IR 05000285/1988009

Insp Rept 50-285/88-09 on 880222-26.Potential Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Penetration Fire Barriers

ML20196H719
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	03/04/1988
From:	Mullikin R, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196H718	List: IR 05000285/1988009 ML20196H715
References
50-285-88-09, 50-285-88-9, NUDOCS 8803140039
Download: ML20196H719 (4)

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' APPENDIX A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/88-09 Operating License: DPR-40 Docket: 50-285 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (0 PPD)

1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)

Inspection At: FCS, Blair, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: February 22-26, 1988 Inspector: [< M R. P. Mullikin, Project Enfineer, Reactor

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-#-39 Date Project Section B Approved: 2" 7*#-PP T. F. Westerman, Chief, Projects Section B Date Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 22-26, 1988 (Report 50-285/88-09)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspec. tion of '9netration fire barrier Results: Within the area inspected, one potentral violation was identified (nonfunctional penetration fire barriers protecting safety related areas, paragraph 2),

i 8303140039 890308

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PDR ADOCK 05000285 '

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted OPPD L. Kusek, Supervisor, Operations (Acting Plant Manager)

T. Patterson, Supervisor, Technical B. Hansher, Licensing Engineer J. Lechner, Plant Engineer S. Crites, Engineer S. Gambhir, Section Manager, Generating Station Engineering A. Christensen, Health Physicist N, RC J. Hilhoan, Director, Division of Reactor Safety Those listed above attended the meeting on February 25, 198 The NRC inspector also contacted other plant personnel including operators, technicians, and administrative personne . Penetration Fire Barriers On February 23, 1988, the NRC inspector discovered air flow through two 4-inch electrical conduits in each of the two safety-related battery rooms. The conduits travel through the 3-hour rated fire wall separating each battery room from its respective switchgear area. The magnitude of the air flow was such that it was evident to the NRC inspector that no internal conduit seals existed. The conduits run through Wall Penetration Nos. 54-5-1 and 54-5-2 in Battery Room 1, and Nos. 55-5-3 and 55-5-4 in Battery Room 2. The conduits end in open air in the battery rooms and in a cabinet in the switchgear area The Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) separates the plant into separate fire area The FHA states that the battery rooms are separated from each other and othat areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> inclusive of all penetrations and opening The FCS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) states, in part, that the design basis of the fire protection systems includes commitment to APCSB Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, Appendix A, dated May 1, 197 Appendix A states, in part, that floors, walls and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum 3-hour rating. Penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide fire resistance rating at least equal to that barrier itsel ;

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i Technical Specifications (TS) 3.15 states, in part, that penetration fire i barriers shall be verified to be functional (intact) at.least once per l 1 18 months by a visual.. inspectio Since no internal conduits seals were ;

) visible to the NRC inspector in the four battery room conduits, the .

licensee's quality control (QC) organization was contacted to determine 1 how these seals are inspected. QC stated that these conduits seals are i

, not inspected because only the seals'inside of conduits'2 inches ~or larger ~

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which do not extend 5 feet into'the fire area on one side are inspecte ! In addition, FCS Maintenance Procedure MP-FP-2, "Fire Barrier Penetration ,

Seals," provide only for sealing the inside of the type. of conduits  ;

described by Q ,

i The NRC inspector informed the licensee that, according to their~  !

commitment to Appendix A, all penetration fire barriers should be seale !

Subsequently, the licensee instituted the TS-required fire watch in all !

safety-related areas since there was ne documentation to show how many conduits that breach fire areas are internally seale ;

a TS 2.19 states, in part, that all penetration fire barriers protecting ,

, safety-related areas shall'be functional (intact). Therefore, the fire ,

J barriers between Battery Room 1 (Fire Area 37) and the East Switchgear Area (Fire Area 36A), and Battery Room 2 (Fire Area 38), and the West ;

, Switchgear Area (Fire Area 36B) were nonfunctional. This is considered to !

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be an apparent violation of NRC requirements (285/8809-01). -In addition,

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j there is no assurance that other fire barriers throughout the plant are- :

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' Exit Meeting l

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The NRC inspector met with Mr. L. T. Kusek and other members'of the ,

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licensee staff on February 25, 1988. At this meeting, the NRC inspector j summarized tile scope of the inspection and findings, t i

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APPENDIX B PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE AGENDA OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT MARCH 15, 1988 Introduction and Purpose of Meeting L. J. Callan

Lack of Internal Conduit Fire Seals I Licensee Presentation OPPD Staff III. NRC Comments L. J. Callan I Enforcement Policy D. A. Powers Licensee Response OPPD Staff V Closing Comments L. J. Callan