IR 05000285/1988043

Insp Rept 50-285/88-43 on 881114-18.One Violation & Unresolved Item Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings & Structural Welding Activities

ML20196A267
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	12/01/1988
From:	Barnes I, Gilbert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196A257	List: IR 05000285/1988043 ML20196A253 ML20196A262
References
50-285-88-43, NUDOCS 8812050299
Download: ML20196A267 (5)

Text

_ __________ - -__ _____ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

l ..

! .

• p . : .

.

APPENDIX B f U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV i f

t l NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/88-43 Operating License: DPR-40 i  ;

Docket: 50-285  !

l l Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)

Facility Name: FortCalhounStation(FCS)  ;

Inspection At: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska ,

Inspection Conducted: November 14-18, 1988 l If Inspector; bWo /M /a.// /pr L. D. Gilbert, Reactof Inspector, Materials Date ,

and Quality Programs Section. Division of i Reactor Safety i I

f I

1. pproved: 0~m /2. /t /RS~

I. Barnes, Chief, Materials and Quality Date Programs Section Division of Reactor Safety I

f f

Inspection Sumary inspection Conducted November 14-18, 1988 (Report 50-285/28-43)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on  ;

previous inspection findings and structural welding activities, j Results: In general, the licensee has shown progress in establishing and I implementing improved controls over welding and nondestructive examination activities. One violation was identified (paragraph 3), however, relative to  !

Quality Control (QC) acceptance of undersized flare bevel welds. The licensee l has initially determined that the responsible QC inspector did not understand

'

the inspection procedure acceptance standards, which suggests an underlying  :

weakness in training criteria for inspector ,

A new unresolved item, which is a matter about which more infomation is t required to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a deviation, or a violation, was identified (paragraph 3) regarding fillet weld size and fit-up l 8812050299 88120'

l

' $DR ADOCK 05000$S5 PDC

, e' :

,

.

gaps. This item indicates that weaknesses may potentially exist with respect to the effectiveness of the corrective action program in tenns of generic assessment of identified problems and timeliness of corrective actions,

>

- . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _____ -- ___ _ _ ____________ _ ___________ ____ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ ___

7_

.

6.- O

,

-3- t DETAILS Persons Contacted OpPD W. G. Gates, Plant Manager

• L. T. Kusek, Acting Manager

• J. L. Dyer, Senior Quality Control (QC) Inspector

• J. L. Kyle. Welding Specialist

• D. Matthess, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing

• R. Kellogg, Supervisor Special Services

• C. Bloyd, Lead, Special Services Engineer

• C, J. Brunnert, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance (QA)

• R. L. Jaworski, Manager, Station Engineering J. D. Rudins. QC, Radiography Level Ill P. Ferrone, Lead, QC Inspector Ebasco M. Villanueva, level III Inspector Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company J. Tetreault, Authorized Nuclear Inspector NRC

• T. Reis, Resident Inspector The NRC inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor employees during the inspectio * Denotes attendance at exit interview conducted on November 18, 198 . Followup of Previously Identified items (92702) (Closed) Deficiency (735/85?9-2.6-1 (H.4)): Plant welding accomplished to nonarglicable welding procedures. The NRC inspector verified that the noces to Drawing No SK-FC-85-62 had been clarified and engineering evaluations were performed to evaluate the as-installed condition of the skewed fillet welds used to install the HVAC supports for Modification Package MR 84-162. The upgraded welding program was previously reviewed and addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/88-31. This item is closed, (0 pen) Deviation (285/8831-01): Failure to meet comitrents to reradiograph the repair welds made to the emergency feedwater storage tank. The NRC inspector reviewed the initial radiographs of longitudinal seam weld 1A and nozzle welds N-10 and N-18 performed by

_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.. .

.

-4-Ebasco. The film side penetrameter technique used by Ebasco to radiograph the area under the stiffener on longitudinal welds was reviewed with the radiographic examination Level III examiners for OPPD and Ebasc Since the stiffener made the area inaccessible for a source side penetrameter, use of film side penetrameters was in accordance with ASME Code requirements. The radiographic film reader i had rejected areas on the films for unacceptable indications and l radiographic technique; however, in the areas of the film that were  !

not rejected, the technique and quality of the radiograph  !

examinations were consistent with the requirements of Ebasco Radiographic Procedure No. RT-2002 Revision 0. This item remains open pending completion of the radiographic examination and repair of the emergency feedwater storage tan . Structural Welding Activities (55100)

The NRC inspector observed the welding and welding controls associated with the fabrication of the diesel generator No. 2 exhaust stack supports for Modification MR-FC-88-60. The supports were designated as limited COE items. The supports were detailed on Drawing No. A-5606 and were being welded using qualified welding procedures as required by Standing Order G-72 and the requirements of AWS 01.1-86. The welding was performed by welders who were listed on the current list of qualified welder The E7018 welding filler material being used to weld the supports was properly issued by QC personnel and controlled by the welders as required in Standing Order G-72A, While observing the welding activities, the NRC inspector ider.tified two areas of concer The first concern involved the fit-up gap for fillet welds on the supports for Modification MR-FC-88-60. The weld data fortes for Modification MR-FC-88-60 allowed a maximum gap of 1/8 inch. Paragraph 3.3 of AWS D specifies that if the fit-up gap exceeds 1/16 inch, then the leg of the fillet weld shall be increased by the arcunt of the separation or the contractor shall demonstrate that the required effective throat has been obtained. The welding engineering specialist had incorporated the fit-up i gap requirements of AWS 01.1 into a General Welding Specification (i.e., i GWS-2000), which was in the process of being issued. The fit-up gap i requirement was also identified in a memorandum to management as a potential problem area. Since the current instructions allow fit-up gaps in excess of 1/16 inch, the NRC inspector requested an evaluation of the completed welds for adequate weld size. QC initiated OR-FC-88-237 to perform this evaluation. This is an unresolved item pending completion of the licensee's evaluatien of fillet welds that may have excessive fit-up gap with insufficient effective throa (285/8843-01)

The second ccncern involved the visual examinatien of flare bevel weld Four flare bevel welds were observed by the NRC inspector to be undersiz The welds were identified on Drawing No. A-5606 as VAS-79-7 through VAS-79-1 The undersize conditien varied from 3/32 to 1/8 inch from the flush weld requirement of the weld data form specified in Modification Package MR-FC-88-6 The welds had been visually inspected by QC and l

.

e .

-5-accepted. The licensee determined that the QC inspector did not understand the acceptance standards specified in QDP-20 Appendix G for visual inspection of flare bevel welds. The failure to follow visual inspection instructions is an apparent violation. (285/8843-02)

4. Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted on November 18, 1988, with those personnel denoted in paragraph 1. At the exit interview, the NRC inspector informed the licensee that one previously identified inspection finding would be closed, the fit-up gap and effective throat of fillet welds would be made an unresolved item, and the failure of a QC inspector to follow instructions would be an apparent violation. No information was presented to the NRC inspector that was identified by the licensee as proprietar ,

I I