038-1 for GE Kingsley. Individual Has Been Reassigned to Position within Naesco ML20217F5811999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Insp Data & Naesco Evaluation of a EDG Exhaust Insp Conducted on 990407.Insp Ensured That Unacceptable Wall Thinning Will Not Occur During 40-year Design Lifetime of Sys ML20217B8621999-10-0505 October 1999 Forwards Rev 28,change 1 to EPIP Er 1.1, Classification & Emergencies, Per 10CFR50.54(q).Rev to Procedure Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan ML20217B7471999-10-0101 October 1999 Provides Notification of Change in PCT of More than 50 F,Per Requirements of 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(i),(ii).Tabulation of Large Break LOCA PCT Margin Utilization Applicable to Seabrook Station,Encl ML20212G5071999-09-21021 September 1999 Submits Complaint to NRC Re NRC Failure to Cite Seabrook Station NPP Operators for Failing to Periodically Calibrate & Establish Adequate Measures to Insure That Relay Equipment Met All Required Calibration Settings Prior to Installation ML20212B9511999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 for MG Sketchley,License SOP-10685, Along with Supporting Medical Exam Info.Nrc Form 396 Has Been Superceded by Revised Version Dtd 971222,which Was Previously Submitted to NRC on 990812.Encl Withheld ML20212C3621999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Rev 34 to Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan & Rev 85 to Seabrook Station Emergency Response Manual, Per 10CFR50,App E & 10CFR50.4 ML20211Q8521999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That Rl Couture,License SOP-11027,terminated Employment at Naesco on 990907.Revocation of License Requested ML20211N8781999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Response to 990820 RFI Re NRC Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20211J9291999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards mark-ups & Retypes of Proposed Conforming License Changes Required in Connection with Transfers Being Sought in 990615 Application of Montaup Electric Co & New England Power Co for Transfer of Licenses & Ownership Interests ML20211M3221999-09-0202 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License NPF-86 & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. Corrective Actions:Conducted Prompt Review of Layoff Decision to Determine Relevant Facts ML20211J8411999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Updated NRC Form 396 for E Decosta,Nrc License OP-10655-1.Without Encl ML20211J8811999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Seabrook Station Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid)(Version 2).Minor Discrepancies Were Noted.Proposed Changes Are Encl in Order to Correct Discrepancies ML20211G9191999-08-27027 August 1999 Informs NRC That Name of New Company, Ref in Order Approving Application Re Corporate Merger Is Nstar Which Is Massachusetts Business Trust ML20211G7761999-08-24024 August 1999 Expresses Great Concern Re Lack of Enforcement Actions Against Seabrook Station Despite Citations NRC Has Issued for Violations of Seabrook Operating License ML20211J2171999-08-23023 August 1999 Expresses Disappointment with Lack of Enforcement Action Against Seabrook Station Despite Repeated Safety Violations ML20211J4971999-08-21021 August 1999 Submits Comments Re Violations Cited in Early Mar & 990509 Insps ML20211H8361999-08-19019 August 1999 Submits Concerns Re Violations at Seabrook Station ML20211J3241999-08-15015 August 1999 Expresses Disappointment in Apparent Failure of NRC to Cite Seabrook Station NPP for Recent Violations of Safety Regulations Uncovered During Recent Insps in Mar & May ML20211J1831999-08-15015 August 1999 Submits Concerns Over Serious Deficiencies at Seabrook Station That NRC Has Declined to Take Enforcement Actions Against ML20211J2071999-08-13013 August 1999 Expresses Concerns Re Violations Occurring Recently at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.Requests Effort to See That Measures Taken to Stop Flagrant,Continuing Violations That Hold Danger to Workers & Community ML20210S2001999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 398 & 396 in Support of Applications for Renewal of Operator Licenses for Individuals Listed Below. Without Encls ML20210R8401999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20210R9581999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards ISI Exam Rept of Seabrook Station, for RFO 6, Period 3,for Insps Conducted Prior to & During Sixth Refueling Outage Concluded on 990510 ML20210R7931999-08-10010 August 1999 Forwards Cycle 7 Startup Rept for Seabrook Station, IAW Requirements of TS 6.8.1.1 ML20210K3281999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re License Amend Request 98-17. North Atlantic Concurs with Staff That Bases Should State That Maintaining ECCS Piping Full of Water from RWST to Reactor Coolant Sys Ensures Sys Will Perform Properly ML20210H8991999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Tabulation of Current LBLOCA & SBLOCA Peak Clad Temp Margin Utilization Tables Applicable to Seabrook Station ML20210H0921999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Naesc Semi-Annual Fitness-for-Duty Rept,Jan-June 1999, Per 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Includes Data from 990101- 0610 ML20210S9911999-07-18018 July 1999 Requests NRC Intervene for All Shareholders of New England Electric System & to Help with Merger with National Grid Group & That NRC Petition Security & Exchange Commission to Investigate Matter Relative to No Shareholder Options ML20210A2521999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Rev 33 to Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan & Rev 84 to Seabrook Station Emergency Response Manual ML20209J0601999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Rev 11 to Vols 1-10 of State of Nh Radiological Emergency Response Plan & Vols 11-50 to Town Radiological Emergency Response Plans,In Support of Vermont Yankee & Seabrook Station.Vols 17-19 of Were Not Included ML20209G1351999-07-0909 July 1999 Forwards Relief Request Re Repair Welding on SA-351 Matl to Be Installed in Seabrook Station SW Pumps & SW Cooling Tower Pumps ML20209D2871999-07-0606 July 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02,re Numerical Estimate of Licensing Actions Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 2001.Schedule Does Not Include Activities Which Meet AL Definition of Complex Review ML20209C9021999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Revised Distribution List for Seabrook Station Correspondence to Reflect Current Organization ML20196G2391999-06-23023 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant Encl ML20196G3381999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards LAR 99-19 for License NPF-86,increasing AOT for Cracs from 30 Days to 60 Days on One Time Basis for Each Train to Facilitate on-line Implementation of Design Enhancements During Current Operating Cycle ML20195J0981999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Responses to Questions Posed in Re Application of New England Power Co for Transfer of Control of Licenses NPF-49 & NPF-86.Copy of 1998 Schedule 13G, Included,As Requested ML20196D0561999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Certified Copy of Endorsements 77 & 78 to Nelia to Policy NF-0296 ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20195J1221999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Addl Clarifying Info to Suppl Info Provided at 990602 Predecisional Enforcement Conference at Region I. Proprietary Declarations by Util Employees to Correct Inaccuracies Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210K4971999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Copy of Ltr from Concerned Constitutent AC Menninger from Franconia,Nh to Senator Smith Re Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Y2K Readiness ML20195E9731999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Rev 32 to Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan & Rev 83 to Emergency Response Manual ML20206T4201999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Resolution Adopted by Shareholders of National Grid Group Approving Acquisition of New England Electric Sys & Vote of New England Electric Sys Shareholders Approving Merger with National Grid Group ML20196L2001999-05-0707 May 1999 Forwards Rev 01-07-00 to RE-21, Cycle 7 COLR, Per TS 6.8.1.6.c ML20206K4301999-05-0707 May 1999 Forwards Copy of Corrective Order of Notice by State of Nh Nuclear Decommissioning Financing Committee ML20206J3321999-05-0505 May 1999 Forwards Tabulation of Number of Tubes Plugged in Each of Two SGs Inspected During Sixth Isi,Per Plant TS SR 4.4.5.5a. Sixth ISI Was Completed on 990420 ML20206J3341999-05-0505 May 1999 Informs That on 990501,ISO New England & New England Power Pool Implemented Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market. Summary of Util Action as Result of Implementation of Subject Market,Encl ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders ML20206G4371999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Environ Operating Rept for Seabrook Station.Encl Rept Is Summary of Implementation of EPP for Period of Jan-Dec 1998 ML20206H4801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Seabrook Station. Listed Info Provided in Encls 1999-09-08
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1 North North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation P.O. Box 300 h
? Atlaritic Seabroet, Ni103874 (603) 474-9521 The Northeast Utilities System August i1,1999 Docket No. 50-443 NYN-99075 _
Ref.: AR#99010406 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn.: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Seabrook Station Response to Second Request for AdditionalInfonnation Regarding Generic Letter 95-07,
" Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves" '
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (North Atlantic) has enclosed a response to the second request for additional information regarding Generic Letter 95-07," Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," that was requested via a June 30,1999 letter.
1 Should you have any questions regarding this information, please contact James M. Peschel, Regulatory Compliance Manager, at (603) 773-7194.
Very truly yours, NORTil ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORP.
l M/&c T'ed C. Feigenbaum [ !
Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer 1
cc:
H. J. Miller, NRC Region i Administrator !
J. T. liarrison, NRC Project Manager, Project Directorate 1-2 R. K. Lorson, NRC Senior Resident inspector Q] j 9908170232 990811 ?
PDR ADOCK 05000443 P pm .
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ENCLOSURE I TO NYN-99075 I
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Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 95-07," Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves" l
Request No.1:
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Your August 15,1996, submittal states that the charging pump discharge to the cold leg valves, SI-Vl38 and SI-V139, are not susceptible to pressure locking because a charging pump is operating when the valves receive a signal to open. The staff requests that North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation reevaluat: the potential for valves SI-V138 and SI-V139 to pressure lock in the event that a charging pump is not operating when the valves receive a signal to open and discuss the results of the evaluation.
The evaluation should explain (1) when the valves are sequenced to automatically open in relationship to the automatic restart of a charging pump on a loss of off-site power concurrent with a loss of coolant accident, (2) if there are any pressure locking scenarios where the valves will operate at locked rotor conditions until a charging pump develops full discharge pressure, and (3) if applicable, long-term
, corrective action, and any short-term corrective action to ensure operability, iflong-term corrective action
! is not complete.
The NRC has approved the operation of motor-operated valve motor actuators for approximately I second at locked rotor conditions as acceptable corrective action for Generic Letter (GL) 95-07 because testing performed by Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory (NUREG/CR-6478) demonstrated that the capability of the actuator does not degrade for that period of time. If applicable, explain how long valves SI-V138 and SI-Vl39 would operate at locked rotor conditions. If greater than l
approximately I second, then explain how any reduction in actuator capability due to operation at locked rotor was accounted for or describe any testing that demonstrates that actuator capability will or will not i degrade after operating at locked rotor for greater than approximately I second.
During a telephone conversation conducted on May 20,1999, you stated that you were considering the use of the Commonwealth Edison (Comed) pressure locking thrust prediction methodology to demonstrate that the valves would operate during pressure locking conditions. Comed recommends that, when using its pressure locking thrust prediction methodology, minimum margins should be applied between calculated pressure locking thrust and actuator capability. These margins along with diagnostic equipment accuracy and methodology limitations are defined in a letter from Comed to the NRC dated May 29,1998 (Accession Number 9806040184). The NRC considers the use of the Comed pressure locking methodology an acceptable long-term corrective action provided these margins, diagnostic I equipment accuracy requirements and methodology limitations are incorporated into the pressure locking calculations. If applicable, discuss how you implemented the Comed pressure locking thrust prediction methodology guidelines discussed in the May 29,1998, letter.
Response to Request No.1:
On a loss of offsite power coincident with a safety injection signal, SI-V138 and SI-Vl39 receive a signal to open at the same time that the charging pumps receive a signal to start. This occurs at the first step of the diesel generator sequencer.
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The bonnets of SI-V138 and SI-V139 are susceptible to becoming pressurized. These valves are normally in the close position during operation. The upstream side of the valve is pressurized to the discharge pressure of the operating charging pump (~2400 psig). The downstream side of the valve is pressurized to reactor coolant pressure. If one postulates a large break LOCA coincident with a Loss of Offsite Power, the upstream and downstream pressure could be reduced to approximately 50 psig. North Atlantic's original response credited the upstream pressure recovering to the discharge pressure of the charging pump during the valve opening sequence. This was based on the fact that both of these ,
components receive signals to start at diesel generator sequencer step 1.
Subsequently, the actuators for SI-Vl38 and SI-V139 were replaced with larger actuators (DCR 98-009).
The larger size actuators have additional capability to unseat these valves against a differential pressure, pressure locking scenario. The Commonwealth Edison Pressure Locking Methodology was used to assure that adequate actuator capability exists to unseat a pressure locked valve. Based on this methodology, the calculated thrust to unseat a pressure locked valve under the assumed conditions (2400 psig in the bonnet and 50 psig upstream and downstream) is 17,419 lbf for SI-V138 and 16,445 lbf for SI-V139. These thrust values have compensated for the uncertainty in the peak unseating thrust value.
Additionally, inaccuracy allowances for instrument uncertainty and limit switch repeatability (valves close on limit switch control) were applied to the static peak unseating value. j The Commonwealth Edison methodology adequately predicts the pressure locking forces of valves provided the evaluation considers the usual uncertainties (equipment accuracy, etc.) associated with thrust calculations. The development of this methodology was partially funded by the Westinghouse Owners 1 Group (WOG). The WOG has initiated a project to revisit the Commonwealth Edison pressure locking methodology to assess the appropriate margins / uncertainties to be considered. North Atlantic does not expect the WOG assessment to change the results for the Westinghouse valves, since these valves are !
forged valves and rigidly designed. One Westinghouse valve was tested in the development of the methodology. The pressure locking methodology accurately predicts pressure locking forces for rigid valves.
Presently, North Atlantic does not add a minimum margin value between the predicted pressure locking unseating thrust and the actuator capability. Ilowever, as stated above, the peak unseating thrusts have been adjusted for diagnostic test equipment uncertainty and limit switch repeatability.
North Atlantic retained MPR Associates to review friction data at valve unwedging to determine the mean friction coemeient, standard deviation and a recommended maximum coemeient of friction. At valve unwedging, the recommended maximum friction coemeient based on static test results was 0.120.
Based on dynamic test results the maximum recommended coefficient of friction was 0.117. Therefore, the 0.12 friction coemeient at valve unwedging is an appropriate value to use to determine the actuator derated capability for this condition.
Based on the static test results, the actual measured coemeient of friction at peak unseating for SI-V138 was 0.076 and 0.111 for SI-Vl39. The actuator derated thrust capability based on a 0.12 friction coemcient is:
e 23,845 lbf for SI-Vl38 and e 26,196 lbf for SI-Vl39.
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' The resulting margins for SI-V138 and SI-V139 are as follows: l j
Margin for SI V138 is (23,845 lbf.17,419 lbf)/ ( 17,419 lbf) or 36.9%.
Margin for SI-V139 is (26,196 lbf.16,445 lbf)/ ( 16,445 lbf) or 59.3%.
l c in conclusion, SI-V138 and SI-V139 have adequate derated actuator capability to open under the postulated pressure locking conditions.
Request No. 2:
Your GL 95-07 submittals do not address if the residual heat removal (RilR) to safety injection and
- charging pump suction valves, Ril V35 and Ril-V36, are susceptible to pressure locking. The NRC staff requests that North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation discuss the potential for valves Ril-V35 and Ril-V36 to. pressure lock in the event that (1) the bonnets of these valves become pressurized during shutdown cooling or RilR pump surveillance evolutions, and then required to open later at a lower RiiR pump discharge pressure,(2) if the temperature of these valves' increases when operating the RiiR system
. during a plant.heatup,'and (3) if applicable, long-term corrective action, and any short-term corrective l
action to ensure operability iflong-term corrective action is not complete. ,
During a telephone conversation conducted on May 20,1999, you stated that you were considering the use of the Comed pressure locking thrust prediction methodology to demonstrate that the valves would
- operate during pressure-locking conditions. If applicable and not previously addressed, discuss how you 1 implemented the Comed pressure locking thrust prediction methodology guidelines discussed in the May 29,~ 1998, letter.
Response to Request No. 2:
- Ril-V35 and Ril-V36 are the' RHR cross connect valves to the charging and safety injection pump suctions. ' The bonnets of these valves could potentially become pressurized during shutdown cooling operations. Ilowever, during shutdown cooling operation, one Train of RHR is aligned for shutdown ,
cooling and the other Train is aligned for Emergency Core' Cooling System (ECCS) injection. Therefore, l
- a maximum of one of the bonnets of these valves could be potentially pressurized during shutdown j cooling / plant heat up operation. During shutdown cooling / plant heat up operation the RHR suction pressure could be as high as 365 psig. These valves are not required to open following shutdown cooling l operation / Likewise, during RilR pump surveillance testing, the bonnet pressures of these valves could l increase.' ilowever, during surveillance testing the RHR discharge pressure is significantly less than
- sucti on pressure during shutdown cooling or heat up operation. During Modes I through 4, surveillance testing is performed with the suction aligned to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and the RiiR pump is operated on minimum flow recirculation.- As a result, the bonnet pressure could increase to the RHR pump discharge pressure (approximately?250 psig). Additionally, the valve bonnets have the potential for being pressurized if the RilR to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) check valves leak during normal power operation.
- As part of the transition to ECCS Cold Leg Recirculation, these valves are opened early in the switchover
. process. Both the environment temperature and the bonnet temperature would not have time to heat up j
. appreciably during 'this relatively short period of time and. the bonnet temperature would be at I
l approximately ambient temperature.' Therefore, these valves are not susceptible to temperature induced
- pressure locking. Prior to the cross connect valves opening, one of the RHR cold leg injection isolation Page 3 of 5 ~
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valves, Ril-V14 or Ril-V26, is closed. This action prevents run out of the RilR pumps. The pump )
discitarge pressure during valve opening would be approximately the same as during ECCS injection.
This condition is not susceptible to pressure locking.
In llot Shutdown operation, Mode 4, one Train of RilR is in operation to supra: plant heatup or cooldow n. During this operational alignment, the redundant RilR Train is :n its ECCS injection alignment. Ril-V35 and Ril-V36 are closed in both alignments. The bonnet temperature of the valve in the RilR Train that is used for shutdown cooling would not increase appreciably. Ril-V35 is located approximately 17.5 feet from the RilR discharge header. Ril-V36 is approximately 42 feet from the RilR discharge header. The maximum temperature in the RCS (TAVE ) when the RilR System is used for cooling is 350 F. The branch connection off the RilR discharge header is just downstream of the ,
applicable RIIR beat exchanger. The process temperature is much less than the RCS temperature at this i branch connection. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that these valves are not susceptible to temperature induced pressure locking under these conditions. Ilowever, as stated above, the redundant RilR Train would be in its ECCS Cold Leg Injection alignment. During Ilot Shutdown operation, the ;
valve bonnet of the valve in the operating train could be pressurized to a maximum of approximately 565 psig (365 psig from RCS and approximately 200 psig from RilR pump head).
If the RilR check valves to the RCS leaked, RilR pressure could increase to a maximum pressure of approximately 600 psig. This is the set pressure of the RilR relief valves. This condition should only be temporary, since Operators would attempt to seat the leaking check valves. Seating of the leaking check valves, if this condition existed, should occur at a pressure much less than 600 psig (probably 100 - 200 psig). At this time, Seabrook Station has not experienced leaking RilR check valves that result in significant pressure increase of the RiiR discharge header. If this condition exists, the valve bonnet has 1 the potential of being pressurized to a maximum pressure of 600psig. Upstream pressure when the valve !
is required to open is approximately 200 psig, the RilR pump discharge pressure. Downstream pressure would be RWST pressure, w hich is assumed to be 30 psig.
The Commonwealth Edison Pressure Locking Methodology was used to assure that adequate actuator capability exists to unseat a pressure locked valve for the worst case described above. Based on this methodology, the required thrust to unseat a pressure locked valve under the assumed conditions (600 psig in the bonnet and 200 psig upstream and 30 downstream) is 17,890 lbf for Ril-V35 and 17,129 lbf for Ril-V36.
Both of these valves have been dynamically and statically tested. The open dynamic / static friction coefficients at peak unseating are:
e 0.036/0.086 for RH-V35 e 0.02/0.012 for Ril-V36 Using a 0.12 friction coefficient at peak unseating results in a degraded capability of:
e 18,939 lbf for Ril-V35, and
. 19,128 lbf for Ril-V36.
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' See the response to Request No. I for justification for using a 0.12 coefficient of friction at valve
' . unwddging. - It should be noted that the degraded actuator capability is based on the minimum reduced voltage of 428 volts for Ril-V35 and 430 volts for Ril V36.
- As stated above, North Atlantic does not add a minimum margin value between the predicted pressure i locking unseating thrust and the actuator capability, flowever, the peak unseating thrusts have been adjusted for diagnostic test equipment uncertainty and torque switch repeatability.
The resulting margins for Ril-V35 and Ril-V3f; are as follows: <
l Margin for Ril V35 is (18,939 lbf- 17,890 lbOi (17,890 lb0 or 5.9 %.
Margin for Ril-V36 is (19,128 lbf-17,129 lbO/ (l's,G lb0 or 11.7 %.
Based on the available' margin, Ril-V35 and Ril-V36 have adequate capability to open under the postulated pressure locking conditions.
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