IR 05000348/1987009
| ML20214U304 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1987 |
| From: | Blake J, Hallstrom G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214U258 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-87-09, 50-348-87-9, 50-364-87-09, 50-364-87-9, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, NUDOCS 8706110135 | |
| Download: ML20214U304 (14) | |
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p urug'o UNITED STATES j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p
f REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
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Report Nos.:- 50-348/87-09 and 364/87-09 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North'18th Street
Birmingham, AL 35291-0400 Docket Nos.: 50-348fand 50-364 License Nos.:
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Facility Name:
Farley-Inspection Conduc ed: April 6-10, 1987 Inspector:
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Approved by:
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J.-). E}laie," Chief
,Dit( Signed M (er 61s and Processes Section vi on of Reactor Safety SUMMARY-
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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site in the areas of pump and valve inservice testing (IST) program. review, (Units 1 & 2),
procedures review (Units 1 & 2), observation of work activities (Unit 2) and data review (Units 1 & '2).
Also examined were licensee actions on previous enforcement matters (Units 1 & 2).
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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I 8706110135 870604
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PDR ADOCK 05000348 G
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y REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. D. Woodard, Plant Manager
- W. B. Shipman, Assistant Plant Manager - Plant Support
- D. N. Morey, Assistant Plant Manager - Plant Operations
- B. W. Vanlandingham, Unit Supervisor..
- L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager
- C L. Buck, Plant Modifications Engineering Supervisor
- R. G. Berryhill, Performance and Planning Manager
- R. M. Coleman, Systems Performance Supervisor
- D. B. Hartline, Generating Plant Engineering Supervisor
- R. V. Badham, Generating Plant Engineer
- W. D. Oldfield, Generating Plant Engineer
- H. R. Garland, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager J. Deavers, Unit Shift Supervisor R. Chandler, Unit Operator R. Sanders, Maintenance Foreman D. J. Sou'herland, Maintenance Foreman Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organization C. G. Ward, Kemper Insurance, Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII)
NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. H. Bradford, Senior Resident Inspector
- B. Bonser, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 10, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The following new j
item was identified during this inspection.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (UNR) 50-348, 364/87-09-01, Adequate Conformance to Administrative Procedures, paragraph 7.a.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
a.
(Closed)
Deficiency 50-348/80-16-01 and 364/80-19-02, Hanger Modification Procedure This item concerned a discrepancy in records for the repair of Unit 1 chemical and volume control system support CVC-R254.
The repair required installation of a new baseplate and four concrete expansion anchors. The Production Change Notice (PCN No.79-409, Rev. 337)
and Construction Work. Request (CWR No. 1-80-9110) to accomplish the repair inadvertently omitted reference to Procedure FNP-1-GMP-43, Appendix D for installation and inspection of the anchor bolts.
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anchor bolts were installed and inspected in accordance with procedure FNP-1-GMP-43. However, the QC inspector had marked the attendant data sheet " test information only" since the scope of FNP-1-GMP-43 was limited to concrete anchors on existing baseplate and the repair required anchor bolts on new baseplate.
Alabama Power Company's (APCO's) letter of response, dated August 12, 1980, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
The inspector examined the corrective actions as stated in the response. This examination included verification of:
Correction of the data sheet for hanger CVC R254.
Revision of FNP-1-GMP-43, Appendix D to include anchor bolt installations on new baseplates (Revision 14, dated August 18, 1980).
Review of subsequent CWRs to assure anchor bolt installation per
FNP-1-GMP-43 (CWRs Nos. 1-80-93 and 1-80-94).
The inspector concluded that APC0 had determined the full extent of
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the subject deficiency, performed the necessary survey and followup actions to correct the subject conditions, and developed the necessary corrective actions intended to preclude the recurrence of similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of response were implemented. This item is considered closed.
b.
(Closed) Infraction 50-348/80-16-02 and 364/80-19-01, Control and Calibration of Torque Wrench Multipliers This item concerned use of uncalibrated four-to-one torque wrench multipliers during seismic support inspections and tests in response to IEB 79-02. NRC verification of a reinspection of Unit 2 service water system support 2SW-R0119 identified this discrepancy as well as the lack of procedural requirements for checking or calibrating
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torque wrench multipliers.
A subsequent accuracy test of the multiplier used for support 2SW-R0119 showed that the. multiplier provided 12% less torque than the theoretical value.
APC0's letter of response, dated August 12, 1980, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II. The inspector examined the corrective actions as stated in the response.
This exarination included verification of:
Continued adequacy of expansion anchors which may have been
undertorqued.
This is demonstrated by results of subsequent investigations of required torques from suppliers versus testing conducted by APC0. An example of results for a 3/4" diameter HILTI expansion is as follows:
The manufactures recommended torque value is 100 ft-Lbs.
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A torque of 100 ft-Lbs is sufficient to install the bolt and preload it a design value to assure a safety factor of 4:1.
APC0 selected 200 ft-lbs as an installation / testing value.
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The minimum actual torque using a worst-case four-to-one
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multiplier would have been 130 ft-lbs or 30% higher than required.
Purchase of new torque wrenches to measure actual torque being applied by the torque wrench-multiplier combination.
(Snap-On Models TEX 1003TFU, TEX 2003TFU, TX 4005TFU)
Maintenance of a calibration program for the torque wrenches involved.
(Six month calibration records were reviewed for several wrenches from purchase through the latest recalibration).
The inspector concluded that APC0 had determined the full extent of the subject infraction, performed the necessary survey and followup actions to correct the subject conditions, and developed the necessary corrective actions intended to preclude the recurrence of similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of response were implemented.
This item is considered closed.
c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-348/82-07-01 and 364/82-06-01, Diesel Generator Exhaust Piping Not Safety-Related This item concerned the potential for blockage of the diesel generator exhaust during a seismic event.
The exhaust piping and pipe supports for the diesel generators were seismically analyzed but were not considered safety related by APCO.
Therefore, diesel i
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generator exhaust piping was not included in APC0's additional inspections in response to IEB 79-14. APC0 had initially explained this omission on previous inspections and IEB 79-14 was closed (See Inspection Report Nos. 50-348/82-07 and 50-364/82-06). However, this item was opened pending additional NRC review.
The inspector held discussions with cognizant licensee personnel to verify that the licensee had evaluated the condition. The licensee had concluded that a safety concern did not exist and no IEB 79-14 inspection should be performed.
This was based on the following:
The piping in question was seismically designed and supported.
(Only the IEB 79-14 Reinspection was at issue).
The pit.ag in question is comprised of short runs on the roof of
the diesel generator building.
The probability of a sei mic event causing the pipe to fail in
such a manner as to block the diesel exhaust is considered negligible.
Rupture or a partially detached condition of the exhaust piping would not cause the diesels to be inoperable or in a degraded condition.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's analysis and response were sufficient to resolve any NRC concern. This item is considered closed.
d.
(Closed) Violation 50-348/85-33-04, Failure to Perform Independent In-Process Inspections for Class 1 and 2 Pipe Welds.
This item concerned ASME Class 1 and Class 2 pipe welds which were required to install new valves in process piping. The welds involved
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were completed under maintenance work requests (MWR) Nos. 94322, 88067 and 84606 and did not receive the independent in process inspections (fit-up, final visual, etc.) as had been performed on the original welds.
APC0's letter of response, dated September 26, 1985, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II. The cause of the lack of in process inspection was attributed to a lack of procedural guidance (See paragraph 7.a. of this report regarding Inspector Follow-up Item 50-348, 364/85-33-01).
The inspector examined the corrective actions as stated in the response.
This examination included verification of:
Adoption of procedural guidance to perform in process inspection (as further detailed in paragraph 7.a.)
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An engineering evaltation to establish continued acceptability
of welds under MWR Nos. 94322, 88067 and 84604.
(Continued acceptability was documented by FNP maintenance memorandum, dated December 23,1985).
A records search to determine acceptability of other pipe welds by the maintenance group on Class 1, 2 and 3 systems. (Required additional inspections were documented under MWR No. 115009).
The inspector concluded that APC0 had determined the full extent of the subject violation, performcd the necessary survey and followup actions to correct the subject conditions, and developed the necessary corrective actions intended to preclude the recurrence of similar circumstances.
The corrective action identified in the letter of response were implemented.
This item is considered closed.
e.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-348, 364/85-33-02, Welder Qualification Status Records This item concerned the adequacy of the method used to track Welder Qualification Status, the " Performance Qualification Renewal" form.
The actual dates of welding used to maintain qualification were not being entered and discrepancies were noted regarding the actual witness of the welding involved by the responsible supervisor who signs the form.
APC0 agreed to review past maintenance welding records to determine if welders have welded production welds with expired qualifications.
The inspector reviewed procedural improvements regarding Welder Qualification Status Records as reported in paragraph 7.a.
The inspector also verified that cognizant licensee personnel had reviewed past welding records (including weld rod issue tickets) for all maintenance welders from initial hire until their termination or adoption of the present form.
The review indicated that no maintenance welders had welded with expired qualifications.
The inspector concluded that licensee actions were sufficient to resolve any NRC concern.
This item is considered closed.
4.
Unresolved Items (92701)
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in pa agraph 7.a.
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5.
Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line (IE Compliance Bulletin 86-03) (92703).
APC0's response to Region II regarding IEB 86-03 is dated November 12, 1986. The response indicates that no such vulnerability exists at Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP).
The inspector reviewed the Westinghouse and Bechtel Power Corporation analyses which support this conclusion. A partial listing of differences between FNP and the vulnerable plant designs is as follows:
Minimum flow recirculation lines contain motor operated
isolation valves rather than air-operated isolation valves.
High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pumps can inject at full RCS
pressure.
- HHSI pump bypass valves receive no automatic signals to open/close.
Minimum flow recirculation valves do not isolate the refueling
water storage tank (RWST).
- Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps do not use a common recirculation header.
The inspector agreed that the engineering analyses were sufficient to support the conclusion that no potential existed at FNP for multiple ECCS pump failures due to a single failure in the minimum flow recirculation lines. This item is considered closed.
6.
Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves (73756) - Units 1 and 2 The inspector examined selected aspects of the licensee's implementation of inservice testing (IST) requirements for pumps and valves to verify compliance with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.
The applicable code for IST, as identified through 4.0.5 of the Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.55(a)g, as ASME Section XI (74S75).
The details of the inspector's examination are described below:
a.
procedures The inspector reviewed licensee procedures to verify compliance with requirements and commitments relative to:
Assignment of responsibilities for preparation of IST procedures, scheduling and assignment of IST, performance of IST, planning and scheduling maintenance, and performance of maintenance.
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Calibration and control?of test instrumentation
Training of IST: Personnel
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Scheduling of test-
Performance of Tests (quarterly and annually) ^ on Units 1 and 2
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pumps:
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Charging pumps 18 and 2C
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RHR pumps 1A, 18, 2A and 2B
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Centainment spray pumps 1A and 2B
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Performance of alternate testing (quarterly position verification) of Units 1 and-2 containment isolation valves:-
V026 A and B (Reactor Coolant)
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V012 (Spent fuel cooling)
V004 and HV2228 (Air to P.essurizer PORVs)
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V002 A and B (Containment Leak Rate Test)
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Performance of alternate testing (disassembly during refuel outage on a rota'.ing basis) of HHSI Units 1 and 2 check valves:
V032 A, B, and C
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V037 A, B, and C l
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Performance of alternate testing (manual full-stroke exercise during refuel outage) of HHSI Units 1 and 2 check valve'V014 Performance of alternate tes'.ing (visual verification of valve
steam movement when-valve covers are removed - Required at least-
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once per interval) of Unit 1 encapsulated M. O. valves:
V003 A and B (Containment spray)
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V025 A and B (RHR/LHSI)
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Note: The inspector did not review the test procedures in sufficient detail to judge the complete adequacy of each procedural step. The review did determine whether all controls and measurements required by code were addressed in the procedures.
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- Review of test results
Identification of status Procedures reviewed by'the inspector were as follows (Note: FNP-0,-1 or -2 in the procedure numbers indicates procedure app.licability to both units, Unit 1 or Unit 2, respectively):
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Administrative Procedures -
FNP-0-AP-1, R19, Development, Review and Approval of Plant Procedures FNP-0-AP-3, R7, Plant Organization and Responsibility FNP-0-AP-4-R11, Control of Plant Documents and Records FNP-0-AP-5, R9, Surveillance Program Administrative Control FNP-0-AP-6, R2, Procedure Adherence FNP-0-AP-11, R7, Control and Calibration of Test Equipment and Instrumentation FNP-0-AP-15, R9, Maintenance Conduct of Operations FNP-0-AP-31, R8, Quality Control Measures FNP-0-AP-52, R9, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization FNP-0-AP-53, R3, Preventive Maintenance Program FNP-0-AP-57, R3, Preservice and Inservice Inspections FNP-0-AP-63, R2, Conduct of Operations - Systems Performance Group
FNP-1-M-013, RS, Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program for ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 Pumps and Valves
FNP-1-M-002, R6, Inservice Plan for Class 1, 2 and 3 Pump and Valve Testing for Unit 1 FNP-2-M-019, R4, Unit 2 Inservice Testing Program for ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 Pumps and Valves FNP-2-M-008, R6, Inservice Plan for Class 1, 2 and 3 Pump and
Valve Testing rar Unit 2
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Surveillance Test Procedures -
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FNP-1-STP-4.2, RIS, Charging Pump 1B Inservice Test
FNP-1-STP-4.5, R14, Charging Pump 18 Annual Inservice Test
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FNP-2-STP-4.3, R8, Charging Pump 2C Inservice Test
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FNP-2-STP-4.6, R7, Charging Pump 2C Annual Inservice Test
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FNP-1-STP-11.1, RIS, RHR Pump 1A Quarterly Inservice Test
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FNP-1-STP-11.3, R10, RHR Pump 1A Quarterly Inservice Test
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FNP-1-STP-11.2, R13, RHR Pump 18 Annual Inservice Test FNP-1-STP-11.4, R10, RHR Pump 1B Annual Inservice Test
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FNP-2-STP-11.1, R4, RHR Pump 2A Quarterly Inservice Test j.
FNP-2-STP-11.3, R4, RHR Pump 2A Annual Inservice Test f
FNP-2-STP-11.2, R4, RHR Pump-28 Quarterly Inservice Test.
FNP-2-STP-11.4, R4, RHR Pump 2B Annual Inservice Test
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i FNP-1-STP-16.1, R13, Containment Spray Pump 1A Inservice Test FNP-1-STP-16.3, R12, Containment Spray Pump 1A Annual Inservice Test FNP-2-STP-16.2, R7, Containment Spray Pump 2B Inservice Test FNP-2-STP-16.4, R7, Containment Spray Pump 28 Annual Inservice Test i
FNP-0-GMP-27.0, RS, Disassembly and Reassembly of Safety Related Valves
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FNP-2-STP-14.0, RS, Containment Integrity Verification Test (As i
applicable to Valves V002 A and B, V012, HV2228, j
and V026 A and B)
FNP-1-STP-14.0, RS, Containment Integritv Verification Test (As i
applicable to Valves V002 A and B,' V102, HV228, l
and V026 A and B)
l FNP-1-STP-640.1, R0, CTMT Spray Pump Suction From RWST Check Valve j
Full Stroke Test (Valve V014)
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FNP-2-STP-640.1, RO, CTMT Spray Pump Suction From RWST Check Valve
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Full Stroke Test (Valve V014)
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FNP-1-MP-63.4, R0, Inspection and Repair of Accumulator Discharge Valve Q1E21V037 A, B, or C FNP-2-MP-63.4, R0, Inspection and Repair of Accumulator Discharge Valve Q2E21V037 A, B, or C FNP-1-STP-11.6, R7, Residual Heat Removal Valves Inservice Test (V025 A and B)
FNP-1-STP-16.7, R9, Containment Spray System Valve Inservice Tests (V003 A and B)
b.
Records Reviews The inspector examined the adequacy of the licensee's implementation of selected IST related requirements (with emphasis on alternate tests to ASME Code Requirements) through reviews of records as described below.
Performance of required pump tests and proper recording and
evaluation of results in accordance with procedures was verified for the following pumps by a review of the test records indicated:
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Charging Pump 18 STP 4.5 test on 3/8/86 STP 4.2 test on 6/9/86 and 9/8/86
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Charging Pump 2C STP 4.6 tests on 6/30/86, 7/4/86, 7/21/86 STP 4.3 tests on 1/6/86, 3/31/86, 7/10/86, 10/10/86,
1/10/87 RHR Pump 1A
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STP 11.3 test on 4/2/86 STP 11.1 tests on 1/2/86, 7/2/86, 9/29/86 RHR Pump IB
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STP 11.4 tests on 7/31/86 STP 11.2 tests on 2/2/86, 5/3/86, 1/21/87 RHR Pump 2A
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STP 11.3 tests on 2/3/86, 1/22/87 STP 11.1 tests on 5/23/86, 8/3/86, 4/3/86, 2/2/87 RHR Pump 2B STP 11.4 test on 9/3/86
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STP 11.2 tests on 3/3/86, 6/4/86, 12/3/86
- Containment Spray Pump 1A STP 16.3 test on 8/16/86 STP 16.1 tests on 2/16/86, 5/16/86
- Containment Spray Pump 28 STP 16.4 test on 10/25/86 STP 16.2 tests on 2/25/86, 5/25/86, 8/25/86, 11/25/86
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Performance of required valve tests in accordance with procedures was verified by a review of the test records indicated:
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VJ26 A and B, V012, V004, HV228, V002 A and B
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1-STP-14.0 tests on 1/5/87 and 1/20/87 2-STP-14.0 tests on 12/20/86 and 1/28/87 V037 A, B and C
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1-MP-63.4 test on 10/10/86 (V0378-MR #136355)
1-GMP-27.0 test on 4/12/85 (V037A-MR #99627)
2-MP-63.4 test on 4/9/86 (V037B-MR #130145)
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V014 2-STP-640.1 test on 4/15/86 (MR #106878)
1-STP-640.1 tests on 4/11/85 (MR #99628)
and 10/24/86 (MR #136356)
V025 A and B
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1-STP-11.6 tests on 11/17/86 (V025A-MR #154710)
and 12/12/86 (V0258-MR #154712)
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V003 A and B
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1-STP-16.7 tests on 10/18/86 (V003A-MR #154718 and V0038-MR #154720)
c.
Observation of Work Activities The inspector verified adequacy and completeness of test procedures by observation of an annual inservice test on charging pump 2C (STP-4.6, R7) completed on April 9, 1987. The test was scheduled to obtain additional verification of baseline data (vibrational) through use of two independent vibration test instruments (IRD Models 306 (Serial #6006) and 818 (Serial #6032). The inspector verified proper understanding of the method for obtaining vibration measurements) and proper recording of the results by the operator involved.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Inspector Followup Items (IFIs)(92706/55050)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-348, 364/85-33-01, Review of Special Welding Processes Manual This item concerned weaknesses in the licensee's welding program, i.e.,
areas where the program did not contain sufficient detail.
Examples were:
Lack of guidance relative to in process inspections - fitup,
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welding procedure requirements, final weld size, etc.
Insufficient details on material storage and issue
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Lack of requirements for detailed weld joint record
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Insufficient details on maintaining status of welder
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qualification Necessary details were to be incorporated in the Special Processes Manual (FNP-0-M-023). The inspector reviewed a controlled copy (No.
026) of FNP-0-M-023, R4, (issued 9/4/86) regarding the details in question.
After review, the inspector concluded that the details / guidance included in FNP-0-M-023 is sufficient to resolve any NRC concern and IFI 50-348, 364/85-33-01 is considered closed.
During the above review, the inspector noted that specified details concerning documentation of in process inspections of groove welds were included in Figure 1 of Section 5.7 (Documentation of Welding i
and Related Activities; FNP-0-SPP-WD-001, R4). However, Figure 1 was not included in control copy No. 026. This omission was an apparent lack of conformance to Section 8.4.2 of FNP-0-AP-4. A random check l
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by cognizant licensee personnel identified another. example of the discrepancy but verified that Revision 4 issuance of FNP-0-M-023 had been correct and complete. The inspector independently verified that the complete Groove Weld Data Form had been available and in use after the issuance of Revision 4 (MWR #153639 - ASME Class 2 Pipe Weld FW-10, completed 11/12/86, and MWR #153640 - ASME Class 2 Pipe Weld FW-12, completed 11/16/86). The inspector concluded that the lack of conformance to FNP-0-AP-4 did not have safety significance in this instance.
However, NRC concern was identified regarding the potential for inadequate conformance to licensee administrative procedures.
This item will be identified as Unresolved Item 50-348, j
364/87-09-01, Adequate Conformance to Administrative Procedures, b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-348, 364/85-33-03, Qualification j
of Inspectors for Maintenance Activities i
This item concerned the qualification of welders and foremen as i
level II welding inspectors without requiring that they have specified technical abilities related to the assigned task (Position 3 of RG 1.58). A licensee audit had identified an almost-identical
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finding (FNP-NC-43-85-8(17)) and this item identified need for NRC review of the licensee's subsequent corrective action. The inspector reviewed the Corrective Action Report (CAR No. 987) in response to
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FNP-NC-43-85-8(17).
The inspector noted that revisions, to FNP-0-AP-31 (Section 7.2) clarified imposition of ANSI Standard N45.2.6 and RG 1.58 requirements. The inspector also noted that some inspection personnel had been recertified to a lower level due to a lack of required experience.
The inspector verified that no
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reinspections had been required due to the recertifications involved, i.e.,
no recertifications from Level II to Level I were required.
The inspector concluded that licensee actions were sufficient to resolve any NRC concern. This item is considered closed.
c.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 50-348, 364/86-21-01, Precedure Revision to Include ANII Functions i
This item concerns inclusion of functions associated with an
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Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII) within the licensee's ISI program.
An ANII is onsite and performing the required functions. However, revision of the pertinent procedures is not yet complete.
The inspector -held discussions with the ANII to verify that the lack of procedure revisions is not causing any handicap in performing the functions involved. This item remains open pending
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NRC review of the pertinent procedures after their revision.
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