IR 05000285/1988025
| ML20155D893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1988 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Morris K OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8810120016 | |
| Download: ML20155D893 (1) | |
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i OCT 41988
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In Reply Refer To:
Docket:
50-285/88-25 Omaha Public Power District ATTN:
Kenneth J. Morris, Division Manager Nuclear Operations 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102
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Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of August 25, 1988, in response to our questions raised during NRC Inspection Report No. 50-285/88-25.
We have reviewed your letter and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our inspection.
Sincerely
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Original sirne.t 3,
L J. Call e.i
L. J. Callan, Director Division of Reactor Projects cc:
Fort Calhoun Station l
ATTN:
W. G. Gates, Manager P.O. Box 399 l
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 l
Harry H. Voigt. Esq.
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LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
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1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington, D. C.
20036
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Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director bec to DMB (IE01)
R.D. Martin, RA RPB-0RSS SectionChief(DRP/B)
MIS System RIV File DRP RSTS Operator Project Ergineer, DRP/B
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Lisa Shea, RM/ALF P. Milano, NRR Project Manager
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DRS RRI W. McNeill I. Barnes (
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Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 2247 402/536 4000
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_LW U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station PI-137 Washington, DC 20555 References:
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Docket No. 50-285 2.
Letter from 0 PPD (R. L. Andrews)
. NRC (R. D. Martin) dated December 23, 1987 (LIC-87-691)
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
Update to Response to Notice of Violation concerning Safety System Outage Modification Inspection (SS0MI)
Please find attached an update to Reference 2.
This update is being submitted as a result of quest'ons raised during Inspection 50-285/88-25.
The original response to violation H.3 indicated that the dye penetrant test procedure and the inspection report form have been revised.
At the time of Reference 2, the form was part of the procedure and the acceptable temperature range was included in the procedure.
The form was changed to require that the actual surface temperature of the parts being tested be documented.
The response has been clarified and is attached.
The change is denoted by a vertical line in the right hand margin.
If you have any questions, please cortact us.
Sincerely, du h
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/ot,K.J. Morris
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Division Manager
Nuclear Operations
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KJM/me Attachment c:
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator P. D. Milano, NRC Project Manager P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident inspector n w4 g BM 5'I
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H.3 Dye penetrant inspections for MR 85-062 (replacement of CCW flow
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element) were found to have been acenmplished and accepted at surface temperatures below the minimum allowed by procedures.
The inspec-tions were redone and two of four welds examined were found to be unacceptable because of linear indications.
(IR 50-285/ 85-29, D2.6-1)
OPPD admits that the original dye penetrant (PT) examination of the welds associated with the replacement of FE-498 was performed at a pipe temperature below the minimum allowed in the procedure.
This violation occurred because the inspection report form in use at the time did not specify temperature limits or recording of the actual temperature and the inspector involved did not realize that the piping was below the minimum allowable temperature.
The PT procedure specifies a minimum temperature of the parts being examined of 60*F.
The actual temperature of the CCW supply header at the time the initial PT was performed between 47' to 51'F.
Despite the fact that the procedure is usable at temperatures below the speci-fled minimum, the welds in question were retested.
Two of the four welds had rejectable linear indications.
Before the welds were reexamined, OPPD's QC inspector informed the NRC inspector that reexamination of the welds would l
probably result in discontinuities.
The discontinuities were predicted on the basis that corrosion had formed on the weld material during the li months which had elapsed since the welds were made.
Experience has shown that cleaning would not be effective in removing the corrosion.
Minor dressing of the welds with a file was sufficient to clean the welds so that reexamination was accept-able. The two welds were again re-examined and this time, exhibited no rejectable indications.
The PT procedure has been revised to require recording of the actual surface temperature of the parts being tested on the Liquid Penetrant Inspection Report Form (FC-182).
Based on the corrective actions taken, OPPD is presently in full compliance.
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