IR 05000348/1987012
| ML20214T567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1987 |
| From: | Long A, Shymlock M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214T550 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-87-12, 50-364-87-12, NUDOCS 8706100322 | |
| Download: ML20214T567 (9) | |
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O.m u00g UNITED STATFS g
'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y'
REGloN ll n
g, j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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s.,...../
Report Nos.:
50-348/87-12 and 50-364/87-12 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291-0400 Docket Nos.
50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.. NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility Name:
Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
May 19-21, 1987 Inspector:
C. II, L cnq
$27!S'7 A. R. Long
D6te Signed Approved by: b - A Mcbt
[t k2f/d
M. B. Shymlddk, Chief f Date' Signed Operational Programs S6ction Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the review of corrective actions for previous inspection findings in the areas of control of measuring and test equipment, maintenance program implementation, and licensed operator training.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
870610 gy $[800 40 PDR A
PDR G
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i REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel:
- J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager
- D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager
- T. W. Cherry, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor C. E. Hanks, Calibration Lab Supervisor R. D. Hill, Operations Manager
- C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager
- J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review L. M. Stinson, Plant Modifications Manager
- L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager L. S. Williams, Training Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, security force members and office personnel.
NRC Personnel:
- W. H. Bradford, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized in an exit interview on May 21, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings, including the closure of the items Summarized below.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensea.
(Closed) VIO 348/85-40-01:
Failure to Follow Procedures in the Measuring and Test Equipment Program (Paragraph 3.a)
(Closed) VIO 348/87-03-01:
Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedures in Correcting Problems with Feedwater Flow Control Valve Indication
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Control Rod Driv Electrical Penetration (Paragraph 3.b)
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(Closed) UNR 348/85-40-02:
Licensee did not Require Drawing Revisions for Minor Departures from Design-Temporary (Paragraph 3.c)
(Closed) IFI 348/85-17-01:
Training Licensed Operators on Interpretation of Printout Data Associated with Reactor Trip Analyses (Paragraph 5.a)
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2 (Closed) IFI 348,364/83-25-05:
Certification of Individuals Qualified to Calibrate Measurement and Test Equipment (Paragraph 5.b)
(Closed) IFI 348,364/85-40-03:
Calibration of Pressure Switches for Instrument Air System Isolations (Paragraph 5.c)
(Closed) IFI 348,364/85-40-04:
Cleaning and Operability Checks of 5 KVA and 7.5 KVA Inverters (Paragraph 5.d)
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
a.
(Closed) Violation 348/85-40-01:
Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedures in Correr. ting Problems with Feedwater Flow Control Valve Indication & Controi Rod Drive Electrical Penetration.
The licensee response dated December 31, 1985 was considered acceptable by Region II.
(1) Example 1: Correction of Wiring Deficiencies Background:
It was determined during NRC Inspection 348, 364/85-40 that the licensee had not identified and corrected wiring deficiencies on the limit switch junction box and main control board indication for certain feedwater flow control valves, although there had been opportunities on two occasions.
Resolution:
At the time of Inspection 85-40, Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) had been written to correct the wiring deficienc'es during the next scheduled outage.
The inspector verified that the wiring deficiencies referenced in the violation were corrected during the outage of October / November 1986. The completed MWRs for the work were reviewed and no problems were t
identified.
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I (2) Example 2:
Placement of Deficiency Tags Background: Procedure FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, requires that if the reported condition on a Maintenance Work Request requires corrective maintenance, then the reviewing authority must ensure a deficiency tag is placed to identify that the. deficiency has j
been reported.
Certain maintenance work requests issued to
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correct wiring deficiencies in feedwater flow control valves
had not required the placement of deficiency tags pursuant to procedure FNP-0-AP-52.
The licensee had stated in their I
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response to the violation that Unit I was operating when the work requests were written.
Because the valves are located in
an area that has limited access during power operation, and because the deficiencies were considered to have no operational
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impact, Operations shift personnel had erroneously determined I
that no deficiency stickers were necessary.
Resolution:
The licensee stated in their response to the violation that the deficiency stickers had been placed as
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required. The inspector verified that plant personnel have been
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directed through training to place deficiency tags under such circumstances in the future.
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(3) Example 3:
Completion of Entries on Maintenance Work Request
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Background: Maintenance Work Request number 11481 was not fully
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completed as required by procedure FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status
Control and Maintenance Authorization. The work sequence on the MWR was also not revised to include the necessary steps for
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l repairs after the problem was identified.
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Resolution: The inspector reviewed the applicable portions of licensee Corrective Action Report ru er 1054 regarding this violation and verified that MWR 11481 had been corrected.
The inspector also reviewed an additional random selection of l
completed MWR's and determined that they had all been fully completed as required.
(4) Example 4:
Temperature Dependent Acceptance Criteria on
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Resistance for Control Rod Drive Mechanism Coils l
Background:
Procedure FNP-0-MP-67.0, Continuity Checks of I
Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Cables and Coils, was used on June 23, 1985, to verify resistances on CRDM coils under hot
conditions, but did not specify vendor supplied coil temperature l
prerequisites or account for resistance variations with temperature.
Resolution:
The licensee stated that the procedure did not account for resistance variations with temperature because it had originally been written to be performed during outages, at
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i ambient conditions. In the case in question, the licensee was j
using the procedure to troubleshoot the cause of two dropped
The licensee stated that they had called the
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vendor while the resistance measurement work was in progress and had verified the acceptability of the data under the actual
measurement conditions.
The cause of the dropped rods was eventually determined to be a fault in an electrical penetration
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rather than in the CROM electrical connections.
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The inspector verified that steps to account for the temperature dependence of resistivity, and vendor specified temperature dependent acceptance criteria on resistivity, have been
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The resistance measurements made while troubleshooting the cause of the dropped rods were within the criteria presented in the procedure.
In addition to the corrective measures specified above, the licensee has conducted retraining of involved Operations, Maintenance and Planning personnel in the accomplishment of activities affecting quality using prescribed procedures and drawings and in the proper completion of paperwork.
The licensee provided the inspector with documentation of this training, and the inspector verified that the training adequately addressed each of the areas of the violation.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had corrected the previous problem and developed corrective action to preclude recurrence of similar problems. Corrective actions stated in the licensee response have been implemented. The item is therefore closed.
b.
(Closed) Violation 348,364/87-03-01:
Failure to Follow Procedures in the Measuring and Test Equipment Program The licensee response dated April 20, 1987 was considered acceptable by Region II.
(1) Example 1:
Environmental Controls of Calibrations Performed in Radiation Control Areas
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Background: Procedure FNP-0-AP-11, Control and Calibration of Test Equipment, Test Instrumentation and Plant Instrumentation, Revision 6, required that temperature and humidity be held to specified limits during the calibration of safety related Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE).
The procedure stated, in part, that when environmental conditions were not specified by the vendor, a relative humidity of less than 70 percent and a temperature of 70 plus or minus 10 degrees F would be used.
Contrary to this requirement, a number of calibrations of M&TE had been performed in the Radiation Control Area (RCA) during a period when environmental conditions were not controlled because the air conditioning was out of service.
The environmental conditions had not been recorded or verified to be within the limits specified in the procedure.
Resolution:
The licensee determined that the only instruments which had been calibrated in the RCA during the period when conditions were not controlled had been pressure test gauges.
They provided the inspector with documentation of a phone L
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conversation on April 8, 1987,. with the manufacturer of the
gauges stating that humidity does not affect the calibration and that temperature compensation is only necessary outside a range of -40 to 120 degrees F.
Therefore no instrument calibrations had been invalidated by the uncontrolled conditions in the RCA lab.
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The inspector verified that the licensee has reinstructed the individuals responsible for the Calibration Laboratory to follow the guidelines of FNP-0-AP-11 while performing calibrations in l
the Radiation Control Area.
Temperature and humidity data are i
to be recorded, and if the limits specified in the procedure are f
exceeded then calibrations are to be suspended.
(2) Example 2: Time Periods for Evaluations of Measuring and Test
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l Equipment Found Out of Calibration
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l Background:
Procedure FNP-0-AP-11, Revision 6, required that j
if M&TE was found to be out-of-calibration during a
recalibration, an evaluation would be performed to ascertain
the need for recalibration of any shop or field instruments on
which the deficient M&TE had been used. The procedure required
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that the evaluation of safety-related activities be completed within 30 days and a Test Equipment Deficiency Report (TEDR)
issued to users of the out-of-tolerance M&TE.
Ten days were then allowed from the receipt of the TEDR for the user to perform an evaluation and take appropriate action. A number of instances had been identified where the ten day time limit for
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the user evaluation had been exceeded.
Resolution:
The licensee determined that 20 days would be a i
more reasonable time period to allow for user evaluations in response to TEDRs.
Revision 7 of Procedure FNP-0-AP-11 j
decreases the allowable time period -for the initial evaluation
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and issuance of TEDRs from 30 to 20 days, then allows 20 days for the evaluations by the users of the equipment in question.
The I&C Supervisor issued a memorandum to all plant managers on
April 7, 1987, notifying them of the changes to FNP-0-AP-11.
The memo stated that all TEDRs approaching delinquency will be l
brought to his attention to assure timely completion.
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The licensee demonstrated to the inspector their process for tracking TEDRs, which appeared adequate.
A randomly selected
sample of TEDRs reviewed by the inspector had all been completed within the required time frame.
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i The inspector concluded that the licensee had corrected the previous
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problem and developed corrective action to preclude recurrence of
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similar problems. Corrective actions stated in the licensee response i
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have been implemented.
The item is therefore closed.
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c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 348/85-40-02:
Licensee did not Require Drawing Revisions for Minor Departures from Design-Temporary 9ackground:
Procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control, required that drawings be revised whenever the need is identified and that typically, site prepared revisions shall be used to input chatjes to drawings to correct them to the as-built condition of the
C at.
NRC Inspection 348,364/85-40 identified that drawings were not
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routinely being updated when a Minor Departure from Design
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Temporary was in effect.
There was no mechanism for identifying whether or not a particular drawing was affected by any existing Minor Departures.
Resolution:
The inspector verified that adequate controls of drawings affected by Minor Departures from Design - Temporary have now been implemented.
Procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Revision 12, requires that all documents which would be affected by each Minor Departure
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be identified on a List of Af fected Documents. Upon notification that a Minor Departure has been approved for implementation, the Document Control Supervisor is required to have the controlled j
drawings af fected by that minor departure annotated with the Minor Departure number.
The drawings remain tabbed until the Minor i
Departure has been cleared or the drawing has been permanently l
revised.
There is normally a one year time limit on the resolution of Minor Departures from Design - Temporary.
The licensee demonstrated to the inspector that these requirements of Procedure FNP-0-AP-8 are being implemented. They are also now in the process of implementing a computerized system for tracking and
tabbing drawings affected by Minor Departures.
Based on the information above, this item is closed.
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4.
Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.
5.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspector Followup Items (92701)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 348/85-17-01:
Training Licensed Operators on Interpretation of Printout Data Background: The licensed operator training program had not formally included training on the interpretation of the computer printouts associated with Reactor Trip Reports and post trip analyses.
The importance of this type of training had been demonstrated by the
1983 Salem I event where a failure of the reactor trip breakers to open during a transient went undetected.
It was subsequently
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determined that many operators did not have sufficient familiarity i
with deciphering the information provided on the sequence of events printout.
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Resolution:
Training on the interpretation of computer printouts associated with post trip analyses has now been formally incorporated into the licensed operator training program. The inspector reviewed
Instructor's Guide OPS-52202G, Reactor Trip Report Training.~
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training appeared thorough and adequate to accomplish the stated objectives.
Specific training on post trip review and sequence of event printouts and on preparing Reactor Trip Reports, the Salem
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event and its generic implications were covered in detail.
I Based on the above information, this item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 348,364/85-25-05: Certification of Individuals Qualified to Calibrate Measuring and Test Equipment Background: This item involved an inspector concern that the lack of a qualification program or formal training in the calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) might fail to assure the repeatability and accuracy of M&TE calibrations.
The inspector had questioned that fact that although I&C journeymen performed calibrations by using procedures and by observing others, in the mechanical lab any mechanic was assumed to be qualified to calibrate M&TE.
The licensee's response to the concern maintained that all personnel performing M&TE calibrations met the Level II Qua'lification Requirements of FNP-85-0624, Certification and Re-Certification of Personnel Performing Calibration of Equipment or Instruments, and that calibration activities performed by these personnel fell well within the skills of the classification.
Resolution:
The licensee demonstrated to the inspector that persons performing M&TE calibrations met the background experience qualifications presented in FNP-85-0624.
In addition, subsequent to NRC Inspection 348,364/85-25, the licensee had implemented a 21 week training program for I&C personnel which includes material 4"
relevant to M&TE calibration.
This training was accredited by INPO j
in December of 1986.
Based on the above information, this item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 348,364/85-40-03:
Calibration of Pressure Switches for Instrument Air System Isolations
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Background:
NRC Inspection 348,364/85-40 identified that four Unit 1 Compressed Air System pressure switches which were referenced in the FSAR as performing safety functions were not being calibrated.
Resolution:
The licensee provided the inspector with Preventive Maintenance Task Planning Sheets and calibration data sheets.which added the calibration of the four Unit 1 switches and the analogous i
Unit 2 switches to the scheduled 18 month / refueling maintenance. No problems were identified with this documentation.
Based on above information, the item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 348,364/85-40-04:
Cleaning of 5 KVA and 7.5 KVA Inverters and Operability Checks of Breakers
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Background:
The licensee's periodic maintenance program did not specify periodic cleaning of the 5 KVA and 7.5 KVA inverters as recommended in the vendor manual, and did not include functional checking of the four breakers within the inverter cabinet.
Resolution: The inspector reviewed Mainter,ance Task Planning Sheets for the inverter cleaning and breaker operability checks, the referenced procedures for performing the work, and the vendor manual.
The vendor recommendations have been satisfactorily addressed.
Based on the above information, this item is closed.
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