IR 05000285/1988015

Forwards Summary of Enforcement Conference on 880608 Re Findings of Insp Rept 50-285/88-15 on 880406-0513

ML20195G386
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	06/21/1988
From:	Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
References
EA-88-145, NUDOCS 8806270327
Download: ML20195G386 (40)

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.y a JUN 2 i W In. Reply Refer To:

Docket

50-285/88-15 EA: 88-145 Omaha Public Power District .

ATTN: R. L. Andrews, Division Manager-Nuclear Production 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Gentlemen:

This refers to the Enforcement Conference conducted in the NRC Region IV Office on June 8,1988, with you and other members of your staff, and Region IV and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation personnel. This conference was related to the findings of the NRC inspection conducted during the period April 6 through May 13, 1988, which were documented in our NRC Inspection Report 50-285/88-15 dated June 1, 198 The subjects discussed at this meeting are described in the enclosed Meeting Summar In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will Se placed in the NRC's Public Document Roo Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with yo

Sincerely, ortcInt1 cgned 0/.

l L.3.C4Jktrl L. J. Callan, Director Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure:

Meeting Sunmary w/ attachments (2)

cc w/ enclosure: (seenextpage)

• previouly concurred

• DRP/PE *C:PS/B 0:DR RMullikin;dp TWesterman LJCallan i

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Omaha Public Power District -2-cc w/ enclosure:

Fort Calhoun Station ATTN: W. G. Gates, Manager P.O. Box 399 Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 Harry H. Voight, Es LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington, D. Kansas Radiation Control Program Director Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director bec to DMB (IE45)

bec distrib by RIV:

RRI R. D. martin, RA RPSB-DRSS SectionChief(DRP/B)

Rly File DRF Project Engineer, DRP/B P. Milano, NRR Project Manager DRS

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1. ENCLOSURE OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT JUNE 8, 1988 MEETING SUMMARY-

. Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (0 PPD)

Facility: FortCalhounStation(FCS).

License No.: DPR-40 Docket No.: 50-285

- SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE CONCERNING.NRC INSPECTION FINDING 3 (INSPECTION REPORT 50-285/88-15)

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On June 8,1988, representatives of 0maha Public Power District, met in

' Arlington, Texas, with NRC Region IV and NRR personnel to discuss the findings documented in the NRC.Inpsection Report dated June 1, 198 The attendance list and licensee presentations are attached. The meeting was held at the request of NRC, Region IV.-

The NRC indicated that the intent of the enforcement conference was to discuss three basic issues. The licensee was requested within the scope of these issues to discuss the root cause, the corrective actions, the licensee's analysis, and the safety significance. The issues identified were as follows:

The excessive air leakage identified by the licensee during t sting of the air accumulator check valves associated with the safety injection and refueling water tank (SIRWT) level indicatio The potential for single failure of the two isolation valves associate with the SIRWT suctio The containment pressure instrument line (3/8-inch) identified by the licensee which had been left open to the atmosphere for over a yea _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - -

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i 1 Attachment 1

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Enforcement Conference Attendance List - Region IV 0mahn Public Power District NRC Attendees:

L. J. Callan, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RIV A. B. Beach, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RIV

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J. L. Milhoan, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RIV H. J. Wong, Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement, NRC HQ-J. A. Calvo, Director, Project Directorate IV, NRR P. D. Milano, Licensing Project Manager, NRR G. F. Sanborn, Enforcement Officer, RIV T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section B, RIY P. H.- Harrell, Senior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun R. P. Mullikin, Project Engineer, RIV T. Reis, Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun J. B. Baird, Technical Assistant, Division of Reactor Projects, RIV OPPD Attendees:

K. J. Morris, Division Manager J. F. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs S. Gambhir, Section Manager, Generating Station Engineering J. X. Gasper, Manager, Administration and Training Services R. L. Jaworski, Section Manager, Technical Services CE Attendees:

R. W. Bradshaw, Supervisor, Chemical Services

W. G. Dove Supervisor, Operations Analysis ,

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Attachment 2 l

CALHOUN STATION

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NRC C'P~?D CONFERENCE r .

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JUNE 8, 1%8 y

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NRC MEETING June 8, 1988 Inspection Report 88-15 j

! OPENING REMARKS / INTRODUCTION (5 minutes) K.'J. Morris i

I OVERVIEW OF MEETING (5 minutes) J. J. Fisicaro II POTENTIAL VIOLATION - FAILURE TO INSTALL A S. K. Gambhir COMPONENT THAT COMPLIES WITH ESTABLISHED DESIGN CRITERIA (285/8815-06) (25 ;4tnutes)

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Background, (System Configuration, Design Basis and Statement of Problem)

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Statement of Problem

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Corrective Actions Taken/Results Achieved

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Future Planned Actions REVIEW 0F ACCUMULATOR TESTING

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Status of Inspection Report Items 1-10 I POTENTIAL VIOLATION - CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

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(285/S815-14) (25 Minutes) T. L. Patterson

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Statement of Probles

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Corrective Action Taken/Results Achieved

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Future Corrective Action Planned

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Calculation of Radiation Levels (285/8815-13) MANAGEMENT INVESTIGATIVE SAFETY TEAM (10 minutes) J. K. Gasper V SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (25 minutes) T. L. Patterson

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Safety Analysis for Operability (SAO)

.- SAO for Instrument Air System i

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LOCA concurrent with CCW Line Rupture in containment (285/8315-07)

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Hot-leg injection (285/8815-11)

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A/HCV-742 (285/8815-15)

VII. IUSTRUMENT AIR STATUS (15 minutes) R. L. Jaworski

- Update on Issue VIII. CLOSING ComENTS (5 minutes) K. J. Morris ll

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. CORRECPIVE AC1' IGE TAKDI AND RESUIHS AGtIDIEI)

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REPIACDtD'P OF CRANE FIG #27 OIECK VAUIES WITI NEW IE TIGff (NUPRD B-8C-1) OIECK VALVE ,

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NDi VALVES INCEIKID IN '3fB ISI PROGRAM

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DGIRIIATION Is PRDIOSED 'IO PE FURINER lODIFIED 'IO FACIIZrATE FUNCPIONAL TESTING (MR-FC-88-39)

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REVIDi OF UIHER A0WMUlAKR DEIAT.IATIONS (14 SIMIIAR INbMTIONS ICDrnrim - SEE TABIE - A)

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T.E A i

EUNCTICM OF OQE & NON-02E VALVES WI'IYI AOCUNJIATORS WITH NON IEAK TIGfP OIECK VAIVES -

VALVE VALVE FUNCPIN FUNCTION OF ACCUMUINIDR CORRECPIVE ACPION ILV-383 1&2 SINP IER ISOL SAFEIY REIATED 4 'IDGORARY FDDIFICATION IIAS BEEN COMPIETE IE VALVES ARE CON-SIG RED OPEhATIO R ~

HCV-2850 EfP ISO VLVS '

{ liCV-2851 "

itCV-2852 "

SEE OSAR 87-10, P. 15 ard 16

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i 11CV-2874A N }{IR ISO VLVS ONLY REQU:: RED IF W LINE BREAIG -

, llCV-2875A " -

OUISIDE F.C. DESIGN BASIS

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IIAND NIFFTA ARE PROVIDED AND 711E AIHTENATIVE MEANS ARE

!!CV-2874B "

VALVES ARE ACCESSIBIE EUR MANUAL AVAIIABIE 70 PERFORM IICV-255B " ~

OPEPATIO DESIGN BASIS FUNC-liCV-2876B " -

TIONS. A IODIFICA-

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MS-291 AIR OPIRAT1!D SEE OSAR 87-10, P. 5 - TION HAS BEEN

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ACCUM. IS NOT REQUIRED FOR PERF0FM- SGIEDUIE MS-292 "

ING ANY DESIGI BASIS SAFEIY EUNCTIO '

HCV-484 OCH EXIT VIX Sat /X ?EE OSAR 87-10, P. 11 -

I!CV-485 "

ARE ACCESSIBLE FOR MANUAL OPERATION

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CONCIUSIONS

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TIIS PROBIIM HAS CAUSED APPARENIIX BECAUSE OF MIS-APPLICA7' ION OF OIECK VALVES BY DE ORIGINAL A/ 'nE PDDBIEN HAS NCTP DISCOVERED EARIZER BECAUSE OF NO RMCTIQUL 'ITSTIN ONCE DE PROBIIM HAS IDENTIFIED, OPPD 'IOOK PRCMPP QX<ttrA.nVE ATICH ' HITS HAS PRCMPPLY REEORIED TO TEE NR DI!2R SIMIIAR INSTAIIATIONS PERE REVIEWED 'IO PRECIUDE IWSIBILITY OF SIMIIAR PBOBIEMS EISDRIER TIIS RE-EMPfiASIZES 'UE NEED FOR OCMPLETION OF DESIGN BASIS RE00HSRTJfION PROJECT INCLUDING HIYSICAL VERIFICATION AS O(JPLINED IN 'DE PPOGRAM PIAN PREVIOUSIX SUCEITED 'IO 'UE HR .

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PARPIAL SCM1ARY OF OPDi/ UNRESOLVED ITDE'

MOf INSPECTION RERXT 188-15 SUWNtY OPEN ITD( 285/8315-01: SUNIT SQIEDUIE FOR FINAL TESTING OF AIR AOCIHJIATOR .

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OPEN ITEM 285/8815-02: SUMIT NER REVISION OF IST PROGRAM TO INCUJDE AOCIMJIATOR OHX3C VAIRES IIENTIFIED Di OSAR 87-1 OPEN ITSt 285/8815-03: THIS ITDi NAIS WITI TIIE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION ISSUE REIATING TO AOCINJIATOR/IUBING AND OCNITOL VALVE OPEN ITEM 285/8515-04: SIRWP IEVEL 00NITOIIES ISSUE FOFMAL CAIIIIIATION TO VERIFY ACCIMJIATORS ARE SIZED wm<t.uL x

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SUPNARY

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OPEN ITEM 285/8515-05: 00t!PIEIE 12 IKXR FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF AOaMRATORS ASSOCIKIED WTIH HmRTFRS FOR SIRRP IEVEL INDICATIO .' ,

OPEN TITM 285/8815-06: USE OF NON IEAK TIQfr O!ECK VALVE - IUIETTIAL '

VIOIATION FAIIURE TO MEEP PIANP DESIGN QumuA - SIBNP IEVEL 00K1BOIIER OPl!N ITDt 285/8815-07: HCV-438 B&D - EVAIDATE AND DE:rERMINE IF OPPD NJST PHEUM AN ANAI2 SIS ASSWDG IOCA 00tKURRDir WrIH CCW Imr2 RUPIURE

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StM4 arf OPEN TITM 285/8815-08: HCV-238 & 239 - SINCE AOWMUIATOR CIECK VALVES ARE INSIDE BIO-SHmn, IT IS NDP APPARENP IICW OPPD DTITNDS TO TEST THE OIECK VALVES QUARITRLY.

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OPEN TITM 285/8815-09: HCV-238 & 239 - PREPARE SEISMIC CAILUIATION i OPEN I W 285/8815-10: HCV-240 - IEEPARE SEISMIC CAICUIATION .

.j OPEN IITH 285/8815-06: ICV-383-1 & 2 - CNLY ONE ACCUNJIAIUR IS PaavImo rea no varuzS. MIS ooEs Nor azEr SINGIE FAIIURE CRrrERIA.

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OUTLINE OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY EVENT PRESENTATION

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e STATEMENT OF PROBLEM e SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL / LICENSING COMMITMENTS NOT MET e STATEMENT OF OPERABILITY e SAFETY IMPLICATIONS e RESULTS OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM REVIEW e CORRECTIVE ACTIONS e CONCLUSIONS l

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O SEOUENCE OF EVENTS

3/27/87 - PERFORMED ST-CONT-3 TEST 1 3/28/87 - PERFORMED ST-CONT-3 TEST 2 5/4/87 - NOZZLE DAMS REMOVED, PARTS STORED IN RM 59 5/27/87 - PERFORMED PENETRATION VERIFICATION USING # 872525

~6/15/87 - NOZZLE DAMS REMOVED FROM RM 59 4/18/88 - DISCOVERED MISSING CAP PC-743 (~1515)

4/19/88 - I&C FOREMAN CONFIRMS CTMT LEAKAGE (~0815)

4/19/88 - CAP REPLACED AND LEAK CHECKED (~0945)

4/19/88 - MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR CONVENES PRC (~1030)

l 4/19/88 - PRC DECLARES EVENT REPORTABLE, ASSIGNS FOLLOWUP ACTIONS TO INVESTIGATE OTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEMS j 4/20/88 - COMPLETE WALKDOWN OF ATL NON-WETTED PENETRATIONS

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4/28/88 - MIST ACTIVATED l

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4/29/88 - SP-CONT-3 ISSUED l- 5/2/88 - SP-CONT-3 COMPLETED

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5/12/88 - MIST REPORT ISSUED 5/26/88 - DRAFT HPES REPORT ISSUED l

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5/27/88 - CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS COMPLETED BY CE l

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CRC IRC CAPS REMOVED A/HCV-742 E}

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VA-275 VA-228 k VA-219 A/PC-765 II X 0 II I VA-260

< A/PC-744-1 pq X H- V A-227 A/PC-744-2 ?( X VA-223

.PC-743 OLAR II X

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g X INSTRUMENT ISOLATION VALVES TEST 1 FIGURE 1 Cm IRC CAPS REMOVED A/HCV-742 n

'7' E 3-l VA-275 V A-228 k V A-259 A/PC-765 X X S >4

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[- A/PC-744-1 ESF X X z

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l A/PC-744-2 X X V A-223 PC-743 OALARMX II

_ INSTRUMENT ISOLATION l VALVES l TEST 2 l FIGURE 2 i

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TECHNICAL / LICENSE ISSUES POTENTIALLY' VIOLATED

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e ST-CONT-3 IS PERFORMED TO SATISFY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5, PARAGRAPH (4), "CON'IAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LEAK RATE TESTS (TYPE C TESTS)".

e TECH SPEC.2.6, PARAGRAPH (1)a. STATES "CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY SHALL NOT BE VIOLATED UNLESS THE REACTOR IS IN THE COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION".

e TECH SPEC 2.8, PARAGRAPH (1) REQUIRES "ALL AUTOMATIC

. ISOLATION VALVES SHALL BE OPERABLE OR AT LEAST ONE VALVE IN EACH LINE SHALL BE CLOSED" DURING ANY REFUELING OPERATION e TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 2.15, TABLES 2-2 AND 2-3, IDENTIFIES THE NUMBER OF MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS FOR THE CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE (CPHS) AS o GDC-19 AND SRP 6.4 CRITERIA ESTABLISHES 5 REM WBE AND 30 REM THYROID / BETA SKIN POSE LIMITS FOR CONTROL ROO CONCLUSION THE FORT CALHOUN STATION WAS IN VIOLATION OF SPECIFICATIONS 2.6, 2.8 AND 2.1 .

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SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR M-38 PENETRATION OPENING

n PERFORMED A CONSERVATIVE CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS TO DEFINE EXPECTED IMPACT ON SAFETY AS A RESULT OF ADDED LEAKAGE FROM CONTAINMEN e PERFORMED INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED CALCULATION OF EXPECTED LEAKAGE FROM THE OPEN CA ,e LEAKAGE WAS DETERMINED USING THE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROFILE USED FOR EE e LEAKAGE FROM M-38 WAS ADDED TO ALLOWED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LEAKAGE FROM ALL OTHER SOURCES TO DETERMINE TOTAL EXPECTED LEAKAGE FOR DESIGN BASIS LOC e USING THE CALCULATED TOTAL LEAKAGE, RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES WERE DETERMINED USING DESIGN BASIS SOURCE TEP.MS CONSISTENT WITH REG GUIDE 1.4 CRITERI s e TOTAL DOSES USING THE ABOVE ASSUMPTIONS INDICATE THAT THE 0-2 HOUR VALUE IS 6.4 REM WHOLE BODY AND 258.6 REM THYROID AT THE SITE BOUNDARY. THESE VALUES ARE WITHIN THE 10 CFR 100 LIMITS OF 25 REM AND 300 REM, RESPECTIVEL . -

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ROOM LAYOUT FIGURE 3 PC-743 (O\ AREA 3 onc Inc 1 OPEN CAP FOR TESTING 6 in OFF THE FLOOR BELOW INSTRUMENT

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+ INSTRUMENTATION

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SUPPORT RACK Q A/PC-765 AREA 2 AREA 1

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..!..O A/ P C -74 4,- 2 A/HCV-74

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V A-219X VA-228 P 3 OPEN CAPS VA-275 FOR TESTING VA-260 ,,

V A-2 27 g 4 ft OFF THE { ,,

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FLOOR. MOUNTED V A-223 ON THE FRAME

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HPES FINDINGS EVALUATED THREE SEPARATE IMAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS: TWO PAST (1)

EVENTS /ONE RECENT (2) FRIMARY CAUSAL FACTOR FOR TWO ACTIONS WAS INADEQUATE WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS. PRIMARY CAUSAL FACTOR FOR THIRD CONCERN WAS COMMUNICATIONS DEFICIENCY (3) SECONDARY CAUSAL FACTORS INCLUDED (TWO CONCERNS):

e INADEQUATE PRE-JOB BRIEFING l e UNFAMILIARITY / LACK OF TRAINING ON SPECIPIC EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS e INADEQUATE TRAINING ON WORK PRACTICES (SELF-CHECKING l

PROCESS)

e ENV-IRONMENTAL CONDITIONS (SLOPPY WORK AREA, WINTER STORM, AND STORAGE OF MATERIALS IN AREA)

e INADEQUATE TRAINING ON SYSTEMS / SAFETY FUNCTIONS

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ALREADY IN PROGRESS

AT TIME OF INCIDENT e ST-CONT-3 WAS UNDERGOING MAJOR UPGRADE TO ENSURE ALL CAPS /

COMPONENTS PROPERLY ADDRESSED e INITIATED PROCEDURES UPGRADE PROGRAM FOR ALL OPERATING MANUAL PROCEDURES e ADDED REQUIREMENT FOR PRE-JOB BRIEFING FOR ALL SURVEILLANCE TESTS THAT ARE PERFORMED ON AN INFREQUENT BASIS e HELD SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH PLANT PERSONNEL TO STRESS IMPORTANCE OF VERBATIM COMPLIANCE AND ATTENTION TO DETAIL e IMPLEMENTED ACCP. EDITED PERFORMANCE-BASED TRAINING FOR CRAFTSMEN AND OTHER TECHNICAL STAFF MEMBERS e RESTRUCTURED MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT TO ADD FIELD SUPERVISORS ( AND PLANNERS FOR EACH CRAFT l

e INSTITUTED PRE-REVIEW REQUIREMENT ON INFREQUENT CALIBRATION PROCEDUR,ES l

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s DEVELOPING STRUCTURED TRAINING FOR PRC MEMBERS

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ADDITIONAL MEASURES PLANNED

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AS A RESULT OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY e A FORMAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENT FOR PERFORMING PRE-JOB BRIEFS IS TO BE DEVELOPED. THE NEED TO BROADEN REQUIREMENTS FOR PRE-JOB BRIEFINGS BEYOND CURRENT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE EVALUATED e WILL REVIEW THE PROCESS FOR CERTIFYING THE QUALIFICATION OF PERSONNEL PERFORMING SAFETY-SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE e A FORMAL PROCEDURE FOR PRE-STARTUP VERIFICATION OF ALL CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS WILL BE DEVELOPED e EEAR ISSUED TO INSTALL CAGE IN ROOM 59 TO SEPARATE OUTAGE STAGING AREA PROM SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS l

e IMPROVED PROCESS FOR POST SURVEILLANCE TEST REVIEW TO ENSURE FIRST LINE SUPERVISOR REVIEW AND VERIFICATION OCCURS

! WITHIN 24 HODRS OF COMPLETION

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( o FORMAL TRAINING FOR IMPROVED SAFETY AWARENESS WILL BE DEVELOPED FOR ALL FIRST LINE SUPERVISORS

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MANAGEMENT INVESTIGATIVE SAFETY TEAM

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PURPOSE'

• Collect and preserve event information

Establish event documentation files

Analyze event significance

Identifyrootcause(s)

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Recommend and review corrective action

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PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP

J.K. Gasper (DesignatedTeamLeader)

R. L. Jaworski

S. K. Gambhir

METHODOLOGY

Identify additional team members

Review available documents and data

Interview personnel involved

Document reviews and interviews

ACTIVATED

• April 28, 1988 by R. L. Andrews

SCOPE

SIRWT Bubbler Check Valve Failures

• Missing Cap On Containnent Pressure Sensing Line

• REPORT TO DIVISION MANAGER, MANAGER - FORT CALHOUN, AND SARC MEMBERS REQUELTED BY MAY 12, 1988

• REPORTS ISSUED MAY 12, 1988

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SIRWT BUBBLER CHECK VALVE FAILURE

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ADDITIONAL MEMBEAS

R. C. Kellogg

W. O. Weber

COLLECT AND PRESERVE INFORMATION

• "As found" condition of check valves destroyed after testing due to way M.0. was written

EVENT DOCUMENTATION INCLUDED WITH REPORT

EVENT SIGNIFICANCE

- During a LOCA with loss of offsite power, instrument air would be lost and failure of the check valves could cause tne. bubblers to fail causing an inadvertent RAS. This "false' RAS could cause SI pumps failure and consequential core damag *

ROOT CAUSES

- Inadequate scope of ST and IST programs

• Inadequate CQE list

• No systematic assessment to assure completeness

- Misapplication of Crane, Model No. 27, horizontal lift check valve

CORRECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

- Limit "testing" procedures to testing and document as found condition

- Replace similar Crane check valves in other air accumulator application Perform fault tree analysis on Safety Injection (SI) System to

determine adequacy of CQE list, and ST and IST programs for the SI Syste Expand to other systems if discrepancies identifie Place air accumulator check valves in IST program

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MISSING CAP ON CONTAIPOENT PRESSURE SAFETY LINE

ADDITIONAL MEMBERS

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M. W. Butt (HPES Coordinator)

- J. D. Kecy

INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION INCLUDED IN REPORT

EVENT SIGNIFICANCE

- Loss of containment integrity

- Greater than Tech Spec leak rate

- Post accident doses less than 10 CFR 100 limits *

- Control Room habitability limits probably exceeded *

• Design Basis calculations using R.G. 1.4 assumptions

ROOTCAUSE(S)

- Inadequate procedure and work package (primary)

- Lack of system familiarity (secondary)

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

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April 29, 1988 letter

- Develop and execute a procedure to accomplish a complete and documented dual verification of all non-wetted penetration "line ups".

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Completed May 2, 1988

MAJOR CORRECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS (Includes HPES Evaluation Recommendations)

- Development and implement procedure (s) to double verify all penetration "line ups"

- Ensure STs and cps return instruments to proper configuration

- Evaluate acceptability of crimped and soldered line seals

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MISSINGCAPDNCONTAINMENTPRESSURESAFETYLINE(continued)

- Evaluate method to reauce human error potential of these and similar penetrations

- Qualify method of installing Swagelock caps to serve as 60 psi boundary

- Eliminate test tee caps as single boundary by installing an isolation valve as a second isolation boundary

- Training on safety significance of events and decisions

- Clearly define person serving as Acting Manager - Fort Calhoun Station

- Separate temporary equipment from permanent equipment in Room 59 (HPES)

- Training on planning and organizing maintenance (HPES)

- Centralize scheduling and implement ILS

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MIST STATUS

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• ADDENDUM TO BE ISSUE 0 THIS WEEK IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS

• LETTER REQUESTING COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS BY JULY 1, 1988.TO BE SENT TO ALL RECIPIENTS THIS WEEK

ASSIGNMENT OF P3 COMMENDATIONS TO BE MADE AND TRACKED

• ' REPORT TO BE PROVIDED TO NEXT SARC MEETING ON JULY 13, 1988

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SAFETY ANALYSES FOR OPERATION AS APPLIED AT THE FORT CALHOUN STATION A SAFETI ANALYSIS FOR OPERATION IS REQUIRED e WHEN AN EXISTING EVENT OR CCNDITION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT HAS PLACED THE PLANT OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS, e THE EVENT OR CONDITION CANNOT BE IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED, AND e THE EVENT MUST BE REPORTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, CHAPTER 10, PARTS 50.72 OR 50.73.

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I j THE SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR OPERATION IS REQUIRED BY 10 CFR l 50.73(B), CONTENTS. SPECIFICALLY, PARAGRAPH (3) REQUIRES "AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVEN THIS ASSESSMENT MUST INCLUDE THE AVAILABILITY OF OTHb'R SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS THAT COULD HAVE PERFORMED THE l

SAME FUN,CTION AS THE COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS THAT FAILED DURING THE EVENT."

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e SAO WAS FIRST INITIATED IN APRIL 1987. CONSERVATIVE IN

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NATURE IN THAT AT TilAT TIME, NO SPECIFIC DEFICIENCIES OTHER THAN HCV-385/386 HAD BEEN IDENTIFIE o SAO ASSUMED THAT ALL SAFETY RELATED ACCUMULATORS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED CHECK VALVES FAILED. USING THIS ASSUMPTION, OTHER PLANT FEATURES WERE IDENTIFIED TO ASSESS SAFETY SIGNIFICANC e APRIL 6, 1988 THE OSAR FOR ACCUMULATORS WAS COMPLETE BASED ON THE FINDINGS FROM THIS EVALUATION A ONE HOUR REPORT WAS MADE TO THE NRC ON LCV-383-1/2, HCV-238,239 AND 240, AND HCV-438B/ e MID-APRIL 1988, DECISION WAS MADE TO COMPLETE TESTING OF THE ACCUMULATOR FOR THE CCW VALVES TO CONTAINMENT COOLERS AND TO TEST THE SIRWT BUBBLER CHECK VALVE e TESTING IS STILL RSQUIRED FOR HCV-385/386, SIRWT BUBBLERS, AND HCV-2987. MODIFICATIONS OR OTHER CORRECTIVE MEASURES ARE NEEDED FOR REPORTED DEFICIENCIE e FOR HCV 438B/D AND HCV-400 SERIES, EITHER MODIFICATION REQUIRED OR DESIGN BASIS MUST BE REVISED AND SUPPORTE APPEARS THAT MR IS MOST LIKELY FIX FOR 438 B/ e HCV-304, 305, 306 AND 307 NEED A CONFIRMING EVALUATION TO VERIFY THE ADEQUACY OF HOT LEG INJECTION FLOW WITH VALVES IN CURRENT CONFIGURATIO c . .

EVALUATION OF LCV-383-1/2 SINGLE FAILURE OUALIFICATION e THE FORT CALHOUN STATION UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (USAR) SECTION 6.2.5, DESIGN EVALUATION, STATES IN PARAGRAPH h, "THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO MEET THE SINGLR FAILURE CRITERION."

e THE USAR, APPENDIX G, CRITERION 21, SINGLB FAILURE DEFINITION, STATES "THE DESIGN OF THE FO.3T CALHOUN STATION IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT THAT NO SINGLE FAILURE OF ACTIVE COMPONENTS WILL INilIBIT NECESSARY SAFETY ACTION WHEN REQUIRED "

e TIIE CODE OF FEDERAL REGUIJ.TIONS, CIIAPTER 10, PART 50, APPENDIX A, CRITERION 21, PROTECTION SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND TESTABILITY, REQUIRES THAT "R2DUNDANCY AND INDEPENDENCE DESIGNED INTO TIIE PROTECTION SYSTEM SHALL BE SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE THAT (1) NO SINGLE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF PROTECTION FUNCTION".

e LCV-383-1 AND LCV-383-2 ARE NORMALLY OPEN, FAIL OPEN AIR OPERATED VALVES TIIAT MUST BE OPEN TO PROVIDE A BORATED WATER SOURCE FOR THE SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS EARLY IN A DESIGN BASIS LOCA. ONCE LEVEL IN Tile SAFETY INJECTION REFUELING WATER TANK (SIRWT) REACHES 16" LEVEL, THE VALVES RECEIVE A RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SYSTEM (RAS) SIGNAL TO CLOSE. THE VALVES ARE CLOSED TO PREVENT BACKFLOW OF ACTIVATED COOLANT FROM THE CONTAINMENT FLOOR FROM ENTERING TIIE SIRW e LCV-383-1 AND LCV-383-2 RELY ON ONE AIR ACCUMULATOR TO CLOSE WITH LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR TO PERFORM THE RAS FUNCTION. THE TWO VALVES HAVE THEIR INDEPENDENT SOLENOID VALVES DOWNSTREAM OF THE ACCUMULATOR AND ITS ASSOCIATED CHECK VALV THERE IS NO SINGLE FAILURE OF THE ACCUMULATOR OR CHECK VALVE, ACTIVE OR PASSIVE, THAT WOULD PREVENT THE VALVES FROM GOING TO THEIR ( FAILED POSITION. PASSIVE FAILURE OF THE ACCUMULATOR AND ASSOCIATED TUBING OR AN ACTIVE FAILURE OF THE CHECK VALVE COULD PREVENT BOTII VALVES FROM BEING CLOSE e AN ADDITIONAL SINGLE FAILURE OF ONE OF Tile CHECK VALVES, SI-140 OR SI-139, WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE THE SAFETY FUNCTION (I.E., PREVENTING BACKFLOW) IS INHIBITE e LCV-383-1 AND LCV-383-2 ARE IN PARALLE THIS DESIGN l

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ARRANGEMENT ENSURES THAT WITH ANY SINGLE FAILURE, AT LEAST ONE PATH OF FLOW FROM THE SIRWT TO THE SI/CS PUMPS WOULD BE AVAILABLE. ALSO, SINCE THE VALVES ARE IN PARALLEL, ONE VALVE FAILING TO CLOSE OR BOTH VALVES FAILING TO CLOSE ON RAS, WOULD HAVE THE SAME EFFECT ON THEIR ABILITY TO PERFORM THEIR SECONDARY SAFETY FUNCTION, THUS, CHECK VALVES SI-139 AND SI-140 ARE REQUIRED TO MEET SINGLE FAILURE CRITERIA FOR PREVENTING BACKFLO CONCLUSION THE 7ACT THAT ICV-383-1 AND LCV-383-2 SHARE AN ACCUMULATOR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF FORT CALHOUN STATION'S OR CURRENT NRC SINGLE FAILURE CRITERI , .. o l i

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SLIDE 1 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM STATUS REPORT

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SLIDE 2 I. :TEMS COMPLETE INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM SPECIFIC Operational Assignment of System Er.gineer Procedural Procedure Change to MP-FP-7 to Ensure Check Valve Operability Review of IAS Operating Procedures Upgrade Incident Reporting Process Development of Operating Instructions for High Dew Points Instrument Air System Line-up/ Tag Out

, Maintenance Preventive Maintenance Program Upgrade Air Dryer Desiccant Replacement Revise Air Dryer Preventive Maintenance Schedule Surveillance Preventive Maintenance / Surveillance Testing of Air Operated Dampers Particulate Monitoring Program

, Dew Point Sampling Program Evaluations System Functional Inspection Evaluation of Interface Valves and Bubblers Consideration of Check Valve Failures in the Safety Analysis for Operability , Engineering Common Mode Failure Consideration MANAGERIAL IMPROVEMENTS

, Evaluations SARC Evaluation of the Water Intrusion Event Event Investigative Team Reporting Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) Upgrade Safety Analysis for Operability (SA0) Personnel Employee / Management Conferences Procedures Policy Statecent Concerning Equipment Operation by Non-Operators

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II. ITEMS IN PROGRESS SLIDE 3 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM SPECIFIC 1. Operational Additional Walkdowns of Instrument Air System Procedures Abnormal Operating Procedure- (A0P-17)

Upgrade in Accordance with Writers Guide Maintenance Clean / Flush the Instrument Air System Valve Teardown Program Surveillance Testing of CQE Non-ISI Valves Monthly Valve Cycling for Inservice Test Program Cycling of Insarvice Inspection (ISI) Valves Inservice Inspection Program Engineering

, Diesel Generator Air Damper Replacement Assessment of Instrument Air System Design to Current Industry Standards System Functional Inspection - Follow-up Development of Instrument Air System Design Basis Documentation Identificaticn and Installation of Air Filter Additions for Valve Oper4 tors and Air Dryer Removal of Plant Air System ar.d Fire Protection System Crosstie RANAGERIAL IMPa0VEMENTS Evaluations Nuclear Operations Plan Development and Appraisal Instrument Air Steering Committee Training General Employee Training (GET) Upgrade for Safety Awareness Additional Field Observation Training Upgrade of Lesson Plans Pre-Job Briefings for Surveillance Tests t

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SLIDE 4 o , .

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INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM CORRECTIVE ACTION ITEMS

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NUMBER OF CORRECTIVE ACTION ITEMS I

TOTAL / COMPLETED 7 ys COMPLETION TIME JUNE 1, 1988 I I I I I I I I I ! I 0 I DEC J AN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 1987 1988 COMPLETION TIME

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REVIEW 0F. INSTRUMENT AIR PROJECT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO SIRWT BUBBLER CHECK VALVE AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY EVE

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CONCLUSIONS OF REVIEW:

> 'The two events _were not the result of ineffective er incomplete

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Instrument Air actions

' . Remaining actions. improve reliability and operability of_the

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Instrument Air System Completed Instrument Air System action have improved OPPD

' responsiveness to events

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St.IDE 7

'- Questions arise on broad issues relating the-two recent events to the instrument air event: Is the scope of the Surveillance Test Program and'CQE list

. properly defined? [0 pen - Action in Progress)

. Are personnel who are performing Surveillance Tests properly trained and briefed? (Closed - Action Initiated and Complete]

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