IR 05000348/1990016
| ML20055H427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055H426 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-90-16, 50-364-90-16, NUDOCS 9007260192 | |
| Download: ML20055H427 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES
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g-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N -
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REGION ll
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Ij 101 MARIETTA STREET, N W.
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g ATLANTA, OEORGI A 30323 -
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Report Nos.: 50-348/90-16 and 50-364/90-16
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Licensee': ' Alabama Power Company
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600 North 18th Street
. Birmingham, AL 36291'
Decket Nos.-:
50-348 and 50-364 License-.Nos.: - NPF-2 and NPF-8=
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Facility'name:
Farley 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted: June 11lthrough July 10,,1990-Inspection at Farleyl site near Dothan, Alabama-
g Inspectors:
M.3
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G.T. Pfaxwell,, Senlo sid9fft Inspector
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V8&euf8A WO/98:
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W. W. Viller, Jr., Reside t' ns ctor Date Signed
/b Ph Approved by:
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F. SfTantren Section Chief, Division of =
- D' ate Signed
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Reactor Projects
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-SUMMARY ~
Scope:
This routine onsite inspection involved 'a' review' of operational safety ~
verification, monthly surveillance observation, = monthly maintenance
observation, evaluation of licensee QA program implementation, evaluation of.
licensee's self-assessment, licensee event repo'rts, and - action on. previous
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L inspection findings.
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I Results:
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. Unit 1 ramped down on June 12 to.about 15 percent power to: allow clean-up. of the feedwater system. The feedwater -had;a high cation conductivity measurement
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l which was caused by an inadvertent. injection of a'smalll amount of Freon-22 into the condensate system. The plant was returned to full power on-June 19.
Unit 2 operated at approximately.100 percent reactor power throughout the-
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reporting period.
An evaluation.of the licensee quality assurance program indicates that ' efforts are being made to reduce personne1 ' error and -in general to improve the' site l
maintenance program.
These improvements. included providing training work'
shops for all plant employces to-enhance employee job performance.
Also, the
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site organization has been adjusted to include a new group for maintenance.
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The new group has been tasked to provide more technical evaluation and review for purchasing, maintenance, procedures, equipment reliability, and in general
techn; cal. guidance concerning plant equipment (paragraph 5).
A non-cited licensee identified violation is documented in the report in paragraph 2.b.(1), Service water system did not meet design basis in the event-of a LOSP/ seismic event.
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REPORT DETAILS
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Licensee Employees Contacted
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R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager
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R. M. Coleman, Modification Manager,
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L._W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager.
' S. Fulmer, Supervisor Safety Audit and, Engineering Review
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R. D. Hill, Assistant General Manager,.- Plant Operations D. N. Morey, General-Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant'
C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Operations Manager L. M. Stinson,-Assistant General Manager -' Plant Support i
J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager
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L. S. Williams, Training Manager Other licensee employees contacted' included, technicians, operations _
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personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members. and office personnel.
Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout 'this report are listed in the
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last paragraph.
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Other Inspections:
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Plant Tours The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during-this inspection
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period to verify that the licensee's requirements and' commitments-were being implemented.. These tours were performed to verify that:
systems, valves, and breakers required.for safe plant operations were-in their correct position; fire protection _ equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and' stored properly;. plant operators were aware of the current plant status;. plant operations
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personnel were documenting the status. of. out-of-service equipment;--
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there were no undocumented cases of - unusual ' fluid. leaks, = piping
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vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; all reviewed. equipment requiring calibration-was current; and in general,
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housekeeping was satisfactory.-
Tours of the ' plant included review of, site documentation. and interviews'with plant personnel. The inspectors reviewed the control room operators' logs,: tag out logs, chemistry;and health physics'.
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logs, and control boards and panels.
During these tours the
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inspectors noted that the ~ operators appeared to be alert, aware of changing plant conditions and manipulated plant controls properly.
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The inspectors = evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended _
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shift briefings. - They observed that the briefings and turnover-
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provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew and verified tbt the staffing met the TS requirements.
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Site security:was evaluated by observing personnel in' the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the-proper authori-
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zation to be-in the respective' areas.
The inspectors also verified
that vital area portals.Were kept locked and alarmed.
The security-personnel. appeared to be alert and attentive.to their' duties, and those officers - performing personnel and vehicular searches were-
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thorough-and-systematic.
Responses to security alarm / conditions
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appeared to be prompt and adequate.
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Selected activities of the. licensee's radiological protection program'
were reviewed by tha inspectors. to verify conformance with plant-procedures and L NRC regulatory requirements.
The areas reviewed:
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- operation and management of the plant's health ' physics staff, "ALARA" implementation,- radiation worktpermits for compliance
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to plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observation -of work s
and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation-protection procedures, and control of radioactive materials.-
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b.
Plant Events and Observations
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(1) Service Water System As reported in NRC Report 348,364/89-14, APC0, conducted a
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't self-initiated safety system assessment (SSSA) of the Farley service
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water system.
On June 16, 1989, the licensee determined that sufficient calculations.were not available:to demonstrate that thei
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service water system was capable of maintaining the design flow to
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safety related loads 'in the event of a LOSP, seismic event, or combination of these events.
Compensatory procedure revisions' were
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implemented.to isolate significant service water non-safety related loads upon indication 'of an LOSP or due to a ' service water pipe rupture'during a seismic event.
On September 13, 1989, the licensee briefed NRC Region 11 management
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on the status of the problems-identified 'during the SSSA and_ the proposed corrective actions. The corrective action included detailed analyses and evaluations of the service water system design flow-requirements.
Field flow measurements were also taken to verify that -
the design flows would be available.
The results of the-review l
indicated that the worst-case design condition for the ' service water
L system was a LOSP or a combination LOSP/ seismic event.
Following one
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of these events, sufficient cooling water would be available to-safety related components without operator. action during the first <15 minutes.
However, operator action would be necessary to establish
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sufficient cooling-water flow to the emergency diesel generators
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- after this first~ 15 minutes.- The compensatory measures.previously
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service water to the diesel generators.-
Refer to LER -348/89-04
(Revision 1) for additional information on this problem.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion:III requires measures to'be established to assure applicable regulatory requirements and design basis for safety related system and components are correctly translated into
- procedures and instructions.
The failure to. implement = adequate procedures to assure that the service' water system would meet the -
appropriate design requirements is' a violation.
However, this I
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violation-was ~ identified by the-licensee, reported to the NRC and
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appropriate corrective actions were implemented.
This. violation -
meets the criteria specified' in Section V of the NRC Enforcement'
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' Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation andt is identified as
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Non-cited Violation 348,364/90-16-01,- Service water ' system did 'nct l
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meet design basis in the event of a LOSP/ seismic event.
(2). Freon-22 Leak into Unit 1 Main Feedwater System (
At about 6:30 a.m. on June 12, ~ the shift-supervisor was notified that the' Unit I cation conductivity for main _ feedwater was trending up.
A quick inquiry revealed that maintenance personnel had been testing 1B feedwater_ level transmitter-LT-527.
In an attempt.to try and locate a possible leak in the lines.for LT-527, the technicians
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pressurized the-lines with Freon-22.
Apparently about one pound of freon leaked _ by the isolation valves and ultimately into the main
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feedwater system.
When the Freon-22 (Chlorodifluoromethane) entered l
the feedwater system it dissociated into Chlorine' arJ ' Fluorine, which resulted in the increased cation conductivity readings.-.
The normal cation conductivity for the main = feedwater typically is measured at about.6 micromhos per centimeter.
However, when the Freon-22 entered the system the readings jumpedito a maximum -of about 3.79 micrombos.
Site abnormal operating procedures 11-A0P-25, Condenser Tube Leakage; provides guidance for operations when a high conductivity measurement occurs. - Paragraph 5.3.1 of 1-A0P-35 requires
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that an orderly reactor power reduction.to less than or equal to.35%
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when the measurements exceed 2.0 micromhos..The_ operators began this power reduction at about 8:02 a.m. on June 12,.and began taking the other actions prescribed by 1-A0P-25
.The steam generator main feedwater clean-up operations began-imediately and -continued until about 5:30 p.m. on. June 13, then the plant began a ramp up in power.
While the plant was at low pcwer, a problem _ was experienced. due to the condensate pump 1A motor bearing temperature increase..As a result, the plant was maintained at about 85% power until-the motor was replaced and the pump was returned to service.
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y The performance of---the chemistry staff byl promptly detecting the-increase in ' cation conductivity and. their vigorous ~ efforts in
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tracking the cause of the _ increase and ltheir efforts with the i
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clean-up. activity was.a good example: of a dedicated professional
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staff.
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The licensee has identified the above event invol'ving the: Freon-22
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on incident report IR 1-90-171.
This incident report willitrack-i this -item to assure that thel appropriate corrective action.is taken to reduce the likelyhood of another similar occurrent:e.
(3): Single Switch to Control'Two= Safety. Trains-Recently at another RII nuclear plant the licensee reported that the plant design had allowed the installation of a single switch to-control both electricci. trains for containment spray reset.
Westinghouse evaluated the design and determined that allowing-one-single switch to affect two electrical-trains could potentially.
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violate the-IEEE 279-1968,' Standard for Nuclear. Plant Protection-
Systems.
l The type of switch in question was-identified as a type "0T 2."
The resident -inspectors-evaluated the design. installation-for - Farley Units 1 and 2 and found-that each train for the containment spray
systems have their separate reset-switches. _However, the inspectors-
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were informed by the licensee that engineering ~ is ' evaluating the applicability of = a Westinghouse Bulletin which addressed the potential for the design mis-use-of reset switches.
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I No violations or deviations were identified.
.The results-of the
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inspections in this area indicate that the, program was effective with
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respect to meeting the safety objectives.
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3.
MonthlySurveillanceObservation(61726)
The inspectors witnessed maintenance surveillanceLtest activities - on safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities were performed in-accordance with TS and licensee requirements.- These
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observations included witnessing selected portions of each surveillance,
review of. the surveillance ' procedures to ensure that. administrative-
controls and tagging ' procedures were in force, determining, that. approval
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was obtained. pri.or to conducting the surveillance test, and-the-individuals. conducting the test-were qualified in accordance with:
plant-approved L procedures.
Other observations included ascertaining that
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i test instrumentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the-specified requirements of TS, any identified discrepancies were properly
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noted, and'the systems were correctly returned to service.
The fo' lowing specific activities were-observed:
0-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test ~
0-STP-80.2-Diesel Generator 2C Operability Test
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-1-STP-1.0 Operations Daily: Shift Surveillance Requirements 1-STP-5.0-Full Length Control Rod Operability Test 1-STP-63.3 EQ Area Temperature Monitoring-1-STP-121 Power Range Axial Off-Set Calibration l
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2-STP-23.3 CCW Pump 2C Quarterly IST
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2-STP-63.3-EQ Area Temperature Monitoring 2-STP-80.1 Diesel. Generator 2B Operability Test 0-ETP-3610 Determination of Movable Detector Operating
.f Voltage - Unit 1.
l Surveillance tests 1/2-STP-63.3 indicate' that the-temperature in the main steam. valve rooms exceed _the acceptable level of 104 degrees F.
The licensee's engineering organization is evaluating this problem-to detennine the appropriate action.
This-will continue: to -be monitored as part of the residents routine inspection program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The results of the:
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inspections in this area. indicate -that the program was effective'with
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respect to meeting the safety objectives.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation-(62703)
l The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities to verify the following:.
maintenance -. personnel were obtaining.the appropriate tag' out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities; correct
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documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to sse; procedures were available for all requested parts and material prior to use; procedures were available and adequate for: the-work being conducted; maintenance personnel performin; work ' activities were qualified to accomplish these tasks; activities ~ reviewed.were: not violating any limiting conditions for operation: during the specific
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I evolution; post-maintenance testing activities were completed;.and that equipment was properly returned to service after the completion of work.
activities. Activities reviewed included:
L MWR 197900 Replace agastats for Unit 2 RHR heat exchanger room sump pumps.
MWR 212293 Check breaker for Unit 1 mini-purge exhaust fan using i
procedure EMP-1530.01.
MWR 214249 Installation of 1/4-inch fuel oil. vent line from -
accumulator to vent pipe for diesel generator 2B per PCN 87-2-4394.
MWR 226584 Repair leaking pump discharge valve for motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 1B.
MWR 228913, Correct oil leaks-on diesel generator 1B.
228914,2146808 and 228919
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MWR:228914
. Secure retainer bands for exhaust manifold on; diesel
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MWR 228915 Recalibrate lube oil: sump temperature indicator for diesel i
generator 1B using procedure 1-IMP-226.2.
MWR 229006 Condensate pump 1A motor bearing over heated.- Replaced.
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the motor with a'new motor from spares. -The new motor was tested and the condensate pump was returned to service.
MWR 229009
. Diesel generator IB jacket water inner. cooler heat-exchanger developed a tube leak.
The _ leaking tube was-plugged, the heat ~ exchanger ~' was then pressures tested, flushed, and returned to service.
NWR 229624 Investigate slow start on diesel generator 18 and perform necessary repairs.
WA-00329430 Clean and adjust smoke detectors in auxiliary building in
accordance with procedure EMP-1220.01.
No ' violations or deviations were identified.:
The results of the
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inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective.with respect to meeting the safety objectives.
5.
Evaluation of Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35502)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the. licensee's quality assurance program implementation.
The. evaluation required a review of:
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the evaluation of recent Region II inspection. reports 'and findings; the'
Region II outstanding item list for the Farley plant; the latest Farley-
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SALP report; licensee's corrective actions for NRC and'SAER' findings; and LERs written within the past 12 months. Also, the inspectors interviewed the site supervisor of SAER and evaluated the findings which 'SAER-has
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identified to site management for the past 12 months.
The inspectors reviewed the minutes of meetings which were conducted on or about September 21, 1989 and December,14, 1989-concerning-the design adequacy for Farley. ' The correspondence identified a new comittee,
" Design Adequacy Review Comittee" (DARC) which was formed to provide l
independent verification, recomendations, and improve 'comunications.
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between Southern Company Services,_ Bechtel and Westinghouse.
The independent verifications and recomendations made by this comittee
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cover significant design issues.
Several design-activities were selected.
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by DARC.
The activities were carefully reviewed and several comments and recommendations were made by the members.
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The, resident inspectors noted-that the - issues identified and
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recomendations made by DARC provided APC0 with increased management :
involvement concerning design tasks which may: affect the Farley plant.
The formation of DARC appears.to be = a - positive step by licensee
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management to improve performance in: the area ~of design engineering and'
engineering technical review.
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The site organization has been adjusted 'to' include a new group in the maintenance area.
This new group has~ been chartered-as an' engineering support group for maintenance.
Their tasks'will include such things as:
providing technical guidance for purchasing; technical review of vendor manuals and other guidelines 'tocimprove equipment reliability; and in y
general = provide technical-guidance concerning plant-- equipment - and-components. The licensee increased personnel in the system performance group for:
' trending, probabilistic risk-assessment, configuration _ _
management, and to facilitate resolution of long: term maintenance: problems (i.e.; S.G. issues, dissolved oxygen, -SW, _ thermalo performance). 0utage'
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planning and. daily planning was combined and readjusted to = improve overall~
j coordination of work scheduling'and performance.
TheLtrainingl staff-has been-increased and re-adjusted due to additional: demands by.the operator re-qualification program. The site administrative staff has;been increased to relieve the~ site staff from many of thei_r administrative-duties.-
A review of licensee and NRC. audits and LERs indicates Limprovements.
However, personnel errors still needs management attention.
. Plant management has recognized the need for continued improvement and has provided training work shops for 'all plant employees 1to enhance employee =
job perfomance.
Also, individuals are made more ' accountable for? their job performance, including following procedures.;
Recent plant events involving equipment failures have shown > that
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improvements may be needed in the preventive maintenance. program :at
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Farley.
Specifically, it ! appears that the failure. to. follow vendor maintenance recomendations may have been a factor:1n these equipment failures.
Licensee management states that one of the. tasks of the:new:
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maintenance engineering ^ support organization-willbbe,to evaluate the
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vendors maintenance recommendation and to incorporate-these
recommendations into the preventive maintenance program as' required.
The above observations did not identify any major deficiencies.
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' Evaluation of Licensee's Self-Assessment (40500)
The inspectors attended an SAER post audit conference-on July 6.
Dusing this conference the SAER group presented preliminary inspection findings.
r for audits conducted on-the surveillance. testing program, control of measuring and test equipment and I&C maintenance.-
A total of five potential "noncunpliance" and eight " concern" items were identified..The
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plant management acknowledged a noncompliance item involved with inadequate test equipment deficiency reports on precision tools which
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were found to be-out of calibration ~.
However, plant management did not, y
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precision tools were not calibrated within their specified calibration frequency; independent:
inspections were not performed for a new card being installed in a feedwater
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bypass control cabinet;. surveillance. requirements were not available to demonstrate proper: operation 1 for-design-accident-loading-sequence ; to :
design-1oad= requirements for diesel-generator.1-2A; and functional' testing not being performed -on the hot shutdown panels.- The plant management i
acknowledged the " concern" items and indicated appropriate corrective
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actions would be initiated.
l The1 site SAER group will forward. their, findings to the-. corporate SAER i
manager'for-final review.
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No violations or deviations were' identified in the areas inspected..
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7.
LicenseeEventReports(90714)
The following Licensee Event Report was reviewed for : potential generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information included-in the report meets the NRC reporting requirements and to consider whether the corrective action discussed in; the report appears appropriate.
Licensee actions were reviewed to. verify that the event has been reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the Technical Specifications; that corrective action was taken by the licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety settings and LCOs were not exceeded.
The inspector examined ' the incident' report -~ 1ogs-and records, and.
interviewed selected-personnel.
The following report.is considered
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LER 88-20 Personnel error results in TS action statement i
requirements not. being-met when fire protection systems l
were inoperable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)-
(Closed)
TI 2500/19 Unresolved Safety L Issue A-26, Reactor vessel
pressure transient protection.
This item was_ reviewed and closed in NRC
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Report 348,364/88-19, Refer to this report for details on this item.-
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(Closed)
TI 2515/65, TMI ~ Item I.D.2.2, Plant-safety parameter display system-(SPDS).
The Farley SPDS was reviewed and' inspected on February.
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5-6, 1990 by the NRC/NRR' staff. -This review found that the SPDS met six
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of the eight requirements of NUREG 0737.
The two requirements not met were:
safety status -information is not continuously displayed; and safety status display of the SPDS does not include radioactivity control l
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For details of NRR's_ review refer to NRC'1etter_ of May 30, 1990 to APCO.
For tracking purposes the original item number will be closed and will be identified by NRR with a new tracking number.
Therefore, this item is closed.
(Closed)
TI 2515/65.TMI Item I.D.2.3, Plant-SPDS fully implemented. The licensee has developed procedures and trained operators on the installed -
SPDS.
Plant administration procedures will ~ require the existing SPDS procedures to be revised and additional training to be performed if any modifications are made to the installed SPDS-system.
Therefore, this '
items is closed.
(Closed)
TI 2515'/65 THI Item II.E.4.1.2, Dedicated hydrogen penetrations.
The Farley plant does not use external hydrogen recombiners.
.The post-accident venting system which is a backup system to the electric recombiners is a dedicated purge exhaust system.
Therefore, this TMI action item is not; applicable to Farley and. is.
closed.
(Closed) 'TI 2515/65-TMI. Item II.F.2.4',. Instrumentation - for detection of '
inadequate core cooling.
The licensee has installed a reactor. vessel
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level monitoring system and has upgraded : the reactor core exit
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thermocouple cables and subcooling margin monitor.
These'are described
in FSAR Section 7.5.4 and meet the NRC requirements of NUREG 0737 Section
II.F.2.
The NRC/NRR review of this item is documented in 'NRC SER
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NUREG-0117, Supplement 5 to NUREG-75/034.
Therefore, this item is
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(Closed)
TI~2515/65 TMI Item-II.K.3;1.B. Final recommendations, B; and 0 t
task force - automatic PORV isolation valve.
The licensee provided' a
.l justification for not installing this valve. This was reviewed and found
acceptable by the NRC/NRR.
For. details refer to NRC letter to APCO of
September 23, 1983.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) TI 2515/65 TMI Item. III.D.3.4.3, Control.' room habitability -
implement modifications.
The'_ licensee determine that no changes were-
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required for the. control room complex to meet :the requirements of NUREG
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0737.
This was reviewed and found acceptable'by.NRC/NRR.
Refer to NRC'
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SER, NUREG-0117, Supplement 5 to NUREG 75-034' of March 1981 for details;
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 348,364/89-14-02, Licensee's -re-evaluation of service water system for adequacy of design.
LERt 348/89-04 ' provides additional -information-on this licensee identified -violation.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's: corrective action listed in the
'LER, including the revision of appropriate procedures, had been accomplished.
However, this item meets the criteria of - the NRC
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Enforcement Policy ~ for licensee-identified violhtions for which a " Notice of Violation" is not-issued.
Therefore, as_ discussed ir, above paragraph
= 2.b this item is closed and is reclassified as a non-cited violation.
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(Closed) Inspector: Followup Item -348,364/89-31-01, Revise service water IST procedures to indicated location pump vibration readings are to be
.taken.
Procedures-1/2-STP-24.1 and 2:have'been revised to stipulate'the location that IST vibration readings are to be taken from..Therefore,
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this item is closed.
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9.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings: were. summarized duringcmanagement interviews throughout the report period, and on July 10,'with the plant
manager and selected members of his staff.
The inspection findings were
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discussed in-detail. 'The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings-
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i and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. '
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i STATUS ITEM NO.
. DESCRIPTION l
Open/Close 348,364/90-16-01 Non-cited Violation: Service:
water system didinot meet-design
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basis in 'the event of a
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LOSP/ seismic event paragraph
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2.b.(1).
Licensee was informed that the items discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 ~were closed.
10. Acronyms and Abbreviations
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AFW -
Auxiliary Feedwater AOP Abnormal Operating Procedure
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Administrative Procedure AP
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APC0 -
Alabama Power Company CFR Code of Federal Regulations
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CVCS -
Chemical and Volume Control System CCW Component Cooling Water
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DC Design Change
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ECP Emergency Contingency Procedure
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EIP Emergency Plant-Implementing Procedure
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Environmental Qualifications EQ
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Engineered Safety Features ESF
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EWR Engineering Work Request
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F Fahrenheit
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Gallons Per Minute GPM
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ISI -
Inservice Inspection IST -
Inservice Test
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Limiting Condition'for Operation-LER Licensee Event Report
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LOSP -
Loss of.0ffsite Power Event MOV -
Motor-0perated Valve MOVATS - Motor-Operated Valve Actuation' Testing MWR
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Maintenance Work Request
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NCR Nonconformance Report
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NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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hRR NRC Office of Nucicar Reactor Regulation
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PMD Plant Modifications Department
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RCP -
Radiation Control and' Protection Procedure RCS-Reactor Coolant System
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SI Safety Injection
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SAER -
Safety Audit and Engineering Review SALP -
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Report SSPS -
Solid State Protection System SPDS -
-Safety Perameter Display System STP Surveillance Test Procedure
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TS Technical Specification
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TMI Three Mile Island-
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TSC Technical Support Center l
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WA Work Authorization i
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