IR 05000348/1987017

Insp Repts 50-348/87-17 & 50-364/87-17 on 870710-0818. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Previous Enforcement Matters,Operational Safety Verification, Surveillance,Observation & Monthly Maint Observation

ML20238A412
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	09/01/1987
From:	Bradford W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20238A355	List: IR 05000348/1987017 ML20238A352 ML20238A379
References
50-348-87-17, 50-364-87-17, CIVP-S-017, CIVP-S-17, NUDOCS 8709090282
Download: ML20238A412 (8)

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pr. atoo UNITED STATES  ;

p 'o blUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 g -

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p HEGION li 101 M AFilETT A ST REET, g j

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9 . . . . . ,o Report o /87-17 and 50-364/87-17 Licensee: Alabama Power Company t 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291 o Docket Hos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. : NPF-2 and NPF-8

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Facility name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: July 10 - August 18, 1987 Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama Inspectors:N/bA4ckftrt -/ 87 W.H.Bradforp Date Signed

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&{Mi $.D}<t W. er, f. t0tM / { 2]n] Date Signed Approved by: // 07 v 4Lb -

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$v H. C./ Dance, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, onsite inspection involved a review of: previous enforce-ment matters, operational safety verification, surveillance, observation and monthly maintenance observatio Results: One procedural violation with three examples was identified:

Technical Specification Amendment #62 for Unit 2 was not implemented within the specified time, failure to follow procedure and use of an inadequate past maintenance test procedur .6 PI O

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L REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted:

J. D. Woodard, General Plant Mcnager l

D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager R. D. Hill, Operations Manager C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager B. Moore, Operations Supervisor J. E. Odom, Operations Unit Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor T. H. Esteve Planning Supervisor J, B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personne . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on August 17, 1987, with the general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the viola-tions identified in Paragraph The licensee did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 348, 364/87-07-01, Inadequate Number of Fire Brigade Drills Conducted During 198 Procedure FLP-0-TCP-17.21, Fire Brigade Initial / Retraining Program Implementation has been issued to describe the plant's brigade training program. This procedure requires a fire brigade  ;

drill schedule to be established for at least six drills per quarter with each operating crew required to participate in at least one drill per quarte The drills are also required to be documented as a training record. The licensee's records were reviewed and indicated that between January 1 and July 8,1987, a total of 30 fire brigade drills had been conducted of which at least 6 drills were conducted per quarte Imple-mentation of Procedure FLP-0-TCP-17.21 should essure that a sufficient number of quarterly fire brigade drills will be conducted in the future.

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, OperationalSafet/ Verification'rf, i Plant Operayfons Revieh (75707)

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The inspectors obs4rved control room operations, reviewed n plicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period. Also, the operability of selected emergency. systems

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was verified 7 tagout records reviewed and proper re'. urn to service of i

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affected components was verified. Tours of the auxiliary ' building, diesel buildinge, turbine building. and service water structure were conducted to observe plant equipment conditior.s, including fluid o leaks and excessive vibretions and general housekeeping efforts. The i verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation','vat ve positions, switch positions, accesstole hydraulic snubbers, hnc'c review of. ' completed logs, records, and

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chemistry results. The licensee's compliance with LCO actiott state- '

ments were reviewed as events occurred.

. The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain ' licensee I management.-and observed various shift turnovers between shift

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supervisor; shift fe emen and licenseo operators. These ce'e tings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testingi activities in progress, as well as discus? ions of significant problem !

The following procedur~.1 discrepancies were identifie (1) No Procedure ,for Containme,nt Penetratic s Overcurrent Protective Device / >

During a review of the Unit 2 Limiting Condition for Operation 4 (LCO) Yog data the inspectors noted that plant precedures were T j - not available to id9ntify the containment penetration conductor byercurrent protective I! vices which vere requi red to be

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de-energized or energizcd under administrative controls by Unit 2 Technical Specification -(TS) Section 3.8.3.1. Amend-ment 62 to Unit 2 TS, issued April 10, 1987, deleted Table 3.8.1, Containment.. Penetration Conductor Overeurrent Protective Devices, from the;TSand the TS Bcses Section 3/4.8.3. states that tabulation of- the required containment penetration

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J conductor overcurrent nrotection'c'evices will be contained in lj plant yrocedures which are 4ontrolled in accordance with 10 CFR

'" 50.59;, he f ailure to estab1!sh and implement this procedure as j

, requi dd'within 30 days upon receipt of the license amendment is  !

' identified as violation 348,'364/87-17-0 ,

(2) Failure to Follow Operational Procedure . On July 24, 1987 between 8.00 a.m. an& 10:00 a.m., the resident inspector witnessed the surveillance tests performed by proce-

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dure 1-STP-33.0B, Solid State Protection System Train E Operability Tes This test was satisfactorily accomplished

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exc.ept, the plant operator performing the test did not follow l the prescribed test sequence as required by Section 4.5 of procedure 1-STP-33.0 The operator did not enter the trip breaker and bypass trip breaker rount numbers into the surveil-lance test data book located within the control room and verified that the counter numbers hau increased since the last entry as required by procedure section 5.7.11 until all of the procedure steps had been completed. This failure to follow procedure is another example of violation 348, 364/87-17-0 (3) Failure to Follow Approved Procedure One June' 18, 1987 during the performance of STP 80.10 " Diesel Generator 2C 1000KW Load Rejection Test", the licensee found an electrical problem in which 2C diesel generator would not have non-essential (NEEP) engine protection when aligned to 2B batte ry . (See unresolved Item 348-364/87-14-03). If 2C diesel generator was aligned to 2B battery an electrical circuit path was provided between the positive (+132VDC) of 18 battery to the negative (-132VDC) of 2B batter There was no voltage potential to operate the NEEP relays for 2C D/G. The 2C'or .'B diesel generators were capable of performing emergency startit g and operation. The cause of the problem was a wiring error in termination cabinet 38B on ITB1-37. The correct point of termination should have been to 2TB1-37. The error was made while performing PCN SE-81-909 under MWR 111291 which modified the control circuitry to prevent the diesel generator from motorin The licensee did not perform adequate testing of the diesel generator after completion of the modification to ensure the modified eouipment would perform as designed, as required by AP-52. This is another example of violation 348,364/87-17-0 Radiological Protection Program (71709)

Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Prooram were reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC regulatory Requirement The areas reviewed included the organization and management of the plant's health physics staff; "ALARA" implementation; Radiation Work Permits (RWP's)

for compliance to. plant procedures; personnel exposure records; observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures; ano control of radioactive material Physical Security Program (71881)

The licensee's compliance to the approved security plan was reviewed by the inspector The inspectors verified by observation and interviews with security force members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements.

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Areas inspected included: organization of the sec'urity force; establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones; access control; and, badging procedure Except as noted above, no' additional violations or deviations were identi-fied wi ..in the areas inspecte .5. Surveillance Observation (61726)

Portions of the following surveillance inspections and tests required by the Technical Specifications were witnessed, observed or reviewed by the inspectors:

STP-3 Containment Inspection (Post Maintenance) Appendix 1 STP-33.0A - Solid State Protection System Train A Operability Test STP-33-0B -

Solid State System Train B Operability Test STP-33.18 -

Safeguards Test Cabinet Train B Functional Test STP-108 -

Incore Thermocouple STP-110 -

Determination of Limiting Hot Channel Factors STP-121 - Powar Range Axial Offset Calibration STP-60 Containment Tendon Surveillance Test No violations or deviat'ons were identifie The inspectors verified that the surveillance were performed in accord-ance with adequate procedures; instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions were met; test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and personnel conducting the tests were qualifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed / reviewed the following maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standarc3, and were in conformance with Technical Specifications:

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B Diesel Generator oil pump seal replacement.

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Replacement of splices (terminations) from T-95 splice material to Raychem shrinkable; splice kits on Units 1 and 2 solenoid valves on the auxiliary feedwater system; 15 motor operated valves on Unit 1 and 2; and 10 fan motor terminations on each uni Items considered during the review included: verification that limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were 'obtained prior to initiating the work; approved procedures were used; comp;eted work was inspected a3 applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; and, radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were also reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect systam performanc No discrepancies were identified except for maintenance activities associated with re-terminating electrical leads to solenoid operated valves, motor operated valves, and electrical leads to motors associated with containment building hydrogen mixing and containment building coolin The inspection and repair work done inside the reactor containment buildings was completed under adverse personnel environmental condition The repair parties were subjected to temperatures up to 139 F. The work was well planned ir, that personnel exposure was limited to 40 to 50 mrem per entry. All personnel wore ice vests and the stay time was limited to 25-30 minutes due to heat stres The inspectors observed and/or reviewed certain completed work packages to determine that work was completed in accordance with the procedure, that post maintenance testing was completed and acceptabl On August 9, 1987, the licensee reduced power on Unit 1 to 37% to complete the inspection and re work on the motor splices. On Auguct 14, 1987 power was increased to full load. On August 14, 1987 power was reduced to 37% on Unit 2 for inspection and rework of the motor splices. On August 19, 1987 power was increased to full loa This is described in paragrcph 6a, 6b and 6 Re-termination of electrical leads to solenoid operated valve On July 21, 1987 the licensee notified the resident inspector of a possible nonconformance in the environmental qualifications of 125 Cdc splices utilized in certain environmentally qualified air operated valves. The licensee identified a total of 84 affected solenoid valves on each uni Of the 84 solenoid valves, 62 are de-energized to perform their accident mitigation function and 22 are energize The licensee has performed a justification for continued

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operatio.n (JCO) evaluation for the 22 solenoid valves. The inspec-tors reviewed the JCO's and attended the Plant Operations Review Committee [PORC) meeting in which each JC0 was evaluated and approved by the POR The licensee initiated a program to change out the as found termina-tion on solenoid valves pertaining to the auxiliary feed water valves and the RCS sample valves. These SOV's are accessible and could be worked separately under administrative Limiting conditions for operations (LCO's).

The old terminations / splices were pigtail type connections. The two leads were bolted together to form a solid connection. They were then wrapped tightly with insulating tape (okonite T-95) and in most cases were covered with T-35 tape for jacke The insulating tape wrap measured approximately 4/32 to 5/22 inch thick. The inspectors observed the performance of a portion of the work on Unit 1 auxiliary feed pump SOV's located in Unit 1 main steam valve room. The old splices (terminations) were replaced by inline splices using Raychem splice kits which are environmentally qualified splices. The splices are all located inside condule Each solenoid valve was re-worked under separate maintenance work request (MWR) which included work sequence under separate but attached referenced instructions. The work sequence contained step by step instructions with sign off verification of appropriate step The inspection was done using FN0-0-ETP-4250. Each splice inspection is documented which includes com;1eted splice physical dimension Of the 22 energized solenoids: 11 are in the auxiliary feed water system and have been replaced; 6 solenoids associated with the main steam isolation valves; I with the component cooling water thermal barrier; and 4 solenoids associated with the pressurizer power operated relief valves. These will be replaced during the next unit outag The solenoids that are de-energized are in a fail safe condition and will be replaced on a subsequent outag This item is unresolved pending completion of the solenoid splices, and further review by the NRC (348-364/87-17-01). Re-termination of electrical leads to motor operated valves (MOV's).

The licensee identified 104 MOV's on each unit which may require l

re-work with Raychem splices to assure environmental qualification.

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The licensee has developed a JC0 evaluatio The inspectors have reviewed the JCO.

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. 7 The licensee initiated inspection and re work on M0'V's which are required to reposition at approximately 5 minutes or longer after an e/ent. There were 3 MOV's per Unit (A and B hydrogen dilution valves and containment vent path valve to R-11 and R-12) which were inspected and repaired. Since these MOV's have been re-worked the licensee has continued to re-work splices to approximately 15 MOV' The MOV's which cann:t be re-worked during power operation will be completed during the next refueling outag This item is unresolved pending completion of the MOV splices and further review by the NRC (348-364/87-17-02).

' Re-termination of electrical power leads to fan motors inside Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment building The licensee determined that the electrical connections to the following fan motors, located inside the reactor containment building, may not meet environmental qualification (1) Reactor cavity hydrogen diluation fans (2 per Unit)

(2) Hydrogen mixing fans (4 per Unit)

(3) Containment cooling fans (4 per Unit)

Between August 9-19, 1987 the licensee inspected the motor lead terminations and replaced with environmentally qualified Raychem splice This item is unresolved pending further review by the NRC (348-364/

87-17-03).

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p UNITED STATES

% gp *foug'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g [" n REGIOMil j io1 MARIETTA STREET, *I t ATLANTA, G EoRGI A 30323

\,******/ '8EP01 y; Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 Alabama Power Company ATTN: Mr. R. P. Mcdonald Senior Vice President P. O. Box 2641 Birmingham, A!. 35291-0400 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-348/87-17 AND 50-364/87-17)

This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted by W. H. Bradford on July 10 - August 18, 1987. The inspection included a review of activities authorized for your Farley facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection repor Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representatives records, intervMws with personnel, and observation of '

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activities in progres The inspection findings indicate that certain activities appeared to violate NRC requirements. The violation, references to pertinent requirements, and elements to be included in your response are described in the enclosed Notice of Violatio Your attention is invited to unresolved items identified in the inspection repor These matters will be pursued during future inspection In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact u

Sincerely, kJ >,

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D id M. V rrelli, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

(See page 2)

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Alabama Power Company 2 .SEP 01 1987 Enclosure:

Notico of Violation

REGION li g j 101 MARIETTA STREET. ** 2 ATLANTA, GEoAGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-348/87-17 and 50-364/87-17 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and N?F-8 Facility:name: Farley l' and 2 Inspection Conducted: July 10 - August 18, 1987 Inspection.at Farley. site near Dothan, Alabama Inspectors: b b A4 - / - Tf 7 W.H.Bradfory Date Signed-Id Y 0 Ant 0N (?lrt] h / 59 W. H.~ Mi er, / Date Signed Approved by: 4/n7 4v1.~. 7 - @-/-87 Q H. C./ Dance, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: .This routine, onsite inspection involved a review of: previous enforce-ment matter _s, operational safety verification, surveillance, observation and monthly maintenance observatio Results: One procedural violation with three examples was identified:

Technical Specification Amendment #62 for Unit 2 was not implemented within the specified time, failure to follow procedure and use of an inadequate past maintenance test procedure.

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, REPORT DETAILS' Licensee Employees Contacted:

J.- D. Woodard,. General Plant Manager D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager W. D. Shipman,- Assistant General Plant Manager R. D.' Hill, Operations Manager C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager L. W. Enfinger,' Administrative Manager B. Moore, Operations Supervisor J. E. Odom, Operations Unit Supervisor B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit' Engineering Review Other, licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personne . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management

' interviews throughout the report period and on August 17, 1987, with the general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the viola-tions identified in Paragraph The licensee did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 348, 364/87-07-01, Inadequate Number of Fire Brigade -

Drills Conducted During 1986. Procedure FLP-0-TCP-17.21, Fire Brigade Initial / Retraining Program Implementation has been issued to describe the plant's brigade training program. This procedure requires a fire brigade drill schedule to be established for at least six drills per quarter with each operating crew required to participate in at least one drill per quarte The drills are also required to be documented as a training I

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record. The licensee's records were reviewed and indicated that between January 1 and July 8, 1987, a total of 30 fire brigade drills had been conducted of which at least 6 drills were conducted per quarter. Imple-mentation of Procedure FLP-0-TCP-17.21 should assure that a sufficient number of quarterly fire brigade drills will be conducted in the futur I i

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~ Operational Safety Verification Plant Operations Review (71707)

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The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period. Also, the operability of selected emergency -systems was verified, tagout records reviewed and proper return to service-of-affected components was verified. Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building, turbine building and service water structure were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks'and excessive vibrations and general housekeeping efforts. The verifications were accomplished by direct ' observation of monitoring

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instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible hydraulic snubbers, and ' review of ' completed logs, records, and chemistry results. The licensee's compliance with LCO action state-ments were reviewed as events occurre The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisor, shift foremen and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing activitins in progress, as well as discussions of significant problem The following procedural discrepancies were identifie (1) No Procedure for Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protective Device During a review of the Unit 2 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) log data the inspectors noted that plant procedures were not available to identify the containment penetration conductor

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overcurrent protective devices which were required to be de-energized or energized under administrative controls by Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.8.3.1. Amend-ment 62 to Unit 2 TS, issued April 10, 1987, deleted Table 3.8.1, Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices, from the TS and the TS Bases Section 3/4.8.3. states

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that tabulation of the required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection devices will be contained in plant procedures which are controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The failure to establish and implement this procedure as required within 30 days upon receipt of the license amendment is 1dentified as violation 348, 364/87-17-0 (2) Failure to Follow Operational Procedure On July 24, 1987 between 8.00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. , the resident inspector witnessed the surveillance tests performed by proce-dure 1-STP-33.08, Solid State Protection System Train B Operability Tes This test was satisfactorily accomplished w -

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3-exc.ept, -the plant operator performing the test did not fol. low the prescribed test sequence as - required by Section' 4.5 o procedure 1-STP-33.0 The operator did not enter the trip breaker and bypass trip breaker count numbers into the surveil-lance test data book located within - the control room and verified that the counter numbers had increased since the last

, entry as _ required by procedure section 5.7.11 until all of the procedu'e steps had been completed. This failure to follow procedure'is another example of' violation 348, 364/87-17-04.

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(3) Failure to Follow Approved Procedures.

1 One June 18,.1987 during the . performance of STP 80.10 " Diesel Generator 2C.1000KW Load Rejection Test", the licensee found an electrical problem in which 2C diesel generator would riot have non-essential (NEEP) engine protection when aligned to 2B battery. (See unresolved Item 348-364/87-14-03). If 2C diesel'

. generator was aligned to 2B battery an electrical circuit path was provided between the positive (+132VDC) of 1B battery to the-negative (-132VDC) of 2B batter There was no voltage potential to operate the NEEP relays for 2C D/G. The 2C'or IB diesel generators Wre capable of performing emergency starting and operation. The cause of the problem was a wiring error in termination cabinet 38B on 1'B1-37. The correct point of termination should have been ta 2TB1-37. The error was made while performing PCN SE-81-909 under tiWR 111291 which modified the control circuitry to prevent the diesel generator from motorin The licensee did not perform adequate testing of the diesel generator after completion of the modification to ensure the modified equipment would perform as designed, as required by AP-52. This is another example of violation 348,364/87-17-0 Radiological Protection Program (71709)

Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Program were reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant proceduras and NRC regulatory Requirement The areas reviewed includeu the organization and management of the plant's health physics staff; "ALARA" implementation; Radiation Work Permits (RWP's)

for compliance to plant procedures; personnel exposure records; observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to veri fy compliance to radiation protection procedures; and control of radioactive materials, Physical Security Program (71881)

The licensee's compliance to the approved security plan was reviewed

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by the inspector The inspectors verified by observation and L interviews with security force members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirement _ ___ 1 _ _-- _-- .__ _

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Areas inspected included: organization of the security force; establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones; access control; and, badging procedure Except as noted above, no additional violations or deviations were identi-fied within the areas inspecte . Surveillance Observation (61726)

Portions of the following surveillance inspections and tests required by the Technical Specifications were witnessed, observed or reviewed by the inspectors:

STP-3 Containment Inspection (Post Maintenance) Appendix 1 STP-33.0A -

Solid State Protection System Train A Operability Test STP-33-08 - Solid State System Train B Operability Test STP-33.1B -

Safeguards Test Cabinet Train B Functional Test STP-108 - Incore Thermocouple STP-110 - Determination of Limiting Hot Channel Factors STP-121 -

Power Range Axial Offset Calibration STP-60 Containment Tendon Surveillance Test No violations or deviations were identifie The inspectors verified that the surveillance were performed in accord-ance with adequate procedures; instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions were met; test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and personnel conducting the tests were qualifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed / reviewed the following maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and were in conformance with Technical Specifications:

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B Diese' Generator oil pump seal replacemen *

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Replacem.ent of splices (terminations) .from T-95 splice material to Raychem shrinkable; splice kits on Units 1 and 2 solenoid valvas on the . auxiliary feedwater system; 15- motor operated valves on Unit .1 and 2; and 10 fan motor terminations on each uni Items considered during the review included: verification that limiting conditions for - operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were 'obtained prior to initiating the-work; approved procedures were usea; comp.leted work was inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control. records were-maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; and, radiological and fire prevention controls _were implemented. Work requests were also reviewed to determine

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the status of outstanding jobs to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system' performanc No discrepancies- were identified except fer maintenance activities

associated with~ re-terminating electrical leads to solenoid operated valves, motor operated valves, and electrical leads to motors associated with -containment building hydrogen mixing and containment building coolin The inspection and _ repair work done inside the reactor conta!nment buildings was completed under adverse personnel environmental condition The repair parties were subjected to temperatures up to 139 The work was well planned in that personnel exposure was limited to 40 to 50 mrem per entry. All personnel wore ice vests and the stay time was limited to 25-30 minutes'due to heat stres a The inspectors observed and/or reviewed certain completed work packages to-determine that work was completed in accordance_ with the procedure, that post maintenance testing was completed and acceptabl On August 9, 1987, the licensee reduced power on Unit 1 to 37% to complete the inspection and re work on the motor-splices. On August 14, 1987 power was increased to full load. On August 14, 1987 power was' reduced to 37% on Unit 2 for inspection and rework of the motor splice's. On August 19, 1987 )

power was increased to full loa This is described in paragraph 6a, 6b and 6 Re-termination of electrical leads to solenoid operated valve On July 21, 1987 the licensee notified the resident inspector of a possible nonconformance in the environmental qualifications of 125 Cdc splices utilized in certain environmentally qualified air operated valve The licensee identified a total of 84 af f ected solenoid valves on each unit. Of the 84 solenoid valves, 62 are de-energized to perform their accident mitigation function and 22 are energized. The licensee has performed a justification for continued i

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,operatio.n (JCO) evaluation for the 22 solenoid valves. The. ins,-

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tors : reviewed the 'JC0's and' attended the Plant ' Operations Review '

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Committee (PORC) meeting.in which each JC0 was evaluated and approved by the POR i The licensee' initiated a program to change out the as found termina-tion on' solenoid ' valve's pertaining to the auxiliary feed water. valves-and- the RCS sample valves. These S0V's are accessible and could be worked separately under administrative Limiting ' conditions for operations (LCO's).

The old terminations / splices were pigtail type connections. The two leads were bolted together to form a solid connection. They were then wrapped tightly with insulating tape (okonite T-95) and in most cases were covered with T-35 tape. for jacke The insulating tape wrap measured approximately 4/32 to 5/32 inch thick. The inspectors observed the performance of a portion of the work on Unit 1 auxiliary feed pump. 50V's located in Unit 1 main steam valve.' room. The old:

splices (terminations) were replaced by inline splices using Raychem splice kits which are environmentally qualified splices. The splices-are all located'inside condule Each solenoid -valve was re werked under separ. ate maintenance work request (MWR) which included work sequence under separate but o attached referenced instructions. The work sequence contained step i by st g instructions with sign off verification of appropriate step The inspection was done using FNO-0-ETP-4250. Each splice inspection is documented which includes completed splice physical dimension Of the 22 energized solenoids: 11 are in the auxiliary feed water system and have been replaced; 6 solenoids associated with the main steam isolation. valves; I with the component Noling water thermal barrier; and 4 solenoids associated with t'1e pressurizer power operated relief valves. These will be replaced during the next unit outag The solenoids that are de-energiztid are in a fail safe condition and will be replaced on a subsequent outag s

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This item is unresolved pending completion of the solenoid splices, and further review by the NRC (348-364/87-17-01). Re-termination of electrical leads to motor operated valves (MOV's).

The licensee identified 104 MOV's on each unit which may require re-work with Raychem splices to assure environmental qualificatio The licensee has developed a JC0 evaluation. The inspectors have reviewed the JC *

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.. The ' licensee initiated inspection and re-work on M0'V's which are required to reposition at approximately 5 minutes or longer after an event. There were 3 M0V's per. Unit (A and B hydrogen dilution' valves and containment vent path valve to R-11 and R-12) which were inspected'and repaired. Since these M0V's have 'been re-worked the licensee has continued to re-work splices to approximately 15 MOV' The M0V's which cannot be re-worked during power operation will be -

c'ampleted.during the next refueling outag This .. item is. unresolved pending completion of the MOV splices and further. review by the NRC (348-364/87-17-02), Re-termination of electrical power leads to fan motors inside Unit I and Unit 2 containment building The licensee determined that the electrical connections to the fc11owing fan motors, located inside the reactor - containment building, may not meet environmental qualification y :

(1). Reactor cavity hydrogen diluation fans (2 per Un'i}) .

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(2) ' Hydrogen mixing fans (4 per Unit). .

(3) Containment cooling fans (4 per Unit) g Between August 9-19, 1987 the licensee inspected the motor lead terminations and replaced with environmentally qualified Raychem splice This item is unresolved pending further review by. the NRC (348-364/

87-17-03).

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