IR 05000348/1987036

Insp Repts 50-348/87-36 & 50-364/87-36 on 871212-16.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ndes & Activities Associated W/Events Re Unit 2,safety Injection sys,6 Inch Line,Through Wall Crack & Integrity of Sys

ML20148T723
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	01/22/1988
From:	Blake J, Coley J, Newsome R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148T677	List: IR 05000348/1987036
References
50-348-87-36, 50-364-87-36, NUDOCS 8802030377
Download: ML20148T723 (17)

Text

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'a UNITED STATES

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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 MEGION ll

! j**f 101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

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i Report Nos.: 50-348/87-36 and 50-364/87-36 i

{ Licensee: Alabama Power Company

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600 North 18th Street

] Birmingham, AL 35291-0400 I Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 .

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l Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: December 12-16, 1987 Inspectors: - -

ww -. . /-2/'FS 1 i Nwsp Dat Signed

%/ //) v l !! BC 4 @C ol Dat 'S1 ned Approve .l ~ . .

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Date Signed j

by:'J.( Slake, M Chief / a erials and Processes Section DfvisionofReactorSafety I

SUMMARY I

! Scope: This special announced inspection was in the areas of nondestructive

! examinations (NDE) and other activities associated with events related to Unit 2, Safety Injection System (SIS), six inch line, through wall crack, and actions taken by the licensee to assure the integrity of similar systems in Units 1 and 2,

Results: In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

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j REPORT DETAILS

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I Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• R. Badham, Systems Performance Engineer

• R. Berryhill, Performance and Planning Manager S. Burns, Senior Project Engineer

• R. Coleman, Systems Performance Supervisor

• D. Hartline Systems Perfornance Engineering Supervising

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D. Morey, Assistant General Manager, Farley Nuclear Power (FNP) Operations

'j *J. Osterholtz, Supervisor Safety Audit Engineering Review

• Shipman, Assistant General Manager FNP Support

! *J. Thomas FNP Maintenance Manager j G. Waymire, General Plant Engineer j *J. Woodard, General Manager, FNP i

! Other licensee employees contacted included construction craf tsmen,

! engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force merrbers, and i office personne l l Other Organization

) *R. Davis, Southern Company Services (SCS) Lead Level !!!

K. Johns SCS, level !!!

NRC Resident Inspectors

l' * Bradford, Senior Resident inspector i * Miller, Resident Inspector

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• Attended exit interview 1 Exit Interview

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I The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 16, 1987, l with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the j arear inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. In l

addition, the inspectors discussed the following comitments agreed to by i the licensee:

l i Perfom radiography on weld D Loop 3. shown on tsumetric/grinnel l spool number EG686/JF-16-38, in Unit 1, during the next scheduled i outage. (Same as weld f3 on 151 150. No. ALA-143) (See details in paragraph 5C.(2)(h));

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. Perform radiography on Loop 1, weld B, shown on isometric /grinnel I spool number 2-101/JG-16G-37, in Unit 2, during this outage. (Same i

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as weld # 31 on ISI 150 No. APR.1-4109) (See details in paragraph 5.C(t)(h));

d Conduct a visual examination of the inside surface of the SIS nozzle  !

! to main coolant piping on Loop 2, in Unit 2 prior to welding replace- I ment piping into place. (Reference Report No. 50-364/87-27 for  !

. additional infomation). [

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l No dissenting comments were received from the license Proprietary l

information is not contained in this repor ,

I l NOTE: A list of abbreviations used in this report is contained in para- }

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graph 6.

4 Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters l This subject was not addressed in the inspection, f

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i 4 Unresolved items l Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio }

l i I 5. Cracked 6" Pipe Weld in Safety Injection System (SIS)

Background 1 j i (1) On December 9,1987, reactor coolant leakage of approximately  !

! .8 gallons per minute was detected in the Unit 2. Loop 2, cold I

) leg safety injection line. The reactor was shutdown to investi-  !

) gate the leakage which appeared to be in the vicinity of the f l

Loop 2 resistance temperature detector (RTD) manifold. Investi-  ;

j gation in this areas resulted in the discovery of a steam leak, r

- through the insulation, at a location downstream of check valve i

! V0518, on the cold leg SIS and at a position in close proximity .

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4 to a 90 degree elbow weld, identified on inservice inspection

! (ISI) isometric drawing APR1-4210 as weld number 1 l

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The Unit 2 reactor operating conditions at the time of the steam l

} leak discovery were: I

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- Steady State Mode 3

- Reactor Power 0

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- Net Output 0 MWe j l

- Reactor Coolant 525 'F Tay (

- Reactor Coolant Pressure 2235 Psig j

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Following identification of the general location of the steam i

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leak, the licensee commenced cooldown and depressurization of the reactor coolant systems while simultaneously initiating several activities designed to identify the exact location,

' cause, and severity of the leakage. These activities included:  :

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- removal of insulation in the general area;  ;

- removal of a small pipe support that was clamped onto the SIS over weld number 16; and

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l - conducting visual examinations following insulation and

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p,pe support removal ,

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Following the visual examination of the areas and elimination of check valve V051B as the leaking component, attention was  :

directed to weld 16, a pipe to 90* elbow weld. Liquid penetrant

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l (PT) examination of this weld by site personnel did not result  ;

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, in conclusive evidence that weld 16 was the source of the leak l primarily because the pipe was full of water and under pressure;  !

therefore, the later detected crack was filled with water at

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this time and would not allow the penetrant to enter the open- 7 l ing. However, during this period, droplets of water could be ,

q seen forming on the weld at the 6 o' clock position indicating -

i the probability of a through wall crac l

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During the preliminary leak detection activities, the licensee had contracted SCS to conduct ultrasonic (UT). NDE, as required, i

, to determine if weld 16 was cracked. SCS personnel were able to l

! detemine the probable existence of a crack in weld 16. The

crack appeared to be through wall for a portion of its length,  ;

appeared to be circumferential and approximately 7" in length, i

The crack was determined to start at approximately 120* and .

l teminate at approximately 240' along the circumference of the (

pipe using top dead center (TDC) of the pipe as the O' reference  ;

point and treasuring clockwise. The crack appeared to be through i

) wall starting at 165* to 195*, approximately 1.5" in lengt l

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Following the SCS detection of the crack-like indication, radiography (RT) of weld 16 was conducted by site personne l The RT was conducted with the pipe still full of water and the  !

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radiographs were not of highest quality due to the pipe being filled with wate However, the radiographs did confirm the  ;

existence of a crack, running circumferential1y near the l l 180* (6 o' clock) circumferential position of the pip l l'

Following confirmation of a crack in weld 16 by RT, with water j in the pipe, the SIS loop 2 cold leg was isolated and draining t i of the pipe was starte RT of weld 16 was scheduled to be i I accomplished again once the water was drained from the pip ;

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1 (2) Detection of the crack by UT according to SCS was difficult and :

signal amplitude from the indication using a standard 45' shear :

wave while establishing the reference level using 10% notches !

from the reference standard, the most comonly used technique for the detection of cracked welds, would only yield a signal I l

amplitude of 10% of reference level with the gain setting at i '

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reference level. However, by using a 60* shear wave technique, the signal amplitude from the crack was at 100% of the reference level with the gain setting at reference level. Since a 45'

l shear wave is almost always very sensitive to notch reflectors I (cracks like), and a 60* shear wave is generally less sensitive to notch reflectors, the fact that the 60' was able to detect the crack much better than the 45* seemed to contradict general-ly accepted UT crack detection capabilities unless some unknown I factor is presen In view of this contradiction, the NRC i inspectors requested that calibration of UT equipment, using l

both 45' and 60' shear waves be accomplished and the calibration

! be observed by the inspectors. in addition, following calibra-i tion of the UT equipment, the inspectors requested that the l

cracked weld be partially examined using the two shear waves.

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The inspectors observed the calibrations and the examinations of l the cracked weld using both the 45' shear wave and the 60' shear I wave and concluded that, in this case, the 60* shear wave technique was far superior to the 45' shear wave technique for l detection of this particular crack. The NRC inspectors suggest-

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ed examination of the weld usiny a 45' longitudinal wave probe, if possible, since longitudinal waves generally penetrate stainless steel weld metal more easily than do shear wave This was not accomplished because longitudinal wave examinations are not comonly done on pipe diameters this small, and special longitudinal wave probes would have to be made to accomodate this W e pipe. The inspectors suggested that longitudinal wave probes be ordered for this size pipe for possible use in the future. E Mplanation for the crack signal response being better with the 60' shear wave than with the 45' shear wave could be given at this tim Additional information maybe deduced from an analysis of the crack following removal of the weld from the S!S system and subsequent planned analysis.

l (3) The licensee initiated a progressive examination plan for those

' welds adjacent to the cracked weld and for all similar system welds on all three loops in both Unit I and Unit The exami-nation of these additional welds utilized a 45' and a 60' shear wave UT examination, with increased examination gain setting, on each of these welds. The NRC inspectors requested that the next three welds in Unit 2 Loop 2, cold leg, SIS, upstream of valve V051B be UT examined since damage to this portion of the system due to sp pathic harmonic vibration with the cracked weld might be possible. Examination of these welds was acccmplished and examinations did not reveal any relevant UT indication _ _ - _ . . __ .___ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _

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i: (4) The licensee's contractor, SCS, was tasked to review all of the

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fabrication radiographs of the welds being examined by UT and to

! review the radiographs taken of the cracked weld both with the pipe full of water and the radiographe taken following the draining of the water from the line. The SCS review of the film revealed some minor discrepancies and resulted in the re-radio-graphing of one weld due to a potential unacceptable root

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condition. The NRC inspectors also reviewed all of these film with some questions regarding the radiographs associated with two welds, one in Unit 1 and one in Unit 2 (for details see

paragraph 5.b.(2)(h).

(5) A complete system waikdown of all three SIS loops in both Units 1 and 2 was initiated to determine if any pipo restric-l i

tions, leakage, or other problems were evident. During the j walkdown of Unit 1, loop 2, a snubber clamp was found that apparently was coming in contact with a snubber support. A

nonconformance report was initiated to correct this condition j and the work was accomplishe No additional significant problems were identified in either Units 1 or l Licensee's Intended Corrective Actions Discussions with involved licensee personnel disclosed the following:

h j (1) The 90* elbow and straight runs of pipe at each end of the cracked elbow to pipe weld would tm removed from the SIS cold leg on loop 2. This portion of the SIS contains weld 16. The removal effort would be accomplished by cutting the weld located

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at valve V0518, the up steam side of the 90* elbow, and by making a second cut in the SIS at the main coolant loop nozzle

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to SIS pipe weld. By making cuts at these locations, no addi-i tional welds would be introduced into the system. A replacement

, 90* elbow and a section of 6, scheduled 160, 304 stainless steel material had been purchased for replacement of the removed sectio The NRC inspectors requested that a visual examination of the I in*ernal surface of the nozzle be accomplished following the cut

! near this location because of the recent loss of the thermal sleeve at the SIS nozzle to maan coolant loop at this location

(see Inspection Report No. 50-364/87-27 for additional informa-

' tion) and the surface would be available for examination for any internal surface damage that any have occurred as a result of

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the thennal sleeve disengagemen The licensee agreed to j examine this surface prior to welding the replacement section of

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the SIS into place.

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(2) The removed section of the loop 2 SIS, containing the defective pipe weld, will be shipped to a Westinghouse (W) laboratory for evaluation to detennine the mechanism and causes of cracking and leakage of the weld joint and to develop information that would be helpful in taking corrective actions. The investigation will center around the six inch diameter pipe to elbow joint contain-ing the crack and will consist of the following tasks:

(a) Preliminary Evaluations Preliminary evaluations will be undertaken to establish the mechanism of cracking by conducting limited examinations on an expedited basis. The purpose of these evaluations is to provide a preliminary assessment of the cracking mechanis The evaluations will include surface examinations, metal-lographic examinations and limited scanning electron microscopy of the freshly opened crack. Chemistry evalu tion of crack deposits by Eday will also be conducted as neede (b) Detailed Metallurgical Evaluations

- SURFACE EXAMINATIONS: The as-received surface condi-tion of the cracked weld will be examined carefully by visual and low power light microscopy techniques for evidence of surface deposits, corrosion, cracks and/or other mechanical damage. The location and orientation of the surface cracks present, if any, will be exam-ined. The results of the surface examinations will be photographically recorde METALL0 GRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS: Light optical metallo-graphic exmainations on sections containing the fracture and/or major cracked regions will be conduct-ed to establish the morphology, orientation and distribution of cracks ano their relationship to local microstructure. The metallographic examinations will also establish the microstructure of the weld and base material FRAC'0 GRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS: The fracture faces of the freshly opened crack will be examinated in the virgin and in the endexed (oxide removed) conditions by light optical and scanning electron microscopy technique The light optical fractographic examinations will establish the fracture orientation, the crack initia-tion sites, bench marks (crack arrest lines) and crack prorsgation history while the scanning electron fractographic examination will establish the fracture morphology and cracking mechanis Evidence for intergranular/transgranular mrphology, corrosion and

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crack deposits as well as for the presence of fatigue striations or overload deposits as well as for the presence of fatigue striations or overload dimpled morphology will be established under this tas CHEMISTRY EVALVATIONS: Chemistry evaluation of the crack deposits will be examined by energy dispersive X-ray analysis to establish the role of any contami-nants while wet chemistry analysis of the weld materi-al composition will be conducted to examine if the material meets the specification requirement MECHANICAL PROPERTY MEASUREMENTS: Hardness measure-ments will be made on the polished sections of the weld material to establish the ductility and tensile strength of the materia DATA ANALYSIS: The results of the various examina-tions will be analyzed and the mechanism and causes of the weld cracking will be established. in case the failure is confirmed to be due to cyclic loads, detailed evaluations will be conducted to identify low cycle and high cycle fatigue regions. Striation spacing measurements will be made to relate to the applied loads. The contributors to the crack initia-tion and their propagation will be identifie (c) The preliminary evaluations are expected to be completed within two days af ter the receipt of the sample. The detailed evaluations are expected to be completed within three weeks after the receipt of the sample at which time a sunnary results report will be provide c. Ooservations and review of licensee's activities The inspectors examined documents, activities, and records as indi-cated below, to determined whether these activities were being

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conducted in accordance with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and licensee commitment The UT examinations were being performed by SCS while the remainder of the activities noted were being performed by Alabama Power (AP) site personne (1) The inspectors reviewed the procedures indicated below to determined whether the procedures were consistent with regula-tory requirements and licensee commitments. The procedures were also reviewed in the areas of procedure approval, requirements for qualification of NDE personnel, and compilation of required records; and if applicable, division of responsibility between the licensee and contractor personnel if contractor personnel are involved in the effor _ _ _ _ _

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8 l j Procedure Title i (SCS)UT-F-480(R1) Manual Ultrasonic with Modification Attachment Examination of Full Penetration Welds (0.200" to 2.5")

(AP) COM-NDE-01 Nondestructive Examination Proc. No. 3.0 (R2) Procedure for Radiographic Inspection of Weldments and Components The inspectors reviewed procedure UT-F-480 to ascertain whether it had been reviewed and approved in accordance with the licens-ee's established QA procedures. The above procedure was re-viewed for technical adequacy and conformance with ASME, l Section V Article 5 and other license commitments / requirements in the following areas: type of apparatus used; extent of coverage of weldment; calibration requirements; search units; beam angles; DAC curves; roference level for monitoring discon-tinuities; method for demonstrating penetration; limits for evaluating and recording indications; recording significant indicetions; and acceptance limit The inspectors reviewed the RT procedure to determined whether it contained sufficient information to assure that the following parameters were specified and controlled within the limits permitted by the applicable code, or any additional specific tion requirement: type of material to be radiographed; material and weld surface condition requirements; type of radiation source, effective focal spot or effective source size; film brand or type; number of films in cassette; minimum source to film distance; type and thickness of intensifying screens and filters; quality of radiographs; film density and contrast for single and composite viewing; use of densitometers for assuring compliance witn film density requirements; system of radiograph identification; use of location markers; methods of reducing and testing for back-scatter; selection of penetrameters including I penetrameter placement; number of penetrameters; shims under penetrameters; radiographic technique for double wall viewing; and, evaluation and disposition of radiograph (2) The inspectors reviewed certification records of equipment, materials, and NDE personnel which had been and will be utilized during the required examinations. The reviews conducted by the inspectors are documented belo (a) The inspectors reviewed the qualification documentation for the below listed SCS and AP exaniners in the following areas: employer's names; person certified; activity qualified to perfomt effective period of certification; signature of employer's designated representatives; basis

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used for certifications; and annual visual acuity, color 5 vision examination and periodic recertificatio Method - Level l Company Examiner UT PT MT RT YT SCS RTD  !!!  !!! !!! III I!! .

t SCS KSJ  !!!  !!! !!! !!! !!

SCS LEM  !!! M !! - !! l l

AP JEA - - - !! - ,

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(b) The inspectors observed an ultrasonic examination demo stration being conducted on the Unit 2 welds indict.ted below. The observations were compared with the applicable j procedure and the Code in the following areas: availability r of and compliance with approved Nondestructive Examination (NDE) procedure; use of knowledgeable NDE personnel; use of  ;

NUE personnel qualified to the proper level; type of apparatus used; calibration requirements; search units; f beam angles; DAC curves; reference level for monitoring [

discontinuities; method of demonstrating penetration, 7 limits of evaluating and recording indications; an *

recording significant indication [

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150 N Description Weld l APR-1-4210 6" Pipe to Elbow 16 [

APR-1-4210 6" Pipe to Elbow 17 The UT demonstrations on the above welds were accomplished j using both a 45' shear wave and a 60' shear wave evami.1 l tion technique. UT equipment calibration, prior to the i above demonstrations, were observed by the inspector (c) Completed ultrasonic examination data and evaluations of l Units I and 2 45' an.' 60' shear wave examinations were >

reviewed by the inspectors to ascertain whether: the I riethods, technique and extent of the examination cceplied with applicable NDE proe.edures; findings were properly recorded and evaluated by qualified personnel; programmatic ,

deviations were recorded as required; personnel, instru- r rents, calibrations blocks, and NDE materiais were desig- l nated. Records reviewed are listed belo I I

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UNIT 1 ISO, No Weld ! 0 Loop IS!/(Grinnel Spool) !$!/(Grinnel)

(FW44) 1 ALA-118 (EG 718/JF-19-508A) 1

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2 (B) 1

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3 (A) 1

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4 (FW32) 1 ALA-132 (EG 686/JF-16-45) 1 (FWI) 2

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2 (C) 2

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3 (B) 2

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(NA) 6 N/A 2 ,

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(hA) 7 N/A 2

ALA-143 (EG 686/JF-16 38) 1 (FW11) 3

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2 (E) 3

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3 (D)

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5 (B) ?

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6 (FW1) 3 UNIT 2

APR-1-4109 (2 101/JG-16G-37) 30 (FWS)

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31 (B) 1

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32 (C) 1

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33 (FW2) 1 APR-1-4210 (2-100/JG-16G-32) *15 (FW5) 2

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APR-1-4210 (2-100/JG-16G-32) *17 (C)

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(NA) 12 (N/A) 2

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(NA) 13 (N/A) 2

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(NA) 14 (N/A) 2 APR-1-4309 (2-454/JG-16G-82) 29 (FW8) 3 s

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31 (C) 3

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32 (0) 3

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?1 (E) 3

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• Examination dati)obtained prior to removal of these welds from the SI ,

The data Unit P, ids. tosh for We 12, 13,2, SIS 14,preservice ultrasonic 15, 16, .1.7, and 18 and examination the

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- Inservice examination data, conducted in April 1986, for

/ ueld 16, was reviewed by the inspectors in order to deter-

$ mined' if any relevan.t indications were reported as a resu?,t of these examinations. , These examinations did not report any indications at these location ,

o j (d) The following listed ultrasonic equipment and materials

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certification records were reviewed:

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Ul t ra sonic 'In'struments ,

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! Hanufacturer/Model S e ri a l "'o .

l l USK/7 27276-4309-2 l

USL/38 210310W

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l USK/7 27276-4314-2 USK/7 27276-4317-2 l

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Ultrasonic IIW blocks with serial no. 790607, 793392 and 793393 Ultrasonic couplant sonotrace 40, batch no. 8662 Ultrasonic Transducers Size Frequency Serial N .5 2.25 MHz J21437

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.375 1.5 MHz 15271

.5 5.0 MHz C03680

.375 2.25 MHz 031294

.25 2.25 MHz 021693

.375 1.5 MHz 15149 tiltrasonic calibration blocks ALA-6 and APR-1 (e) The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 radiographs and associ-ated documentation for the radiographic examinations indicated belo The reviews were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code in the following areas:

the type of material to be radiographed has been identi-fied; the material thickness is within the specified range; i type of radiation source; type, and number of films in .

cassette; minimum source to film distance; type and thick-ness of intensifying screens and filters; exposure condi- >

tions; quality of radiographs; film density and sufficient contrast for single and composite viewing; use of densitom- t eters for assuring compliance with film density require-ments; system of radiograph identification; use of location markers; methods of testing for back-scatter; selection and use of penetrameters including penetrameter placement, and special requirements for single and double wall viewing; l

number of penetrameters; shims under penetrameters; radio-  :

i graphic technique; and, evaluation and disposition of radiograph ISO N Description Weld Comment APR-1-4210 6" Pipe to Elbow 16 RT with water ir, pipe

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6" Pipe to Elbow 17 RT with

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6" Pipe to Elbow 16 RT no water in pipe

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6" Pipe to Elbow 17 RT no water in pipe Following RT of weld 16 with no water in the pipe, a circumfer-enttal crack in the weld was evident in the radiograp The crack followed the approximate weld heat affected zone on the elbow side of the weld for approximately 2-1/2" then crossed the weld metal at approximately a 45' angle and proceeded another 2-1/2" along the weld heat affected zone on the pipe side of the wel ,

(f) The below listed fabricated weld acceptance radiographic film was reviewed to determine if radiographic quality was in accor- ,

dance with the applicable procedure and Code requirements and to specifically verify the following: penetrameter ser.sitivity; filn density and density variation; film identification; film quality; weld coverage; and weld acceptabilit Unit 1 Isometric Weld ID Film Reviewed EG686-JF-16-38 FW-11 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0

" 0-5, 5-10, 10-5, 15-0 FW-1

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B JAC, BE, EH, HI

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E AD, DG, Gil, JA

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• • D AD, DG, GI, IA L

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C AD, DF, FI, IA ,

EG718-JF-19-508A A KD, DG, GJ, JX

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8 AD, DG, GJ, JA

" F!,'- 32 0-5, 5-10, 10-5, 15-0

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FW-44 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0 r

EG686-JF-16-45 B A-D, D-G, F-J, !

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C B-E, E-H, H-J J-B 7 l

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FM-1 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0

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FW-34 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0 UNIT 2 EG2-100-JG-16G-32 *B J-A-8, B-E, E-H, H-J

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• C A-C, C-E, E-G, G-I, I-A

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• FW-5 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0

" *FW-1 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0 EJ2-454-JG-16G-82 B A-C, H-I, B-J, F-J, E-H,

" C-E

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C A-C, C-E, E-H, H-1, '

I-K, K-A

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O A-C, C-E, E-G, G-1 1-K, K-A

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E A-C, C-D-E, E-G, G-!

I-K, K-A

"

FW-6 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0

"

FW-8 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0 EG2-101-JG-16G-37 C A-D, D-G, G-J, J-A

"

• • 8 K-A-D, D-G, G-J, J-A

"

FW-B 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0

"

FW-8(RI) 0-4, 4-8, 8-12, 12-16, 16-0

"

FW-2 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-0

• Welds to be removed from S!0

• • Welds with indications noted during review (g) The inspectors reviewed the associated examination records for the above listed welds to determine compliance with procedure requirements for examination reccrds and to determine if dispo-sition of the welds radiographed was in compliance with applica-ble Code and specificatior, requirement _ _ _ _ _ _ - -

_ _ _ _ _ . __ __ _ ________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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.

(h) During the review of the fabrication radiographs by the inspec-tors, two welds were noted which contained controversial indications. These two welds are identified below along with the indication location and a description of the indication Unit loop 3, weld D, as identified on isometric EG686-JF-16-3 Possible indication noted on radiographic film view I-A at station K. The indication is approximate-ly 7/8" in length and appears to be a possible lack-of-fusion conditio Unit 2, loop 1, weld B, as identified on isometric EG2-101-G-16G-37. Possible indication noted on radiograph-ic film view J-A at station K. The indication is approxi-mately 1/2" in length and appears to be a transverse linear indication extending out of a small porosity indication and running across the weld roo It should be noted that each of these welds have been UT exam-ined as noted in paragraph 5.c.(2) (c), above. The UT examina-tions did not reveal any relevant indications and, therefore, it is improbable that if these are valid indications they would have any appreciable through wall dimension However, the inspectors discussed with the licensee, the possibility that these indications could be valid. Following these discussions, the licensee made the following commitments:

- Unit 1, loop 3, weld D, isometric EG86-JF-16-38, will be radiographed during the next scheduled Unit 1 outag Unit 2, loop 1, weld B, isometric EG2-101-JG-16G-37, will be radiographed during the current Unit 2 outage.

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l (i) The inspectors reviewed the fabrication weld history records for the below listed SIS 90' and 45' elbow to pipe welds that are similar to the failed elbow to pipe wel These reviews were conducted to confirm that the reqaired materials, welding procedure, and inspection requirements were in accordance with applicable requirement UNIT 1

, Isometric Weld ID -Loop l

EG718-JF-19-508A A 1

"

8 1 EG686-JF-16-45 B 2

"

C 2 i

m

- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

-

.

EG686-JF-16-38 B 3

" 3 C

" 3 D

"

E 3 UNIT 2 EG2-101-JG-16G-37 8 1

" 1 C

EG-2-100-JG-16G-32 *B 2

" 2 C

EG2-454-JG-16G-82 B 3

" 3 C

" 3 D

" 3 E

• Cracked weld (j) The licensee established reference alignment measurements prior to making the initial cut to remove the failed section of the Unit 2 pipe. The initial measurements were compared to measurements made immediately following the initial cutting operation in order to determine if an excessive cold sprirg motion was evident. The inspectors reviewed these measurements and concluded that no signifi-cant cold spring motion had teken plac (k) The inspectors reviewed the material certification documen-tation for the replacement pipe spool piece and the re-placement 90* elbo Wii.hin the areas inspected, no violations or devf ;tions were identifie _ _________

-

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6. List of Abbreviations AP Alabama Power DAC Distance Auplitude Correction ID Identification IIW International Institute of Welding ISI Inservice Inspection ISO Isometric MHz Megahertz MT Magnetic particle Mwe Megawatt electrical NDE Nondestructive Examination N Number NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission Psig Pounds per square inch gauge FROC Procedure PT Liquid penetrant QA Quality Assurance R Revision RT Radiograph RTD Resistance temperature detector "

SCS Southern Company Services SIS Safety Injection System Tav Temperature average TOC Top dead center UT Ultrasonic VT Visual W Westinghouse

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P I

i

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