IR 05000285/1988007
| ML20150E350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1988 |
| From: | Harrell P, Mullikin R, Reis T, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20150E345 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-88-07, 50-285-88-7, NUDOCS 8803310101 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20150E350 (17) | |
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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/88-07 License: DPR-40 Docket: 50-285 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station Inspection At: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: February 1-29, 1988 Inspector: ~
/[ [ / NU Dath /
E H. tiajreW,~ Senio'r Resident Reactor Inspe'ctor
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T. Reis, Residentr' Reactor Inspector 3-7-88 Date u EBJ R. Mullikin, Project Engineer 3 /n /u Date hh f Approved: l
T' /[bd luil rlesterman, Chief, Projects 2/25/ 2 Da'te
. Section B
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8803310101 880325 PDR ADOCK 05000285 O DCD
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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 1-29, 1988 (Report 50-285/88-07)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including followup on previously identified items, licensee event report fellowup, operational safety verification, plant tours, safety-related system walkdown, monthly maintenance
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observations, monthly surveillance observations, security observations, i radiological protection observations, and in-office review of periodic and special report Results: Within the 10 areas inspected, 2 violations (failure to meet the fire brigade manning requirements, paragraph 4; and failure to follow procedures, paragraph 8) were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted
- R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Production
- Gates, Plant Manager
- Bateman, Supervisor, Procurement Quality Assurance C. Brunnert, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance
- Core, Supervisor, Maintenance T. Dexter, Supervisor, Security
- J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affair J. Foley, Supervisor, I&C and Electrical Field Maintenance
- L. Gundrum, Plant Licensing Engineer
- B. Hansher, Plant Licensing Engineer
- H. Hendrickson, Manager, Civil Engineering, Generating Station Engineering
- R. Jaworski, Section Manager, Technical Services J. Kecy, Reactor Engineer L. Kusek, Supervisor, Operations
- J. Lechner, Acting Plant Engineer T. McIvor, Supervisor, Technical
- K Morris, Division Manager, Quality Assurance and Regulatory Affairs
- T. Patterson, Supervisor, Technical
- G. Roach, Supervisor, Chemical and Radiation Protection
- J. Spilker, Senior Nuclear Production Engineer
- S. Willrett, Supervisor, Administrative Services and Security
- Denotes attendance at the monthly exit intervie The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personnel, Followup on Previously Identified Items (0 pen) Unresolved Item 4.5-3 of NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-22:
Fuse block enclosure not addressed by the fire hazards analysi This item identified a wooden fuse block enclosure installed in each battery room that was not addressed by the fire hazards analysis. No determination could be made as to the significance of the enclosure on the overall combustible loading for each battery rocm as the enclosures had not been included in the fire hazards analysi The licensee painted the untreated wooden enclosures with a fire-retardant paint to minimize the affect of the combustible enclosure on the overall combustible loading in the battery room The NRC inspectors toured the battery rooms and verified the enclosures were painted. Based on this action, it appeared that the enclosures did not significantly increase the combustible loading for these room _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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In October 1987, the licensee issued an updated fire hazards analysis
, to reflect changes in the plant since the last fire hazards analysis
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was issue However, the updated analysis did not include the i enclosures as combustible materials in the battery room fire area This item remains open pending a revision to the fire hazards analysis to evaluate the significance of the enclosures as combustibles in the battery room fire areas, (Closed) Severity Level IV violation II.F.2.1 (Deficiency 5.2-1) of NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-22: Failure to check and verify a computer calculatio This item involved the failure of the licensee to verify a computer calculation generated by a contractor fcr the derating of electrical cables that were enclosed in a fire protection wrapping system. The cables were wrapped to meet the separation criteria specified in Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 5 The NRC inspectors reviewed Calculation MR-FC-85-25, "Cable Ampacity Derating." This calculation was prepared by the licensee to verify that the wrapped cables were capable of performing their intended safety function. The calculation indicated that the cables were satisfactory for continued plant operatio In discussions with licensee personnel, it was determined that the calculation provided by the contractor was intended for preliminary analysis only and was not intended to be a part of the design basis.
, The contractor's calculation was only to be used as an independent
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verification of the licensee's calculatio The NRC inspectors reviewed Calculation MR FC-85-25 and noted no problem Based on the review, it appeared that the licensee had adequately established that the cables would adequately perform their intended function.
! c. (Closed) Severity Level IV violation 285/8702-03: Failure to
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maintain the procedure for alignment of the breakers on the 480-volt
! motor control centers (MCC) in an up-to-date conditio This violation was related to the licensee's failure to maintain the procedure used for alignment of the breakers on the 480-volt MCCs in an up-to-date condition. In response to this violation, the licensee revised and reissued Checklist E of Procedure 01-EE-2, "480-Volt
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System (Normal Operation)," in May 1987 to correct the discrepancies I noted during the walkdown performed by the NRC inspectors in l January 1987.
l l During the July through August 1987 inspection period, the NRC l inspectors performed a walkdown of the 480-volt electrical system l using the revised chec 4 st. As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/87-20, this violation remained open pending the t
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i issuance of another revision to Checklist E. The revision issued in May 1987 still contained deficiencies identified in January 1987 that had not been correcte The licensee issued another revision to Procedure OI-EE-2 in November 198 This revision incorporated Checklists B, C, D, and E of Procedure 01-CE-2 Into a single comprehensive checklist, ,
designated as Checklist B. In December 1987, the NRC inspectors reviewed the revised Checklist B in conjunction with Figure 8.1-1 of <
the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and performed walkdowns of various MCC The NRC inspectors found that the revised checklist l still did not provide adequate instructions for all the electrical l The NRC inspectors noted that some
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breakers on the MCC safety-related loads were not included on the checklist and there was no overall defined scope as to what should be included on the checklist for normal operation of the 480-volt syste The licensee performed a walkdown to determine the loads served by each MC Based on this walkdown, Checklist B of Procedure OI-EE-2 was re-revised and issued on January 29, 1988. The NRC inspectors reviewed the revision to Procedure 01-EE-2 and noted the safety-related loads that were omitted during the December 1987 review were included. The NRC inspectors also verified, by a review of selected loads, that the licensee had also included other loads in Procedure OI-EE-2, as appropriat Based on the review of the revised procedure, it appears that the licensee has adequately ,
addressed the concerns noted by the NRC inspectors during the previous procedure reviews and system walkdown (Closed) Severity Level IV violation 285/8710-06: Failure to maintain containment integrit l l
This item involved the failure of the licensee to maintain containment integrity during refueling activities. Containment integrity was not reestablished after performing Procedure ST-DC-3,
"0C Transfer Switches," in that containment isolation valves were automatically opened during transfer of the dc power supply and were not subsequently manually reclosed by the control room operator To prevent recurrence of this problem, the licer,see issued a revision to Procedure ST-DC-3. Tne revision required that the test not be performed when containment integrity is require The NRC inspectors reviewed the procedure change made by the licensee to verify that the change adequately implemented appropriate i
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corrective actions. By establishing a requirement that Procedure ST-DC-3 can not be performed when containment isolation is required, it appears that the licensee had taken appropriate actions to prevent recurrence of this problem related to loss of containment integrit l
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6 (0 pen) Open Item 285/8733-06: Freezing point of the antifreeze solution in the cooling water system for the security and technical suppart center (TSC) diesels was unknow This item was identified during the performance of a review to verify cold weather preparations had been established. During the review, the NKC inspectors noted that the licensee had not determined the freezing point of antifreeze solution in the TSC and security diesel In response to this concern, the licensee issued Maintenance Orders (MO) 875927 and 875928 to check the freezing point in the security and TSC diesels, respectively. In addition, the licensee issued M0s 875835 and 875836 to check the freezing points in '
Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) 1 and 2, respectively. The results I of the determination of the freezing point indicated the following:
TSC diesel, -39 F; security diesel, -60 F; EDG 1 -28 F; and EDG 2,
-33*F. The licensee's engineering staff reviewed the data and i determined that the results obtained indicated the operability of the four diesels was satisfactor The licensee had established requirements for routinely sampling and testing the antifreeze solution in EDG 1 and 2; however, no requirements exist for routine testing of the antifreeze solution in the security and TSC diesels. This item remains open pending the establishment of a routine testing program for the security and TSC r diesel . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and '
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine ,
that reportebility requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplithed, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had '
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been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS).
The LERs listed below are closed:
87-001 Surveillance test performance error 87-018 Inadequate sizing of the air accumulators for Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386 !
A discussion of the review performed by the NRC inspectors for ea&. LER is ,
provided belo ( LER 87-001 reported an event where two raw water pumps were out of service at the same time due to the performance of a surveillance tes The surveillance test removed one raw water pump from service l when another pump was already out of service due to maintenanc ,
This event caused entry into a TS limiting condition for operatio I
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As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/87-15, the NRC :
- inspectors performed a review of this event to address the specific !
concerns related to this event. During tbc review, the NRC l inspectors noted that the licensee had not properly addressed the ,
generic aspects of this event. The generic aspects were related to the need to review other surveillance tests to verify thLt the tests were adequate to prevent a recurrence of the even The licensee revien d other surveillance procedures to cetermine
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whether or not changes should be mad Based on the review, the '
i licensee issued a revision to Procedures ST-ESF-6, "Diesel Start and Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump," ST-ESF-12, "SIRVT Temperature
Indication and Alarm," and 01-51-1, "Safety Injection-Normal '
Operation."
The NRC inspectors reviewed seleded surveillance procedures to
, determine if a change was required and reviewed the procedure ;
revisions issued by the licensee. Based on this review, it appeared that the licensee had taken appropriate actions to address the '
generic aspects of this event.
- LER 87-018 reported an event where it wu discovered, during followup of a violation issued in NRC Inspection v.eport 50-285/85-22, that
. Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386 did not meet the defined operating ,
criteri The operating criteria was not met in that a single air accumulator supplied both valves causing the valves to be susceptible
to a single failure, and the air accumulator may not have shut the ;
j valves within the 45-second time criteria specifited in the accident
. analysis. The licensee performed testing to determine the stroke i time of the valves. The test data indicated that the valve closing l time was at or near 45 seconds.
t The function of Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386 is to shut when the safety-injection system is automatically aligned to operate in the containment recirculation mod The valves shut to prevent the I radioactive water in containment from entering ti.e safety injection l and refueling water tank (SIRWT). If the valves failed to shut, the I water entering the SIRWT would be contained within the auyiliary
- building. The auxiliary building ventilation radiation detectors
! would alarm to alert the operator to the presence of airborne contamination in the auxiliary building. The auxiliary bui' ding can be secured to prevent the discharge of the contamination to the environment.
I To correct this apparent design deficiency, the licensee installed a
- separate air accumulator for each v 've. The additional air
- accumulator was installed for Valve h;V-386 in accurdance with Safety
! Related Design Change Order (SRDCO) 87-35, "Instellation Procedure J for ar, Air Accumulator for HCV-386." The e:cumulator size was i verified to be adequate by performance of Calcelation FC-00507 j "Accumulator Sizing and Seismic Support for Subsystem IA-4407 and
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IA-4408." The licensee tested the accumulator installation and verified that the closing times for both valves were approximately 35 second The NRC inspectors reviewed selected portions of SRDC0 87-35 and Calculation FC-00507. During review of this documentation, the NRC noted that the air accumulator had been seismically mounted, the tubing used to connect the valve and the accumulator was seismically supported, the size of the air accumulator was adequate, system components were purchased in accordance with the appropriate quality assurance requirements, and testing was performed to verify proper performance of the accumulator installatio The NRC inspectors also noted that the licensee's assumption for proper operation of Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386 within the stated accident analysis required operator action. Operator action is required to manually shut Valves HCV-385 and HCV-386 to ensure that the valves stay shut for 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> af ter initiation of the containment recirculation. The licensee was in the process of issuing a revision to Procedure E0P-20 "Functional Recovery Procedure" to provide instructions for operations personnel at the end of this inspection period. Because the licensee had not completed the revision to Procedure E0P-20, this item remains open pending approval and issuance of the procedure change. (285/8807-01)
To ensure that the air accumulators and associated valves continue to perform their intended function, the licensee issued a revision to Procedure ST-ISI-SI-1, "Safety Injection Valve Inservice Testing."
This procedure requires a regularly scheduled surveillance test be performed to verify the adequacy of the installation by confirming that valve stroke time is less than 35 seconds. The NRC inspectors
- reviewed Procedure ST-ISI-SI-1 and determined that the procedure was l adequate.
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! Based on the reviews performed by the NRC inspectors, as discussed l above, it appeared that the licensee had taken appropriate action to I correct the design deficiency for the air accumulators for l Valves HCV-385 and HCV-38 The licensee is continuing to review the adequacy of air accumulators for other safety-related valve The results of the reviews performed by the licensee will be evaluated during close out cf Deficiency 2.1-1 in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-2 ,
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No violations or deviations were identifie N
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4. Operational Safety Verification l
l The NRC inspectors conducted reviews and observations of selected l activities to verify that facility operations were performed in
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conformance with the requirements established under 10 CFR, administrative procedures, and the TS. The NRC inspectors made several. control room observations to verify the following:
Proper shift staffing Operator adherence to approved procedures and TS requirements Operability of reactor protective system and engineered safeguards equipment Logs, records, recorder traces, annunciators, panel indications, and switch positions complied with the appropriate requirements Proper return to service of components Maintenance orders (M0) initiated for equipment in need of
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maintenance
Appropriate conduct of control room and other licensed operators
- Management personnel toured the control room on a regular basis During a review of the level of the licensee's staffing to meet the requirements for manning the fire brigade, the NRC inspectors noted that the onsite staff was not adequate. TS 5.2.2.e states that a fire brigade consisting of five members shall be maintained on site at all time Amendment 40 to the TS issued the fire protection safety evaluation report as part of the licensee's operating license. Section 6.1 of Amendment 40 states, in part, that a 5-man brigade be available onsite during all shifts and independent of demands placed on operating personnel and the security force in a fire situation.
i The licensee's staffing included eight security guards and seven operators per shift that were qualified fire brigade members. The adequacy of staffing was reviewed by the NRC inspectors based on the assumption that a fire occurred in the control room. The duties of each onshift individual
, were: three operators to shut down the plant from remote locations, one j operator to man the emergency notification system telephone as the l
declaration of an alert is required when evacuating the control room, five j guards as an armed emergency response force, one guard to assist in plant l shutdown, and one guard stationed on a compensatory measures pos With these individuals assigned duties other than the fire brigade, the remaining individuals, three operators and one security guard, were available for fire brigade duties.
I By having only four individuals available for fire brigade duties, as discussed above, the licensee failed to meet the TS requirement for staffing of the fire brigad This is an apparent violation.
- (285/8807-02)
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10 l During review of this item, the NRC inspectors and licensee personnel determined that the establishment of a compensatory measures post for a security guard' caused the fire brigade to be one member short of its required complement.- When the compensatory post was established in approximately June 1987, licensee personnel did not realize ~that the action affected fire brigade staffing and did not add an additional fire brigade member to each shif When the NRC inspectors notified the licensee of this problem, the licensee took immediate actions to ensure that fire brigade was staffed to meet TS requirements. This was done by reassigning the duties required of the security guard in the event the control room is evacuated to another individual. This allowed the security guard to participate in fire brigade activities without having concurrent duties. The NRC inspectors reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and it appeared that the fire brigade was fully staffe . Plant Tours The NRC inspectors conducted plant tours at various times to assess plant and equipment conditions. The following items were observed during the tours:
General plant conditions', including operability of standby equipment, were satisfactor Equipment was being maintained in proper condition, without fluid leaks and excessive vibratio Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices were observed, including no fire hazards and the control of combustible materia Performance of work activities was in accordance with approved procedure Portable gas cylinders were properly stored to prevent possible missile hazard Tag out of equipment was performed properl Management personnel toured the operating spaces on a regular basi No violations or deviations were identified,
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! Safety-Related System Walkdown i
The NRC inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following
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safety-related system to verify system cperability. Operability was
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determined by verification of selected valve and switch position The system was walked down using the drawings and procedure note . .
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Auxiliary feedwater system (Procedure 01-FW-4, Checklist 'A, Revision 31, and Drawings _ 11405-M-254, Revision 63, and 11405-M-253, Revision 58)
During the walkdown, the NRC inspectors noted no discrepancies between the drawings, procedure, and plant as-built conditions for the selected areas checke No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observations The NRC inspectors reviewed and/or observed seier,ted station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components to verify the maintenance was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory requirements, and the TS. The following items were considered during the reviews and/or observations:
The TS limiting conditions for operation were met while systems or components were removed from servic Approvals were obtained prior to initiating the wor Activities were accompli;hed using approved M0s and were inspected, as applicabl Functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to servic Quality control records were maintaine Activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
l Parts and materials used were properly certified.
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- Radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.
l i The NRC inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following maintenance activities:
M0 880525, "Charging Pump CH-1A Breaker Not Working Properly." This
! M0 was initiated because CH-1A had been tripping off line for no l apparent reaso The problem was presumed to be associated with the breaker itsel On February 10, 1988, the NRC inspectors observed portions of the troubleshooting performed on the CH-1A breaker. The NRC inspectors noted that the work was being performed in an approved l
critical quality equipment storage area. The personnel performing the work were qualified electrical maintenance technicians and a maintenance engineer was present to assist in the troubleshootin The NRC inspectors reviewed the M0 and verified proper authorization
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had been obtained to perform the wor The NRC inspectors also verified that proper tags had been hung to identify that the equipment was out of servic Preventative Maintenance (PM) 880930, "Raw Water Pump Vibration Testing." On February 8, 1988, the NRC inspectors observed an electrician taking: vibration readings on raw water pump C. The inspectors noted that the technician was using an approved procedure and had a calibrated instrument to take reading M0 880340, "Repair Latches, Knobs, and Closures on Station Doors for the Month of February." The NRC inspectors witnessed maintenance personnel repairing a key card lock on the door that provided access from the northeast turbine building to the switchgear room. The NRC inspectors reviewed the M0 and noted it was properly filled out and authorized. The NRC inspectors also noted that a security guard was properly posted as a compensatory measure while the door was undergoing repai M0 880579, "Remove and Repair VA-12A Fan / Motor Assembly." The neutron detector well cooling fan, VA-12A, failed in early Februar The licensee decided to remove the fan from containment, and to repair and reinstall it to minimize the risk of exceeding the temperature limits specified in TS 2.13 for the concrete surrounding the neutron detector cooling wells. Prior to performing the task, the licensee surveyed the area for gamma and neutron dose rates to develop man-rem estimate The NRC inspectors reviewed the man-rem estimates with appropriate licensee personnel. Based on the review, it appeared the licensee employed appropriate measures to obtain reliable dose rate Reactor power was reduced to 35 percent to remove the uni The area was shielded with water bottles to reduce the neutron flux at the work site. The unit was removed, repaired per an approved procedure,
. reinstalled, and returned to service the following da MO 880467, "Leaking Air Regulator to HCV-2893." The NRC inspectors witnessed an instrumentation and control technician remove a leaking air regulator in the instrument air system for Valve HCV-2893, the raw water backup inlet isolation valve. The NRC inspectors noted that the technician had a properly authorized M0 and completed the work in accordance with the instruction provided by the M No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observations The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of and/or reviewed completed documentation for the TS-required surveillance testing on safety-related systems and components. The NRC inspectors verified the following items uuring the testing:
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Testing was performed by qualified personnel using approved procedure Test instrumentation was calibrate The TS limiting conditions for operation were me Removal and restoration of the affected system and/or component were accomplishe Test results conformed with TS and procedure requirement Test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the tes Deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The NRC inspecto ; observed and/or reviewed the documentation for the following surveillance test activities. The procedures used for the test activities are noted in parenthesi Monthly testing of the pressurizer pressure channel check (ST-ESF-1)
Quarterly inservice testing of the raw water system valves (ST-ISI-RW-1)
Biannual testing and loading of the emergency diesel generator (ST-ESF-6)
Monthly test of the station battery chargers (ST-DC-2)
Quarterly inservice testing of the main steam isolation valves to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (ST-ISI-MS-1)
Quarterly inservice testing of the chemical and volume control system valves (ST-ISI-CVCS-1)
During observation of the above surveillance tests, the NRC inspectors noted three examples where licensee personnel did not strictly adhere to approved station procedures. The examples are discussed belo The NRC inspectors observed a water plant operator timing the stroke cycle of raw water Valve HCV-2853 per ST-ISI-RW-1. Procedurally, the operator was required to use a stopwatch. Instead, the operator used his personal wristwatch which did not have a stop function. The NRC inspectors noted that, upon realizing the noncompliance, the operator stopped, obtained a stopwatch, and reperformed the test on Valve HCV-2853 as well as other valves he had timed prior to the arrival of the NRC inspectors.
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The NRC inspectors witnesse'd the performance of ST-ESF- During the portion of the procedure where the operator was required to unload the diesel generator, the operator temporarily set aside the procedure while concentrating on the control board. By doing this, he inadvertently skipped over Step 17 which performed a checkout of the fuel oil transfer pumps. The NRC inspectors alerted the operator of the omitted step and they were subsequently performed prior to shutting down the diesel. The NRC inspectors noted that performing these steps just prior to shutting down the diesel is allowed by procedure. However,- it is apparent from the scenario that the steps were simply overlooke , During observation of ST-DC-2, the NRC inspectors noted that an electrician performed a portion of Step 1.b.(5) prior to performing
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Step 1.b.(4). This action was not allowed by procedure. The NRC
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inspectors noted that the performance of these steps out-of-sequence posed no safety significanc Section 5.8.1 of the TS states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained that meet or exceed the minimum requirements of ANSI 18.7-197 ,
- Section 5.1.2 of ANSI 18.7-1972 states, in part, that procedures shall be followed and the requirements for use of procedures shall be prescribed in writing.
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, Section 2.4 of Procedure 50-G-7 states, in part, that it is the i responsibility of every individual performing activities to follow procedures exactly as written and strict adherence to all procedures is j absolutely required.
i Contrary to the above, as described in the three examples discussed above, individuals failed to follow surveillance test procedures exactly as'
written. This is an apparent violation. (285/8807-03)
The preceding three examples of procedural noncompliance did not affect the safe operation of the plant. However, they are illustrative of what was perceived as frequent inattention to detail and failure to follow procedure Four operations personnel were questioned and it was noted that they were unfamiliar with the stringent requirement of Section 2.4 of Procedure 50-G-7, which states that strict adherence to all procedures is absolutely require Upon notification of the three problems by the NRC inspectors, the licensee issued a memo, dated February 16, 1988, to all department heads to stress that verbatim compliance with all procedures is mandatory. Each department head then discussed the philosophy issued by the plant manager with the individuals assigned to their department '
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9. Security Observations The NRC inspectors verified the physical security plan was being implemented by selected observation of the following items:
The security organization was properly manne Personnel within the protected area (PA) displayed their identification badge Vehicles were properly authorized, searched, and escorted or controlled within the P Persons and packages were properly cleared and checked before entry into the PA was permitte The e'. '9ctiveness of the security program was maintained when securi .y equipment failure or impairment required compensatory measures to be employe The PA barrier was maintained and the isolation zone kept free of transient materia The vital area barriers were maintained and not compromised by breaches or weaknesse Illumination in the PA was adequate to observe the appropriate areas at nigh Security monitors at the secondary and central alarm stations were functioning properly for assessment of possible intrusion On February 27, 1988, the licensee identified an event where a loss of compensatory measures occurred due to a nuclear watch officer (NWO)
sleeping on watch. The NW0 was immediately relieved of his duties and replaced with another qualified individual. The licensee took action to prevent recurrence t'v reducing the frequency of watchstander radio checks from 30 to 15 minutcs. In addition, the licensee also established a program where the security officer-in-charge performs random tours of all compensatory posts. The licensee reported the event to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of the physical security plan. No prior violations had been identified by the NRC that were similar to this even The NRC inspectors reviewed the actions taken by the license Based on this review, it appeared that the licensee had taken actions to correct the event and had taken actions to prevent recurrenc No violations or deviations were identifie .
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1 Radiological Protection Observations
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The NRC inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were implemented in conformance with the facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirement The activities listed below were observed and/or reviewed:
Health physics (HP) supervisory personnel conducted plant tours to check on activities in prcgres Radiation work permits contained the appropriate information to ensure work was performed in a safe and controlled manne Personnel in radiation controlled areas (RCA) were wearing the required personnel monitoring equipment and protective clothin Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled based on the activity levels within the are Personnel properly frisked prior to exiting an RC No violations or deviations were identifie . In-office Review of Periodic and Special Reports In-office review of periodic and special reports was performed by the NRC resident inspectors and/or the NRC Fort Calhoun project engineer to verify the following, as appropriate:
Correspondence included the information required by appropriate NRC requirement Test results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and specification Determination that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of identified problem Determination as to whether any information contained in the correspondence should be classified as an abnormal occurrenc Correspondence did not contain incorrect, inadequate, or incomplete informatio The NRC inspectors reviewed the following:
Additional questions on OPPD response to Generic Letter 86-06, dated February 4, 1988 Monthly operations report for January 1988, undated
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17 January monthly operating report, dated February 12, 1988 Threshold levels for the Fort Calhoun internals vibration monitoring system dated February 25, 1988 During review of reports, NRC personnel identified a 10 CFR Part 21 report submitted by a utility that appeared to be applicable to the licensee's facilit The NRC resident inspectocs provided a copy of the report to the plant licensing engineer for review of applicability by the license The report (Reference 87-74) was issued by the Northern States Power Company and discussed problems with abrasive damage to the leads of Limitorque valve No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with you and other members of your staff at the end of this inspection. At this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.