IR 05000285/1988002
| ML20196B788 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1988 |
| From: | Gagliardo J, Greg Pick NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196B779 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-88-02, 50-285-88-2, NUDOCS 8802120143 | |
| Download: ML20196B788 (5) | |
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APPENDIX B'
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U.S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection' Report:
50-285/88-02 Operating License:
DPR-40 Docket:
50-285,
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Licensee:
OmahaPublic.EfwerDistrict(0 PPD)
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1623 Harney' Street Omaha, Nkbraska 68102
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.y Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)
Inspection At:
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska and RIV Office
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Inspectiml Conducted:
January 4-15, 1988
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[$~F Pick, hactor Inspector', Operational-
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Appro,ed:
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J. }E. Ga@iardo, Chief, Operational Programs Date
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InspectiCn Summary
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Inspection Conducted January 4-15, 1988 (Report 50-285/88-02)
Areas Inspected:
Routipe, unannounced inspection of followup on'previously
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identified items.
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Results: Within tid'hia inspected, one' violation was identified (285/8802-01, paragraph 2).
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me 8802120143 800209 PDR ADOCK 03000285 O
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DETAILS
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Persons' Contacted 1
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OPPD.
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-*R.JL.'Andrews, Di. vision Manager-Nuclear Production -
-*W.G. Gates, Manager.: Fort Calhoun' Station
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- J..K.- Gasper.. Manager, Administration and Training. Services 1*K. J. Morris, Division Manager,1 Quality Assurance and Regulatory (Affairs
~*M.'E. Eidem Department Manager,-GeneratingLStation~ Engineering GSE),
1 Mechanical:and Nuclear
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- J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuclear.Regu'latory and Industry Affairs.(NR&IA)
- T.,L.-Patterson,; Acting Supervisor, Technical
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- J. C. McIVor Supervisor,: Technical 1-
- L.'L.- Gundrum, Senior; Nuclear Production'. Engineer, NR&IA
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- W..Hansher, Licensing Engineer i
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'NRC
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- P..Harrell : Senior Resident Inspector.
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- Denotes those, individuals attending the eNit'mee ing.
2.
Followup.on Previously Identified < Items
. (0 pen)L Deficien$y (285/85-22 D2.241):
Incorrect Design' Input in
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Calculation Associated with MR-FC-81-21B -The NRC inspector determined.
-that a new calculation was conducted, verified, and-approved regarding
' accumulator volume and minimum air. pressure. - An independent calculation
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was' conducted for verification purposes. TheLminimum air pressure utilized was 94.7 psia.
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A training session was h' eld 1n December 1986, on Calculation Preparation
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and Checking and on Sizing Air Accumulators and Providing Seismic
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Accumulator. Support. The source of input data was obtained from catalogues and via a telecon with Worthington Cylinders, specifically, for the standard volume of a 20-pound propane tank. A functional test was
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conducted _ verifying that the accumulator volume held the valve in position for at least 30 minutes.
It should be noted that, presently, long-term
. corrective actions regarding identification, operating criteria, and functional testing of Certified Quality Elements (CQE) valve operators is-sc e u eh d l d to be completed by the end of the 1988 refueling-outage. This item remains-open.
(0 pen) Deficiency (285/85-2202.2-3):
Incomplete Installation / Testing l
Performed for MR-FC-81-218 - The NRC inspector reviewed documentation and
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determined that the functional tests conducted during the 1987 refueling
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outage on. Valves HCV-438B and HCV-438D were satisfactory.
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The acceptance criteria required the valves to be held in position (closed) for 20 minutes utilizing the accumulator volume.
The functional
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Also documented was that the operator took'6 minutes to get from Al-100 to Valves HCV-438B and HCV-438D.
This item remains open pending completion of long-term actions relating to identification, functional testing, and operating criteria of CQE valve operators with accumulators. This is presently scheduled to be completed by the end of the 1988 refueling outage.
(0 pen) Deficiency (285/85-22 D2.2-6):
10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation
Based Upon an Incorrect Assumption and Analysis Methodology - The NRC inspector determined, based upon Item D.9 of OPPD's response dated April 10, 1987, and ~upon the February 12, 1987, letter from NRC to OPPD summarizing both the July 20 1986, enforcement conference and the August 7, 1986, working meeting, that activities relating to this deficiency-were considered adequate.
The NRC inspector verified that the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) update was submitted on July 22, 1987, and that the change to the Technical Specifications (TS) for correction of the typographical error was approved. The NRC inspector was informed that the TS error was reinstituted because of a later change submitted that apparently relied upon old TS' data. This is an example of how design basis information of the most current nature is not being communicated between the vsrious: people and groups at OPPD.
This item remains open.
(Closed) Observation (285/85-2206.2.1):
Untimely Closeout of Emergency Modifications - The NRC inspector determined from a printout on Emergency Modification Status that the number of emergency modifications were significantly) reduced in 1986 and 1987 from previous years (especiallyThir 1984 and 1985.
to 1985 whereas six were issued between 1986 and 1087. After receiving an explanation of what "MF-COMP" in the status column of the Emergency Modification Status printout meant, the NRC inspector noted that the final design packages for the six emergency rr.odifications selected were issued.
This item is considered closed.
(0 pen) Deficiency (285/85-29 D2.3-5): Construction Package Drawing Changes Without an Approved Field Change - From informatios contained in Item G.2 l
of OPPD's April 10, 1987, response and the February 12, 1987, letter from NRC to OPPD regarding status of SS0MI items, the NRC inspector considered l
the licensee's activities to be satisfactory.
The NRC inspector verified l
that training was held on the draft copy of Standing Order (S0) G-30, Revision 19, "Field Changes to Modification Construction Drawings," which
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was issued April 4, 1987. This item remains open pending verification that all engineers and planners in OPPD involved with plant modifications have received this training.
(0 pen) Deficiency (285/85-22 03.1-2):
Design Temperatures for Safety-Related Piping - The NRC inspector reviewed OPPD actions relating to correction of design temperatures to be utilized during design
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reanalysis. OPPD contracted Applied Power Associates, Incorporated (APAI)
to analyze to.the CQE portions of ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 piping and to provide a reevaluation of operating and accident temperatures of piping systems (Report No. A0R-103.83.07).
r The nominal pipe size was 2 1/2 inches.and larger including 2-inch ASME Class 1 and 2 piping in the chemical and volume control system.
Several heat exchanger outlet operating and accident temperatures that were not given explicitly for the component cooling water (CCW) return were calculated from heat loads and flow rates given in Tables 9.7-2 and 9.7-3 of the USAR.
All accident and operating temperatures were found in the USAR except for accident temperatures relating to failure of spent fuel cooling system.
OPPD is presently reviewing the temperatures submitted in the APAI Report A0R-103.83.07 and checked the uncontrolled P&ID temperatures utilized against those in the referenced APAI report.
Existing pipe temperature analyses were judged to be conservative provided the delta temperature (delta-T) equals or exceeds the delta-T indicated by the APAI report. The differences identified were justified as being acceptable except for some in the raw water (RW) system which were nonconservative.
Stone and Webst-r Ingineering Corporation (SWEC) was contracted to analyze additional supports for the RW system. This item is open until the temperatures reflected in the Operations Support Analysis Report (0SAR) are included as part of the piping reanalysis.
(0 pen) Deficiency (285/85-22 D3.2-3):
MR-FC-84-162 Calculation - The NPC inspector verified that some of the corrective actions stated in the OPPD response were completed. The lesson plan relating to "Determining the Natural Frequency of Ductwork" along with the list of GSE attendees was confirmed. Also reviewed was Engineering Standard, CTS-3, Revision 0,
"Selecting, Specifying, Applying and Inspecting Paint and Coatings," dated August 1987. The standard was extensive and covered all activities relating to coating of interior surfaces of PWR containments which are made of the following materials:
carbon steel, stainless steel,
galvanized steel, aluminum, concrete, and masonry.
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The NRC inspector tried to verify completion of corrective actions related to the coating of the containment ventilation ductwork supports with galvanized paint, since OPPD chose to paint the supports instead using galvanized steel. The NRC inspector requested OPPD personnel to provide the work order that caused the containment ventilation ductwork supports to be coated and the respective purchase order (P0) and/or stores requisition for the galvanized paint. What OPPD provided the NRC inspector was steps in FC-84-162 which referred to a standard maintenance procedure for painting, MP-PAINT-1, and listed material used and the respective P0 numbers. MP-PAINT-1 stated for personnel to use the necessary painting materials and equipment implying documentation of
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materials used was with the modification packag,
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t The mod'ification package failed to' list the galvanized paint utilized; however, discussions with.an OPPD engineer indicated that the paint-was galvanized spray paint,used throughout the facility requisitioned from stores and should have been listed.
Criterion.V of~Appehdix' B to 10 CFR 50 states,-in part, that: activities
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affecting' quality shall be accomplished.in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings..
Paragraph 4.2.1 of Section 2.1 of the. licensee's Quality ' Assurance Manual states, in part, that "activities affecting' safety shall be...
accomplished in accordance with these instructions and procedures."
Fort Calhoun Station Standing Order G-21. "Station Modification Control,"
Step 1.4.19.5 requires, in part, "A list of materials required for-the modification...."
The licensee's failure to list in the design' package the galvanized spray
' paint used, during November 1985, on the containment ventilation duct supports is an apparent violation. (285/8802-01)
No other violations or deviations.were identified.
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Exit Interview The scope of the inspection and findings were discussed with those persons identified in paragraph 1.
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